

AZƏRBAYCAN
MİLLİ ELMLƏR AKADEMİYASININ TARİX İNSTİTUTU
VƏ REGIONLARIN İNKİŞAFI İCTİMAİ
BİRLİYİNİN BİRGƏ LAYİHƏSİ

AZƏRBAYCAN XALQININ
ÜMUMMİLLİ LİDERİ HEYDƏR ƏLİYEVİN
ƏZİZ XATİRƏSİNƏ

AZƏRBAYCAN
MİLLİ ELMLƏR AKADEMİYASI

TARİX İNSTITUTU

AZƏRBAYCAN
XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİ

Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri



BAKİ

may, 2008

Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin
İşlər İdarəsi
PREZİDENT KİTABXANASI

Azərbaycan
Milli Elmlər Akademiyası Tarix İnstitutu
Elmi Şurasının qərarı ilə
çap olunur

Elmi redaktoru
və **ön sözün müəllifi:**

Yaqub M. Mahmudov

Azərbaycan MEA-nın müxbir üzvü, əməkdar elm xadimi,
tarix elmləri doktoru, professor

Tərtib edəni:

N.Ə. Maksvell
tarix elmləri namizədi

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tarixinə dair Böyük Britaniyanın indiyədək işıq üzü görməmiş arxiv
sənədləri toplanmışdır. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri Azərbaycan Xalq
Cümhuriyyəti tarixinin indiyədək məlum olmayan
səhifələrinə işıq salır.
Toplu elmi işçilər, diplomatlar, aspirantlar, magistrələr, tələbələr, habelə
Azərbaycan tarixi ilə maraqlananlar
üçün nəzərdə tutulmuşdur.

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BÜTÜN HÜQUQLAR QORUNUR

AZƏRBAYCAN XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİNİN
90 İLLİK YUBİLEYİ HAQQINDA
AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLİKASI PREZİDENTİNİN
SƏRƏNCAMI

AZƏRBAYCAN XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİNİN
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SƏRƏNCAMI

2008-ci il may ayının 28-də Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin yaranmasının 90 illiyi tamam olur. Müasir Azərbaycan Respublikası 1991-ci ildə öz müstəqilliyini bərpa edərək, Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin siyasi varisi kimi onun bayrağını, gerbini, himnini qəbul etmişdir. İstiqlal Bəyannaməsinin elan edildiyi 1918-ci ilin 28 may günü hazırda Respublika günü kimi qeyd olunur.

Müsəlman Şərqiində ilk parlament respublikası - Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti xalqımızın qədim dövlətçilik ənənələrini yaşadaraq, müasir dövrə xas dövlət təsisatlarının yaradılmasına nail olmuşdu. Milli parlamentarizmin təşəkkül tarixi isə Azərbaycan parlamentinin 1918-ci il dekabr ayının 7-də keçirilmiş ilk iclasından başlayır.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin yaranması mürəkkəb siyasi dövrdə cərəyan edən hadisələrin və Azərbaycan xalqının milli oyanışının məntiqi yekunu idi. Abbasqulu ağa Bakıxanov, Mirzə Fətəli Axundov, Həsən bəy Zərdabi, Cəlil Məmmədquluzadə və digər görkəmli şəxsiyyətlər tərəfindən təməli qoyulmuş proseslər Azərbaycanda yeni tipli teatrın, məktəbin və mətbuatın yaranması ilə nəticələnmiş, milli özünüdərkini gerçəkləşməsinə böyük təsir göstərmişdir. Bakının neft paytaxtına çevrilməsi milli sahibkarlar təbəqəsinin formalaşması ilə yanaşı, dünyanın aparıcı universitetlərində təhsil almış ziyalılar nəslinin yetişməsinə şərait yaratmışdır. Əlimərdan bəy Topçubaşov və başqa ziyalıların siyasi proseslərə qatılması, Dumaya seçilməsi və Rusiya müsəlmanlarının təşkilatlanmasında oynadıqları rol tariximizin unudulmaz səhifələrindəndir.

Rusiyada çar üsul-idarəsinin ləğvi, baş verən fevral və oktyabr çevrilişləri, Birinci dünya müharibəsinin fəsadları və bir sıra digər amillər Qafqazı ayırı-ayrı siyasi qüvvələrin qarşıdurma meydanına çevirmişdi. Dünyanın aparıcı dövlətlərinin Bakı neftinə göstərdiyi maraq vəziyyəti daha da gərginləşdirirdi.

İlk qərarı ilə milliyyəti, dini, sosial vəziyyəti və cinsindən asılı olmayaraq, ölkəmizin bütün vətəndaşlarına bərabər hüquqlar verən Cümhuriyyətin yaranması çox mürəkkəb şəraitdə elan olunmuşdur. Cəmi 23 ay yaşamış Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti tarixinin hər bir səhifəsi bütün azərbaycanlılar üçün olduqca əzizdir. Bununla belə, bu tarixdə ürəyimizi qürur hissi ilə dolduran hadisələrlə yanaşı, ümummilli faciələrə yol açan səhifələr də vardır.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin öz dövlətçilik atributlarını qəbul etməsi, dövlət və hərbi quruculuq, iqtisadiyyat və mədəniyyət, təhsil və səhiyyə sahələrində atdığı addımlar xalqımız üçün tələyüklü əhəmiyyət kəsb etmişdir. Cümhuriyyətin böyük uğurlarından biri Paris sülh konfransında 1920-ci il

yanvarın 11-də Azərbaycanın müstəqil dövlət kimi tanınması olmuşdur. Lakin ölkənin öz neftini xarici bazarlara çıxarmaqdan təcrid edilməsi nəticəsində yaranmış siyasi, iqtisadi və sosial böhran güclənirdi. Həmçinin parlament daxilində hökm sürən hərə-mərclik, Qarabağda və Zəngəzurdakı erməni silahlı dəstələri ilə qarşıdurmalar gündən-günə dərinləşirdi. Əhalinin əsas hissəsinin ağır durumu isə bolşevik təbliğatı üçün münbit zəmin yaradırdı. İrəvanın ermənilərə paytaxt kimi verilməsindən sonra İrəvan mahalından qaçqın düşmüş 150 mindən artıq soydaşımızın vəziyyəti olduqca gərgin idi. Belə bir vəziyyətdə parlamentin son iclasında bolşevik ultimatumunun qəbul edilməsi aprel işğalı ilə nəticələndi.

Aprel işğalı Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin liderlərinin bir qismini Məmmədamin Rəsulzadə kimi mühacir həyatı yaşamağa məhkum etdi, digər qismini Fətəli xan Xoyski və Həsən bəy Ağayev kimi erməni terrorunun qurbanına çevirdi, qalanlarını da bolşevizmin amansız repressiyalarına məruz qoydu.

1920-ci il aprelin 28-də ikinci respublika – Azərbaycan Sovet Sosialist Respublikası yaradıldı. İki il ərzində öz müstəqilliyini qoruyub saxlamağa nail olan respublika 1922-ci ildə SSRİ-nin tərkibinə daxil olduqdan sonra öz müstəqilliyinin ancaq formal atributlarını saxlaya bilmişdi. Yalnız onu əvəz edən dördüncü respublika müstəqillik ideyasını yaşatmış və Azərbaycan bütün sərvətlərinin, o cümlədən neftinin tam sahibi kimi çıxış edə bilmişdir.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin tarixinə dair sanballı əsərlər, hətta ikicildlik ensiklopediya nəşr edilsə də, tariximizin bu mərhələsi ilə bağlı çox sayda sənədlər hələ xarici ölkələrin qapalı arxivlərində saxlanılır və öz tədqiqatçılarını gözləyir.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin ölkəmizdə milli dövlətçilik tarixində xüsusi yer tutduğunu nəzərə alaraq qərara alıram:

1. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin yaranmasının 90 illiyi respublikada geniş qeyd edilsin.
2. Azərbaycan Respublikasının Mədəniyyət və Turizm Nazirliyi Azərbaycan Respublikasının Təhsil Nazirliyi və Azərbaycan Milli Elmlər Akademiyası ilə birlikdə Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin 90 illik yubileyinə həsr olunmuş tədbirlər planı hazırlayıb həyata keçirsin.
3. Azərbaycan Respublikasının Milli Məclisinə Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti parlamentinin yaranmasının 90 illiyi münasibətilə xüsusi iclasın keçirilməsi tövsiyə olunsun.
4. Azərbaycan Respublikasının Nazirlər Kabineti bu Sərəncamdan irəli gələn məsələləri həll etsin.

İlham Əliyev
Azərbaycan Respublikasının Prezidenti

Bakı şəhəri, 15 fevral 2008-ci il.

AZƏRBAYCAN
XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİ

Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri

YAQUB MAHMUDOV

AMEA-NIN MÜXBİR ÜZVÜ,

ƏMƏKDAR ELM XADİMİ,

TARİX ELMLƏRİ DOKTORU, PROFESSOR

AZƏRBAYCAN

XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİNİN

TARİXİNƏ DAİR

QIYMƏTLİ SƏNƏD TOPLUSU

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Azərbaycan xalqının tarixində ən parlaq, ən şanlı səhifələrdən biridir.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin elan olunduğu gün – 1918-ci ilin 28 may günü Azərbaycan torpaqlarının Gülüstanda (1813) və Türkmənçayda (1828) Rusiya imperiyası ilə Qacarlar İrəvanı arasında bölüşdürülməsindən sonra ilk dəfə olaraq Azərbaycan xalqının qədim dövlətçilik ənənələrinin yenidən dirçəldildiyi gündür.

Öz dövrünün ən demokratik respublikalarından biri olan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin bizim ölkəmizdə elan olunması, eyni zamanda, bütün Şərqdə ilk dəfə olaraq demokratik, hüquqi və dünyəvi dövlətin məhz Azərbaycan xalqı tərəfindən yaradılması demək idi.

Şimali Azərbaycanda Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin varisi olan müstəqil Azərbaycan Respublikası yarandıqdan (18 oktyabr 1991-ci il) sonra Cümhuriyyət tarixinin öyrənilməsi üçün xeyli iş görülmüş, bir sıra ilk mənbələr, qiymətli tədqiqat əsərləri işıq üzünə çıxmış, ikicildlik «Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti Ensiklopediyası» nəşr olunmuşdur. Lakin bu şanlı tarixin hərtərəfli öyrənilməsi üçün irəlidə daha çox iş qalır. Hələ Rusiya, Fransa, İngiltərə, Almaniya, Türkiyə, İran, Polşa, Gürcüstan və başqa ölkələrin

YAQUB MAHMUDOV

AMEA-NIN MÜXBİR ÜZVÜ, ƏMƏKDAR ELM XADİMİ, TARİX ELMƏLƏRİ DOKTORU, PROFESSOR


arxivlərində yatıb qalan çox qiymətli sənədlər öz tədqiqatçılarını gözləyir.

Milli Elmlər Akademiyası Tarix İnstitutunun Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti tarixi şöbəsinin müdiri, tarix elmləri namizədi Nigar Maksvellin Böyük Britaniya arxivlərindən toplayıb gətirdiyi və tədqiqatçıların istifadəsinə təqdim olunan həmin sənəd toplusu tarixşünaslığımızda çox mühüm hadisədir.

«Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri» adlanan həmin topluya daxil edilmiş 251 sənəd Cümhuriyyət tariximizin indiyədək lazımınca araşdırılmamış bir çox məsələlərinin üzərinə işıq salır. Tədqiqatçıların, habelə geniş oxucu kütləsinin istifadəsinə verilən bu sənəd toplusunda Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti hökumətinin, demək olar ki, bütün fəaliyyət sahələrinə dair çox qiymətli sənədlər toplanmışdır.

Böyük Britaniya arxivlərindən əldə olunmuş yeni sənədlər çox aydın sübut edir ki, Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti öz dövrünün ən təkmil, ən demokratik dövlət qurumlarından biri idi. Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin qurucuları o dövrün bütün Avropa miqyasında ən qabaqcıl, mütərəqqi dünyagörüşünə malik olan dövlət xadimləri

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idilər. Bununla bağlı olaraq sənədlərdəki bəzi məlumatlara diqqəti çəkmək istərdim. Məsələn, Bakını işğal etmiş ingilis qoşunlarının komandanı general V.M.Tomson 1918-ci ilin noyabrında Londona göndərdiyi məlumatda Cümhuriyyət hökumətinin başçısı Fətəli xan Xoyski ilə görüşü barədə yazırdı: «... **O, ağıllı adamdır, hüquqşünasdır və öz bacarığı ilə Qafqazda bizə məlum olan bütün əvvəlki dövlət qurumlarından daha qabil olan dövlət qurumu yaratmışdır...**». Mənimlə görüş zamanı «O, ermənilərin xəyanətindən yana-yana danışdı...» (Bax: İranın şimalındakı ingilis qoşunlarının komandanı general-mayor V.M.Tomsonun mərkəzə məlumatı. Bakıdakı ilk günlərin təsviri. 17-24 noyabr 1918).

İngiltərə arxivlərinin sənədlərində Cümhuriyyət hökumətinin digər baş naziri Nəsim bəy Usubbəyov haqqında da çox maraqlı məlumatlar vardır. Bu sənədlərdən birində yazılır: «... Baş nazir Usubbəyov dəqiq, yaxşı təhsil görmüş, itiağıllı, liberal ideyalara malik olan, səmimi, vicdanlı, qarşısına qoyduğu məqsədə nail olmağa çalışan lütfkar bir insandır... Alyansın Azərbaycanın siyasi statusunu müəyyən etməkdə çox ləngiməsi baş nazirin fəaliyyətini çox çətinləşdirir. Baş nazirin ideyaları dini ideyalar deyil, milli ideyalardır. O, bolşevizmə nifrət edir... **Onun istədiyi bircə şey var – o da öz ölkəsinin müstəqilliyidir...** Baş nazir ölkədəki siyasi vəziyyətə nəzarət edir. Və britaniyalıları təbrik etmək olar ki, baş nazirin mövqeyi möhkəmdir. Onun komandası və kabineti **bəzi Avropa ölkələri üçün nümunə ola bilər ...** İstənilən başqa ölkədən fərqli olaraq bu ölkənin (Azərbaycanın – Y.M.) xalqı və hökuməti Böyük Britaniyaya çox yaxşı münasibət bəsləyir. Əgər onlara kömək etsək, onlar İngiltərə ilə sədəqətlə əməkdaşlıq edəcəklər. Onlar öz işlərini yaxşı idarə edirlər və bütün ləyaqətli adamlar kimi, **hər şeydən daha çox, yeni dünyada öz yerlərini tutmağa can atırlar...** Cənab Usubbəyovun səmimiyyəti və onun öz ölkəsinin siyasətinə nəzarət etmək bacarığı barədə mənə yüksək fikir oyandı. Bizim hər ikimizdə gələcək münasibətlərimizin inkişafına böyük ümid yarandı» (Bax: Böyük Britaniyanın Qafqazdakı Ali Komissarı O.Vordropun Azərbaycana səfər barədə mərkəzə göndərdiyi məlumat. Sentyabr-oktyabr 1919).

İngiltərənin Qafqaz siyasətinin icraçıları olan hərbi-siyasi xadimlər Cümhuriyyət hökuməti üzvlərinin, demək olar ki, əksəriyyəti ilə görüşmüşdülər. Bu baxımdan aşağıdakı məlumat da çox qiymətlidir:

«... Xarici işlər naziri Cəfərov və Daxili işlər naziri general Ağabəyov yaxşı təhsil görmüş bacarıqlı adamlardır... Keçmişdə Duma üzvü və fraksiya lideri olmuş Cəfərov Rusiya tarixində böyük rol oynamışdır. O, uğurlu və populyar natiqdır. General Ağabəyov rus ordusunda xidmət etmişdir və Türkünstanda böyük vəzifədə olmuşdur. Onların hər ikisi nisbətən cavan, enerjili, xarici görünüşcə xoşa gələn və incə rəftarlı adamlardır» (Bax: Böyük Britaniyanın Qafqazdakı Ali Komissarı O.Vordropun Azərbaycana səfər barədə mərkəzə göndərdiyi məlumat. Sentyabr-oktyabr 1919).

Azərbaycan xalqının 1918-1920-ci illərin son dərəcə ağır, mürəkkəb beynəlxalq və daxili şəraitində qazandığı böyük uğurları topluya daxil edilmiş sənədlərdən biri – Xarici İşlər naziri Fətəli xan Xoyskinin 23 fevral 1920-ci il tarixli memorandumu daha aydın təsdiq edir:

«... **Azərbaycan xalqı öz müstəqilliyini xaosa qarşı qətiyyətli mübarizə sayəsində qoruyub saxlamış, qısa müddət ərzində nümunəvi qayda-qanun yaratmış və möhkəm dövlət siyasəti formalaşdırmışdır. Bunu sivil ölkələrin Azərbaycana səfər etmiş bütün nümayəndələri yekdilliklə bəyənməmişlər**» (Bax: Xarici işlər naziri F.Xoyskinin memorandumu. 23 fevral 1920).

Haqqında bəhs etdiyimiz sənəd toplusunun tarix elmimiz üçün çox mühüm əhəmiyyəti bir də bundan ibarətdir ki, həmin topluya daxil edilmiş arxiv sənədləri ermənilərin iç üzünü açmaq, onların işğalçılarla sıx əlaqəsini və türk-müsəlman əhaliyə qarşı soyqırımları planlarını açıqlamaq üçün son dərəcə qiymətli məlumatlarla olduqca zəngindir.

Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri sübut edir ki, hələ 1917-ci ilin oktyabrında bir qrup varlı və nüfuzlu ermənilər Azərbaycanın Naxçıvan, İrəvan, Zəngəzur, Qarabağ və başqa bölgələrində türk-müsəlman əhaliyə qarşı dəhşətli soyqırımları həyata keçirən Andronikə maliyyə köməkliliyi göstərilməsi üçün Tehrandakı Böyük Britaniya elçisi Çarlz Merlingə müraciət etmişdilər. Lakin ermənilərin çoxsaylı xahiş və teleqramlarına baxmayaraq ingilis komandanlığı ermənilərə **1 mln.** rubl məbləğində maliyyə vəsaitini birbaşa deyil, ruslar vasitəsilə vermişdilər (Bax: Böyük Britaniyanın Tehrandakı keçmiş vitse-konsulu, sonralar isə Tiflisdə və Bakıda Britaniya missiyasının əməkdaşı R.Makdonelin general Denstervilin başçılığı ilə Britaniya qoşunlarının gəlişi ərəfəsində Azərbaycanın daxilində və xaricində baş verən hadisələr barədə Mərkəzə məlumatı. Sentyabr 1917 – avqust 1918).

İngilislərin ermənilərə maliyyə köməkliyi göstərməsi xəbəri xüsusilə Gəncədə və Bakıda türk-müsəlman əhalinin böyük narazılığına səbəb olmuşdu. Məsələn, ermənilərin ingilislərdən növbəti dəfə daha **2 mln.** rubl maliyyə yardımı almasından xəbər tutan Gəncə Milli Komitəsinin üzvləri ermənilərə göstərilən maliyyə vəsaitinin aparılmasının qarşısını almaq üçün şəhərdən Tiflisə tərəf keçən qatarları diqqətlə yoxlayırdılar. Bu yoxlamalara bəzən Fətəli xan Xoyskinin özü başçılıq edirdi. Yeri gəlmişkən, topluya daxil edilmiş sənədlərdən biri təsdiq edir ki, ingilislərdən «bu köməkləri alan erməni alayı çox keçmədən hücumla keçərək bir neçə kürd kəndinin əhalisini quduzcasına qırıb məhv etdilər». Buna cavab olaraq Tiflisdəki Britaniya missiyasının başçısı leytenant-polkovnik Payk bundan sonra erməni birləşmələrinə maliyyə yardımı göstərilməsini qadağan etdi (Bax: R.Makdonelin göstərilən məlumatı).

Topluya daxil olan sənədlər ermənilərin, vəziyyətdən asılı olaraq, öz ağalarını tez-tez dəyişməsi faktını da təsdiq edir. Məsələn, azərbaycanlılara qarşı 1918-ci ilin Mart soyqırımı zamanı Bakıda olan Britaniyanın Tehrandakı keçmiş vitse-konsulu, sonralar isə Tiflisdə və Bakıda Britaniya missiyasının əməkdaşı olmuş R.Makdonel ermənilərin öz çirkin məqsədlərinə yetmək üçün bu dəfə də bolşeviklərlə birləşməsinin şahidi olmuşdu. Onun təsdiq etdiyinə görə bu hadisə Qafqaz müsəlmanlarının ingilislərə qarşı nifrət alovunun üstünə «yağ tökmüşdü». Rus zabitləri bununla əlaqədar olaraq hətta ingilis zabitlərini ələ salaraq deyirdilər: «Britaniya hökuməti Bakını türklərdən təmizləmək üçün ermənilərə nə qədər pul verib»? Bütün bunların şahidi olan R.Makdonel Erməni Milli Şurasına etirazını bildirmiş və bəyan etmişdi ki, «ermənilər müsəlmanlara qarşı bolşeviklərlə birləşməklə öz tarixlərinin ən böyük səhvini yol verdilər. Bunun üçün bütün məsuliyyət «Daşnaksutyun» təşkilatının üzərinə düşür» (Bax: R.Makdonelin göstərilən məlumatı).

Britaniya arxiv sənədlərinin məlumatlarından aydın olur ki, çox keçmədən, ingilis hərbi komandirləri başa düşməyə başlamışdılar ki, ermənilərə maliyyə yardımı göstərilməsi Böyük Britaniyanın türk-müsəlman əhali ilə bağlı siyasətinə ağır zərbə vurur. Bu baxımdan topludakı bir sənəd xüsusilə qiymətlidir. Məsələn, Böyük Britaniyanın Hindistandakı hərbi qüvvələrinin baş komandanı 1918-ci il iyulun 20-də Londona məxfi surətdə bildirmişdi ki, «ermənilər bizim tatarlar (türklər – Y.M.) içərisindəki işimizə böyük

ziyan vurdular. Bu belə bir ağır fikir yaranmasına səbəb oldu ki, guya britaniyalılar düşünülmüş surətdə antimüsəlman siyasəti yeridirlər. Çünki ermənilər çoxlu sayda tatarı (türkü – Y.M.) qırdılar» (Bax: Böyük Britaniyanın Hindistandakı hərbi qüvvələrinin baş komandanının mərkəzə 20 iyul 1918-ci il tarixli məxfi məlumatı).

Ermənilərin türk-müsəlman əhaliyə qarşı törətdikləri soyqırımlarının miqyası getdikcə genişlənməkdə idi. Böyük Britaniyanın İrəndakı ali komissarı P.Koksun Tehrandan Londona göndərdiyi 22 dekabr 1918-ci il tarixli məxfi teleqramda göstərilirdi ki, «Təbrizdə fəaliyyət göstərən Qafqazın Müsəlman Respublikaları Şurası İspaniya konsulundan xahiş etmişdi ki, Böyük Britaniya və Amerika Birləşmiş Ştatları hökumətlərinə məlumat versin ki, ermənilər Qafqazın müsəlman əhalisini qırırlar» (Bax: Böyük Britaniyanın İrəndakı Ali Komissarı P.Koksun mərkəzə 22 dekabr 1918-ci il tarixli məxfi məlumatı).

Böyük Britaniya Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin 11 iyul 1918-ci il tarixli «Bakıda vəziyyət haqqında memorandum»unda bildirilirdi ki, «ermənilər tatarlara (türklərə – Y.M.) qarşı öz qüvvələrini nisbətən yaxşı silahlanmış bolşeviklərdən istifadə etmək üçün onların qüvvələri ilə birləşdirmişlər. Bakıda ağır döyüşlər baş verdi. Kononer qayıqlarının matrosları bolşeviklərə qoşuldular və Bakının tatar (türk – Y.M.) məhəllələrini top atəsinə tutdular. Bolşeviklər və ermənilər qalib gəldilər» (Bax: Böyük Britaniya Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin 11 iyul 1918-ci il tarixli «Bakıda vəziyyət haqqında memorandumu»).

Böyük Britaniya səfiri O.Vordrop 1919-cu ilin sentyabr-oktyabrında Azərbaycana səfəri barədə İngiltərəyə yazırdı ki, «Azərbaycanlılar bildirirlər ki, yerli ermənilər bolşeviklərin köməyi ilə xeyli miqdarda müsəlman əhalini qırmisslar. Şaumyan yalançı bolşevik imiş» (Bax: Böyük Britaniya səfiri O.Vordropun Azərbaycana səfər barədə mərkəzə məxfi məlumatı. *Sentyabr-oktyabr 1919*).

Səlanikdəki Böyük Britaniya qoşunlarının baş komandanı general C.F.Miln 1919-cu ilin 6 fevralında Londona – İmperiya Baş Qərargahının rəisinə yazırdı: «Bizim Bakını işğal etməyimizdən əvvəl Şuşanı iki türk alayı Andronikin ordusunun hücumlarından qoruyurdu. İndi isə ermənilər şəhərə doluşmuşlar və tatarları (türkləri – Y.M.) qırırlar. Hökumət qayda-qanunu qorumaq üçün mümkün olan hər şeyi edir. Oraya qayda-qanun yaratmaq üçün Britaniya əsgərlərindən ibarət bir batalyon göndərmək lazımdır... Bakı erməniləri xüsusilə xoşagəlməz vəziyyətlər yaradırlar. Onların yoxsul təbəqələri

bolşeviklərə və gizli «Daşnaksutyun» cəmiyyətinə qoşulmuşlar. Onlar Rusiyanın Azərbaycana olan iddialarını müdafiə edirlər. Onların tatarlardan (türklərdən – Y.M.) intiqam almaqdan başqa heç bir məqsədi yoxdur» (Bax: Səlanikdəki Böyük Britaniya qoşunlarının baş komandanı general C.F.Milnin imperiya Baş Qərargahına 6 fevral 1919-cu il tarixli məxfi məlumatı).

İş o yerə çatmışdı ki, İranın Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi də 1919-cu il oktyabrın 21-də ermənilərin müsəlmanları qırması barədə Böyük Britaniya Diplomatik missiyasına müraciət etmişdi. Müraciətdə deyilirdi: «Ermənilər bir qədər bundan əvvəl İrəvan, Naxçıvan, Qars və başqa yerlərdə müsəlmanlara qarşı, qəddarcasına qırğınlar və talanlar törətmişlər. Ermənilər bütün bu yerlərdə müsəlmanlara qarşı milliyyətindən asılı olmayaraq, hər cür zorakılıq aktları həyata keçirmişlər. Müsəlman ailələri pərən-pərən salınmış, günahsız kişilər və uşaqlara qarşı qırğınlar törədilmiş, qadınlar təhqir olunmuş, qırğına məruz qalanların əmlakı talan olunmuş, kəndlər yerlə yeksan edilmişdir...». İranın Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi Böyük Britaniya hökumətindən xahiş edirdi ki, «erməniləri cilovlamaq, onların bu cür bəd əməllər həyata keçirməsinin qarşısını almaq, dinc insanların həyatını qorumaq üçün təlimati göstərişlər versin. Böyük dövlətlərin nümayəndələri ermənilərin törətdikləri vəhşiliklərin şahidi olduqları üçün, yəqin ki, həmin dövlətlər bu vəhşiliklərin qarşısını almaq və cinayətkarların cəzalandırılması üçün lazımı tədbir görəcəklər» (Bax: İran Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinin ermənilərin müsəlmanları qırması barədə Böyük Britaniya Diplomatik Missiyasına 21 oktyabr 1919-cu il tarixli müraciəti).

Ermənilərin törətdikləri vəhşilikləri Böyük Britaniyanın Qafqazdakı Ali Komissarı O.Vordrop da təsdiq edirdi. Onun Londona göndərdiyi 2 oktyabr 1919-cu il tarixli raportunda deyilirdi:

«Lap bu yaxınlarda ermənilər Yeni Bayazıt, Aleksandropol və İrəvan bölgələrində 60 müsəlman kəndini yerlə yeksan etmişlər» (Bax: Böyük Britaniyanın Qafqazdakı Ali Komissarı O.Vordropun mərkəzə 2 oktyabr 1919-cu il tarixli məxfi məlumatı).

Azərbaycan xalqına qarşı törədilən soyqırımının əsas təşkilatçısı erməni-qriqorian kilsəsi idi. Böyük Britaniyanın Şimali İrandakı qoşunlarının baş komandanı general-mayor V.M.Tomsonun Bakıya gəldiyi ilk günlər barədə Mərkəzə verdiyi məlumatdan (17-24 noyabr 1918) aydın olur ki, erməni yepiskopu bir nəfər erməni lideri ilə onun qəbulunda olmuş və öz «məsləhətlərini» vermişdi. Erməni keşişinin

ingilis generalına verdiyi «məsləhət» belə idi: «Hər hansı bir xeyirli işi həyata keçirərkən ruslara və tatarlara (türklərə – Y.M.) qarşı qətiyyətli olmaq lazımdır... Təhsil görmüş ruslar ağıllarını itirmişlər və o qədər də böyük nüfuza malik deyillər. Lakin onlar ermənilərdənsə tatarlarla (türklərlə – Y.M.) daha asanlıqla təmasa girirlər. Hamı erməniləri müdafiə etdikləri bütün işlərə görə, istər bolşevizmlə bağlı olsun, istərsə də britaniyalılarla, xəyanətkar olduqları üçün rüsvay edirlər» (Bax: İranın Şimalındakı ingilis qoşunlarının komandanı general-mayor V.M.Tomsonun mərkəzə məlumatı. Bakıdakı ilk günlərin təsviri. 17-24 noyabr 1918).

... Yuxarıdakı qısa yazı ilə biz «Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti. Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri» toplusunda verilmiş yeni sənədlərin işığında Cümhuriyyət dönməsinin ancaq bəzi məsələlərinə nəzər saldıq. Göründüyü kimi, bu qiymətli sənəd toplusu tarixşünaslığımızda Cümhuriyyət tarixinin öyrənilməsi sahəsində yeni səhifələr açır. Bu səhifələrin açılmasına görə Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədlərini Azərbaycana gətirib nəşr olunmasında fədakarlıq göstərən tarix elmləri namizədi Nigar xanım Maksvellə, toplusunun işıq üzünə görməsi üçün böyük əmək sərf edən Əsədulla Mir-Həşimova, Elmar Məhərrəmov və Namiq Rüstəmovə dərin-dərin minnətdarlığımızı bildiririk.

AZƏRBAYCAN
XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİ

Böyük Britaniya arxivlərinin sənədləri

MÜNDƏRİCAT

Y.M.MAHMUDOV

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin tarixinə dair qiymətli sənəd toplusu

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N.Ə.MAKSVELL

Oxucuya

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NİGAR MAKSVELL

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ELMLƏRİ NAMİZƏDİ

OXUCUYA

2008-ci il mayın 28-də Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin yaradılmasının 90 illiyi tamam olur. Müsəlman Şərqində ilk dəfə məhz Azərbaycan xalqı demokratik respublika yaradaraq özünün siyasi suverenlik və iqtisadi müstəqillik əzmini bütün dünyaya nümayiş etdirmişdir.

Elə ilk günlərdən gənc respublika dünya dövlətləri birliyinə üzv olmaq arzusunu və iradəsini ortaya qoydu. İstiqlal bəyannaməsində gənc Azərbaycan dövlətinin «bütün millətlər və bilxassə həmcüvar olduğu millət və dövlətlərlə münasibəti-həsənə təsisinə əzm edəcəyi» ifadə olunurdu.

Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin xarici siyasətinin əsas məqsədini bütün dövlətlərlə mehriban və bərabərhüquqlu münasibətlərin yaradılması təşkil edirdi. Azərbaycanın müstəqilliyinin 1920-ci il yanvarın 11-də Antanta dövlətləri tərəfindən «defakto» tanınması bu siyasətin ən uğurlu nəticəsi sayıla bilər.

Lakin Azərbaycan xarici siyasət kursunun təşəkkül tapmasından, dövlət müstəqilliyinin dünya dövlətləri tərəfindən tanınmasına qədər çətin və mürəkkəb yol keçməli olmuşdur.

Mühüm coğrafi-siyasi əhəmiyyətə malik olan Azərbaycan müstəqil dövlət kimi mövcudluğunun ilk günlərindən iri dünya dövlətlərinin mübarizə meydanına çevrildi. Azərbaycanı öz nüfuz dairəsinə salmağa can atan ölkələr sırasında Böyük Britaniya xüsusilə seçilirdi.

Azərbaycan-Britaniya münasibətləri mürəkkəb tarixi inkişaf yolu keçmişdir. İlk dövrlərdə bu münasibətlərdə gərgin məqamlar mövcud olmuşdu. Lakin strateji istiqamətlərinin daxili və xarici siyasətin vəhdətinə əsaslandığı gənc dövlətin müdrik

və uzaqgörən siyasəti Azərbaycanın müstəqil dövlət kimi yaşamaq iqtidarını bütün dünyaya sübut etdi. AXC hökuməti qısa müddət ərzində Mudros sülhünün şərtlərinə görə ölkədə yerləşmiş ingilis hərbi komandanlığı tərəfindən Azərbaycanın dövlət müstəqilliyinin qeyri-şərtsiz tanınmasına nail oldu. Halbuki ilk vaxtlar ingilislər Azərbaycan adlı dövlətin varlığını belə qəbul etmək istəmirdilər. Əgər general Tomson 1918-ci ilin noyabrında «Azərbaycan Cümhuriyyətinin adı altında bizə yalnız xalq kütlələri içərisində heç bir dayağı olmayan, türk komandanlığının intriqası ilə yaradılmış bir hökumət vardır» kimi bəyanat vermişdisə, onun xələfi general Şatelvort 1919-cu ilin avqustunda Bakını tərk edən Britaniya qoşunları adından Azərbaycan, xüsusən Bakı şəhərinin əhalisindən üzr istəmiş və göstərmişdir ki, «qəlbən təəssüf edirik ki, biz çoxlu dostlarımız və tanışlarımızla vidalaşırıq, onlara ürəkdən sülh və səadət arzulayırıq».

Azərbaycan tarixçiləri Azərbaycan-Britaniya münasibətlərinin tarixinin öyrənilməsində müəyyən uğurlar əldə etsələr də, bu məsələnin bir çox aspektlərinə yenidən, obyektiv baxılmasına ehtiyac duyulur.

İndiyədək tədqiqatçılarımız bu problemi araşdırarkən əsasən Azərbaycanın milli arxivlərində saxlanılan sənədlərə müraciət etməli olurdular. Lakin bir çox dəyərli sənədlər hələ də tarixçilərin diqqətindən kənar qalmaqdadır. Bu sənədlərin üzə çıxarılaraq elmi dövriyyəyə buraxılması xalqımızın tarixinin qaranlıq səhifələrinin açılmasına imkan yaradacaqdır.

Hazırda bir çox Avropa dövlətlərində Azərbaycan tarixinə, o cümlədən Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin tarixinə aid çoxlu maraqlı sənədlər saxlanılmaqdadır. Təəssüf ki,

müxtəlif arxivlərdə mühafizə olunduqlarına görə, onların toplanması və sistemləşdirilməsində çətinliklər yaranır. Hazırda Azərbaycan tarixçiləri Türkiyə arxivləri materiallarından müəyyən qədər istifadə edə bilirlər. Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət Arxivində Fransa arxivlərindən gətirilmiş sənədlər toplanılmışdır. Lakin bu sənədlər ayrıca toplu şəkildə nəşr edilmədiyindən, tədqiqatları üçün əlçatmaz olaraq qalır.

Oxucuların diqqətinə çatdırılan bu toplu Azərbaycan tarixinə aid Britaniya arxivlərində saxlanılan sənədlərin nəşri sahəsində atılan ilk addımıdır.

Topludakı materiallar müasir tədqiqatçılara Azərbaycan-Britaniya münasibətlərinin bir sıra mühüm məqamlarını yenidən nəzərdən keçirməyə, 1917-1920-ci illərdə Böyük Britaniyanın Cənubi Qafqazda həyata keçirdiyi xarici siyasətini səciyyələndirən ideya prinsiplərinə, məqsəd və mahiyyətinə daha geniş şəkildə diqqət yetirməyə imkan yaradacaqdır.

Topluda işıq üzü görmüş sənədlər əsasən Forin Ofis siyahılarından tərtib edilmişdir. Bəzi sənədlər isə digər təşkilatların, məsələn Hərbi Departamentinin, Nazirlər Kabinetinin və Maliyyə Nazirliyinin sənədləridir.

Sənədlər 1917-ci ildən başlayaraq, xronoloji ardıcılıqla yerləşdirilmişdir. 1917-ci ilə aid məlumatlar, məsələn Cənubi Qafqaz hökuməti haqqında, Cənubi Qafqazın gələcək quruluşu ilə bağlı ingilis hökumətinin planları haqqında materiallar əsasən Ümumqafqaz xarakteri daşıyır (məsələn: regionda mümkün siyasət haqqında memorandum). Topluda eyni zamanda Qafqazda baş verən hadisələrlə bağlı sənədlərlə yanaşı, Azərbaycanın daxili vəziyyətinə aid, o cümlədən general Denstervilin başçılığı ilə ingilis

qoşunlarının burada olması ilə bağlı sənədlər də daxil edilmişdir.

Lakin məlum səbəblərdən topluya daxil edilmiş əsas sənədlər 1918-1920-ci illərə aiddir (Britaniya qoşunları məhz bu dövrdə Azərbaycanda idilər – N.M.). Lakin burada 1920-ci ilə aid sənədlərə də rast gəlmək olar. Əsasən siyasi xarakter daşıyan bu sənədlər memorandumlardan, mühüm dövlət xadimlərinin hökumətə hesabatlarından ibarətdir.

Bütövlükdə topludakı sənədlər Cənubi Qafqazda, o cümlədən Azərbaycanda cərəyan edən hadisələrdə bilavasitə iştirak etmiş Britaniya hərbi, siyasi, diplomatik dairələrinin baxışlarını, mövqelərini müəyyənləşdirməyə imkan verir.

Sənədləri əsasən aşağıdakı fondlara ayırmaq olar:

Rusiyaya aid fond 1917-ci il

[FO 371]

Qafqaza aid fond 1918-1919-1920-ci illər

[FO 371]

Türkiyəyə aid fond 1918, 1919-cu illər

[FO 371]

Məxfi sənədlər (Rusiya 1918-1920-ci illər)

[FO 418]

Məxfi sənədlər (İran 1918-1920-ci illər)

[FO 416]

Məxfi sənədlər (Türkiyə 1918-1920-ci illər)

[FO 406]

Hərbi əməliyyatlara rəhbərlik: Cən. Rusiya

[WO 406]

Densterforsun sənədləri

[WO 95]

Maliyyə Nazirliyinin sənədləri

(Densterforsun hesabatları)

[T 2255]

Nazirlər Kabinetinin sənədləri (Qafqaz

1918-1919-cu illər)

[CAB 45]

Bu fondlardan götürülmüş sənədləri aşağı-

- dakı şəkildə təsnifləşdirmək olar:
- a) Azərbaycanın və Cənubi Qafqaz regionunun ümumi icmalı;
 - b) Cənubi Qafqaz Respublikasının təşkili, Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyətinin yaradılması;
 - c) Naxçıvan məsələsi və AXC-nin beynəlxalq aləmdə tanınması;
 - ç) Azərbaycan ordusu;
 - d) Azərbaycan iqtisadiyyatı;
 - e) Azərbaycanın Denkinin Könüllülər ordusu ilə münasibətləri və Gürcüstanla bağladığı müqavilə;
 - ə) Azərbaycanın Ermənistanla münasibətləri;
 - f) Azərbaycanın İran hökuməti ilə münasibətləri və federasiya məsələsi;
 - g) bolşevizmin güclənməsi, AXC-nin süqutu və Millətlər Cəmiyyət

AZƏRBAYCAN XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİ

Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri

AZƏRBAYCAN, GÜRCÜSTAN VƏ ERMƏNİSTANDAKI VƏZİYYƏT HAQQINDA
1917-Cİ İLDƏN SONRA

fo 371/11793

Sketch of affairs in Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia since 1917.

Following the appointment of D. Kerevsky to the position of Prime Minister of Russia on July 19, 1917, Armenians and Tatar members of the Duma left Petrograd, hastened back to Transcaucasia, decided upon a policy of independence for Transcaucasia as a whole and started negotiations to this end.

1. Meanwhile arrangements were made for electing and convoking a Diet of the Georgian, Armenian and Tatar peoples. This Diet assembled at Tiflis at the end of August 1917. On September 16, 1917, D. Kerevsky became Dictator of Russia and five days later Russia was declared a republic. Transcaucasian leaders now considered that the moment for definite action on their part had arrived; and so avoiding the question of complete independence for the time being, the Diet as the "Council of the Transcaucasian Peoples", declared Transcaucasia to be a Federal Republic on September 21, though technically, the republic continued as an integral part of Russia.

2. The three constituent parts of the Federal Republic (Georgians, Armenians and Tatars having conflicting ideals and aims and belonging to different religions, were unable to agree upon a common policy, and the republic was thus foredoomed to failure.

4. On November 8 1917, the Bolshevik revolution in Petrograd occurred which placed Lenin and Trotsky in Power.

Hostilities/

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Hostilities between Russia and ^{the} Central Powers were suspended on December 2, the Armistice of Brest-Litovsk was signed on December 15, and peace negotiations were commenced. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Bolshevik Russia on the one hand and the Central Powers and Turkey on the other, was signed on March 3 1918; and under it Russia was obliged to cede to Turkey the three Transcaucasian districts of Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, the two former in the area claimed by Armenia, the latter in the area claimed by Georgia. This menace to the territorial integrity of the Transcaucasian Republic intensified the conflicts of interests between the Georgian, Armenian and Tatar peoples, the two first standing to lose much under the treaty while the Tatars of Azerbaijan were in favour of it.

5. The position was further complicated by Turkish military operations which were carried on for the purpose of occupying the districts awarded to Turkey under the treaty.

6. Amid these distractions the Republic declared its independence on April 22, 1918, hoping thereby that the country might be placed outside the operation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Negotiations with the Turks proved unwilling and at last, on May 26, the Transcaucasian Federal Republic dissolved.

7. At the same time Georgia declared her independence and formed a national government, the Tatar National Council proclaimed the establishment of a Republic of Azerbaijan, while the Armenian National Council assumed charge of Armenian affairs. Henceforward each state followed the policy it considered most advantageous in its own interests.

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Georgia, indeed, had already decided that from Germany alone could she hope to obtain without delay the protection she desired.

8. Germany had long been attracted by the Baku oilfields and the possibilities of the Transcaucasian route from Batoum to Baku in facilitating movements against Great Britain. It was however, not until after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that the question of controlling these oilfields and of securing possession of the Transcaucasian route entered the sphere of practical politics. German troops were in the Ukraine when the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia was nearing its end and the individual states were casting about for external support. Germany thereupon occupied Odessa and Sebastopol and seized a portion of the Russian Black Sea fleet. This step, with the establishment of a military dictatorship in the Ukraine, placed her in a position to reach Transcaucasia with troops without having to use the route through Constantinople.

9. The effect was soon evident in the conclusion of a treaty of peace between Germany and the Georgian Government on June 8 1918, by which Germany recognised the Republic of Georgia undertook to assist the Republic financially and to establish at once a friendly occupation of the country by German troops. Germany further undertook to secure peace between Georgia and Turkey - now in possession of the port and district of Batoum under the treaty of Brest-Litovsk - and to take the requisite measures to prevent Turkish infringement of the rights and neutrality of Georgia. In return, Georgia was to grant Germany priority in mineral concessions. On the same day (June 8) that this treaty was signed the Georgian Government and the Armenian National Council each concluded a treaty of peace

with/

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with Turkey.

10. By the Tareo Armenian treaty of June 8, 1918, Turkey recognised the independence of the Armenian Republic, which in return was to accept a Turkish occupation of the country, and in consequence of the route from Batoum to Baku being closed by Germany, to give Turkish troops free passage across her territory thus affording Turkey access to Azerbaijan, which she already regarded as a Turkish preserve.

11. It is now necessary to come to the Armistice of Mudros between the Allied powers and Turkey, which brought about a British occupation of Transcaucasia. The armistice with Turkey of October 31, 1918, provided for the evacuation of transcaucasian territory by Turkish troops. The armistice of November 11, between the allies and Germany required a similar evacuation by German troops. Acting on behalf of the Allies a British occupation of Transcaucasia was begun in order to secure the execution of the terms of both armistices.

12. Accordingly on November 17, 1918, a British force from North Persia, accompanied by a force of Russian Social Revolutionary troops, arrived by sea and occupied Baku. On December 27 another British force detached from the army at Salonica, occupied Batoum, and eventually occupied Georgia with headquarters at Tiflis. The Republic of Azerbaijan was occupied by a third force which arrived from Mesopotamia via Baku.

13. Following the arrival of the British troops and the departure of the Germans and Turks, a reorganisation of Transcaucasia was begun. In Georgia little was necessary, the German occupation having left the country untouched

27/

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by war and the administration being in the hands of experienced Georgians. In Armenia, owing to the desperate conditions which prevailed, British assistance was confined principally to relief work and to the settlement of disputes between Armenia and her neighbours. In Azerbaijan where, after the departure of the Turks, the Government had collapsed, leaving the country in chaos, it became necessary for the British to re-establish an administration in almost every department of the country life. The Russian and Azerbaijan State banks were amalgamated and worked by a British staff and the issue of notes regulated, food control was established, and the population placed on rations under the card system in use in England, with the result that supplies of food became abundant. A British Labour Control Office was set up to investigate and settle industrial disputes. Industry and shipping which had been nationalised by former Socialist governments were released and placed in private hands. Trade between Baku and Persia was encouraged, the Baku-Batoum pipe-line restored, and oil pumped between those towns; and, in accordance with the terms of the armistice the whole system of transport and communications was taken over by the British. Continual quarrels regarding rolling-stock and engines had occurred between the republics and it was found advisable therefore to set up a British railway board at Tiflis, and place all the Transcaucasian railways under their exclusive control.

14. In the province of Batoum, which the Turks had occupied under the treaty of Brest-Litovsk only two evacuated under the armistice of Mudros - the British adopted/

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adopted similar administrative measures to those taken at Baku, but a commission of Russian and native inhabitants was appointed to assist in governing. Indeed, during the period of the British occupation, British political efforts in Transcaucasia were confined to essentials. It was sought to reconstruct and reorganize as far as possible; to give the republics the opportunity of working out their own destiny; above all to keep the peace between the republics, and between them and the forces of General Denikin, the Russian Reactionary leader. The British authorities therefore did (although, as events proved, unsuccessfully) what they could to foster Transcaucasian federal unity as a policy for the republics to follow.

15. British interests were, however, not sufficiently great to warrant more than a brief continuance of this thankless responsibility; and early in 1919 His Majesty's Government had decided that on financial and other grounds the occupation could not be maintained much longer. At the beginning of April the Supreme Council of the Allies in Paris agreed that British troops should be withdrawn, and their place taken by Italian troops, the mandate for Transcaucasia having been offered to, and accepted in principle by, the Italian government. Later the Italians refused the position of mandatory. The United States government in turn seemed disinclined to accept the position which the Italians had rejected, even though the mandate might include the whole of Turkey as well. No power being willing to undertake the task and the British evacuation having been decided upon, the three republics of Transcaucasia offered to bear the cost of the British garrison were allowed to remain, but His Majesty's Government found themselves unable to accept this offer.

16. Meanwhile a movement, which attained its chief importance/

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importance under General Denikin and promised great possibilities for the Allies had developed in Cis-Caucasia, north of the Caucasus Mountains. Indeed it fundamentally affected Allied policy in Transcaucasia and the policy of each of the Transcaucasian states. This movement, which to the Allies appeared to contain the hope of Bolshevism being overthrown by Russian efforts also kept before their vision the prospect of the emergence of a reconstituted Russia whose interests it would be highly impolitic for the Allies to injure in advance; a Russia, too, whose immediate aim, as the Transcaucasian states well knew would be to destroy the independence of those provinces which had detached themselves from her. Allied policy was therefore to support the anti-Bolshevik movement in Cis-Caucasia in every way short of armed resistance and at the same time to go cautiously in the matter of recognising the independence of the Transcaucasian states. These states, however, were divided on the matter of their future position in regard to Russia. Armenia desired autonomy under Russia; Azerbaijan on the whole, looked towards Turkish protection but was opposed to any form of Russian domination; Georgia desired complete independence and was hostile to anything favouring a Russian recovery.

17. Though disinclined to give formal recognition to the Transcaucasian states until the Russian situation had become clear, Great Britain at least, recognised that these states were entitled subject to the decisions of the Peace Conference to

make/

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make their own choice. Great Britain therefore sought, during her occupation, to maintain peace in Transcaucasia, to give the states assistance and an opportunity of working out their own destiny a policy which appeared contradictory to and failed to satisfy both the anti-Bolshevik Russians and the Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians.

18. About the middle of August 1919 General Denikin's cause, which had been growing, was further increased in power by the handing over to him of the British Caspian fleet. This step was taken in consequence of the decision of His Majesty's Government to withdraw all British forces from the Caucasus, and because of the manifest inability of the Republic of Azerbaijan to man a fleet capable of resisting Bolshevik aggression on the Caspian Sea.

19. Owing to causes into which it is not now necessary to enquire General Denikin's movement at one time seemed to be on the point of complete success, entirely collapsed, and danger to the various Transcaucasian states from this quarter was removed.

20. On August 28, 1919, the British troops were withdrawn from Transcaucasia, but a small garrison was left at Batoum in order to prevent an immediate dispute between General Denikin, the Georgians and the Turks for possession of the port. Certain other foreign troops were to assist in the occupation but never arrived.

21. Recognising that there were forces at work that might at any time cause the downfall of the Transcaucasian republics, His Majesty's Government despatched to Tiflis a diplomatic mission under Mr. (now Sir) Harbord, which arrived in August, 1919. Mr. Harbord was instructed/

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instructed to safeguard British interests, to give such moral support and advice to the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as might be possible without involving His Majesty's Government in any kind of continuous obligation. He was to use all his influence to prevent hostilities between General Denikin and the republics, or between the republics themselves.

22. Following the failure of General Denikin's movement at the end of 1919 (to which reference has already been made) Bolshevik Russia entered into close relations with Nationalist Turkey; and as an offset to this the Allied Powers, in January 1920, granted *de facto* recognition to the governments of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, withdrew British support from the Russian Revolutionary movement, and, in February 1920, announced that Constantinople, together with a small piece of territory in Europe, would remain in Turkey's possession. These three events had a great and immediate effect upon Russian policy in Caucasus which thereupon set itself to prevent the creation of a Mohammedan buffer state in the Middle East, which should be hostile to Bolshevism.

23. In pursuance of this policy a prepared revolution occurred at Baku on April 27, 1920 and a Soviet Republic and Administration were proclaimed. The Bolsheviks then encouraged the Tatars of Azerbaijan to continue the struggle against the Armenians in the disputed area of Zangazur, without with no intention of allowing the latter to gain possession of the territory. Denikin's general in hostilities with the Tatars discovered that these would serve their interests rather than his; and on May 7, 1920 a treaty was signed between/

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between Azerbaijan and Georgia, providing for the transit of supplies, administration, for the transportation of troops and the transportation of goods. This treaty was followed on June 6 by another between Georgia and Bolshevik Russia, in which assurances of good faith were exchanged. Treaties between Bolshevik Russia and Armenia and Azerbaijan were also drafted; but the Armenians refused to sign owing to conditions requiring the transportation of Soviet troops upon the Armenian railways, and the handing over of the disputed areas of Lenjanur and Karabagh to Armenian control as a temporary measure.

24. Meanwhile the Soviet Government of Azerbaijan had risen against Bolshevik rule. In June arising on a considerable scale occurred in the district of Elizavetopol, but was put down with great ruthlessness by the Bolsheviks assisted by the Armenians of the district. The result was still further to alienate the Moslems from Bolsheviks.

25. In drafting the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the Supreme Council, recognizing the great international importance of Batoum, had proposed to make the port and province a free state under the protection of the League of Nations. The scheme which was opposed by Georgians, Russians, and British alike fell through as likely to be unworkable in practice. On July 7, 1918, therefore, the British garrison was withdrawn and the town and province were handed over to Georgia under conditions between the Allied Powers and the Georgian Government. Unimpeded transport rights by rail and facilities in the port of Batoum were provided under the agreement for Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Georgia further undertook to grant Armenia a concession for a railway through the valley of the Chorukh between Batoum and Armenian territory.

26. By the end of July 1918 the Polish campaign had turned definitively in favour of the Bolsheviks; the relief of this anxiety presented

ultimatum

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ultimatum to Armenia demanding the immediate acceptance of the draft treaty of June. To this ultimatum Armenia made no reply; and so the Soviet army advanced and compelled the signature. On August 8, a large consignment of arms and munitions for Armenia reached Batoum and were forwarded through Georgia to their destination.

27. De jure recognition by His Majesty's Government of the independence of Armenia was accorded by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Sévres on August 10, 1918, and by the treaty between the principal Allied Powers on the one hand and Armenia on the other, which was signed at the same time. These treaties did not become operative and the boundaries of Armenia were never formally laid down. On November 30, 1918, an Armenian Soviet Government was proclaimed at Delizhan. In the following month the Armenian Soviet Government signed the Russo-Armenian Treaty recognizing Armenian independence. A portion of the Armenian Army remained loyal to the Dashnak (Anti-Bolshevik) Government and retreated under its leadership to the mountainous district of Lenjanur. These troops subsequently attacked, driven and re-established a Dashnak Government for a few weeks. Reinforcements of Red troops were however brought up, included the Dashnak force and replaced the Soviet Government in power. The army then again retired to Lenjanur, here an independent state was maintained until the summer of 1921, when it was finally unopposed by Bolshevik forces from Azerbaijan and Russia.

28. The Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic forms part of the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, which federation was established by an agreement signed on March 12, 1922, by the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

28./

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28. The Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic in its turn, is included in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The British representative was withdrawn after the successful Soviet revolution referred to above (see para. 27), the Armenian Soviet Government not having been accorded recognition by His Majesty's Government.

29. The Armenian Republic has since been recognized by His Majesty's Government except as part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, de jure recognition of which was granted on February 2, 1924.

31. As already stated (para. 22 above) His Majesty's Government granted de facto recognition of the Azerbaijan Republic in January 1920. In the following April the Bolshevik party overthrew the existing administration and broke off all relations with the Entente and other enemies of Soviet Russia. On September 30, 1922 in a treaty of alliance signed at Moscow, the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized by Russia.

32. The Georgian Government received de jure recognition by the Allies on January 17, 1921. In February a revolution broke out which resulted in the introduction of the Soviet form of government.

33. The remarks in preceding para. (28-30) respecting Armenia apply equally in regard to Azerbaijan and Georgia.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

December 23 1917.

John W. Field
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SER P. KOKSUN TELEQRAMININ SURƏTİ
23 DEKABR 1917

SECRET

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COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM Sir P. Cox

DATED 23rd December 1917.

RECEIVED AT INDIA OFFICE 11 p.m.

243133

(R). 6259. In reply to request for appreciation of situation Neel wires as follows.

RECIPIENT. Position is that H.M. Government have decided to support in every way project of Caucasian Federation in extenso; things however seem to be hanging fire as political and financial side of question is being dealt with through Teheran and General Shore prefers to take his instructions direct from Ser Office.

Both Teheran and Tiflis agree that apart from purely military side of question, Shore is in need of strong staff which should have two sides.

(a) Financial.

(b) Political and propagandist.

It will require very determined effort on our part to (two corrupt groups) Caucasian Federation as Germans are already in field and have in existence a formidable organization.

The first and most pressing problem is to form some central authority which Georgian, Tartars, Armenians, Mountaineer tribes, will recognize. This can probably best be effected by presence of small British unit of about 1000 men to supply a rallying point for genuine friendly elements in country. Shore strongly advocates this policy.

Other problems which will demand immediate attention are

(1) Fighting German propaganda.

(2) Organization and distribution of food supplies.

(3) Establishment of line of communication

with outside world. Failing trans-Siberian railway we shall have to organize communication across Persia.

(4)

SER P. KOKSUN TELEQRAMININ SURƏTİ
23 DEKABR 1917

(4) Supply of certain articles of prime necessity to
Caucasus such as medicines and cotton goods.

(b) Disposal of Baku oil.

At present Tartars realize disadvantage of Turkish rule
and it should therefore be our policy to foster and take
advantage of this (corrupt group). At the same time we might
aim at bringing them into touch with loyal Mohammedan elements
in Mesopotamia and India with a view to forming a solid block
of Mohammedan opinion and opposed to pro-German party in Turkey
and Persia. Realisation of this policy would greatly facilitate
reconciliation of Tartar and Armenian interest which is one
of most difficult problems we have to face.

If we succeed in conciliating Mohammedan opinion in Caucasus
it is probable Tartar and Turk elements in Azerbeijan province
will wish to join Caucasian Federation and throw off their
allegiance to Persia. This would provide strong weapon in
dealing with Persia question. *Ende.*

I beg if there be no objection I may be informed as to
nature of Caucasian Federation and of measures contemplated
by H.L. Government. It seems to me that any organization to
work northern Persia cannot succeed or maintain itself under
present conditions unless based on this force and equipped
financed and worked from here.

Addressed to Foreign., repeated to S. of S. for I.

SER C. BUKANANIN DEPEŞASI
30 NOYABR 1917

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MURATA.

229180

MILITARY. DEC 2 1917

Decypher from Sir G. Buchanan (Petrograd) November 30th.

D. 9.20 p. m. November 30th. 1917.

R. 3.15 p. m. December 1st.

No. 1916.

----- (FO) -----

Following from Consul at Tiflis.

At plenary meeting of all (? national) parties
and factions convened here yesterday it was almost
unanimously resolved: In view of state of civil
war, Anarchy and absence of proper services and
authority in Russia to form a provisional democratic
Government in trans-Caucasia:

A representative from each Executive and other
Committees to enter Government pending results of
polling by equal separate and (? direct) vote at
elections for constituent Assembly are published
(sic) when members elected to Assembly are to take
over Government of trans-Caucasia until constituent
Assembly is convened and a responsible democratic
republican Government is established in Russia.

The meeting also decided in favour of autonomy
for trans-Caucasia and confederate union with Russia.

The Bolsheviki had no success.

KONSUL STİVENSİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
4 DEKABR 1917

Enclosure in Consul Stevens' despatch No.35
of December 4th. 1917.

Translation.

Declaration by the Commissioners of the Trans-
Caucasus.

To the people of the Trans-Caucasus.

For over a century the peoples of the Trans-Caucasus worked in close union with Russia binding their fate with her, and now for the first time during the present historical period they have been abandoned to their own resources and are compelled to have recourse to their own expedients to ward off the approaching economic and universal calamity.

On the questions as to whether the Caucasian Revolutionary Democracy will know how to stand in defence of all attempts to subdue the revolution and will be able to guarantee to the country the most necessary fundamental revolutionary precepts and bring influence to bear on Central Russia as regards the liquidation of civil-war in the ranks of the Democracy and the creation of a homogeneous revolutionary, universally recognised authoritative Russian Republic will depend the fate of the peoples of the Trans-Caucasus and their normal development.

In order to direct the life of the country into this course, and as a result of an agreement arrived at between all the Socialistic parties and democratic revolutionary organisations, the authority of the country has been established. This Power is constructed provisionally and only until the convocation of the All Russia Constituent Assembly. If, however, according to circumstances of Russian actualities the timely summoning of the latter should be rendered impossible, the authority retains its powers until a conference of the members elected to the Constituent Assembly from the Trans-Caucasus and Caucasus Front is convoked.

KONSUL STİVENSİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
4 DEKABR 1917

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Therefore, bearing the character of a provisional authority, it sets itself to principally solve questions having regard to the urgent needs of the population.

To definitely improve the disorganised finances, to save the Army and population from the impending famine by securing supplies for them; to improve means of transport and ways and communications, to regularly and healthily demobilise on conclusion of peace; to protect public order; to control over production and distribution; by all means to protect the interests of labour and those of the working classes; to immediately introduce a democratic Zemstvo; to reorganise the tribunals and organs of administration; to immediately organise democratic Land Committees in places in which they do not exist so that they should take over the management of Appanage, State and Church lands and also lands belonging to privately owned large proprietors, the promulgation of the confiscation of which will follow in the immediate future, together with a declaration regulating all land questions and to prepare them for the Constituent Assembly land legislative body; the immediate abolishment of all class privileges and institutions created for the purpose of protecting the interests of privileged classes; to establish good neighbourly relations with contiguous peoples on the basis of their recognition of revolutionary principles.

Adhering to the point of view of complete self-determination of nationalities proclaimed by the Russian Revolution, the Commissioners of the Trans-Caucasus will take steps to come to a rapid and equitable solution of the national question in the Trans-Caucasus.

Recognising the maintenance of unity of the general Russian Front, the Trans-Caucasian Government Commissioners will take most energetic steps towards the immediate conclusion of peace, being guided in this direction by the general conditions obtaining on the Western Front, by the

KONSUL STİVENSİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
4 DEKABR 1917

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conditions of local life and in agreement with the wishes of the peoples inhabiting the Caucasus.

The solution of all the enumerated questions is to form the basis and subject-matter of the future activity of the newly formed authority in the country.

All dispositions and orders of the Trans-Caucasian Commissioners are to be carried out on the spot without falter.

All counter action to this authority will be considered as a distinct attempt on the life interests of the peoples of the Trans-Caucasus and an endeavour to draw them into the sphere of the darkest civil and international war will be nipped in the bud by all the forces of the parties and organisations which have established the authority.

In taking over this heavy burden, the Trans-Caucasian Commissioners call upon all those to whom the interests of the revolution and freedom are dear, to close their ranks around the authority of the country and to march shoulder to shoulder with them on their road to constructive revolutionary work.

Peoples of the Trans-Caucasus! Our fate is in your hands. Let us show ourselves worthy of the majestic mission.

Let us stand at the height of these historical problems and show the whole world a living example of loyalty to the covenants of the Great Revolution and their incarnation into life.

Here follow signatures of twelve Commissioners.

.....

GENERAL ŞOURUN DEPEŞASI
24 DEKABR 1917

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From General Shore.

To D.F.I.

Despatched 6.30 p.m. 24-12-17.

Received 11.45 a.m. 26-12-17.

Obj. Your 48476.

Reply in 3 sections. (Wgins).

Section A. I regret situation has not hitherto been sufficiently clearly represented. It certainly is complicated. To begin with there are not many governments so far, but one government only. A locally elected Commissary (sic) of 12 Commissioners considers itself the de facto Government of the South Caucasus (for details see my telegram 106 Dec. 1st). Armenians, Georgians and Tartars comprise 3 main groups of population and are all represented on this "Commissary." Each nationality, also has its political subdivisions of Bolsheviks Socialists Federalists etc. General political tendency is nominally non-separatist from Russia, yet each group nevertheless yearns after national autonomy. Present government is supposed in 8 days time to give way to body of 26 (?) delegates to National Assembly elected within the South Caucasus, who will (?) designate SOG to control affairs (if they can until convocation of general Russian National Assembly. Therefore for the present there is but one president, Dagestani.

B. (Wgins). Chief Military Power is still ostensibly in hands of G.O.C. Chief Caucasus front, though actually he is entirely dominated by Commissary for War and Arms. Military staff working "Arsenal" although troops do not obey their orders unless they like them; no troops exist on whom absolute reliance can be placed. Bolsheviks is to be found among nationals as well as Russian troops.

German propaganda among Russians is very active. Tendency to begin construction in formation of national troops. For military purpose Armenians and Georgians Military committee

GENERAL ŞOURUN DEPEŞASI
24 DEKABR 1917

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(2)

can introduce (2) (3) (4) to our territorial association, but introduce politics and family quarrel into military questions and generally dispute authority of Russian General Staff.

There exists however only one Commander-in-Chief Prjevalski. (Ends)

4. (Begins) The sums mentioned when reduced to sterling at about 60 are not so terrible, but financial provisions in present state of excitement of Caucasus, and under Russian banking laws, is certainly a difficulty. So far loudest appeals for help have come from Averianov as "General Intendant, and Gegerdori as President. I have been working on principle indicated in my telegram 106 of Dec. 19th trying to force Armenians and Georgian Military Committees to work with Russian Staff on pain of withholding financial support. They all distrust Russia, but we have not the officers to reconstruct entire fabric of Russian Staff machinery. Averianov estimates that only 5% of present Russian corps will "volunteer" to stay on front. Some corps are being "nationalized;" others are being replaced by national formations (Armenian corps in principle only) but in meanwhile Russians have begun the steam roller step --denanding back pay, daily subsistence allowance and sweeping railroads. Authorities are terrified, turning everywhere for money; he hopes they will, if paid, go quietly. (Ends)

5. (Begins) Averianov says they cannot possibly be free these months before armistice ends---which is now January 15th in (roughly) British with Russian general armistice. I really doubt whether the situation can be saved now without those foreign troops the necessity for which I have indicated so often. Entire civil military, Caucasus are waiting for the news with the clue, only there is no clue. At present south-eastern front appear busy with our affairs. I have presented to Chief of the Staff Protocol of terms on which British or Allied Governments might finance C.O.C. Caucasus front, which, if he agrees to, I will send you. Am endeavouring to get a definite financial proposal showing what or

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should be asked to pay for, but in view of present state of disorganization and terrorism, I doubt if the Russian of lower rank what they have got or how long they may have it. All calculations as to cost of flood (1 group uncalculable) tide etc. (2) return of Bolshevik soldiers; or by general collapse of railways, looting and destruction of stores etc. For completion and progress of south-east union, please see my telegram 106 Dec. 19th. (Ends)

6. (Begins) It does not yet appear clear to you that local government have not joined the south-east union and Minister General appears to be under some misapprehension. For this reason in my telegram 106 Dec. 19th, I suggested making entry into union a condition of subsidizing south-eastern civil government. I am awaiting news from Tseretia who I hope has now reached Jarkhanov by now (via my telegram 107 Dec. 19th). Financial arrangements proposed by them have only concerned south-eastern government and the question has not been raised by President Jarkhanov as to financial support of south-east union. (Ends)

2 copies to

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SER C. BUKANANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
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RUSSIA

MILITARY

DEC 1917

Decypher. Sir G. Buchanan. (Petrograd). Dec. 1st. 1917.

D. 4.40.p.m. December 1st. 1917.

R. 11.0.p.m. December 3rd. 1917.

No. 1922. (R).

Following from Vice Consul at Baku:

"There is no money in town and Bank would have very soon to be closed. If you can obtain Russian Government's permission for Russo-Asiatic Bank in London to place to the credit of Imperial Bank of Persia, London, £100,000, we could purchase roubles in Persia and bring over here increasing demands for roubles there to regulate exchange and alleviate situation here. Imperial Bank of Persia are averse to purchase on their account. Present value of £1 sterling in Persia from 50 to 55 roubles".

I can do nothing here at present.

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B A K U

South Russia.

December 6th. 1918.

The following is a report on certain events, in which I took part, between September 1917 and August 1918. During the whole of this period I kept a complete record in cypher which was destroyed by Lieut. Crutchley on Aug. 1st 1918 when the occupation of Baku by the Turks seemed only a matter of hours. All dates are therefore only approximate as I have no other record than my memory to rely on.

About October 1917 a deputation, consisting mainly of wealthy and influential Armenians from Tiflis, visited Sir Charles Marling, then British Minister at Teheran. The object of the deputation was to get into touch with the British Foreign Office and find out what were the aims of the British Government in the Caucasus, and whether the Armenian people could rely on our support and if so to what extent. At that time the Russian Army was deserting from the Caucasus front and the Armenians maintained that their own people would remain at their posts and, with the new forces that they hoped to form would be able to guard the frontier and avoid a Turkish invasion.

The deputation, according to their own statements, was informed that the British Government intended to support in every way possible i.e. morally, financially, and with material all elements who were willing to continue fighting the common enemy and work for the good of the common cause. Further that every moral support and sympathy would be given to the aims and aspirations of the Armenian people.

I was instructed by the Foreign Office, through Sir Charles Marling, to hand over the British Vice Consulate and to report Chief of the British Mission in TIFLIS, then Brig. General Offley Shore. In October I joined the mission and was nominated Financial Adviser at Tiflis. I never really took up my post, as the Financial Board was never formed, and during my stay in Tiflis my work mainly consisted of that of a Political officer.

On my arrival at Tiflis most of the Russian Army had already left the front and was devastating the surrounding country on their way back into Russia. General Lebidinsky was still the Commander in Chief of the Russian Army on the Caucasian Front and General Avorianov Officer Commanding the troops in the conquered territories, in other words the Armenian Army in Armenia. The Armenian troops still remained on the front, and it was hoped that we should be able to form a volunteer army of sufficient strength to hold the frontier and keep the conquered territory. The actual figures suggested were 2 Armenia Divisions, 1 Assyrian Division, 1 Division of Russian Volunteer and perhaps a mixed division of Greeks and other nationalities. It was evident from the first that nothing could be hoped for from the Georgian Army whose Infantry were mostly Bolshevik while the cavalry declared its intention of only guarding its own territory.

It was decided to form a Financial Board, and all sums sanctioned by this board were to be paid to the various formations and institutions through the existing Russian Staff, and no payment whatever was to be made direct to any National Unit. (Vide replies to telegrams received from the F.O. asking the Mission to give direct support to the Armenian Forces under General Andronik).

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This arrangement was purposely made, and at my instigation, in order to avoid any possibility of it being said that the British Govt. was exclusively supporting any one National Unit. However circumstances, enemy propoganda and the exaggerated statements of the Armenians themselves proved too strong, and very shortly we obtained the reputation of exclusively supporting Armenians. The fact that the Armenians Divisions were at that time holding their positions at the front made it imperative that these people should receive their pay and supplies. Therefore as it happened the first payment of one million roubles, which was made through the Russian Staff, was handed by them to General Avorianov and went to support the Armenian Divisions. A subsequent Rs.200,000 was given to the Russian Volunteers and four millions was lent to the Tiflis Govt. to enable it to carry on. This was the total amount disbursed up to the time of my leaving the mission.

About this time Consul Stevens, on instructions from the F.O. handed the Armenian Committee a document stating that the British Govt. intended to support the Armenians by all means possible. This together with the fact that, owing to circumstances, the Armenians were actually the only armed formation which had received any money from us, made it almost impossible to counteract the impression that we were out to help the Armenians exclusively, or to stop the chattering tongues of the Armenians themselves, while a subtle propoganda was carried on by enemy agents among the Mussulman population of the Caucasus, especially at Elizavetpol and in Baku.

About this time the Mussulman tribes along the Tiflis Baku Railway began holding up and disarming the Russian troop transports returning from the front. The reason given for this was that the Mussulman Monarchists did not want the Bolshevik soldiers to return to Russia with their arms, but the whole affair was undoubtedly engineered by Turkish and German agents with a view to arming the Mussulman population of the Caucasus, and at first it met with most extraordinary success. During this time I journeyed twice to Baku to fetch money; we were often under rifle and machine gun fire for many miles, and the journey, which is normally one of twelve hours usually took from five to six days.

On one occasion Captain Noel travelled up with me and we carried two millions of roubles, we had a special carriage allotted to the mission and placarded. Our first incident was being chased by a train of Bolshevik soldiers who declared their intention of uncoupling our carriage and leaving us to our fate in the steppes. We were then held up by the Mussulman Committee at Elizavetpol for three days. A certain Colonel Effenfief and Khan Moiskie (a cousin of the present President of Azerbaijan) wished to arrest us, they stated we were carrying money for the Armenians, and had all the figures and dates of money already given, also knowledge of Mr Stevens letter given to the Armenian Committee. We asked them to search our carriage in which we had a guard of six French soldiers. Those were early days and we rightly concluded that nobody would care to take the responsibility as a matter of fact they would have found the two millions in my dirty clothes bag. I only heard yesterday that it was really owing to the strong representations made by Mirah Khan the then Persian Consul General at Elizavetpol, that we were eventually allowed to proceed.

During the latter part of 1917 General Offley Shore left Tiflis and Lieut-Colonel Pike was left in charge of the British Mission.

Shortly after the above mentioned payment was made to the Armenian Formations certain Armenian Regiments ran amok in the conquered territory and cutting up several Kurdish villages massacred the inhabitants. When the incident was reported to Colonel Pike he requested the Russian Staff to refuse all further payments to these Armenian Formations.

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During my stay in Tiflis the Armenians, and a great many of the ordinary public, were certainly convinced that the British Mission was formed for the express purpose of aiding the Armenians, they talked and boasted a great deal and greatly added to the bitter feelings against us which was being promulgated among the Mussulman, and made it practically impossible to approach him. Captain Noel while in Tiflis worked hard among the leaders of the Mussulman party, and eventually did succeed in persuading Khan Tolushkanov to accept our assistance. Khan Tolushkanov on returning to Baku was deprived of his command and rank for having "sold himself to the British". The Head of the Mussulman Party in Baku has since told me that at that time they were actually under agreement with Turkey. Any overtures at that time would have been too late.

Bitterness against the British continued to increase, and in the early part of 1918 orders were issued by the Mussulman Committee of what is now termed Azerbaijan to arrest all Britishers travelling on the railways. Ten Englishmen, employees of the Caucasus Copper mines at Batoum, travelling from Batoum to Baku en route for England were arrested under this order and were only liberated at the end of last month.

In January 1918 I volunteered to go to Grosney on a special mission to endeavour to free certain Allied subjects who had been thrown into prison by the Bolsheviks. I therefore left Tiflis in January in a special wagon taking with me Capt. Noel, who was going to take up his post as Political Officer at Baku, Lieut. Crutchley who was to have acted as Liaison Officer to the Baku Aviation School, and General Pavletsov, the Russian General who made the famous attempt against the Bolsheviks under the Kerensky Government. There was a price of Rs.50,000 on his head dead or alive and the Bolsheviks condemned to death anybody who assisted or harboured him. The American Consul in Tiflis aided him with a false passport and we carried him and his wife down to Baku in our carriage from whence he hoped to get away to Persia. On his arrival at Baku I took him up to my flat where he remained for a week, and by giving a personal declaration that he was only an inoffensive American Missionary obtained him his visa of exit from the Bolshevik Committee in Baku.

We travelled from Tiflis with nine Bolshevik Troop Trains. Our journey took six days and seven nights and was full of excitement. We fought our way from Shamshore to Liaki, the Mussulman Tribesmen were dug in all along the railway and fortified behind buildings with machine guns. Each point had to be taken by storm, the Bolshevik soldiers leaving their trains destroying and mutilating everybody they found. Buildings and stations were burnt with incendiary bombs, each troop train carried machine guns, and the armoured train was used as far as Evlach. We eventually reached Baku with very few casualties on our train. The troop trains suffered very heavily and their casualties were considerably increased by a train smash in which our train participated. One of the humours of the situation was that the Bolshevik soldiers were actually fighting a way out of the country for General Pavletsov.

I remained a week in Baku to enable me to obtain the necessary passes and papers from the Bolshevik and Mussulman organisations in order that I might travel to Grosney in comparative safety, the Bolshevik troops trains had also stopped off in Baku to bury their dead so I had to continue my journey with them as far as Petrovsk, the journey took me five days, about 300 miles.

The position at Grosney was most interesting and one saw advanced Bolshevism in its early stages. The town was constantly shelled by the Chechens, was surrounded by wire charged with a high electric current, everybody was mobilised, including the British Colony, and either made to man or dig the trenches. Nobody was allowed out of the town without a special pass. The arrested Allied subjects had bought themselves out of prison, I was unable to help relationships

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or got the male members of the Colony away. I left after a weeks stay taking some of the British women and children with me. The rest refused to leave their husbands for whom it was impossible to obtain a permit of exit.

On my return journey the Mussulman Committee at Derbent made a protest at my proceeding and tried to arrest me, however a paper from one of their committees prevented them carrying out their plan.

I returned to Baku in March and found it impossible to rejoin the Mission in Tiflis as all communications had been cut.

On my return to Baku one of the Mussulman Committeemen asked me to call on him and informed me that Captain Noel had been taken prisoner by Kutchik Khan in Enzeli. Further he informed me that General Pavletsov had been arrested in Persia and had disclosed his identity, that documents had been found on him and letter written by myself, that the Mussulman Committee knew I had a hand in getting him out. If therefore I attempted to take over Captain Noel's post or in anyway occupy myself with local politics they would inform the Bolsheviks of the part I played in Pavletsov's escape, that if I attempted to leave the town I would be arrested.

Four days later trouble started between the Bolsheviks and the Mussulman over the disarmament of a Mussulman ship and culminated in the March massacres. The Armenians joined hands with the Bolsheviks and the Mussulman was practically turned out of Baku, not a single Mussulman of any importance remaining.

As may be imagined this added fresh fuel to the hostile feeling felt against us by the Mussulman of the Caucasus. Even Russian officers asked me, half in jest, how much the British Government paid to carry out such a successful campaign and rid Baku of the Turco-phil elements.

At the time I protested before the Armenian National Council, and still maintain that they made one of the biggest mistakes in their history when they supported the Bolsheviks against the Mussulman. The whole of the blame for this policy must be laid at the door of the Armenian Political Society known as the Dashnachtsoun and not the Baku Armenian National Council who did their best to keep the peace. Without Armenian support the Bolsheviks in those days would never have dared to take action against the reactionary Mussulman.

Having no instructions I telegraphed to Colonel Pike who instructed me to remain where I was, to keep well in with the Bolsheviks and Armenians and do my utmost to get matters arranged so that General Dunsterville and his force could come through to Baku. I telegraphed to General Dunsterville and reported the situation to him by courier. Later I received instructions to spare no expense and make every effort to obtain possession of the Bolshevik Fleet on the Caspian Sea.

The position in short was as follows)- the fleet which professed to be of the Social Revolutionary Party, was supported by the Bolsheviks and was as a matter of fact composed of the very worst elements who meant at all costs to be on the winning side, it was strongly anti-Armenian and inclined to be anti-British. The Armenian leaders, their National Council and the Dashnachtsoun, although backing the Bolsheviks for political reasons were not in the least Bolshevik, were very pro-British, but their soldiers were very badly infected with Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks themselves were of course as anti-British as possible. The task of backing these three elements, (the fleet, the Armenians, and the Bolsheviks) seemed rather impossible.

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I therefore worked out a plan of action and kept to it steadily the whole way through.

1. To gain the personal confidence of the Bolsheviks.

2. To work where possible through the Armenian National Council who having a preponderance of Armenian troops in the Bolshevik Red Army, had a considerable influence with the Bolshevik Council, especially in the matter of nominations to various posts in the administrative machine and police.

3. To endeavour to persuade the majority of the 600 Russian officers who were loafing about the town or in hiding to join the Red Army, so that when the time came we should have officers, and probably many men, in the Red Army on whom we could rely.

4. Establish communications by courier between myself and Colonel Pike and General Dunsterville.

5. Prepare the fleet so that at a given moment, when required it would obey the instructions of General Bicharacheff or General Dunsterville.

1. I succeeded in gaining the confidence, I may even say the friendship of the Bolshevik Commissaire for the Caucasus, STEPAN SEAMIAN. At the beginning I would like to say I was greatly helped by General Lecondole, the Chief of the Rostov Railway Mission who together with his staff was awaiting instructions in Baku, and to whom I lent my house. I became a constant visitor at the house of Shaumian and his assistant Japaridzi, and Shaumian also secretly visited me. He evidently looked upon me as perfectly harmless and we had long discussions on Socialism. I visited the Committee rooms every night and up to the day of my trial was always well received by other Bolsheviks.

2. With the Armenians of course matters were made easy, as all Armenians were openly anglophil. However care had to be exercised here as Shaumian and many of his followers were very suspicious of the Armenian National Council which they looked upon as a Bourgeois Institution. I used to visit the enemies of Bolshevism only at night and then dressed as a Russian soldier.

3. This was the real difficulty, and to my mind the most important item in my programme. It failed hopelessly. I think most of the officers I approached looked upon me as a madman. Many who were formerly friends refused to recognize me in the street. I obtained a few good agents but they also were unable to do anything. Had we succeeded in getting fifty percent of these young officers to join the Bolshevik Army, I maintain that each one would have been able to gain the confidence of at least three soldiers and when Bicharacheff did arrive in Russia we should have then had at least 1500 men on whom we could have relied instead of absolutely nobody. However the plan failed and I only know of four men who did join.

In spite of my friendship with the Bolshevik leader, Shaumian, I was very closely watched and was shadowed wherever I went. Catering for these officers brought me into touch with many of the counter-revolutionary organisations, and most of my interviewing had to be done through agents.

4. The establishment of communications also to a great degree failed, and at no time, except when I was permitted to use the wireless, was I able to maintain regular communications. As Couriers both to Persia and to Tiflis I mostly used girls, they were able to travel as members of refugee families or as nurses and servants. One of these couriers Marie Nicolainva Kudratseff, ran through Kuchi Khans people four times and twice got to Tiflis with

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despatches carried in leather buttons, she also worked for some time as a typist with the Bolshevik Committee.

5. At first my chief agent with the fleet was the Bolshevik Minister of Finance. He was a social revolutionist not a Bolshevik and seemed able to work through the ship's committees. I understand that he eventually fell under suspicion and paid the death penalty while I was in Persia.

I worked as much alone as possible, and for my own personal safety took nobody completely into my confidence, and appeared to be doing as little as possible. All sorts of Russian officers came to me and offered their services, especially as agents with the fleet. Many of these I know were sent by the Bolsheviks, to one and all I suggested that they should join the Bolshevik Army. One Colonel I remember spat on my floor, slammed the door saying he would report me to my government as a useless traitor.

About June the situation seemed very satisfactory, Shawian and several other of the Bolshevik leaders were nibbling at the offer of British assistance. Through the Armenian National Council we had got our own agents into the Bolshevik Secret Service, and my other agents with the Bolshevik Committees were giving me all the information I could expect. The fleet and the Social Revolutionary Party seemed willing to support us when the moment should arrive.

About this time the chief engineer of one of the gun boats, Kerochenko by name, called on me and although I did not know him personally I knew him to be working for us among the crews of the ships. He informed me that a certain Colonel Oriol had arrived from Persia stating that he was one of Bicharacheff's agent and had received instructions to blow up the whole fleet. Kerochenko did not like the look of him or his companions and asked me to attend a secret meeting. It was arranged that I should be on the sea-front at a certain time where I would see a sailor sitting alone and when he got up I was to follow him. I was led away into the back street of the town to an empty house where I met Colonel Oriol and his friends consisting of two Georgian officers, one Russian who refuse to give his name and Lieut. Voskrosensky, Colonel Oriol's name subsequently turned out to be Ballas. This was my first meeting with Lieut. Voskrosensky who was the only man who gave his correct name and said nothing during the meeting. I learnt their whole plan to blow up the fleet, and was also given evidence that Oriol, alias Ballas, came to Baku armed with a letter from Bicharacheff. This letter was subsequently destroyed by Doctor Turkia.

Ballas was of Daghestan origin and had served in the Mussulman Regiments, I did not like his Georgian friends who were all very anti-Armenian, while the Russian officer had the appearance of being a Russian German. They all evidently know a great deal about Bicharacheff's and General Dunsterville's plans. They required money for their work and were all evidently very hard up. Their idea was to commence operations in two days. I persuaded them to wait and gave them sufficient money to keep them in food and drink. I then telegraphed to General Dunsterville but received no answer.

A few days later a certain Mr. Eugenie Djunkovsky presented himself, he was bearing a letter from Colonel Pike authorising me to give him up to half a million and give him a free hand in handling the fleet. I therefore took Mr Djunkovsky into my confidence as regarded the fleet, introduced him to my agents, informed him of my suspicions with regard to Ballas, and effected a meeting in order that he might judge Ballas and Company for himself. I handed Djunkovsky Rs. 200,000 in cash on account as it was all I had available at the time.

Djunkovsky plan was, with the help of the fleet, some oldtime soldiers and the workmen, to turn out the Bolshevik Government by force and replace it with anything he could find that was not Bolshevik. When I learnt this I assured him he was riding for a fall, as in the first place without the knowledge and consent of the Armenians the thing was impossible, secondly neither the Social

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Revolutionaries or the counter-revolutionary elements had any sort of organization or men who could run a government. Any change of Government until either Bicharacheff or the British were ready to come over and take matters in hand was doomed to failure, and that he had much better continue preparing things until that psychological moment arrived. At one time I thought that I had finally persuaded him that my plan was the wisest. However circumstances altered the whole of my arguments.

Alharvey and Djandre arrived from Bicharacheff in Persia, both determined to arrest Colonel Ballas, this was evidently in reply to my telegram to General Dunsterville. I pointed out the foolishness of this as Ballas certainly knew too much and might be persuaded to talk in a Bolchevick prison, for they intended to arrest him through the Bolchevicks. I finally persuaded Alharvey who promised to take Ballas to Persia, however my arguments came too late and Ballas had already been arrested by the Bolchevicks S.S. on information already given them by Djandre. That night Alharvey and Djandre left for Persia. On the following day two of Djunkovsky's agents got drunk, talked and were also arrested. That night one of my agents with the fleet came and informed me that the effect of those three arrests would be that we should all be arrested or put out of the way as one of the agents had been taken with certain notes and names on him. That the only thing to do was to make an attempt to turn out the government the following morning and arrest all the Bolchevicks and so avoid arrest which was certain. I rang up Djunkovsky and got no reply, went round to see him and found that he had left for some unknown destination. I did everything in my power to dissuade these people from making an attempt I knew would fail, I spent the whole night until early next morning interviewing people I had never dared go near before but all my efforts were in vain. The next morning a futile attempt at a local revolution was made, the fleet did not do what it was supposed to do and the workmen did not turn up. Many arrests were made papers and documents were found and I momentarily expected my own arrest. My telephone was cut off and men were posted outside my door and followed me quite openly wherever I went.

Moreover nothing further happened for four days, during which time I was pretty busy finding out all details in order to defend myself if necessary. I was greatly helped in this by the local Russian priest, it was impossible for me however to see him or to correspond with him, all this had to be done through third parties, as he was watched this became rather difficult, so I got my lady typist to hand him notes as she kissed the cross and receive documents from him while she took the blessing. In this way I learnt that all Djunkovsky's typing had been done in the Bolchevick office and on their machine, also the originals of all the notices issued, which originals had been found by the Bolchevicks.

On the fourth day at about eight o'clock at night Shawian sent up his car and two soldiers to take me down. On arrival I learned that I was to stand my first trial before the revolutionary tribunal. Shawian presided and I was accused of conspiracy and the penalty was death. I posed as injured innocent and accused Djunkovsky of using our name without any sort of authority, bringing up other instances of similar cases, I informed them that it was rather an insult to the British Government to think that they would have used Macdonell as a conspirator to turn out a Govt. when there were hundreds of trained men at the Gov's disposal had they wish to undertake such a venture. I finally brought forward some of their own despatch paper and asked for some lines to be typed on their machine and compared with the original stuff supposed to have been found in the hands of Djunkovsky's agent. On it being proved to be the same paper and

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Situation on arrival in Transcaucasia. Narrative of first
few days in Baku, November 17th - 26th, 1918.
by Major General V. L. Thomson, Commanding Northern Persian Force.

Arrived Baku 12:50 p.m. November 17th. Received on arrival by two Turkish Officers with letter from Hurcoel saying they had left two Battalions to keep public order. These were ordered to withdraw by 3 p.m. A number of functionaries from the Mayor of the town to a Russian Colonel (who it afterwards appeared had helped the Turks actively in capturing the town) made speeches of varying length which were replied to. Bicharakov did not appear and on enquiry at his ship he said quite frankly and in a friendly way that he considered the Tartar Azerbaijan Government was in fact being recognised by us and he must stand aside. The general public seemed genuinely pleased to see our arrival. Later the President of the House Committee, a Russian, appeared as a substitute for the Mayor who had been sent for and gave a useful information, promising to continue municipal routine and help in every way. Bicharakov made a long visit and explained further his attitude and expressed anxiety at the Tartar Government not being deposed instantly. As he left the hotel he was attacked by Mussulmans who were dealt with by Lt. Col. Shuttleworth with his fists. Various minor individuals were interviewed and Proclamations issued. During the evening the "Azerbaijan" newspaper appeared with a large type announcement that a great victory had been won, and that the Allies recognised the Independent Azerbaijan Republic. The Editor was sent for, an individual in an advanced state of alcoholic truculence came on his behalf and declined to print the Declaration which he was ordered to insert in the next issue, that the statement was entirely false. Later a deputation of 3 one of whom had been at Hurcoel as a delegate, came about 11 p.m. and asked for an interview on a matter of urgent importance to the Mussulman population. Their contention went over old ground but owing to the late hour and their excitement their hostility was clumsily concealed. They were informed that they had not carried

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out their orders in regard to (1) removal of Turks, (2) Disarmament and removal of Azerbaijan troops, (3) Preparation of billets for the British troops. These offences coupled with their defence of the Azerbaijan newspaper created a serious and responsible position for them. The following morning, the declaration, as demanded by us was printed in large type in the newspaper.

On the 18th inst. the Centre Caspian Government arrived about 10:30 a.m. and with a great expenditure of words and time vigorously demanded the deposition of the Tartar Government. Most of the talking was done by the illiterate sailors; having had their say and being met with a refusal, they appeared quite satisfied and promised to use their influence which is based on their possession of considerable public funds, reputed 200 million roubles, and is chiefly spent in debauches - in the preservation of law and order and to work whole-heartedly towards the regeneration of Russia. Numerous military officers from various parts of Russia appeared, among them Major-General from Vladikavkaz, Major General Baron Lepelov from Orsk and some Jews. The Armenian Bishop called and poured forth some of the woes of his people and a "moderate" Armenian leader with him explained exactly which people, Russian and Tartar, should be drastically dealt with, in his view, as a foundation to any building up process. A Russian Mussulman Major General called, apparently on behalf of the Daghestanis, and naively admitted he had been in Constantinople a few months ago "on a mission", and was at pains to explain that he did not actually participate in the attack on Petrovsk during the present month. He was most anxious to convey a message to Chernoff, the President of the North Caucasus; this he did not get, but he was charged to again inform the Turkish Commander at Petrovsk of his serious personal responsibilities in breaking the armistice. Mr. Mandelieff called by request and was most encouraging as to the prospects of forming a coalition provincial Government of moderate of all parties, politicians to be rigidly excluded. He is a very wealthy

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Tartar and carries much weight with all classes in consequence and apparently has been a moderating influence for many years though, as he admits, he has never succeeded in obviating a massacre instigated by either party.

The representative of the Ufa Government subsequently arrived and proved intensely disappointing, an impression which was deepened at a further discursive interview the following morning. Ufa apparently have an idea that Richarakov personally has robbed the till of some enormous sum and that a visit of a pompous geological Professor is all that is required to enforce reparation. F. Golovin will not recognise Richarakov in any capacity, nor will he deal with Tartars or Armenians, he is a plenipotentiary to deal with the Allies and restore Government in the Caucasus with a strong hand. A very earnest appeal was made to him, reinforced by some strong words by Doctor Post as an American, to concentrate on getting the best out of all parties and keep the regeneration of Russia always in front of him, and to forget his personal dignity as a Plenipotentiary Extraordinary charged with plenary powers etc. etc. Unless M. Golovin has not yet recovered from his journey and is far from himself, it can only cause dismay or worse that such a man as he appears to be should be sent on an errand of the most extreme difficulty.

A deputation of the Mercantile Community came to offer a friendly greeting which gave an opportunity of recognizing the excellent manner in which they have worked for us, representatives of the ship Owners were equally friendly. Some Representatives of the Russian business community brought a resolution passed at a meeting the previous day and promised the most enthusiastic co-operation in the scheme for a coalition Government. They explained that as an earnest of their intentions they were meeting some Tartars that afternoon to come to a working agreement as to representation. They urged the disarmament of Richarakov's troops which were hampering them as Russians, just as the Armenian Archbishop appealed

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for the disarmament of the Armenians. Where every house is an armoury the suggestion is more easily made than executed. At the same time the fact remains there is a reasonable spirit abroad, the town is quite quiet, the Tartar Government anticipate being asked to go and will not be willing to evacuate an untenable position of giving their prop, the Turk, being removed.

November 20th.

The President of the Azerbaijan Government came with Mr. Asadullieff and explained at great length how the Republic were forced by circumstances into the arms of the Turks. He contended that he was glad to see them so honestly welcomed the Allies as the hope for small nations. They look forward to complete emancipation from Russia and to that end were raising a "defensive army" of 50,000 men. He acquiesced in the view that the representation of all parties in the Government was desirable and promised a reorganisation on this basis within a fortnight. He clearly understands that the Allies have no intention of recognising Independent Republics, and that all questions of that nature will be settled at the Peace Conference. He has little hope of a coalition Government but will give it a fair trial and will strive for justice for all. He asks that we should judge as to who will be the transgressor. He seethes bitterly of Russian Government and of the treachery of the Armenians, he admits that there is blame on all parties. Undoubtedly a clever man, a lawyer, who has set up a vigorous local administration, vastly more practicable than any previously known in the Caucasus. He stated roundly that he had expressed indignation at his claiming to be in the employ of Azerbaijan. He would write and stop it and declared that all Turks either had gone or were on the point of doing so. The Azerbaijan Army had been removed from Baku as demanded by us, and would only be maintained at Elisabetpol and outlying districts against Armenian marauders commanded by Andronik and Avetissov who were at the moment

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murdering Tartars in large numbers.

To form a hasty opinion of a complex situation with 72 hours experience is absurd. The following stand out as salient features:-

- (1) National patriotism for a Great Russia what or a Monarchy or Republic is practically non-existent in Baku.
- (2) The hatred and intolerance betw on the uneducated Armenian and Tartar is incredible in its ferocity.
- (3) The educated Russian has lost heart at any rate temporarily, and carries little weight but he sides with the Tartar rather than the Armenian whom all stigmatise traitors to every cause they have supported from Bolshivism to the British.
- (4) The Allies are suspected of trying to push the Caucasus peoples under a Central Russian Government of some kind after making good terms for the British French and American pets, the Armenians.

Participation by us in political and economic questions appears entirely unavoidable. In order to police Baku area with the troops available, the following are essentials which can only be achieved by political pressure.

- (1) The disbandment of the Azerbaijan Army, and the ejection of Turks from the province.
- (2) The prohibition of the landing of Armenian troops and the return of unarmed refugees to their homes through Tartar areas.
- (3) The reopening of trade.
- (4) The modification of the methods of the Azerbaijan Government which at present are harsh and unreasonable towards Russians and Armenians.

The situation is complex but the attitude of the moderate men of all parties, who sincerely desire peace, gives grounds for hope that the problem is not insoluble. Unfortunately while looking zealously at the Democratic Federations of States achieved in the United States, Canada, and Australia the Caucasian races can not at present conceive anything more improbable than their venting to join together to form a new Russia, whether it be Monarchy or Republic.

At the same time the educated men, who are not always the leaders who do the talking, realise that small states can not remain independent and that Russia must always be the paramount power in the Caucasus. The people can be taught this in

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time, but they first must be certain that the Russian Government as they know it is not going to be forced on them by the Allies.

November 21st.

Saw Mr. Lesner of Nobeis the largest oil combine in Baku. A Bosen Manager of a Bosch Firm at least 50 million Roubles of whose Capital belongs to Deutscher Bank. discussed reopening a Bank, also pipeline also procuring more Russian labour. He is obviously an able man and inclined to help. No doubt at the moment we can help him a great deal more than he can help us. Interviewed also Committee of Tartar Merchants, nothing new. Saw later deputation of Uralak Cossacks, usual requests. Practically everybody to-day complained vigorously of Richerkev's men whose drunkenness and shooting in the streets is causing alarm. Further outbreak by them in which I was killed and 2 opponents wounded led to issue of Proclamation forbidding carrying of arms and public execution in cases of wilful firing in the streets.

November 22nd.

Fatten Ali Khan (Prime Minister) and Finance Minister called again. A business like couple and a good deal was arranged. He is really working for a representation coalition Government. Jas Al Harvi and explained clearly that situation with Richerakov was becoming very difficult owing to his companions, his possession of large sums of Russian State Bank money which was removed from Baku in September, and the disgraceful behaviour of his men which he was making no attempt to stop. Saw Bergererov and arranged details repatriation of Armenians to be fixed by him in consultation with Rowlandson and local Government.

November 23rd.

Interviewed Georgian representative and arranged various minor matters. He is a worm. While trying to arrange with Kowcombe and State Bank Official some means of reopening of State Bank Lt. Colonel Cockerill arrived stating that the

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Bank officials there present had gone to the Bank that morning, ejected the former Bank officials on the instant and created a tumult. He was assisted by an armed guard with a written order from Bicharekov. As this Bank Official is a member of Centre Caspia Government and responsible to a large extent for looting of Bank in first instance, he was sent away and a message despatched to Bicharekov that his guard would be ejected if still there at 2:0 p.m. Bicharekov was also informed that further interference in Bank affairs by him would not be tolerated. This had desired effect and he asked for ships to remove his troops. The hope is that he will not relent and elude down and thus make it difficult to hold him to his intention.

November 24th.

Chernosheff, President North Caucasus who asked for an interview has not turned up. He was formerly an Officer of the Imperial Guard and has been operating against Bicharekov with Useef Ismet Fasha. Whether he controlled the Turks or vice versa remains to be seen.

Gen. Patten Ali Khan again at his request. Reports Coalition going on but satisfactorily his chief difficulty being Gelovin and his demands for unconditional submission to Ufa Government. Promised to get Russians to drop the Ufa question, as Mussulmans agreed in principle to the suzerainty of Russia. A great advance from their demand of an independent Republic which they stood out for and were raising an army to defend. Saw Yergasaroff on minor Armenian questions. Stokes talked to Bicharekov for hours last night. By himself he is reasonable but Martineff his Staff Officer is intensely anti-British and has much influence. Consequently Bicharekov's words and actions belie each other. To-day they put a Cossack guard in the State Bank, and ejected the former Bank Officials. The latter is a small local temporary organization, the only Bank open and invaluable. The Cossacks have been removed and Bicharekov told definitely and finally he must remove

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his troops from Bank. (letter attached).

24/11/18.

(signed) V. Thomson. Major General
Commanding North ern Persian Force.

V. TOMSONUN BİÇERAXOVA MƏKTUBU
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Final in Russian.

9.

Baku.

24.11.18.

Dear Bicherakov,

I write to you as a friend, and I communicate with you on paper rather than verbally because what I have now got to say is final, and it is better not to discuss it. In any case I assure you that nothing which has happened will interfere with our personal friendship. You have always been very straight with me, and I have always sympathized with your difficulties.

The situation now is not one which can be allowed to continue. I do not refer to small incidents which have occurred here, and to the fact that in your name my orders have been repeatedly disobeyed. I refer to much larger matters. The war is over, the business now is to restore peace, and I put it to you that your force now is serving no useful purpose, and is now no longer justifying its existence. If your force were to proceed at once to a front, either to Anakin or Courlev, well and good, but it is not doing so, and there is no work for it here. You have a record in this war of which any man may be proud, for you continued the struggle in the darkest hour, when nearly all gave it up. Are you going to spoil that? For your enemies are not a few, and you place a strong weapon in their hands if you keep your force inactive. As I have said, there is no front to which it is going, therefore it should be disbanded. I urge you to consider this. It is my duty to my country and to you to restore peace here, and there can be no question that your force is the cause of disturbance and anxiety here. It must go. I ask you that it should go at your order, and in your own way. Thus I shall be grateful to a man whose friendship I value very much, and in advising you in this way, I do so absolutely convinced that I am advising you in the right way in your own interests and in what is more important to you, in the interests of the country for which you have given so much, and served so well.

Yours sincerely,

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Notes on the Situation in AZERBAIJAN.

The situation in Azerbaijan and Georgia is extremely interesting but at the same time very complicated. The Tartars, Georgians and Armenians unite in hating Russian rule, but they detest one another so thoroughly that they will not sink their enmity towards one another, even if their independence were promised them as the price of their doing so.

However much, therefore, we may sympathize with the principle of self-determination, especially in the case of a capable nation like the Tartars, if the constituent races of a country are irreconcilable, there is no alternative to getting outside power to govern them.

Before the British landed at Baku the Tartar delegates of the Azerbaijan Government were informed that the Allied Powers were unable to recognize the independent States formed in the Caucasus, because they had been set up either by Germany or Turkey, and because the Allies were bound to the reconstitution of Russia. The statement made later by Fatah Ali Khan, President of the Azerbaijan Republic, in indication of the action taken by the Tartars, is of interest, as coming from the head of a Government which had a very successful, if brief career.

He stated that the nations of the Caucasus had always dreamed of being free from Russia and that their opportunity had come when the Russian revolution took place, and the Bolshevik Government were formed in Moscow. At first a Caucasus Government was set up, but when the Russian Army was withdrawn and Bolshevism became rampant, the component nations split up into the 3 natural states, viz: Tartar or Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. In Azerbaijan there was constant fighting between the Tartars on one side and the Armenians and Bolsheviks on the other, and in March of this year 180 villages were destroyed by one side or the other and 60 Tartars were killed. The Tartars consequently applied to the Turks as their national protectors for assistance, and an arrangement was made that the Turks should supply a certain number of troops and instructors in return for supplies. The Tartars had no intention of/

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of being subject to Turkey as they looked upon themselves as being intellectually superior to the Turks. It was true that they contemplated raising an army of 50,000 men, but that was for defence against the Armenians and neighbouring states.

There is no doubt that there will be a considerable amount of disappointment among the Tartars if Russian rule, as it existed before the war, is reintroduced. Many influential Tartars realize that they must come under the control of some Central power, but trust that a certain degree of autonomy will be granted to them at the Peace Conference. On the other hand the Chevinists declare that Great Britain will only be able to retain her citizen army in the field for a period of 3 months after the war, and that when the British troops are withdrawn from the Caucasus, the independent state of Azerbaijan will again be established.

During the Bolshevik regime the Armenians, as may be inferred from Fatch Ali Khan's statement, had a good deal the better of the Tartars. The total population of Azerbaijan is about 3,000,000 of which 2,000,000 are Tartars and the remaining 1,000,000 are half Armenians and half Russians, Germans, and other European races. The disparity between the Tartars and Armenians is not, however, very great in the city of Baku and its vicinity, which accounts for the Armenians being on the side which did most damage in March last. The tables were entirely turned on September 15th, when the British withdrew from Baku and the Turks entered the city. The number of Armenians who were killed in the 3 succeeding days is estimated at 20,000 and it is stated by the Armenian Archbishop that Tartar civilians bought Armenians from the Turkish soldiers that they might have the pleasure of killing them. It is not surprising in the above circumstance if the Armenian of Azerbaijan hates the Tartar and refuses to associate himself with the latter in the Government of the country.

The feeling of the Armenian towards the Russian is
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scarcely more friendly, and he certainly does not want him back as a ruler; for, though there were 60,000 Russians in Baku, they did little to resist the Turks, and left the defence of the city to the Armenians and a handful of British troops.

Since the occupation of Baku by the representatives of the Allies, the behaviour of the Russian troops has not been such as to raise them in the estimation or popularity of the inhabitants. The only disturbances which have taken place in Baku have been caused by Bicherstev's troops who have shot Armenians in the streets and assaulted Tartar shepherds because they exhibited signboards in Turkish. As a consequence of these disorders, Russian troops are forbidden to carry firearms in the streets, except in parties of 20 or when accompanied by an officer. Not that the officers themselves are above reproach for several amused themselves lately by firing off revolvers in the principal hotel in the middle of the night. Moreover there are 170 Russian Officers loafing about Baku doing nothing, although we have offered to pay their way and expenses to join any Russian force in the field.

The question also arises, if the Trans-Caucasian provinces are to remain apart of Russia, which of the various Governments are they to recognize as their Central authority. There are several of these so-called Governments, but they are all more or less inept.

On November 19th there arrived at Baku a Professor (of Geology) SOLOVIEV, who stated that he was the representative of the UFA National Government and had been invested with plenary powers for the Government of the Caucasus. He declined to recognize Bicherstev when he/accused of having appropriated large sums, and refused to have anything to do with the Azerbaijan Government on the ground that they were Tartars. The Professor appears to be not quite sane, and in the meanwhile it is doubtful whether the UFA Government exists or has been superseded by the Siberian Government.

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Another local Government is the Centro-Caspian: It ruled in Baku before the Turkish occupation, and its principal claim to power is the possession of the effects of the Russian State Bank, some 200 million roubles (or what remains of them) and the Bank's securities. As the president and representatives of the Centro-Caspian Government are ignorant sailors, not unaddicted to drink, it is impossible for them to represent Russian authority. It is worth noting that they make what influence they have felt, by working with Colonel Bicherakov's Chief of Staff - Colonel Martinev, who is strongly anti-British - and that when Bicherakov is aggravating, it is probably the result of their joint machinations.

A third Government is the North Caucasus, or Mountaineer, Government whose headquarters are at Petrovsk or Derbent according to the local situation. The President, Chernolev, was in the Russian Imperial Guards, and his permanent address appears to be the Hotel Metropole, Baku. He is a very rich man and is part owner of the oilfields at Grosni, which the Bolsheviks have set afloat.

The North Caucasus Government is in a somewhat precarious position. Ninety per cent of its population are Muhamedans and are opposed to Bolshevism, but they cannot resign themselves to cooperate with General Denikin's force because it is largely composed of Cossacks, and the Mountaineers have a grievance against the latter as they are dispossessed of their land to form Cossack colonies. Another unfortunate circumstance for the Government is that after the news of the Armistice had been communicated to Isset Pasha and Chernolev, the two combined together and attacked and drove Bicherakov out of Petrovsk. The excuse offered by Chernolev for this ill-timed exploit was that Bicherakov's Armenians had killed the Mayor of Derbent, the brother-in-law of his Minister of Finance. Chernolev's way out of his difficulties savours rather of comic opera, for he has implored Bicherakov to take his troops back to Petrovsk and to assume command of the troops of the North
Caucasus/

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Caucasus Government, a prayer to which Bicherakov has acceded.

It appeared to Major-General Thomson that, pending instructions from the War Office as to the Government's policy in the Caucasus, the safest procedure to adopt would be the formation in Azerbaijan and Georgia of coalition provincial Governments constituted of the moderate men of all parties. As an inducement to the parties in power to form such a Government it was pointed out that if they wished to impress the Allied Powers with their ability for self-Government they must give evidence now that they could sink their national animosities and work together in restoring order and property to the country.

It is an example of the difficulty of dealing with these people that in Azerbaijan the obstacles in the way of carrying out the proposals were raised by the Russians and Armenians, neither of whom were represented in the existing Government. After a considerable amount of argument as to the form of declaration to be taken by the Government and the numbers of each nationality in the Cabinet, it was agreed that it was not essential to have a declaration of policy and that the constitution of the Cabinet should be 6 Tartars, 3 Russians and 3 Armenians. Everything appeared to be progressing favourably and a day was fixed for the Cabinet to meet when suddenly the Armenians declared they would join no Cabinet that included Fatah Ali Khan as Prime Minister, because he was responsible for the massacre in September last. As Fatah Ali Khan is one of the ablest public men in Baku (he is also one of the few men who have loyally helped General Thomson) the Tartars have refused to be dictated to in the matter, and at present there is a deadlock in the formation of the Cabinet.

Facilities such as the above are not confined to Baku but exist also in the relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia. The pipe line between Baku and Batum can deliver 4 million poods of kerosene a month and on it depends a good deal of the
prosperity/.

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prosperity of Baku and only to a less extent of Tiflis and Georgia. Although the pipe line is a Russian construction and belongs to neither State each claims entire authority over such portion of the pipe as lies within its territory. Baku wants to send kerosene, and Tiflis wants masoot; Georgia wants to pay in state notes and Baku prefers something more substantial in the form of food, wood or manganese; Georgia refuses to sign the agreement and Baku refuses to start pumping oil until she does. In consequence both are losing money and the Turkish troops of whom the Georgians are most anxious to be rid are hung up in Georgia for want of oil fuel for the railway engines.

The urgency for a declared policy and for the presence of British troops has been dealt with in General Thomson's paper. Azerbaijan wants food and the rest of the Caucasus wants oil. There are two ways of bringing about the necessary exchange and these are by getting rid of the Bolsheviks out of the great grain producing country round STAVROPOL and by gaining possession of the SKATERINGODAR-PETROVSK railway, and the restoration to proper working order of the railway from BATUM to BAKU.

Dec. 8th 1918

(Signed) R.I.G. Gorton
Brig.General.

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SECRET

184665
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN OFFICE
NOV 1918

THE FUTURE SETTLEMENT OF TRANS-CAUCASIA WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO BRITISH INTERESTS

(Based on P.I.D. Russia/D16)

1. THE future of Trans-Caucasia is part of the general problem of the future of the Russian border States, though it has special features. The establishment of an armistice with Turkey, especially if this opens up the Black Sea to the British fleet, will make it both possible and urgently necessary to consider as one the lines of a future settlement of these districts. It is suggested that the wisest plan would be that any settlement should start from the principle of self-determination; this would imply the recognition of Georgia, Armenia, and the Tatars as free independent States, which it is hoped will ultimately come into a federal union with one another. This would also imply that they should be free, at any rate in the meantime, from Russian dominion, and that the Caucasus should become the frontier of a restored Russia. The possibility of their voluntary return into a stable and liberalized Federation of Russian States should not, however, be absolutely foreclosed.

2. All this almost necessarily implies, however, that it may be necessary to depute some Western Power to watch over, assist and control these nationalities in their efforts with self-government, and if some such sort of control was found to be necessary, it would of course be most convenient, since no suitable Government is likely to be established in Russia for a considerable period, that this duty should be delegated by the Peace Conference either to Great Britain—an extension of a Mesopotamian Protectorate—or to the United States of America, because of her Asiatic and Armenian interests.

3. The first desideratum, of course, is the withdrawal of all Turkish and German forces, including all individuals, whether civilian or military, who may have been left behind for the purpose of propaganda. This is particularly important with regard to Georgia. In addition to being the most compact and homogeneous, Georgia to-day is probably the most advanced, politically and economically, of the three nationalities. During the later years of the war the Georgians have been the special object of German attention, both on account of their racial characteristics and the potential wealth of their country. Lately, in face of force majeure, and particularly in order to withstand the aggressive designs of the Turks, the German orientation of the Georgians became distinctly pronounced, although they have never committed themselves in a degree comparable, for example, to that of Finland. Several independent sources testify to their desire to be absolutely free from German domination. There seems to be no doubt that certain far-reaching business contracts have been entered into between the German authorities and the Georgian Government, sometimes with a view to intermediaries for the exploitation, for example, of the manganese deposits. So far as anything in the nature of commercial treaties have been entered into between these Governments, a decision should be made for their cancellation; while, on the other hand, in view of British trade interests, Batum should be declared a free port, as was provided for in the Treaty of 1878, with free access by railway to Armenia, India, Persia, and Central Asia.

4. The Georgian claim for independence is based upon their historical continuity from the third century (B.C.) and the maintenance of their political independence till 1801 under a series of most trying circumstances and invasions. The Georgians are not merely anxious to state their claims to independence under the principle of self-determination espoused by the Allies, but also on their treaty rights of 1783 with Russia, which were violated by that country. De jure Georgia has full right to determine her position. In this respect she is in a stronger position than any other nationality in the former Russian Empire, for she was never conquered by Russia. The boundaries of a geographically and ethnographically Georgian can be traced at any rate provisionally, although complications may arise in more than one border district, owing to the influx of Armenian refugees in past decades, and expressions of doubt as to the

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orientation of certain Modern Georgian elements. Owing to the ravages of war, all pre-war statistics and population distributions are more or less untrustworthy to-day; accordingly, the whole situation seems to call for investigation on the spot by a joint Allied Commission.

5. The Armenian claim for independence, or, to express it otherwise, the formation of an Armenian protectorate under an international guarantee with mandatory power to one of the guarantors, would naturally involve the union of the six Turkish vilayets and Kikhin, and the Russian Armenian provinces. This represents the main current of Armenian opinion. It is possible, however, that such a union, which must come about if there is to be any Armenia at all, will not be favourably regarded by all Russian Armenians, some of whom have never professed any interest in their compatriots of Turkish Armenia, and may even prefer to remain linked with Russia rather than enter such a united Armenia. A territory of this extent, with an outlet to the Black Sea at Trabzon, is greatly disproportionate to the present Armenian population, and would be shared to a very large extent with the Kurds, whose rights would require to be safeguarded. There is some reason to suppose that these two peoples would not have great difficulty in coming to an understanding if left to settle matters by themselves, i.e. apart from Russian or Turkish intriguing and interference, under the aforesaid Protectorate.

6. The third element is the potential Tatar Republic, comprising the Governments of Baku and Elizabetpol, to which Dagestan on the North and Persian Azerbaijan are added in the minds of Tatar and Turkish expansionists like Enver Pasha. The crux of the situation is the question of the ability of a possible Tatar element composed of Baku and Elizabetpol to form a self-governing element alongside of Georgia and Armenia; for if this is not possible, it would be difficult to avoid handing these last elements back to Russia, which raises the final question of the relation of these three elements to Russia.

7. We assume then that the Georgians are able to conduct their own affairs, and the Armenian Protectorate likewise able to be self-maintaining; and it may be pointed out that other countries, like Modern Greece, have not been at any more advanced stage of political development than these two elements are to-day, at the time that independence was given to them. At the present moment, so far as indications go, the crux of disproof of the ability of the Tatar element also to maintain itself in co-operation with and alongside of the other two, would seem to be with those who are opposed to the idea of the formation and federation of the three Trans-Caucasian States, and while the question of their possible future reunion with Russia ought not to be foreclosed, the following considerations ought to be borne in mind:—

8. The Russian elements in Trans-Caucasia numbered at the beginning of the war 200,000, including an army of 150,000, out of some 7,000,000. In view of the collapse of German aspirations beyond the Danube, it looks as if the key-stone of British policy with regard to the Farther East may need to be the assumption of a protectorate over these three Trans-Caucasian elements or at least the furnishing of them with assistance towards their development as political entities on ethnographical lines. From this point of view it is therefore a serious question whether it may not be better to discourage Russian advances beyond Cis-Caucasia, that is to say, confine her to the northern side of the Caucasus, thus making Trans-Caucasia a barrier to any future Russian aspirations towards the south-east. For it is advisable not to close our eyes to the fact that the populations to the north-west of the Caucasus are the Kuban and Don Cossacks. The Ukraine also has a large Cossack element, and it is probable that sooner or later these elements will attempt to revive the old Russian policy of aggressive expansion towards the south-east. This policy may also be stimulated by the pressure of immigration from Northern Russia, unless this can be diverted regularly towards Siberia; but, on the other hand, the attraction of the warmer south and its waters will always be irresistible. With an internationalised Dardanelles, Russian aggressive movement beyond the Caucasus could only be predator in purpose, and the difficulty of restoring Baku to Russia lies in the fact that if she is given any footing in Trans-Caucasia she will inevitably attempt to recover all her former possessions. With the oil-fields of Grozny and Maikop and the ports of Derbent and Petrovok she will not suffer essential loss or means of direct communication with her Trans-Caspian possessions.*

* The main objection to this policy lies in the circumstance that, under the Supplementary Treaty between Germany and Russia, the town of Baku was left to Russia, and it might be invidious for the Allies to support a policy which would more completely deprive Russia of this town. Moreover, the oilfields of Baku are of really vital interest both to Russia and to European industry.

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9. At the moment, the Ukraine appears to be working hand in hand with the reactionary elements in Great Russia, with the object of assuming some power of attorney for all Russia at the Peace Conference. It is probable that the Ukraine will press for the association of Eastern Galicia, Besarabia, and the whole of the Caucasus on the pretence of creating a federation of these centres; and the present pressure of the Kuban Cossacks towards the Sukhum district is probably instigated by military considerations with a view to keeping the door along the Black Sea open for a later invasion of the whole of Trans-Caucasia.

November 1, 1918.

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SER A. KROUNUN MEMORANDUMU
7 NOYABR 1918

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Presented for the War Cabinet. November 1918.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM ON A POSSIBLE TERRITORIAL POLICY
IN THE CAUCASUS REGIONS.

1. APART from the Armenian provinces of Turkey, there are four separate areas calling for special consideration: (1) Georgia; (2) Russian Armenia; (3) Russian Azerbaijan; and (4) Daghestan.

2. Persian Azerbaijan and Turkish Armenia are not discussed in this memorandum. The former will not be involved in the peace settlement, since we are practically pledged to secure Persia's integrity. The latter constitutes a separate problem.

3. The areas here considered all belonged to the Russian empire before the revolution. The three first are separated from European Russia by the Caucasus range; whilst Daghestan, though on the north side of the main chain, is a mountainous province not easily accessible from the Russian steppes.

4. All four areas are non-Russian in nationality (in contrast to the Kuban, Stavropol, and Terek districts which border upon them on the north), and all four have declared their independence since the revolution. They have claimed the right of self-determination, and a practical politician will start with the recognition of this claim. In applying the principle, it will, however, be prudent to follow a course which may be calculated to cause the minimum of resentment and bitterness to a reconstituted Russia, and leave her no ground for complaining that the Allies had taken advantage of her temporary weakness.

5. It would appear safe to begin by recognizing effective national governments in any areas in which they have been established, in such a form as not to prejudge the question of their permanent independence or reintegration with Russia. With this view it may be desirable to contemplate from the outset, and even make provision in some formal declaration, or other instrument, that any arrangements now made or agreed upon shall be regarded as open to reconsideration and revision after the lapse of some fixed period. The League of Nations, if established, might offer the necessary machinery for this purpose. The duration of the provisional settlement should be long enough to allow, on the one hand, of the possibility of a return of Russia to a state of stable political equilibrium, and to permit, on the other hand, of the three South Caucasian States having a fair chance of finding their own feet under the conditions of complete political autonomy guaranteed to them in the interval by the Allies. If Russia recovers rapidly, they might conceivably rejoin her in some federal relation; if the anarchy in Russia lasts many years, their present separation from her will probably be permanent. Our policy towards the Caucasus should be framed to meet either eventuality.

6. If we proceed to build on the provisional foundation of four independent Caucasian States, the question immediately arises whether in fact these four units are strong enough, placed as they are, to stand each by itself, or whether greater stability should be sought by superimposing some system of federation. A more detailed examination of the conditions prevailing in the several territories, as briefly outlined below, will show that there are great practical difficulties in the way of any very close federation, such as would consist in the setting up of a joint legislative body or of federal executive departments of government, and, in the absence of monarchical institutions, even the looser link of a personal union or common sovereign offers no solution. Independent sovereignty,

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however, of each of the four units does not necessarily imply that they will be able to dispense with the active support of some outside Power which would furnish expert advisers and administrators and financial assistance in some degree. If it were to be arranged that such advice and assistance should be given to each of the four States by one and the same foreign Power, this would supply a unifying element sufficiently strong to take the place of the federal link. But even this may prove a counsel of perfection.

7. It is undoubtedly a British interest that regions so near to those countries in the Middle East in which we have a direct stake should not be allowed to lapse into anarchy. On the other hand it would be undesirable, because dangerous from the point of view of our future relations with Russia, that England should be the Power whose mandate it was to offer advice and support to the Caucasian States. Our interest would best be served by this task being entrusted to some other Great Power friendly to ourselves, whose assistance would be accepted by the populations concerned. Subject to these general considerations, the situation in each of the several areas may now be examined.

8. Georgia is a compact territory with suitable ports and railways, inhabited by a population with a tradition of political independence, altogether homogeneous in language, and nearly so in religion—except for a Muslim minority in the south-west, a minority which would be increased if the Georgian-speaking elements over the Turkish border (Lazae) were united with Georgia. It would be comparatively simple to recognize the present independent Georgian Government, though we should have to insist upon its breaking off its special relations with Germany. Foreign assistance in the internal administration of Georgia would be needed, little, if at all. As the most compact, and highly developed, politically, of the three States, Georgia will probably work best with that Power which would demand least of her and ride her, so to speak, with the lightest bridle. One condition, however, might well advantage be imposed, namely that Batoum and perhaps also Poti should be free ports, and that there should be freedom of transit, along the railways in its hinterland, for trade with Azerbaijan, Daghestan, Armenia, Persia, and Central Asia.

9. Russian Armenia is less homogeneous in population than Georgia (the Armenian element being mixed with Azerbaijanian and Kurdish), and not self-sufficing geographically, since it has no seaboard. It has also been ravaged by the war, and the position is further complicated by the fact that the Russian Armenians may either now or hereafter desire union with those formerly subject to Turkey. Our natural line of policy would be to recognize the present independent Government (the Armenian "Republic of Erivan"), and not to oppose its union with Turkish Armenia, if desired. The corollary of such a union would be that whatever foreign Power received the mandate of assisting Turkish Armenia would extend its good offices to the united country.

10. Russian Azerbaijan presents a more difficult problem. There is not a homogeneous population, Armenians and Azerbaijanis being intermingled (and at dagger's draw) in the mountainous districts in the west. Baku, the capital, is a cosmopolitan city, containing Armenians, Russians, Persians, Jews, and people of all nationalities engaged in the oil industry. And the Azerbaijanis are a comparatively backward Moslem Turkish-speaking race, who are probably incapable in their present stage of establishing an orderly, civilized Government, and certainly could not cope, by themselves, with the administration of Baku, where their recent entry has been marked by pillage, and the massacre of the non-Azerbaijani elements. It would hardly be advisable for us to recognize the present independent Government, which has been set up under the aegis of the Turks by the Azerbaijani land-owning class and the handful of Azerbaijani industrialists at Baku, the oil

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industry there being almost entirely in the hands of the other nationalities. The connection of Azerbaijan with Turkey, which rests on community of nationality and religion and a common hostility to the Armenians, will be much harder to break than that of Georgia with Germany. A strong foreign protectorate is therefore desirable. A special problem arises over the Baku oil-fields, the produce of which is vital to the industry and transport of European Russia, and is also of great importance to the rest of the world. Whatever political régime is set up in Azerbaijan, it might be desirable to place the oil-fields under some kind of direct international control on the model, perhaps, of the Danube Commission.

11. *Daghistan* is a conglomeration of wild Moslem tribes, speaking many languages (none of them Turkish, except along the coast), and with no cohesion, which it took Russia nearly a century to conquer. They are now independent again: but they can hardly be left to themselves, since the railway from Baku to Grozny runs through their territory, and the oil-fields of Baku and Grozny, in which there are important British interests, would be exposed to their raids. Grozny has in fact been besieged by them for many months since the revolution. On geographical grounds there would be much to be said for reunion with Russia, since *Daghistan* lies on the northern slope of the Caucasian chain. But Russia in her present condition is clearly not competent to resume her responsibilities on the *Daghistan* mountains. The task of establishing and maintaining law and order will be a thankless one, and possibly irretrievable, from the military point of view.

12. There remains the selection of the Mandatory Power, which is the crux of the problem. If we approach a solution by a process of elimination, it will probably be conceded that we can begin by ruling out Russia, England, and Italy. There remain France, the United States, and the minor European Powers: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland. Possibly President Wilson may favour one of these minor Powers, or make a show of doing so. It is however, difficult to believe that such a suggestion can survive a serious and honest study of the problem. The influence of the Mandatory Power and its capability of exercising authority in any shape must rest either on the exercise, or show, of military force, or upon prestige. None of the minor Powers command either. For practical purposes they must be left out of the account. That leaves France and the United States.

13. The choice of France presents several advantages. The first is that it would probably be welcomed by the Armenians as far as Armenia is concerned. In a recent letter to Mr. Balfour the Armenian National Delegation at Paris have put forward the demand of an independent Armenia, comprising the six vilayets and Cilicia, together with Russian Armenia, if the latter desires to come in, the whole to be under the collective protectorate of the Allied Powers, of whom one should afford assistance as their mandatories during a period of transition. The second argument in favour of choosing France as the mandatory is that this would square with the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. It might even be possible, by including in the territories covered by the mandate, the four Caucasian States which form the subject of the present memorandum, to induce France to make concessions as regards French claims in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine.

14. It is of course necessary to remember that France has so far no connection with the Caucasus, and there is no certainty that she would be welcomed by the populations. Nor would her appearance on the northern frontier of Persia be likely to improve our position in that country. This may, however, be regarded as a minor evil, and, provided the consent of the populations was forthcoming, the French solution might well be accepted by us as the whole satisfactory, especially if the French mandate derived its

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authority from a league of nations and remained subject to some, however indefinite, control of that nebulous body.

15. It may be urged that a mandate to the United States would on the whole suit us better, although we should thereby lose the lever by which we could hope to make France relinquish some of her inconvenient claims under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. There is, unfortunately, little hope that the Americans will be ready to come forward unless we are to assume that their ostensible reluctance is only a pretence and that they would gracefully yield under the friendly and flattering pressure of the rest of the world.

16. A third alternative would be even more in accordance with our interest: that would be to let France be the mandatory for Armenia (including Russian Armenia if desired by the inhabitants) and confer the mandate for Georgia, Russian Azerbaijan, and *Daghistan* on the Americans. But President Wilson would probably be even less willing to accept this arrangement, which would undoubtedly throw upon the United States a considerable and difficult burden, without any countervailing glory or profit.

17. The best hope for a practical solution seems to lie in a French mandate for Armenia and the South Caucasian territories.

EYRE A. CROWE.

Foreign Office, November 7, 1918.

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31 OKTYABR 1918

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NOTE ON AZERBAIJAN.

N.B.—This paper was written before the armistice with Turkey had been signed.

1. When the joint Trans-Caucasian Government broke up at the end of May the Tatars declared an independent republic, with its temporary capital at Elizabetopol, pending the occupation of Baku. The precise territory claimed is uncertain, but it certainly included the provinces of Elizabetopol and Baku, probably the south-eastern part of that of Erivan, and possibly Daghestan and Persian Azerbaijan. These further claims, however, do not seem to have been upheld by the Tartar Delegation to Constantinople, and the Daghestanis, who are Moslems (Sunni) but not Tatars, belong to the union of Caucasian mountaineers, and appear to be divided over the question of their inclusion in Azerbaijan. There is no evidence as to the desire of the Tatars in Persian Azerbaijan to be included in the new State. A notable Pan-Turanian, Rusal-Zade, President of the Azerbaijan National Assembly and of the delegation to Constantinople, appears to share with Khinsky Khan, the head of the Government, the chief influence in directing the policy of the new State of Azerbaijan. Rusal-Zade is the founder and leader of the Musavat Party (extreme pro-Turk), and worked at Teheran during the Persian revolution, and therefore presumably has numerous connections with the Persian democrats.

2. The Turks advanced into Azerbaijan towards Baku in June, 1918, and by the end of July were in occupation of most of the territory of the new Republic. Germany then accepted the position of Turkey being virtual Suzerain of Azerbaijan, but she has never recognized it as a State, and the omission of any reference to it and the assignment of Baku to Russia in the Russo-German supplementary treaty of the 27th August caused loud protests from the Turks and Tabus.

3. From July onwards, Nuri Bey, Enver's brother, was established at Elizabetopol with dictatorial powers, and his stringent measures seem to have been successful in restoring order, but they occasioned great dissatisfaction among the local population. At the same time he pushed on the formation and training of a Tatar Corps. This should be noted in connection with certain political ambitions of Nuri's unconnected with his military operations against Baku. The successful conclusion of these later on the 15th September gained for Azerbaijan its most coveted prize, and the Azerbaijan Government at once moved there from Elizabetopol.

4. But on the 23rd September the Germans obtained from Talant, at Berlin, a secret protocol agreeing to the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Azerbaijan, and the facilitating of communication between Germany and Persia. It appears probable that Talant in signing the above protocol, which amounted to a complete change of Turkish policy in Azerbaijan, was making a virtue of necessity, since he must have fully realized the military situation and the impending collapse of Bulgaria. Four divisions are so far known to have received orders for transfer to Constantinople, while a portion of the troops, which took Baku and were under orders to clear Enzeli, had these orders countermanded. One of the above four divisions has since received orders to stand fast as mentioned in paragraph 6.

5. On the other hand, a wire from Enver to Nuri, reported on the 12th October, said that it was necessary for the Turks, while they were still strong in Azerbaijan, to clear the Russians and Armenians out of that country.* This applied particularly to the Lenkoran and Astara districts since it was necessary to destroy any obstacle which might prevent the Turkish frontier from marching with those of Azerbaijan. From the foregoing and other evidence it is obvious that the Turks intend to secure and maintain a footing in Azerbaijan, including Persian Azerbaijan. This is also shown by their establishment of an independent line of communication outside the boundaries of the new Armenia as restricted by the Turks and by orders for the concentration of troops for operations against the Armenians in Karabagh.

6. It is further significant that Enver's relations are known to be collected in Azerbaijan, and that precautions are being taken to select partisan officers for service there and to despatch further officers from Turkey. The Turks can scarcely expect to annex Azerbaijan during this war, and it seems possible, if not probable, that they intend ostensibly to evacuate their regular troops while retaining a band of Enver's adherents, who may have hoped to exterminate the Armenians before the conclusion of peace, and to secure their position on the plea of self-determination of peoples.

In Baku itself, however, the Azerbaijan attitude appears to be conciliatory towards the Russians but to be entirely hostile to the Armenians, of whom 13,000 are reported to have been massacred after the capture of the town.

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Further colour is lent to this theory by the recent agreement made by the Persian Crown Prince at Tabriz, whereby the two Azerbaijan were to be united, and by the fact that on the 17th October the 5th Caucasus Division, which had been ordered to Constantinople, received counter orders to remain in Azerbaijan and, if necessary, to become subject to the Azerbaijan Government, whose national forces, about 9,000 men, were reported to be incompletely organized at the end of September. Nuri was to visit the North Caucasus at the beginning of October, and, since the Turks are known to favour the union of Azerbaijan and the union of Caucasian mountaineers as being better able to stand as an independent State and as supplying a strong centre for their propaganda, it is most probable that he is working for this, in addition to conducting operations against Nizharukov near Derbend.

7. The Turks by the 18th October, when they were contemplating an armistice, appear to have changed their attitude somewhat towards the Armenians, since on that date Enver issued orders that no Turkish forces were to enter Armenian territory, especially Karabagh, and that Turkish commanders were not to take any part in disputes between the Armenians and the Tatars. This may have been a subterfuge, but it is also reported that the Turks intend playing off the Armenians against the Georgians, the protégés of Germany, by giving the former a disputed district, which might serve as compensation for further Tatar gains.

8. Further, by the 23rd October the Turkish Supreme Command had definitely ordered the evacuation of Persia and the Caucasus outside the Brest-Litovsk frontier, (i.e., outside the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum), and the Eastern Army Group was officially abolished, but the Turks appear to be apprehensive of Armenian action, especially on the part of Andranik, for the Armenians were warned to keep within their existing frontiers and to refrain from any hostile measures.

Meanwhile, in consequence of the Turkish evacuation of Persian Azerbaijan, the Germans at Tabriz and Teheran are anticipating departures* and the German troops are on the point of withdrawal from the Caucasus. But Litten, who is on his way from Germany to assume the post of Consul at Tabriz, is still continuing his journey, and von Kross and the German civilian staff are to remain as long as possible, probably with a guard of 500 men, though von Kross had asked that a larger number of troops should be retained to safeguard German prestige and to satisfy the urgent requests of the Armenians and Georgians.

9. There is, however, no indication of the withdrawal of the 5th Caucasus Division mentioned in paragraph 6, and the general conclusion regarding the Turks is that Enver's party aim at securing the British evacuation of Persia on the ground of Persian neutrality, whilst themselves maintaining an unostentatious "Enverian" nucleus to secure control of a "self-determined" Azerbaijan, thus providing for the future a strong and well-placed centre for Pan-Turanian or Pan-Islamic activity.

10. As regards the Germans, their principal objective appears to be the establishment of a controlling interest in Georgia, where they have issued a loan and have secured considerable political success by the activity of von Kross working through the agency of Chkhenkeli, the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This policy entails control of Baku, and the Germans are known recently to have sent there a party of experts as well as a Consul. Though they are probably relieved at the official withdrawal of the Turks from Azerbaijan, it seems likely that their financial interests are common with those of Enver and his relations, as it is well known that Enver is in the pay of Germany. This point, however, requires confirmatory evidence.

11. The general conclusion is that the Turks and Germans aspire to retain a foothold in Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively, on the plea of self-determination, and that unless this design is carefully watched at the Peace Conference, we may incur serious future military liabilities in the Caspian region.

* On the 25th October, Wustrow, the German Consul at Tabriz, was empowered to make his way to Tiflis with the archives when necessary. As early as the 21st September Sommer, at Teheran, had suggested that Berlin should approach Mehdid with a view to protecting German interests in Persia.

† It may, however, be remarked that, as regards Persian Azerbaijan especially, the Turkish subordinates have shown themselves as oppressive as they well could. On the other hand, 80 per cent. of the population of Azerbaijan are illiterate.

‡ It should be noted that von Kross telegraphed to Enver on the 16th October that the Germans had been obliged to meet President Wilson half way on the question of evacuation, since their peace offer would otherwise have been refused; it was not clear whether that evacuation applied to the East as well as to the West, but von Kross was, if possible, to induce the Georgian Government of their own accord to protest against a German withdrawal. Turkish fears are well illustrated by their anxiety as to possible requests from Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus for recognition from the British and American Ministers at Teheran.

GENERAL STAFF,
WAR OFFICE,
31st October, 1918.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE MILITARY POSITION IN ARMENIA AND THE CAUCASUS.

When the three peace treaties were signed at Batum on the 4th June between Turkey and the newly declared States of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Turks were already in occupation of the districts of Batum, Kars and Ardahan, as well as of parts of Georgia and Armenia, and showed no signs of giving up their advance towards Baku, while they had also entered Persian Azerbaijan and were moving on Tabriz. The military position may therefore be considered under the four heads:- Georgia, Baku, Armenia and Persia.

1. Georgia. Since about the middle of June the Turks have ceased military operations in Georgian territory. They had occupied certain frontier villages near Ozurgeti, the districts of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikh and a considerable portion of that of Borchala, where they had been pushing up the Alexandropol - Tiflis railway, until stopped by the Germans from Tiflis. During the next two months continual negotiations were in process between the Turks, Germans and Georgians over the conjoint questions of the evacuation of occupied Georgian territory and the utilization of the Georgian railways for Turkish troop movements. The weakness of the Germans in Trans-Caucasia for long prevented them in inducing the Turks to evacuate Abastuman and Atskhur, two Georgian towns between Batum and Tiflis, upon which the negotiations had concentrated, but the Germans did succeed very largely in holding up Turkish trains and thus preventing the Turks from concentrating in force at Baku. Finally about the third week in August Enver Pasha appears to have issued orders for the 3rd Turkish Army to evacuate Abastuman and Atskhur, thus removing the obstacle to Turkish use of Georgian railways, but it is still doubtful whether the Turks have evacuated the southern and south-western portion of the district of Borchala, also claimed by the Armenians.

During the period of hostilities the Georgians showed little
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military ability or bravery; there was continual friction with the Armenians; Batum, a place of great strength, is stated by the Italian Consul General at Tiflis to have been captured by 400 Turks; Chkhenkeli, the Georgian Prime Minister, is reported to have agreed to the evacuation of Kars without any reference to the Armenians. The Georgians were undoubtedly in a desperate position but their general conduct has not been at all in consonance with the martial ardour and military traditions so repeatedly emphasized by their apologists. They still had on the 1st July no army and according to the Germans were without the early prospect of creating one, but by the 19th August the Georgian Government had accepted an Army Bill, apparently imposed by the Germans and sanctioning the appointment of German advisers to the Ministry of War.

2. Baku. Although the Germans arrived at Tiflis (the 12th June) before the Turks and thus succeeded in throttling the railway system, the Turks pushed across by road transport to the Tiflis - Baku railway line outside Georgian territory, and as early as the 7th June they had established outposts within 95 miles of Baku and despite German opposition continued to concentrate troops in Azerbaijan. They did not, however, have sufficient forces to push on till the 9th July, when the Baku Soviet troops (mainly Armenians, 7,500 in number) began to retire; in spite of the efforts of the Russian General Bicharakov, they continued to put up little real resistance and by the 20th July the Turks had occupied Khurdalan, nine miles North-West of Baku, Bicharakov retiring northwards. The Baku forces, however, at this point seem to have rallied, since they repulsed two Turkish attacks on the 1st and 5th August (i.e. before the arrival of the 1st British echelon, the 6th August), and made no reply to favourable terms of peace offered by the Turks on the 3rd. A defensive line was held just in front of Baku and only minor operations took place until the 26th August, from which date onwards the Turks resume their attacks, the British finally withdrawing on the 14th September.

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The Baku Bolsheviks during June appear to have been confident and ambitious against the Turks, but they were opposed to British aid in men (report of the 3rd July) and on the 14th July at a meeting of all political parties the Bolshevik Government alone voted against asking for British assistance, while three days later it was reported that they were almost certainly in German pay. But on the night of the 25th July they were overthrown and a new Centro-Caspian Government was set up composed of all political parties. The new Government, whose position was rendered additionally precarious by the arrival of the Bolshevik leader Petrov on the 2nd August with reinforcements, have proved difficult to work with, in particular refusing to grant the assistance of the Caspian fleet in case a British withdrawal was necessary; and on the 23rd August General Dunsterville summed up the situation as being one in which there was general suspicion and lack of cohesion (e.g. the defence troops were apparently at this date still under five different political organisations); he stated that matters were improving and would improve but that the real danger lay in the feeling of security induced by the arrival of British troops.

The Armenians are specifically mentioned in the British reports as to the general friction and lack of co-operation, but now are they mentioned as being exculpated and it is known that the Armenians and Russians are extremely distrustful of each other. On the other hand, the Armenian National Council at Baku, some of whom at the beginning of June were reported to be wavering towards compromise with the Turks, have now disowned the new Armenian Government and the old Tiflis National Council and appear anxious to secure the rectification of the Batum Treaty and the liberation of their compatriots with the help of the British. Though it is impossible to say how far they are influenced by the fear that the calling in of the British, for which the Armenians seem to have been mainly responsible, has made any compromise impossible. Unfortunately the

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evidence available as to the Armenian troops at Baku is not at all favourable. There were at the beginning of July 3,500 well-disciplined Armenians, but this number was reduced to 1,500 by the 10th July owing to sickness and casualties, and little resistance was offered by the other Armenian troops during July. On the 11th August the unreliability of all the troops at Baku, other than the British, was pointed out: on the 17th an attack against Mashtagi failed owing to several Armenian battalions refusing to continue fighting and disbanding to their homes; on the 19th General Dunsterville reported that there was no discipline or organisation among the Baku troops, and on the 20th that the Armenian troops were unreliable: he added to this, however, that until they were organised only the small British force prevented the fall of Baku, thereby implying that they would eventually be of value. Finally, according to information dated the 11th September, the Russians at Baku were strongly opposed to the Armenians; the day before, at a sailors' and workmen's meeting a resolution was passed that as the Armenian administrators and soldiers had proved worthless they should be removed.

3. Armenia. No definite military operations appear to have been carried out in the new State of Armenia (nominally at peace with Turkey) since the end of June, up to which time the Armenian forces were still carrying on guerilla fighting in the rear of the Turks and obstructing Turkish movements. But a continual series of local raids seem to have been carried on during July and August, particularly in the neighbourhood of Echmiadzin, though apparently against the will of the Armenian Government. Thus it is believed to have been Von Kress's opinion on the 4th August that the new Government could not prevent the formation of bands of refugees in constant friction with the Turks; the refugees he stated numbered 7,000 to 8,000 and could not be fed by the Government, who with their restricted boundaries were even unable to feed the permanent population; the Turks were still in occupation of Armenian districts,

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were plundering and devastating wholesale, and even wished to invade the Karadagh and disarm the inhabitants. It was essential for the existence of Armenia that the boundaries of the Brest Litovsk treaty should be restored. This is typical of Von Kress's favourable attitude towards the Armenians, which does not appear to be shared by the Berlin Foreign Office, e.g. Von Hintze stated with reference to the repatriation of Armenian refugees that the wishes of the Armenians should be taken with considerable reserve. And it is certainly apparent that, so far, the Germans have done very little for the Armenians, as compared with the Georgians, despite the appeals of the former.

On the 4th August the President of the Baku Armenian National Council stated that there was an Armenian Army of 25,000 men at Erivan, commanded by Nazerbeko, who were short of supplies and munitions, and that Antranik, the famous national hero, was at Nakhichevan: on the 4th September, after urging the importance of assisting the Armenians in Erivan and the Karadagh, he claimed that the Baku Council was supported by the Armenians of the occupied districts. But, although Antranik, at least, is certainly likely to oppose the Turks to the last, there is no reliable evidence as to how far the settled population of Armenia could be relied on to assist actively in an organised offensive against the Turks; and the present opposition to the Turks in this area, such as it is, is confined to isolated bands, which do not constitute a menace to Turkish military operations. Finally, it should be noted that the Turks have been unable to utilize securely the Julfa railway line, which runs apparently through the Armenian territory near Echmiadzin, and that consequently they have been ^(temporarily?) diverted to the Erzerum - Bayazid - Shakhakhtu line of communications.

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4. Tabriz. The Turkish operations in Turkish Azerbaijan, which began contemporaneously with those into Trans-Caucasia, were originally conducted with weak forces, owing to the claims of the advance on Baku. The Germans were anxious to divert the Turks from Baku against the British but it was not until the British had shown that, despite the threat to their communications, they intended to send troops to Baku and the Turks had concentrated as many troops as they appear to have thought necessary before Baku that they fell in with German wishes for a concentration against the British.

P.S. Since the above was written British forces have evacuated Baku.

FORİN OFİSİN KƏŞFİYYAT ŞÖBƏSİNİN MEMORANDUMU
28 OKTYABR 1918*Enter Russia Sir R. Graf*[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.] 465

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POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,
FOREIGN OFFICE

October 28, 1918.

RUSSIA/016.

MEMORANDUM

ON

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TRANS-CAUCASIA.

[This Memorandum is issued in continuation of Memorandum Russia, 006, and deals with recent events in Trans-Caucasia and their bearing on the relations between Georgians, Armenians, and Tatars, and their future relation to Russia. In particular, attention is directed to the dominant rôle played by the Georgians, their present relation to Germany, and the possibility of detaching them. See also Memorandum Turkey, 006.]

THE revolution of March 1917 seems to have been more immediately productive of desirable positive results, at least temporarily, in Trans-Caucasia than in any other region of the Russian State with the possible exception of Esthonia. This was in great part due to the enterprise and comparative political maturity of the Georgians (see below), whose constituent National Assembly met for the first time on the 19th November, 1917, in Tiflis. The evidence of the possibility of good understanding between the principal national elements in Trans-Caucasia was seen in the formation of a general Trans-Caucasian Government following on the declaration of independence of the country as a whole, which was a definite reply to the Bolshevik coup of the 9th November on the part of a region characteristically non-Bolshevik. This Government was faced, however, with an insuperable task. To begin with, the possibility of a permanent harmonious understanding between Georgians, Armenians, and Tatars was to the liking neither of Turkey nor Germany. Indeed ever since the revolution, Turkey through her agents had sought to permeate Eastern Trans-Caucasia and the Northern Caucasus, using Mohammedan mullahs as her propagandists, for she was afraid that a Trans-Caucasian republic including Georgians, Tatars, and Armenians would separate her from the Tatars in more than a geographical sense, hinder her penetration of Turkestan and eventually develop into a formidable entity which could not be treated as a subservient vassal. Germany, on the other hand, had already decided upon a definite policy which she wished to follow with regard to Georgia.

Of the numerous items in the programme of the new Government (4th December) one was peculiarly urgent. "Recognising the maintenance of unity of the general Russian front," it ran, "the Trans-Caucasian Government Commissioners will take most energetic steps towards the immediate conclusion of peace, being guided in this direction by the general conditions obtaining on the Western front, by the conditions of local life, and in agreement with the wishes of the peoples inhabiting the Caucasus." These local conditions were sufficiently grave. The Russian army on the Caucasian front had been given the order to demobilise, but already great numbers of deserters had been moving to the rear, plundering and destroying as they went. Anarchy was rapidly increasing and the Bolshevik movement progressing. The Trans-Caucasian Government wished to defend their frontiers with Georgian and Armenian troops, but this involved reorganisation and meantime the front was giving way. Accordingly negotiations were begun on the initiative of the Commander-in-chief of the Turkish army between him and General Prjevalsky, the Commander-in-chief of the army of the Caucasus, for an armistice on the whole of the Caucasian front. The latter was "compelled to take the step (of agreement) in consequence of the general political conditions obtaining in Russia": a clause provided against any utilisation of the situation to the detriment of the Allies in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. It appears, however, that the Turks did not keep their part of whatever bargain was actually made. The growing restiveness on the part of the wealthier Tatar landed proprietors against the socialistic proposals of the Government facilitated the work of the Turkish and other agents in sowing distrust in particular between the Tatars and Armenians. It was not in human nature that the jealousies and hatreds of centuries should be completely eradicated in the course of a few months. The secret co-operation

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of the Tatar with the Turks was accompanied by a greater tendency on the part of the Tatar elements to dissociate themselves from the general policy of the Trans-Caucasian Government. The Turks continued to advance and sent a detachment towards Baku with a view to getting into direct contact with the chief Tatar centre. With the threat to Batum, the Trans-Caucasian Government was quite ready to enter into negotiations at Trebizond.

The Trebizond Negotiations.

Accordingly at a meeting of the Trans-Caucasian Diet on the 16th February, 1918, it was unanimously decided to carry on peace negotiations with Turkey. The departure of the representative delegation headed by Tchkhenskeli for Trebizond was postponed because a telegram was received that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was to be signed the following day, in accordance with which Batum, Kars, and Ardahan were made over to Turkey. The delegation wished to make enquiries on this point.

The surrender of these provinces came as a surprise to the Georgians, as these provinces are inhabited by some 350,000 Mohammedan Georgians who had been hitherto guided by motives of nationality rather than religion. Further, according to the treaty of 1783 Russia undertook to return to Georgia all her provinces recovered from Turkey, which were subsequently ceded to Russia by the Berlin Congress of 1878. So far as the point in equity is concerned, it is therefore hardly a question of "disannexation." Indeed, the Turkish Government, before entering this war on the side of Germany, offered to the Georgians to include these provinces in the future State of Georgia and also to give the province of Lazistan as far as the vicinity of Trebizond, which she has occupied since 1465. The very fact that the Turkish Government negotiated the surrender of these provinces with the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk, and not with the Trans-Caucasian Government, shows that she was perfectly aware of the character of her actions.

At the outset of the Conference (the 1st March) the Turks were asked if the evacuation of Kars, Batum, and Ardahan was an intimation of a refusal to continue negotiations. Apparently a direct answer was not forthcoming. The Trans-Caucasian delegation were simply told that the Turkish representatives had come to Trebizond to lay the conditions and requirements of the Porte before them. These were on the lines of wishing to conclude a lasting peace with Trans-Caucasia, and for that purpose the Turkish delegation had been invested with full powers. Indirect pressure was, however, applied from the beginning, and the conference was presided over throughout by the Turkish delegation, Rauf Bey.

The Turkish delegates then asked for precise information with regard to the status of the Trans-Caucasian Government and the Republic which it represented. They were told that after the Bolshevik revolution in Caucasus, a new and independent Government had arisen, responsible to the Diet, and that the Trans-Caucasian Republic was already established with a Government which had entered into international relations, and which protested against the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, concluded without its consent, although it was the case that no notification of the independence of this Government had been sent to the Powers.

At a subsequent meeting the Turkish delegation refused to accept this position, and while not denying that a treaty concluded between two Governments could have no value in relation to a third, insisted that if Trans-Caucasia wished to profit by the rules of international law, a Government should have been formed in concordance with the principles of international law, and steps taken towards its acknowledgment by the other Powers. It further declared that the Trans-Caucasian Government, in an ultimatum of the 23rd January, on the necessity of regulating its actions in accordance with the conduct of other territories which formed part of the Russian Federal Republic, and by the fact that it had not sent representatives to the Brest-Litovsk conference, had shown that it did not consider itself an independent Government, but a member of that Republic. (As a matter of fact the Trans-Caucasian Government had wished to send delegates to Brest-Litovsk, as did the Ukraine, but nothing was done through the active refusal of the Tatar delegates to have anything to do with the matter.) The Turkish Government knew that a Government was in process of formation in Trans-Caucasia, and that it wished to be independent of Russia, but up to the present time there were only Russian troops on the Trans-Caucasian front. Accordingly the Turkish delegation rejected the statement of the Trans-Caucasian Government on the invalidity of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in so far as it related to the Caucasus.

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In reply, the Trans-Caucasian Government pointed out that the Turkish Government had recognised the Trans-Caucasian Government in addressing itself to it from its head-quarters on the 1st/14th January, in respect to a conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Caucasus; and later had notified that it was ready to send its delegates to conclude a peace conference, and to sign a treaty for the conclusion of peace. The Trans-Caucasian delegates held to their position that they now were actually engaged as representatives of a Government in peace negotiations with Turkey, in order to settle the consequences of the war between Russia and Turkey so far as it concerned themselves, with a view to a lasting peace, but insisted that before any ratification of a peace treaty were possible, the independent Trans-Caucasian Government must be recognised with all the formalities required by international law. Apparently the Trans-Caucasian delegates had gone prepared to treat with the Ottoman delegation as equals, bearing their own definite proposals, of which one, namely, the self-determination of Armenia (Anatolia) was rejected as an interference with internal Turkish affairs. The Ottoman delegates now began to unmask themselves, and stated that a definite official recognition of the Trans-Caucasian Republic could only be given by means of a special clause in the treaty, negotiations about which could only be held after all claim to Batum, Ardahan, and Kars had been relinquished.

This announcement caused a suspension of the conference, and some members of the Trans-Caucasian delegation returned to Tiflis to report to the Diet, after which the president of the delegation was invested with full powers, the Diet having decided on the 13th March to abide by its decision regarding the question of peace terms with Turkey, but to attempt to make an honourable peace acceptable to the Caucasus and Turkey. In the end, at the resumed conference, the Turkish delegation was informed that the Trans-Caucasian Government was ready to come to an understanding on the Armenian question acceptable to the Turkish delegation, yet which would allow the Trans-Caucasian delegates in the course of the conference to present the question of the return of the Armenians as Turkish subjects for consideration and decision, as also the refugees of other nationalities. There followed a further suspension in order that the Ottoman delegation might confer with its Government. The reply came in the form of an ultimatum, with a request for the definite and final proposals of the Trans-Caucasian Government within forty-eight hours.

This announcement was immediately sent on to Tiflis, and as the Trans-Caucasian delegation received no further communication from their Government, they surrendered their position at the expiry of the time allotted, and stated that they accepted the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Thereafter on the 31st March Rauf Bey communicated to the Trans-Caucasian delegation that the Turkish Government had been informed of the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and considered it necessary, before summoning their allies to further negotiations, that the Trans-Caucasian Government should declare its independence. On the 1st April, in view of the impossibility of coming to agreement about further Turkish demands, the two delegations agreed to consider the Conference suspended, deprecating, however, the idea of a rupture.

Up to the period of the opening of the negotiations the Turkish forces had been constantly advancing into Trans-Caucasia. Indeed Erzerum seems to have been taken after slight opposition on the day on which they opened (27th February), nor did the fact of the actual deliberations hinder the military activities. In certain sections of the country the Turks received the direct assistance of the Kurds.

The Batum Negotiations.

The Trans-Caucasian Government now considered the possibility of continuing the war, but the Tatar section was opposed to the idea. The Turks continued to advance. Batum was captured (1st April) and Kars threatened, being captured on the 26th April. Opinion now swung towards the other extreme of surrender, and the Turkish invitation to resume negotiations at Batum was readily accepted. On this occasion Germany was also represented, in particular by General von Lossow. The negotiations commenced about the 20th May. The Turkish Government now reiterated their advances on the Brest-Litovsk terms, and demanded in addition the districts of Akhalsikh and Akhalkalaki in the Government of Tiflis and control of the Trans-Caucasian and Julfa railways for the transport of troops during the war. The Georgian delegates refused to surrender the districts in question, and the negotiations were broken off on the 25th May.

The Trans-Caucasian Government ceased to exist after the collapse of the Batum negotiations. *De facto* it had lost its representative character from the date of the fall

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of Kars, when the Tatar elements broke away. The Georgians and Armenians had up till now been maintaining a sporadic defence at various points, but with the continued advance of the Turks a German orientation of the Georgians came into evidence. On their advice the independence of the now reduced Georgia was proclaimed by the Georgian National Government on the 26th May. This was followed by the proclamation of an independent Armenian Republic of Ararat under the protection of Turkey, consisting merely of the districts of Erivan and Etchmiadzin, embracing some 12,000 square kilometres in all. A third republic also proclaimed and placed under Turkish protection was that of Azerbaijan, comprising the Governments of Baku and Elizabetpol and the remaining five districts of Erivan; it was also made to include the Georgian districts of Zakatal and Borchalo. It is perfectly clear that while Turkey wished to maintain a Trans-Caucasian republic, with the Tatars predominant in it, under her protection, Germany was opposed to this plan, as she considered that unless the country was divided in an orderly manner on historical and ethnographical lines between the three nationalities it would not present so suitable a subject for exploitation.

Almost immediately thereafter an ultimatum was addressed by Turkey to the delegates at Batum, who replied that a Trans-Caucasian Government no longer existed. Separate delegations nominated by Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan arrived at Batum on the 4th June and signed a series of treaties accepting the Turkish ultimatum. From the districts of Akhalkalaki and Akhalsikh Turkey could always threaten Tiflis and Kutais, while her domination of Eastern Trans-Caucasia was even more complete.

Meanwhile, on account of the close relations always existing between Georgia and the Ukraine, Tchekhenkeli, the ex-Premier of the Trans-Caucasian Government, went to Kiev, to consult the Rada as to the best steps to take in view of the Turkish aggression. Influenced by what he saw at Kiev, realising the hopelessness of resisting the German or Turkish military power under the circumstances, and with no expectation of Allied assistance, he proceeded to Berlin and sought the intervention and assistance of Germany in the Georgian interests against the Turkish demands. The sequel was a passage in Von Kuhlmann's speech of the 24th June:—

"Turkey, which in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of Peace had received the promise of getting back those districts which she had lost in 1877 to the Russians, found herself obliged quite recently, by the strategic development in Upper Mesopotamia, to utilise the line Batum-Fabriz-Julfa in order to lay a line of communications across Northern Azerbaijan to the Tigris Valley. In its advance from the territories falling to it under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty the Turkish army, as we were informed by the supreme Turkish Army Command, for reasons of safety, pushed the left wing of its advancing troops fairly wide into regions which undoubtedly, according to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, could not come into question for permanent occupation or annexation by Turkey. Both Chief Army Commands have had a thorough discussion on the matter. The Turkish advance to the Caucasus has been, we have been informed, stopped."⁹

On the 26th June 3,000 German troops landed at Poti and proceeded to Tiflis, not so much to act as an army of occupation as to watch the Turks. It is of interest also in this connection to note that while Germany appointed Count Schulenburg as envoy to the Georgian Government, no corresponding appointment was made in the case of the Armenian or Tatar Republics. The same tendency to preferential dealing appears in the Russo-German supplementary treaty, where it is provided that—

"Russia agrees to Germany's recognising Georgia as an independent State. Germany will give no assistance to any third Power in any military operations in the Caucasus outside Georgia or in the districts mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Peace Treaty."

The Constantinople Conference.

The intention apparently was to hold a conference at Constantinople for the ratification of the Batum Treaty. Delegates duly arrived and accounts have been given of certain negotiations there (Turkey, No. 006). There is, however, to date no account in the "Daily Review" Enemy Press Supplement of *political* negotiations at Constantinople

⁹ "Daily Review," Enemy Press Supplement, July 4, 1918.

† "Daily Review," Enemy Press Supplement, September 19, 1918.

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as a result of which the terms of the Batum Treaty were ratified,* while M. Avaloff, accredited Georgian delegate to Berlin, distinctly states in a despatch of the 25th September, handed to Sir H. Findlay, that: "La conférence n'est pas lieu jusqu'à cette date (le 14 septembre). . . ." This, however, is just what might have been expected on the part of Germany, as the terms were much too favourable to her Caucasian rival, Turkey. That there was German purpose in the restricted scope and subsequent prevention of decision in the political negotiations at Constantinople seems to be further evidenced by the terms of the (Brest-Litovsk) supplementary treaties between Germany and Russia.

Nevertheless, the Turks continued their advance in Trans-Caucasia and North-West Persia. This was facilitated by the arrangements made at Batum (and probably ratified at Constantinople) with regard to the use of the railways, although every step in the Turkish progress, which reached Julfa, Hamadan, and Enzeli was distasteful to the Germans. In particular the Tatar population was particularly mobilised with a view to the capture of Baku. This city had been in the early part of April the scene of the only considerable Bolshevik success in Trans-Caucasia, the Tatars proving the strongest anti-Bolshevik element in the place. Unfortunately some of the local Armenians could not resist the temptation to make common cause with the Bolsheviks, and seized the opportunity to pay off old scores on the Tatars. Later, by a small majority, the Russian and Armenian non-Bolshevik elements invited the British co-operation on the 25th July. In spite of the brilliant British interlude Baku fell into the hands of the Turks on the 30th August.

Georgia.

Georgia, historically and ethnographically, consists of the following areas: The Government of Tiflis, the district of Zakhatal, the Government of Kutais, the districts of Ardahan and Olti in the province of Kars, the provinces of Batum and Lazistan, the province of Sukhum, and the southern part of the Black Sea province. Thus the eastern boundary of Georgia is the district of Zakhatal, then a portion of the Government of Elisabetpol, beginning from the station of Evlakh, and thereafter following a straight line down to the north of Alexandropol. The Georgian boundary to the north-west on the Black Sea extends almost as far as Tuapse, which is the old boundary of the Georgian province of Abkhazia. It has been stated that the Tatars claim the whole of the district of Zakhatal, as also the Borchalo district in the Government of Tiflis. Ardahan, Olti, and the provinces of Batum and Lazistan are principally inhabited by Mohammedan Georgians.

The Georgian race is the most compact ethnographical element in the Caucasus, numbering in all about 3,000,000, of whom 2,350,000 are Christians; the remainder, including the Lazis, are Mohammedans.

Under the Treaty of Batum between Turkey and Georgia, Turkey detached from Georgia the following districts: In the province of Tiflis the districts of Akhalsikl and Akhalkalaki, together with the province of Batum, and districts of Ardahan and Olti in the province of Kars, which constitute organic parts of Georgia. In any reconstruction of Trans-Caucasia, they ought to be returned to Georgia for historical and economic reasons. Further, those Georgian Mohammedans, who are brave and intelligent, would furnish Turkey with a substantial fighting force in the event of their being affiliated to Turkey, and such a dismemberment of Georgia and separation of Mohammedan Georgians from Christian Georgians, would mean the formation of a Georgian Irredenta. In any case, the mere fact that these Georgians are Mohammedans furnishes no reason for a Turkish claim over a race that is not Turkish, any more than it does for Turkish dominion over Arabs, Syrians, Mohammedan Albanians, or the Mohammedan Serbians of Bosnia.

The Georgian claim for independence is based in the first instance on the circumstances that that people has had a historical continuity of some 2,000 years, and was able to maintain its political independence till 1801 under a series of most trying circumstances and invasions. Further, the Georgians not merely have the right to self-determination proclaimed by the Allies, but also have their treaty rights of 1783 with Russia, which were violated by that country. Accordingly *de jure* Georgia has full

* In "La Voix de l'Arménie" (1st and 15th July), there is reproduced, "sous toutes réserves," an account of a statement made to a correspondent of the "Politische Korrespondenz" of Vienna by M. Khatemian, in which he speaks of a treaty of peace in fourteen articles having been signed on the 4th July by each of the three Republics with Haïli Bey. In default of other evidence, it seems as if this were a reference to the Treaty of Batum of the 4th June.

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right to determine her position. In this respect she has a stronger position than any other nationality in the former Russian Empire, for she was never conquered by Russia. It is also important to note that the geographical position of Georgia does not bar the way to the sea for Russia like the Ukraine or the Baltic provinces. Georgia in Russian hands was indeed only a bridge for the domination of Persia and Asia Minor. Russia cannot justify her presence in Georgia except from an imperialistic point of view; she cannot strictly say, "I need Georgia." Georgia, finally, is surrounded on the east by the Tatars and Lesghians, semi-barbaric races that have been an occasion of trouble in the past as in the present. On the north she borders with the Kuban Cossacks, who have lived largely to oppress, and on her southern borders she has been contiguous with Turkey, with whom she has nothing in common. Such are the circumstances that constitute the argument in the Georgian mind for the necessity of her independence.

In any case there can be no true understanding of the Trans-Caucasian situation until it is realised that the Georgians rather than the Armenians are to-day the dominating race in that region. Previous to the war, they had rapidly been improving their economical position relative to the Armenians, while they proved their fitness for self-government by their utilisation of the possibilities opened up for the first time by the revolution of March 1917. In ecclesiastical, military, legal, and educational matters they showed alertness and efficiency in the introduction of measures and the organisation of institutions tending to the establishment and betterment of these different aspects of their national life. There is little doubt that nothing in this particular national development escaped the notice of Germany, and that for many reasons Georgia had become a subject of peculiar interest to Germany.

It is worthy of remark that on the 24th June, von Kuhlmann spoke in the Reichstag as follows:—

"The disappearance of the Tsar's Government gives rise to a whole series of questions in the Caucasus. The State of Georgia, which was by far the most consolidated as a nation, aimed from the beginning, after the disappearance of Russian supremacy at building up anew and independently carrying on its national life. Georgia was followed by other comparatively new and insecurely established political entities. Armenia tried to obtain independence as a State. The Tatars also, who form the predominating element of the population in the Eastern Caucasus region as far as the neighbourhood of Baku, combined into the State of Tartary. These three States are trying, on the other hand, to unite in the form of a Trans-Caucasian republic, and thereby to increase their internal strength as a State, and their power of resistance towards the outer world." [Here follows the passage quoted on p. 4.] "The conditions of the future settlement of Caucasian affairs will be settled at the conference in Constantinople. The State of Georgia, with which we have entered into friendly relations, and which we have recognised by a diplomatic exchange of notes as *de facto* existing, has sent us to Berlin its Foreign Minister, with whom we are engaged in a friendly exchange of views. We, for our part, in order to attain a satisfactory insight into the situation of Georgia itself, and the very confused situation in the Caucasus, have sent General von Kress on a diplomatic mission to Tiflis. We wish a prosperous future to the Georgian State and its brave population and rich land—(loud cheers)—and we shall gladly do what in us lies to build up friendly relations between Georgia and Germany."

It is perhaps worth while attempting to find out what lay behind these very marked references by von Kuhlmann to the State of Georgia. From the beginning of the armed organised opposition on the part of the Georgians and the Armenians to the Turks, the latter had been reckoning on the ultimate exhaustion of the supplies of the Georgian and Armenian armies, after which it would be a very easy matter to control the whole of Trans-Caucasia.

The German idea was, however, to use Turkish pressure on Georgia in the same way in which she used the Bolsheviks against the Ukraine, creating a situation in which she could appear the only protector of Georgia against the Turks. It seems as if the intention of Germany was to make Georgia her deputy-governor in the Caucasus and Middle-East, just as she attempted to make Finland her deputy-governor in relation to North Russia, and Bulgaria to the Balkans. These three peoples, while totally different in many characteristics, yet all possess good fighting qualities, and have accordingly been selected by Germany.

The reason of this attitude on the part of Germany to Georgia is not far to seek.

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Armenia, partly on account of the historical massacres, partly owing to the fact that her cause has always had outstanding Armenian personalities like Boghos Nubar Pasha to champion it, has been the subject of West European solicitude for many years. The Georgians, their close neighbours have not attracted the attention of the West in the same way, and it might naturally be supposed that Germany would endeavour to work on any feelings of jealousy, and offer to espouse the Georgian cause on certain terms. This has actually been the case. On more than one occasion, during the latter period of the war, overtures have been made to the Georgians by the Germans, and rejected. The reason for such overtures, apart from the desire to have control over the wealth of the country, has undoubtedly been the circumstance that the Georgians are a fighting race. Organised and properly supported, they could put 250,000 men in the field. The desire to utilize this force, either now or in the future, in connection with her schemes in the Middle and Far East, has been the governing idea in German diplomacy in Trans-Caucasia. The same instinct that realised the existence of pliable first-rate fighting stuff in the Bulgarian and Finn had likewise hoped for the Georgian. Just as the 800,000 Bulgarian bayonets under German influence upset the balance of the forces in the Balkans to the disadvantage of the Allies, so it was hoped that through a similar hold upon the military resources of Georgia, the balance of forces would be upset in the Middle East in favour of Germany, and the military situation of all the Powers interested in this area be thus imperilled. The military importance of a people very often does not depend on the actual number of its army so much as on the presence of that army in the fighting field at a certain place and at a certain time. Already reports are to hand about secret agreements between Germany and Georgia as, e.g., in connection with manganese deposits and the export of various raw materials, but in view of the past history of Georgia these negotiations may still be considered as opportunism in face of complete ignorance of the outside situation and of the presence of *forces majeure*. The situation has features analogous to those in Finland, only the Turks play the part of the Red Guards, but there is nothing to show that Georgia has committed herself to Germany in anything like the same degree that the Finnish Government committed their country to Germany. The probability is that "the urgent message" brought by Gabriel Khuudalze, Diplomatic Representative of Georgia in Bolshevik Russia, from the Tiflis Government to Mr. Wardrop, on the 2nd August, was genuine. It was to the effect that "no party in Georgia was pro-German, but that, on the contrary, all his countrymen looked first of all to Great Britain and then to France as their true friends, and if they had been forced to appear to assume a German orientation this was entirely due to the desperate plight in which they found themselves between the Turks and their wild Moslem supporters on the one hand, and the equally ferocious Bolshevik, of Baku and the Northern Caucasus on the other. The Bolsheviks had thoroughly demoralised the Caucasian front, and this was why Batum, Erzerum, &c., had fallen." On the 9th September Mr. Zourab Avaloff (member for Georgia in the Russian Senate under the Kerensky Government) stated to Sir M. Findlay that "he and others had been to Berlin to ask for recognition of national independence, and that his Government (in Georgia) especially desired recognition by Great Britain and France." This gives an opening for entering into direct communication which might be used very advantageously in the interests of the Allies. The field must not be left to Germany. Confirmation of this reading of the situation is found also in a recent statement by Captain Noel to the effect that "the Georgians realised that they had chosen the wrong side and wished to repair their errors." He urged entering into relations with them and promising them and the mountain tribes of the Caucasus "to use our friendly offices at the Peace Conference to procure a measure of self-government which will give them scope to develop their national and religious ideals." The same conclusion occurs in the following telegram from Mr. Leslie Urquhart: "The Georgians and Mingrelians have been forced to conclude peace in view of break away (?) by Armenians. Tatars were practically neutral. Georgians and Mingrelians come round to our side on first opportunity."

Armenia.

In the solution of the Armenian question, it would seem to be advisable to consider the future centre of Armenia gravitating towards Southern Asia Minor, rather than towards the Caucasus, whither the Armenians have come in past decades mainly as refugees from Turkey during the Russian rule, and been used in part (as, indeed, were the other nationalities likewise by the Russian Government) to promote discord between the Georgians and Tatars. From the point of view of a future satisfactory arrangement

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with Georgia, it is a matter of great importance that no part of the Southern portions of historical Georgian provinces should be included in an Armenian State, since these regions are principally populated by Georgian Mohammedans. For, in that event, two difficulties will at once arise, namely, hostile feeling on the part of Georgia towards Armenia, and the practical impossibility of the latter effectively controlling a territory 70 per cent. of whose population is Georgian Mohammedan, and therefore of different race. All such occasions for conflict between Georgia and Armenia can only be highly detrimental to both races, and will provide the Turks and Germans with the necessary material for intrigues.

Again, the Armenian Socialist politicians have been agitating for the strengthening of the Socialist elements in Georgia with a view to weakening the national feeling amongst the Georgians, and in this way to strengthen internationalism, the idea of which is also repugnant to the majority of the Tatar leaders. They have also been steadily working in the direction of attempting to make Tiflis, the ancient Georgian capital, into a sort of general capital for Trans-Caucasia, an attitude not dissimilar to that of the Jews in Warsaw. Lately the Armenians, deprived of their territory in Turkey, have emigrated into Tiflis and Georgia proper, the number of refugees in the neighbourhood of Tiflis alone running into hundreds of thousands. As Tiflis is cut off from the Kuban corn supplies, and is unable to feed such a great addition to the population, the conditions from the point of view of health and food are serious. It would mean the obviation of a great deal of future trouble if a clear understanding could be reached upon this matter.

Further, from the point of view of the future harmonious relations with Georgia, and in accordance with historical and ethnographical considerations, it is suggested in Georgian circles that the Northern boundaries of the Armenian State should run in a straight line from Erzinjan to Erzerum, thence to Sarakamysh, thence to Kars, thence to Alexandriopol, thence to Erivan, and from that point the whole frontier of Turkey and Persia should be followed down to Van. Such an arrangement implies the inclusion of the whole of the province of Kars, with the exception of the districts of Ardahan and Olti, and the whole of Erivan up to Lake Gokcha. With the Turkish provinces (Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Erzerum, Karpuz, and Kilikia), the Armenians would have a territory largely disproportionate to their numbers, of which to share in the administration.

On the other hand, if under any arrangement Turkey is permitted to retain suzerainty over an autonomous Armenia, the probabilities are that she will tend to push the Armenians on to the Southern portions of Georgian territory seized under the Brest-Litovsk and Supplementary Treaties, and not allow this autonomous (or independent) Armenia to extend further west than Erzerum, thus maintaining physical contact with Persia and the Azerbaijan Tatars, and at the same time creating lasting animosity between Armenians and Georgians.

The Tatars.

With Georgia and Armenia constituted as two independent States—for amicable arrangements for their relationship as good neighbours will follow on the defeat of Turkey—there remains the question of the Tatars. The establishment of the independent States of Georgia and Armenia is necessary in order to interpose a solid barrier which will break down the contact between Turkey and Persia and the Azerbaijan territories. The leading necessity for separating the Tatars and Turks in this way lies in the circumstance that if the Tatars of Eastern Caucasia and Azerbaijan are directly linked up with Turkey, this means that the latter will be in a position to bring under her direct influence the whole of Northern Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. A possible solution therefore appears to be the further creation of an independent Azerbaijan State. These three independent States could be easily controlled as the result of the internationalisation of the Dardanelles and Constantinople. After a period of time, when these three States have consolidated and recovered from the appalling hardships of the war, it probably would not be very difficult to arrange a Federation amongst them, thus forming a Trans-Caucasian Republic with three contributory States. The essential point is, however, that such a Federation must not be attempted before this consolidation takes place, as it would necessarily lead to racial feuds and perpetual disturbances. The principle of Federation can only come as the natural consequence of a long political and cultural evolution; but that it can so come is evidenced in the case of the Balkans and Scandinavia. The great drawback to an Azerbaijan Republic is the illiteracy and total lack of political capacity of the Tatars. The alternative solution, viz., to leave Trans-Caucasian Azerbaijan under Russia seems

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preferable. Such a solution was naturally the German one, as appears from indications in the German-Russian Supplementary Treaty. "Russia will do her utmost to further the production of crude oil and crude-oil products in the Baku district, and will supply to Germany a quarter of the amount produced, or at least a number of tons, to be agreed upon later, per month. In so far as the quantities produced in the Baku district are not sufficient to supply this number of tons, or must be used for other purposes, they will be supplemented by quantities produced elsewhere. . . . Germany will also take measures to prevent the military forces of any third Power in the Caucasus overstepping the following lines: The Kura, from its mouth to Petropavlovskoye; from there onwards, the boundaries of the district Shemakha to Agrioba; thence a straight line to the point where the boundaries of the districts of Baku, Shemakha, and Kuba meet; then along the northern boundary of the district of Baku to the sea."* If this procedure were followed, Daghestan might be added to this Federated State of Russia. On the other hand, the most recent Turkish ambition is to add the Persian Azerbaijan and make the whole a Tatar State.

Relations of Trans-Caucasia to Russia.

It becomes increasingly clear that the question of the Russian Border States is going to be one of the cruxes of the Peace Conference. It naturally arises out of the principle of self-determination, to which the *Entente* Powers are to a great degree committed. The practical difficulty will be in deciding which particular countries and peoples are fit subjects for the application of it. It cannot be applied to the Hererues, but it may be applied to the Estonians; and in the measure in which it is urged by the *Entente* Powers, will the reflex effect be felt in connection with countries like Ireland, Egypt, and India.

It is further obvious that the degree in which the principle of self-determination is urged in the case of the Russian Border States may influence the future relations of Russia and Great Britain, and tend to drive Russia and Germany together. There is no doubt that the centralising instinct is very strong in the Russian character. It may take different forms in a Gourko and a Kerensky, the one following it for military purposes, the other for political control; but it is there alike in both cases, and has to be reckoned with. The educated Russian would not easily school himself to the loss of Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and Trans-Caucasia. Already in many cases he is inclined to suggest that the movements for independence and self-determination in these countries are artificial and the products of British stimulation with a view to weakening Russia. This is of course mere wilful disregard of the facts of the case, and the practical solution can only lie along the lines of deciding, after the most careful consideration, in what cases the claims for economic and political independence are the soundest, leaving open, however, in every instance the possibility of the future return of these States into a Russian Federation.

With regard to Trans-Caucasia, the situation seems to be as follows: The Georgians at any rate are quite unwilling to consider entry into a Russian Federation at the present time; for one reason, such a step will bring them into immediate connection with Northern Caucasasia, which is dominated by Cossacks whose brutal actions in connection with the subjugation and recent political movements in the Caucasus are not easily forgotten, and make the idea of friendly relations difficult to entertain. The record of Liakoff, the present Ataman of the Kuban Cossacks, in connection with his treatment of the native populations in Persia and on the Caucasian front is in itself sufficient to destroy for a long time all thoughts of a rapprochement. There is the further point that the Cossacks are not likely to agree to a republican form of Government, since their institutions are based on a feudal militaristic system. The Armenians will be content to be under international control. The Tatars can hardly as yet stand alone.

For all these reasons independence or semi-independence seems to be the initial step in a possible process of later Federation which could only be realised to-day in a formula; in actuality, only after the process of decades. These constitute at the same time some of the reasons why through recent years the gravitation of Georgia and Armenia has always been towards the Western democracies. Nevertheless, the Caucasian questions are so complicated, and the upheaval and destruction so great as to render even the most recent statistics untrustworthy, and to suggest that probably the wisest decisions will only be reached after an investigation of the actual conditions on the spot by an Allied Commission.

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* "Daily Review" (E.P.S.), September 19, 1918.

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11 Sentyabr 1918

S E C R E T,
O P E R A T I O N S

154943

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From:- War Office.

Desp. 11 SEP 11 1918

To:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

Repeated C. in C. India.

65999 Cipher. Referring to your X.1845 & last sentence in which War Office policy regarding Baku situation is criticised by Dunsterville. So that the conditions under which the Baku ~~expedition~~ expedition sailed may be understood it may be well to review certain telegrams which have referred to this question in the past. Sp X.9026 of 24/5. Dunsterville requests permission to go to Baku with Bicharakoff which is negatived (59064 of 27/5.) by War Office. Dunsterville's proposal (X.9076 of 27/5) to accompany Bicharakoff with one squadron and a company Mesopotamia again negatives. Dunsterville again proposes (X.9257 of 4/6.) to send such troops as are available with Bicharakoff and considers opportunity propitious for occupation of Baku. Mesopotamia suggests that regarding sending British troops to Baku Dunsterville be given a free hand and asks for the approval of War Office. War Office (59665 of 6/6) sanctioned preparation being made but veto despatch of troops to Baku without definite instructions in view of enemy strength in the Caucasus. Dunsterville again (0.744 of 8/6) urges going to Baku, suggesting he could hold out against considerable Turkish forces if Baku knew British troops were en route and suggests that great results might be achieved by a battery and a battalion. On 2/6 (59842) War Office again negatived despatch of troops to Baku in view of supply and evacuation difficulties, but on 14/6 Dunsterville (0.661) again urges occupation of Baku and on 18/6 (0.903) forwards request from Baku for British assistance. On 15/7 the War Office finally have no objection to despatch of small

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force to Baku (62323 of 15/7) but Mesopotamia (X.365 of 18/7) doubts such a force achieving any results), Baku again calls for British assistance (X.368 of 19/7) and G.O.C. Mesopotamia sanctions despatch of one battalion and a battery in which War Office (62655 of 20/7) concur subject to Dunsterville accompanying the expedition and retaining under his control sufficient shipping to ensure its safe withdrawal. The expedition starts but Dunsterville from Enzeli (X.112 of 12/8) now doubts its success and talks freely of evacuation and surrender. Dunsterville is ~~ordered~~ ordered to Baku. Mesopotamia suggests eventually Baku force be limited to 3 battalions in which War Office concur (64910 of 14/8) generally, hoping that oil resources will be destroyed in case of evacuation. Dunsterville (X.1456 of 22/8) from Baku describes situation as critical and asks for reinforcements. Mesopotamia (X.1672 of 26/8) forwards appreciation of situation in Baku to the effect that though Allies may have temporary success there/^{they} will not be able to compete with the eventual arrival of superior hostile forces and asks Dunsterville to state his proposals for carrying out the policy laid down, namely, to obtain possession of sufficient shipping to control the Caspian and to prepare for the withdrawal of his troops. War Office (65442 of 31/8) entirely concur in this appreciation and instructions. Mesopotamia (X.1772 of 1/9) refuses further reinforcements to Dunsterville in view of threatening situation in North West Persia. In view of above it appears to us:

- (A) That the occupation of Baku by a British force urged by Dunsterville.
- (B) That both Mesopotamia and the War Office negatived such

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a policy but finally adopted it with reluctance.

(C) That so soon as the expedition sails Dunsterville finds himself in the very difficulties which the War Office and Mesopotamia anticipated and foresees disaster.

(D) That two of the conditions under which authority was given for the expedition to sail were not complied with, namely, that Dunsterville should accompany it, which he did not do till afterwards and that sufficient shipping for evacuation should be controlled by him which is apparently not the case.

We would also point out that in our 61196 of 29/6, 62323 of 15/7, 62635 of 20/7 and 62829 of 23/7 we doubted whether Dunsterville was the most suitable man for his appointment in which Mesopotamia did not agree. We fully realise the difficult and hazardous nature of the task which Dunsterville was called upon to execute. It was with full knowledge of these difficulties that, in view of the immense importance of the results to be achieved, we took the risk involved and for any failure of the Baku expedition we accept full responsibility. As to Dunsterville's suitability for his present post we have had serious misgivings for some time past. The attitude of recrimination which he now adopts adds to our former misgivings and should you deem it advisable you are at full liberty as soon as the situation permits to relieve General Dunsterville from his command.

H.O.X. Copies to :-
C.I.G.S. H.O.3. M.I.R.a. Col. Pridon.
D.C.I.G.S. H.O.5. M.I.R.b. Lord R. Cecil.
D.F.O. H.O.5.a. M.I.2. Lord Curzon.
D.D.F.O. D.K.I. M.I.2.b. E. Committee.
H.O.2. M.I.1. D.C.D. Lt. Sea Lord.
H.O.8.a. M.I.R. F. O.

MESOPOTAMİYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
13 NOYABR 1918

SECRET.

From: G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia.

To: D.M.I., repeated India, Mudros, and Teheran.

Despatched 15.45 13.11.18.
Received 11.co. 14.11.18.

X.3809 Novr. 13th.

Following information gleaned from Baku newspaper
forwarded by North Persian Force. Begins.

Nuri styled himself Commander of Caucasus Islam Army
up to Novr. 1st, after that date Commander in Chief Azerbaijan
Army. In interview on Novr. 1st Naim Djawad Bey, Chief
Political Officer Caucasus Islam Army declared Porte would
spare no pains to organise strong friendly Azerbaijan Army.
All ranks of Turkish Army now in Azerbaijan will be considered
as in service of Azerbaijan Republic where they will remain
as long as their assistance is required. All males 19 to 24
ordered to mobilize. Nuri's father in Baku. Ends.

Comment.

Above confirms intention of Turks to evade article XI
of Armistice. Turkish ? regulars in Azerbaijan estimated
5th Caucasus Division, 38th and 56th Regiments, 15th Division,
36th Division Total 6700 rifles.

C.2. Copies to:- M.I.l.a.

M.I.l.a. Copies to:- C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.

M.I.2 & b. M.I.R. & b. D.M.O. M.O.2 & A. M.O.5 & A. M.O.X.

I.O. F.O. E.C. Lord Curzon. P.S. to A.G.

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War Office, 158228
Whitehall,

496/13 (M.I.2).

S.W.
SEP 17 1918
13th September 1918

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his
compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and, with reference to his request, in his letter No.
152386/W.44 of the 3rd September, for information as to the
present military position in Armenia and the Caucasus, begs
to furnish the attached memorandum.

Major-General W. Thwaites begs to inform Lord Hardinge of
Penshurst that although in face of facts it is useless to
pretend that the Armenians are satisfactory allies or deserv-
ing of all the sympathy to which they lay claim, this does
not affect the assistance extended to them by British military
commanders wherever practicable. Several thousand Armenians
have been rescued by British troops on the Euphrates, in
Kurdistan and in Palestine, while now a small detachment of
British troops is fighting in the Armenian cause at Baku
against

W.T.

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against heavy odds, with precarious communications and apparently very little effective assistance from the Armenians themselves.

British troops have been handicapped throughout by the great distances to be overcome in Asiatic Turkey and it is only when sufficient transport has been received that really effective assistance can be offered. Major-General W. Thwaites therefore agrees that this is a good opportunity to impress upon the Americans the necessity for sending His Majesty's Government all possible assistance in the provision of transport in the Turkish theatres of war.

*Beard*KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MEMORANDUMU
18 Fevral 1918

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32217

Intelligence Bureau,

Department of Information.

C 19.

SECRET.

18.2.18.

MEMORANDUM ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THECAUCASUS.

The study of the most recent newspapers gives ground for regarding the immediate outlook in the Caucasus as serious, events rapidly moving in the direction indicated in our two immediately preceding Memoranda. "Even to the extreme simple-minded" (writes Nschak, the leading Armenian paper, in its issue of December 26) "it must be evident that Russia and still more the Caucasus is shaken to its foundations". The grave element is that as we foretold, apparently no confidence is felt in the ability of the present Trans-Caucasian Government to cope with the situation. In fact, the same paper intimates that it is convinced "that there is no authority to provide against the crisis and no body capable of even thinking about it". This pessimism seems to be borne out in part by the fact that instead of providing means and measures to meet the approaching crisis, the Government seems to be most busily engaged issuing decrees on the agrarian problem and the suppression of titles. It is apparent that the Bolshevik party is growing in strength and aggressiveness and if, as is probable, they are reinforced by another 25 to 30 thousand troops returning from the front, amongst whom all ideas of discipline and patriotism have disappeared, the Caucasus may be the scene of such chaos as characterises European Russia at present.

In Northern Caucasia there seems also to be growing confusion, although the South Eastern Union is reported as strengthening its position and extending its sphere of action. Even there, however, the Bolshevik agitators and emissaries are hard at work to bring about confusion in order that they may seize the power. The Bolsheviks have gained so much strength already that on December 26

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their agents killed General Karaulov, the Ataman of the Terek Cossacks, along with some of his followers. It appears that Karaulov was returning from Piatagorsk to meet and disperse the Bolshevik troops from the front. At one of the local stations the Military Guard simply shot him and threw his dead body out of the window. This murder of Karaulov is bound to have roused the Terek Cossacks, and this in its turn may introduce a new element of discord between the regular forces and the South Eastern Union.

Another serious danger from the South is revealed in the local expressions of the Pan-Turanian movement. Count Vorontsoff Dachkoff whilst Viceroy (1905-15) settled some hundred thousand Russian colonists on the Mughan steppe along the course, and in the hinterland, of the Lower Araxes. Now that all military protection has disappeared from the Russo-Persian frontier, wild tribes of North-Western Persians, fierce Turco-Tatar tribes of Shahsevans and Karadaghis are moving across the river into the Mughan steppe where they are reported as having massacred thousands of Russian peasant colonists, carried off the women and burnt down farms. These raids by the Shahsebans have caused a serious panic at Baku itself, where national regiments are being equipped to meet them. It is noteworthy that these brigand tribesmen do not spare any of the Tatar or Persian peasants on their way; all are treated alike by Shahsevans and Karadaghis, but so far the greatest sufferers have been the helpless Russian colonists.

The effect of this wide-spread movement of the Persian tribesmen was immediately felt at Elizabetpol, on the main line between Tiflis and Baku. In the last week of December about 3,000 Tatars from the Elizabetpol district raided several railway stations on the main line, killed the railway officials, robbed the buffets and tore up the lines; they also cut down telegraph and telephone-wires and destroyed all communication between Baku and Tiflis. It was proposed to send Georgian and Armenian national regiments to quell

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these Tatar raids, but the Provisional Government, considering that such an action might arouse suspicion among the Tatars, decided to send mixed regiments to keep order at Elizabetpol and to repair the communications.

At Tiflis itself the Provisional Government is working under many difficulties. In almost all civil and municipal bodies the Bolsheviks as yet represent a comparatively small proportion. Nevertheless their secret activity and strength appear to overshadow all the democratic organisations; owing to the increasing numbers of demoralised troops returning from the front, this influence grows daily.

It appears that the Petrograd Bolsheviks sent some time ago a certain Stepan Shahoumian as their Commissioner for organising the autonomy of Turkish-Armenia. This Armenian Bolshevik on arriving at Tiflis expressed himself as against all nationalist manifestations, national regiments, national autonomy and so on. In the local press he openly expressed himself against Georgian nationalism; so he was naturally asked to leave Tiflis, the capital of Georgia. During the second conference of the representatives of the Caucasian Territorial Army Shahoumian gathered round himself 170 Bolsheviks, as against a bloc of 160 representatives of Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries and Nationalists combined; the conference achieved nothing practical. Both sides accused each other of espionage under the old régime and of playing the role of agents provocateurs at present. All this simply tends to strengthen the nationalist movement amongst Armenians and Georgians, and increases the importance of their National Councils relatively to the Provisional Government.

Following upon the signing of the armistice with the Turks, whole regiments appear to have left the front indiscriminately. The Armenian National Council, fearing an inroad by the Turks, has been appealing to the Armenian deserters not to leave their trenches.

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The Georgian National Council has likewise issued a similar appeal. Thousands of Turkish-Armenians have been equipped by the Armenian Military Union and sent already to the trenches left vacant by the deserting Russian regiments. The Armenian Teachers' Union has also volunteered to send several hundreds of men and women teachers to the Erzerum and Erzingan fronts to replace the deserting troops. The Armenian press continues to express its feeling that the moment has arrived when Armenia is going either to be a new Armenia or the graveyard of all Armenians.

The latest information from the Caucasus (dated February 14) only confirms the above. The Russian troops as well as the native soldiers returning from the front are under no control and, besides the Tatars, are pillaging the country in all directions. Civil war is being waged everywhere, revolt and disorders are rife, and the Central Trans-Caucasian Government's authority is practically non-existent.

As we pointed out in previous Memoranda, the National Councils are the only bodies on which any reliance can be placed.

18.2.18.

BRİTANIYA VƏ CƏNUBİ QAFQAZ HÖKUMƏTLƏRİ ARASINDA MÜQAVİLƏ
19 AVQUST 1918

P R O T O C O L .

1. The British Government on the one hand, and the Executive Committee of the Transcaspian Government on the other hand, in view of the common danger of Bolshevism and of a Turko-German invasion of Trans-Caspia and Turkistan, agree to act together with the common objects :-

- (a) of restoring peace and good order throughout Transcaspia and Russian Turkistan,
- (b) of resisting to the utmost all Turko-German projects of military conquest or political penetration in Transcaspia and Russian Turkistan.

2. On their part the Executive Committee of the Trans-Caspian Government desire that the British Government will :-

- (a) undertake the defence of RAKU, which is the door to Russian Central Asia, and on the safety of which the economic life and military power of Transcaspia and Russian Turkistan largely depend;
- (b) garrison the Port of KRASNOVODSK with a view to defending it, with infantry and guns, against any attacks either by Turko-German or Bolshevist forces;
- (c) assist to the utmost of their power the Executive Committee of the Transcaspian Government with British troops, guns, machine guns, aeroplanes, rifles, ammunition and explosives;
- (d) render financial assistance to enable the Executive Committee of the Transcaspian Government to carry on the war and administer the country.

3. In return for such military and financial assistance the Executive Committee of the Transcaspian Government undertaken :-

- (a) to give every facility to the British Government in the use of Caspian Sea shipping;

BRİTANIYA VƏ CƏNUBİ QAFQAZ HÖKUMƏTLƏRİ ARASINDA MÜQAVİLƏ
19 AVQUST 1918

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- (b) to give free access to the Fort of KRASNOVODSK and to render all help in putting that place in a state of defence;
- (c) in case of necessity, to withdraw, in consultation with the military representatives of the British Government, all railway rolling stock of every description so as to make the railway useless to an enemy;
- (d) to destroy in case of necessity all reservoirs containing masout or water along the railway;
- (e) to pull up sections of the railway track and destroy bridges, culverts, crossing places and sidings, and to dismantle telegraph communications, if necessary, with a view to hindering an enemy's advance;
- (f) to raise and train in Transcaucasia further contingents for military service;
- (g) to give facility to the British in such matters as use of railway and telegraph (including wireless), collection of supplies, deputation of British officers to Transcaucasian forces for liaison purposes, and improving for motor traffic such portion of the AKHALAD - AKHURD road as is within Russian limits;
- (h) totally to prohibit the export of cotton from Transcaucasia until such time as they (the Transcaucasian Government) have acquired control of Turkistan; the export of cotton thereafter being only allowed under a system of licenses designed to prevent any cotton reaching enemy hands.

4. On their part the British Government undertakes:-

- (a) to defend BAKU as long as possible, and to endeavour to send as much masout to KRASNOVODSK as circumstances admit;

BRİTANIYA VƏ CƏNUBİ QAFQAZ HÖKUMƏTLƏRİ ARASINDA MÜQAVİLƏ
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- (b) subject to the prior requirements of the defence of BAKU, to defend KRASNOVODSK with infantry and guns against all enemy attempts from the sea;
- (c) to place machine guns now at Manomudabad at the disposal of the Transcaucasian Government for service on the Sovy front;
- (d) to supply further machine guns and ammunition now on their way from India and to train at once not more than twelve selected soldiers of the Transcaucasian Government in their use;
- (e) to supply one thousand rifles, and ammunition, now on their way from India;
- (f) to lend Russian-speaking soldiers of the British Army for the purpose of training from levies in Transcaucasia;
- (g) to give 680,000 rounds of masout ammunition;
- (h) to give explosives for the destruction of bridges etc, if necessary, and to lend experts in the use of explosives;
- (i) to lend additional British troops for service in such areas as may be mutually agreed upon as soon as they can be brought up, bearing in mind that in view of the great length and difficulty of the lines of communication no large forces can thus be made available;
- (j) to endeavour, if the physical obstacles can be surmounted, to lend some aeroplanes to the Transcaucasian Government.

5. The British Government recognise in principle the propriety of affording the Transcaucasian Government financial assistance for the purpose of carrying on the war for the joint aims set forth in Paragraph one of this Protocol. The amount and method of payment to be matters for further discussion between the two Governments, it being agreed that whenever such pay-

BRİTANIYA VƏ CƏNUBİ QAFQAZ HÖKUMƏTLƏRİ ARASINDA MÜQAVİLƏ
19 AVQUST 1918

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ments be made a financial representative of the British Government shall be attached to the Transcaspian Government and shall have, with the latter Government, joint control over disbursements made from any free grants in aid by the British Government.

6. (a) As regards control of military forces lent to the Transcaspian Government, it is agreed that whenever any British military force is lent to the Transcaspian Government for a specific purpose, such as the defence of KRASNOVODSK, or the front towards TASHKENT, such force shall not be diverted to any other place without the prior consent of the British Government; but, that subject to this reservation, such forces as are lent for service on the front towards TASHKENT shall be under the ~~supreme~~ command and comply with the orders of the Transcaspian Commander on that front, such orders being conveyed through the agency of a British officer attached to the Transcaspian Commander for liaison purposes. After the arrival of artillery at KRASNOVODSK a portion of it, in connexion with the general situation on the fronts, may be transferred to the Eastern front on agreement on the subject between the Transcaspian Government and the British Government.

(b) As regards the defence of KRASNOVODSK, which is a local and naval matter, any British forces in KRASNOVODSK for this purpose would remain under the sole command of the British Senior Officer, a representative of the Transcaspian Government being attached for information and liaison purposes.

7. The representative of the British Government for all purposes of this Protocol is Major General W. Mallison.

(8) On behalf of the British Government I guarantee the continuance of military and financial assistance

BRİTANIYA VƏ CƏNUBİ QAFQAZ HÖKUMƏTLƏRİ ARASINDA MÜQAVİLƏ
19 AVQUST 1918

5.

so long as your Government maintains itself in power and has as the main planks in its political platform the restoration of order and the suppression of all Pilsnevich or Turko-German intrigues or projects for invasion.

(Signed) W. Mallison, Major General
Commandant. Commissary for Foreign Affairs, V. Doknov.
18th August, 1918.

Handwritten notes and signatures:
"I have signed."
"S. C. I."
"W. Mallison"

KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MEMORANDUMU
16 YANVAR 1918

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SECRET.

Intelligence Bureau,
Department of Information.
C. 15.

MEMORANDUM ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE CAUCASUS.

(16 January, 1918.)

10284

JAN 17 1918

I. General Situation.

Following the examples set by the Ukraine, Siberia and the South-Eastern Union or Kuban, Trans-Caucasia has established a Republic and a Central Executive Committee to take over the charge of affairs until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. On November 7/20 the Executive Council of the Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies in Tiflis, which is Menshevik or Moderate Socialist in outlook, assisted by the Nationalist party leaders, formed itself into a Committee of Public Safety with a view to saving the country from conditions similar to those which marked the Bolshevik access to power in Petrograd and Moscow. To further the cause of Trans-Caucasia and the defence of the front, a further meeting of representatives of every political and nationalist party and industrial union took place on November 11/24 in order to recognise a central authority in Trans-Caucasia. At this meeting the following resolutions were passed:

(1) Until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, to entrust the defence of Trans-Caucasia and the front to the Committee of Public Safety, consisting of representatives of the revolutionary democracy, public bodies and nationalities.

(2) To settle problems of a local character alone.

(3) To base their authority on the Soviets, on *Local Dumas* and public representative bodies.

Two days later the three Special Commissioners for Trans-Caucasia were invited to join this Government, of which Mr Gueguetchkori was elected President and Mr Tchekhengeli

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Commissioner for Home Affairs. It has been chosen on a proportionate national basis from representatives of the proletariat and bourgeois parties. Against all this procedure the Bolsheviks entered a protest.

Information received at the beginning of the month referred to the gradual spread of anarchy throughout Trans-Caucasia, corresponding with an extension of Bolshevism. The general situation had become alarming in the Southern Caucasus, and Turkish Kurds, Persian bandits, Moslem troops and Russian soldiers returning from the front were causing widespread destruction and loss of life. We are not in a position to give the quite latest news; but the situation is hardly likely to have improved, whilst Turkish emissaries are stirring up the country and recommending a further massacre of Armenians.

The results of some recent elections to different Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies show a decrease in the Menshevik or Moderate Socialist vote and an increase in favour of the Nationalist and Bolshevik parties. Naturally, the latter are particularly resentful against the smaller nationalities making use of the Revolution to develop their particular national ideals. Particularly symptomatic in this respect are the results of the municipal elections in Baku. The Socialist bloc obtained 25 places; Dashnaksutiun (Armenian) came next with 17, closely followed by the Bolsheviks with 16; thereafter came the Musavet party (14 places) and the Mussulman United Bloc (11 places); the Cadets have only 6 places. It should be noted that the two Mussulman blocs together polled a thousand more votes than the Socialists. Further evidence of the intensity of national feeling may be gathered from the circumstance that when Bolshevik individuals of the demobilised Russian Tsaritsin Regiment began looting and

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plundering in the town of Kutais they were promptly rounded up by Georgian soldiers, put into a train and sent out of Georgia.

2. Allied Relations with the Caucasus.

The following extract from Sakhartvelo, the leading Georgian newspaper, under date of October 25 (which has only recently come to hand), may be taken as representative of Georgian feeling.

"We are in possession of reliable information that the Baku Tatars are in constant communication with the Young Turks in Constantinople and are getting ready for the time when they can render assistance to the advancing Turks and the Germans.

"The Western Allies, France and England, are doing nothing at all to assist us beyond negotiating with some adventurous Armenians. In this we are placing them in the position of representatives of the Caucasus. Such an attitude on the part of England and France constitutes an insult towards the Georgians and Tatars and is going to produce most deplorable effects for the Armenians and themselves. The Western Allies have always been late in assisting small nations; we are sure they will be late also in our case, thus enabling Germany to enter into our country, where we have no ammunition and nothing with which to defend ourselves. England and France have looked for decision to Petrograd, and for that reason endangered their own position and ours as well".

The above is written from a keenly Nationalist point of view and has, therefore, to be discounted to a considerable extent; but it indicates elements in the situation which may be easily overlooked with unfortunate results. The present Caucasian Central Government is international in outlook and worthy of all support, but it is not easy to suppose that the animosities and suspicions of centuries can be eradicated in the course of nine

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months, and the cohesion of the Government may not be very great. On the other hand, each of the three principal nationalities, Georgian, Armenian and Tatar, has its own National Council on which, with minor exceptional elements, they will at once fall back on the indication of any serious local trouble. These National Councils at this stage therefore represent a more permanent element, and the Realpolitik of the Caucasus hinges upon them. They cannot be ignored in view of possible eventualities. The general tendency in Trans-Caucasia since the Revolution has been for the nationalities to increase in strength and to improve their organisation, while Non-National, All-Russian and Bolshevik organisations have not made a corresponding progress.

If this is the case, however, it must be remembered that the Georgian and Armenian nationalities are on about equal terms, and in the event of the Allies entering into relations with them, preference for one or approaching one through the other, or indirectly, would infallibly arouse the jealousy of the other, and lead to trouble. It happens that, owing to their tragic history, the Armenian people has been brought into more direct contact with the European Powers than the Georgians, and they also have several very able, outstanding personalities both locally and abroad to represent their interests. On the other hand, while the Georgians fail in this respect, they are much the more numerous people and, particularly since the Revolution, have made much more rapid strides than the Armenians in the consolidation of their national interests. Further, in the years immediately preceding the war they had been gradually drawing level with the Armenians both in business enterprise and in political control, especially in Tiflis; and they would probably be able to provide fighting forces on as great a scale as the Armenians if approached directly. The

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Georgians are gentlemen and good fighters, and are prepared to fight not merely in defence of Georgia, but against the possibility of Turco-German domination in Asia Minor. They are prepared to fight for the existence of an autonomous (late Turkish) Armenia, as, if they did not, it means that there would be further Armenian pressure on their own territory. They are also prepared to fight in defence of the Trebizond vilayet in particular, and the country of the Lazis, who are Mohammadan Georgians.

In order to keep a strong hinterland it is necessary that the nationalities should remain in harmony with each other and loyal to the Central Government, which is largely composed of members of these different National Councils. This, however, will not be easy, since their interests are conflicting, especially in the case of Armenians and Tatars, while the religion of the latter makes them definitely hostile to the Allies. Turco-German propaganda has been at work among Tatars and Georgians trying to make them fall out with the Armenians, and the conciliatory spirit which existed among them all at the beginning of the Revolution is, at the moment, on the wane. The circumstance that the Tatars, who were not subject to conscription under the old regime, have also started to form an army under the leadership of their own Council at Baku is a serious factor in the situation, considering that the Tatar nationalities are anti-Armenians and pro-Turk. All this means that the Georgians hold the key to the situation, inasmuch as disregard of them would drive them into neutrality. This would imply the loss of a definite amount of hold on the Tatars and the certainty of renewed massacres of the Armenians by the latter. Newspaper reports of trenches more or less thinly manned by the Turks may be a feint to cover an advance on Tiflis later in the spring.

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3. Georgian National Interests.

These are being continually urged with very marked insistence. The Georgian demands are for the observance of the ancient treaties with Russia, guaranteeing her (1) her own elected Government, (2) expedition of her own business affairs, (3) Courts of Justice and the use of the Georgian language for educational purposes as being the speech of the peasantry and industrialists, and (4) autocophaly of the Church and maintenance of a national army, (5) inviolability and indivisibility of treaty boundaries. The determination is expressed to defend these rights not merely before the Constituent Assembly, but at the Peace Conference. The present Georgian point of view may perhaps be given typically in a few sentences from the speech of Mr Chenkeli, Minister of the Interior in the present Caucasian Government, before the Petrograd Preliminary Parliament in the end of September:

"... Russians do not seem to have any national self-consciousness at all, and I am ashamed, as the representative of a small nation, to have to teach you a lesson in that respect. So far as the attitude of the Bolsheviks is concerned, I consider it absolutely ruinous for Russia, as she is herself totally devoid of national self-consciousness. Let us, on the other hand, beware of too much nationalism, as this is going to lead to our domination by Germany, in which case we shall be cursed by the organised democracy of the Western Allies. We Georgians will patiently wait until the Russians recover their self-consciousness; should we be disappointed there is nothing left to us but to look after ourselves and defend our independent political existence".

The consciousness of the national strength may be further judged by the calmness with which the Georgian press is regarding the Tatar endeavours from Baku to isolate the Georgian Mussulmans,

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in particular the Adjartsı, and this in spite of the fact that the latter revolted in 1914. A Conference of Georgian Mussulmans was held in the town of Akhaltsıkh at the end of October. The general feeling seems to have been that religion and nationality ought not to be presented as two mutually exclusive elements, and that good Mussulmans could also be good Georgians. The Christian Georgians have no fear of the movement, particularly in view of the general drawing together of Georgians and Tatars as against the Armenians in connection with the introduction of Zemstvos and other contentious matters.

The Georgian nobility, having decided to acquiesce in the abolition of titles and ranks as proclaimed throughout Russia, have been faced with the question of the disposition of certain lands and property amassed by the nobility as a class. It has been decided voluntarily to surrender these in the educational interests of the Georgian people as a whole, a decision which is quite in accordance with the generous instincts of the Georgian race. A special governing body composed of representatives of the towns, Zemstvos, educational institutions and political parties is to be formed to hold the property temporarily until the Georgian Representative Assembly can make some permanent decision.

4. Introduction of the Zemstvo.

The Armenian Dashnaksutiun party have taken up the attitude that there must be no introduction of Zemstvos without a previous change of administrative boundaries in certain cases. Their reasons for adopting this attitude may be summarised as follows:

The last administrative changes of boundaries were made in the late sixties more in the interests of the bureaucratic desire to

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break up the Armenian majority in certain provinces than on any sound economic or ethnographical lines. The 1,700,000 Armenians of Trans-Caucasia are found for the most part in the Governments of Erivan, Elizabetpol and Tiflis, and partly in Baku and the districts of Kars. In the 19 districts inhabited by Armenians, the latter form a majority in only 6, their minority in the other 13 being due to the unnatural distribution of the boundaries.

While the Armenian suggestions for readjustment are quite reasonable in general, they are open to serious criticism in some respects. The most widely accepted Armenian proposal would give 15 Armenian districts where 60% of the population is Armenian, but where, by their scheme of distribution, they have arranged to secure a majority for themselves in 10 of these districts. They also make claims on the southern areas of the Government of Tiflis, to which the Georgians will never consent.

The result of these claims is seen in the formation of a Georgian Mussulman bloc against the Armenians whenever the matter has come up for public discussion. The whole question was referred to the Provisional Government last summer, which decided to introduce the Zemstvo at once in those provinces and districts about which there was no dispute and to postpone the introduction elsewhere until after the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, when an attempt was to be made to bring about agreement between the contending parties. This decision was considered at a Conference of the different Caucasian parties held under the presidency of Chenkeli at the end of October. The Georgians and Tatars supported each other and carried a resolution introducing the Zemstvo in Georgian and Tatar areas without redistribution and postponing the settlement of those areas which were under dispute. The Dashnaksutiun representatives left the meeting in protest.

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5. Administrative Problems.

There have been signed articles in the Kavkazhoe Slovo and Vozrojdenie drawing attention to the chaotic administrative conditions still prevalent in Turkish Armenia, in spite of the expenditure of 10 million roubles subsequent to the great loss of Russian lives in conquering the country. The type of official enlisted by General Pyeshkoff in the autumn of 1916 was totally unsuitable. Many of the old "administrative orders" have remained in force. The police were certainly changed and the Governor-Generalship was converted into a General Commissaryship, but the administrative organisation brought into being by the General Commissary has done comparatively little to relieve the distress, and left the vital issue of practical aid to local charitable societies. Wandering Armenian refugees have been attacking Tatar homesteads in desperation, Tatars have retaliated on Armenians, and further trouble has developed from the steps taken to put matters right. It is urged in the articles in question that even yet the "old regime" plan of setting nationality against nationalist is followed; that competent administration must be introduced at once, the whole administrative body reorganised and broad democratic elements of citizenship introduced.

It may be noted that the Dashnaksutiun party passed the following resolution, amongst others, at their last meeting in Tiflis with regard to Turkish Armenia:

"Starting from the general position that the Turkish Armenian question has been an international one from the beginning, and that the independence and separate administration of the conquered provinces are secured by the enactments of the Hague Convention and that this situation is further acknowledged by a declaration of the Russian Democracy on April 14, 1917, and of the Provisional Government on July 8, this session of

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Dashnaksutiun acknowledges the absolutely essential separation of the Commissaryship of Turkish Armenia and its direct relationship with the Central Government, and will determinedly oppose the proposal made in different Caucasian circles of an administrative union of Turkish Armenia with the Caucasus proper".

16.1.18.

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Secret.
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Intelligence Bureau,
Department of Information.
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26755

Memorandum on the Political Situation in the
Caucasus.

General Situation.

So far as we know the Trans-Caucasian Government is still in existence. The tearing up of the railway line between Baku and Elizabetpol has, however, prevented the transport of consignments of flour from the Kuban district to Tiflis and is thus producing a food crisis which is becoming increasingly acute. In normal times Georgia, for example, imported 50 million poods of grain from the Kuban district annually, but cannot get at present even at the rate of a quarter of that amount. The Ukrainians were prepared to send grain from Odessa by boat, but the Black Sea Fleet, which is in the hands of the Bolsheviks, intimated their intention of preventing this except on the condition that the Trans-Caucasian Government should become Bolshevik. It seems probable, therefore, that within a short period the Trans-Caucasian Government will be faced with an acute food crisis which may eventuate in riots and ultimately in its overthrow. In that case it may be expected that the Russian army in Persia will get more than ever out of hand and commence pogroms in Persia and Armenia. It is stated that already the Persian population in Gilan and Mazandaran has been decimated by the Russian soldiery. If it is the case that the present Trans-Caucasian Government has definitely demanded the withdrawal of British troops from Turkey in Asia on the basis of "no annexations", this only strengthens the necessity for the Western Powers keeping in direct touch with and placing most reliance on the National Councils, since the Federal Council (Trans-Caucasian Government) is theoretically opposed to the dismemberment of Turkey. In the case of

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a no-annexation policy being adopted Lazistan might be lost to the Georgians - the actual Bolshevik proposal being that the province should decide by referendum if it wants to remain in Turkey or rejoin Georgia - and Armenia in Turkey being either restored or made autonomous would result in increased Armenian pressure on the present Georgian territory.

Constituent Assembly Election Results.

Confirmation of some of the possibilities and tendencies outlined in the previous paragraph may be further found in the results of the Constituent Assembly election for the town of Tiflis, the figures of which have just come to hand. The principal parties polled as follows:- Mensheviks 36,755; Dashnaksutiun 19,462; Bolsheviks 17,620; Social Revolutionaries 11,526; Cadets 9,462; Social Federalists (Georgians) 3,445; Georgian National Democrats 3,262. Analysis shows that the garrison voted mainly Bolshevik and Social Revolutionary; the prisons voted Bolshevik almost unanimously. The outstanding feature, however, is the presence and growth of a Bolshevik electorate whatever the explanation of its origin.

Declaration by Trans-Caucasian Government.

On December 4 a declaration was made by the Commissioners of the Trans-Caucasian Government to the people of Trans-Caucasia, from which the following extract may be given, in which their policy is outlined. By inference it also provides a picture of the conditions obtaining at present in Trans-Caucasia.

"Definitely to improve the disorganised finance; to save the army and population from impending famine by securing supplies for them; to improve means of transport and ways and communications; regularly and healthily to demobilise on conclusion of peace; to protect public order; to exercise control over production and distribution, and by all means to protect the interests of labour and those of the working

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classes; immediately to introduce a democratic Zemstvo; to reorganise the tribunals and organs of administration; immediately to organise democratic land committees in places in which they do not exist, so that they should take over the management of Appanage, State and Church lands, and also privately-owned lands belonging to large proprietors, the promulgation of the confiscation of which will follow in the immediate future, together with a declaration regulating all land questions and to prepare them for the Constituent Assembly Land Legislative body; the immediate abolition of all class privileges and institutions created for the purpose of protecting the interests of privileged classes; to establish good neighbourly relations with contiguous peoples on the basis of their recognition of revolutionary principles.

"Adhering to the point of view of complete self-determination of nationalities proclaimed by the Russian Revolution, the Commissioners of Trans-Caucasia will take steps to come to a rapid and equitable solution of the national questions in Trans-Caucasia.

"Regarding the maintenance of unity of the general Russian front the Trans-Caucasian Government Commissioners will take most energetic steps towards the immediate conclusion of peace being guided in this direction by the general conditions obtaining on the Western front, by the conditions of local life and in agreement with the wishes of the peoples inhabiting the Caucasus".

The Conclusion of an Armistice.

Conformably with the policy outlined in the preceding paragraph the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Caucasus intimated on December 5 to the Consuls of the Allied Powers in Tiflis his acceptance of the proposal for an armistice on the whole of the Caucasian front received by him from the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army. The Russian Commander-in-Chief intimated that he was "compelled to take this step in consequence of the general political conditions obtaining in Russia". His acceptance of the "humane" proposal is further stated to be "in no way directly against the Allies of Russia, their interests being safeguarded by a condition imposed upon the enemy fully and immediately to cease proceeding with all strategic regroupment movements which might injuriously affect the English Army in Mesopotamia". A protest was lodged by the foreign Consuls against "the initiation of proceedings elaborating terms on the basis of which an armistice was to be concluded without the knowledge of our Governments".

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Georgian Affairs.

The Georgians continue to show enterprise in the reorganisation of their national life in all its aspects. Latterly the Georgian National Council has arranged a general registration of its man-power in order to be able to mobilise their forces for the economic organisation of the country. All the available professions are being classified, after which each individual will receive a card and so be ready to undertake specified work of national importance when called upon.

In addition to the re-establishment of the independence of the Georgian Church, the creation of a national army, the formation of national schools, the opening of a national university and mobilisation of man-power, the Georgians are also taking steps for the establishment of their own law courts. A special Commission composed of Georgian barristers is engaged in working out a scheme for this particular reform. During the past hundred years the Georgian peasantry have suffered untold injustices under the procedure of the Russian Law Courts, having to plead or defend themselves through Russian interpreters, a system that lend itself very easily to unlimited bribery and abuse; but with Georgian judges and the use of the Georgian language some of the more obvious forms of injustice will be removed.

Georgian Manganese Ore Industry and its Importance for the War.

Attention may be drawn to the importance of the Georgian manganese ore industry for the war. In spite of the repeated attempts of foreign capital, 65% of the entire industry is still in Georgian hands; 15% has been in the hands of German capitalists directly connected with Krupps, and in her extension towards the East, Germany has continuously had her eye upon this Georgian industry. During the old regime a Swedish group of capitalists,

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which was in close touch with Germany, endeavoured, it is said through Rasputin's influence, to prevent the sale of German property here and desired to secure it for themselves. But this effort was frustrated through a very powerful protest on the part of the Georgian nobility.

Georgian-Tatar Relations.

It is now possible to give the decisions reached by the Congress of representatives of West Georgian Mohammedans held at Akhalzykh for the purpose of establishing complete unity with Georgian Christians. They are as follows:-

- (1) The establishment in the Western part of Georgia of Georgian modern/schools.
- (2) The complete elimination of all Turkish influence, as "although we have the Mohammedan religion in common with the Turks we are Georgians by race and therefore cannot recognise Turkish influence".

The Congress further referred to the "following established facts: that the Albanians, Egyptians, Arabs, Syrians and Persians, although having a religion in common with the Turks, have separated themselves from Turkish political influence; therefore all attempts of the Turkish leaders to establish a Pan-Islam movement in order religiously to control all Moslems will be frustrated".

Georgian-Tatar-Armenian-Relations.

There is still evidence of considerable feeling against the Armenian national claims in the form of protests from the local inhabitants of the threatened districts. It may be recollected that in the programme drawn up by Dashnaksutian claims were made for (1) the whole of the Erivan Government; (2) the South-Western part of the Government of Elizabetpol (the Tatars absolutely refuse to consent to such claims and are even threatening to eject

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the minority inhabiting the above-mentioned parts); (3) the district of Akhalkhaki and half of the district of Borchalo (the Georgians entirely refuse to consent to these claims to their historical territory on which, they state, they have a majority of 65%, and declare that they will resist any unjustified attempts of this kind with armed force).

Anglo-Russian Commission in Petrograd.

The following extract is from the Georgian newspaper Sakhartvelo under date November 13:

"The above-mentioned Commission, besides maintaining a general propaganda in Russia, is also interested in the Caucasus. We welcome the activities of the Commission so far as they are concerned in telling us what Great Britain is doing in this war, but unfortunately so far as the English press is concerned they do not show much interest or knowledge in the affairs of the Caucasus, and it will therefore be desirable that the Anglo-Russian Commission should influence the British press in that direction. Needless to say the German press and leading public opinion takes an intense interest in the Caucasus and is publishing many works".

9.2.18.

SER Ç. MERLİNQİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
9 MAY 1918

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MAY 11 1918

PERSIA

MILITARY.

Decypher of telegram from Sir C. Marling (Teheran).

May 9th. 1918.

D. 5.15 p.m. May 9th. 1918. 537

R. 3.20 p.m. May 10th. 1918.

No. 396.

Following from Consul at Tabriz May 9th, begins:

Nouri Pasha (there is some scepticism as to whether he is Enver's brother) arrived yesterday with 30 Turkish officers and men. They told some Persian officers of Cossack Brigade who called on them that they are part of General Staff of Turkish Army of 15,000 men which has three objectives: - (1) Kars; (2) Er^{van}; and (3) Via Ardebil, Astara and Baku to annex to Turkish ^{by} Mussulman regions of Caucasus.

They consider Azerbaijan as belonging to Turkey but Russian Consul General thinks that they mean old frontier west of Lake Urumia.

They said that only General Staff and its requisite personnel would come to Tabriz which would be its headquarters (on the other hand, Governor General again told French Consul this morning that Nouri Pasha would only stay a few days) and they had no hostile intentions against anybody who would not interfere with them or their objects.

Vali-Ahd

SER Ç. MERLİNQİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
9 MAY 1918

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Vali Ahd is now reported to have changed his mind and said that as he did not leave when Russians came he would not do so (group omitted; ? if) Turkish troops came, on the other hand, my French colleague tells me His Highness violently abused Turks to him yesterday. Cossack Brigade has been ordered on no account to leave.

There has been no wireless news from Tiflis since General Karpoff left Julfa with his staff two days ago. There are however some Armenians left to work wireless.

There is now a tendency on the part of the French and United States Consuls and many Persians to regard Turkish menace on Azerbaijan as a bluff, Russian Consul General is still pessimistic; personally all I can say is that if Turks want to come Persians are much too feeble and split up in cliques ever to resist them.

Sent to Teheran, Dinsterville.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to Government of India No. 396, Bagdad.

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN TELEQRAMI
12 OKTYABR 1918

WAR DEPARTMENT.

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This telegram opens up the possibility that, before the Turks evacuate Persian Azerbaijan, they may carry through a "plebiscite" there, declaring the separation of the province from Persia and its union with Russian Azerbaijan and Baku in an independent "Turanian" State.

The Persian Crown-Prince would be a good Turkish candidate for the throne of this new principality.

Hitherto (i.e. during the period between the beginning of the Russian Revolution and the present Turkish occupation of Tabriz) the Persian Azerbaijanis have apparently rejected similar proposals from their Russian fellow-countrymen.

This was natural, since Tabriz was the centre of the Persian Nationalist Party, and the Persian Azerbaijanis hoped that, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the war, both Russian and English influence in Persia would be brought to an end, and Persia received into the Turco-German Alliance.

As "Turaniens" in language and at the same time leaders of the Persian Nationalist Party, the Persian Azerbaijanis had everything to gain politically by remaining inside Persia, if Persia's foreign relations developed in such a direction.

Now, however, it is clear that British influence will not merely remain, but will extend to the whole of Persia as fast as the Turks evacuate it. And the Persian Azerbaijanis, being anti-British and pro-Turk, and in many cases personally committed to the enemy (e.g., their most talented leader, Taki-Zada, has been for many months at Berlin), may in these circumstances prefer to sever their connection with Persia altogether.

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN TELEQRAMI
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Thus a plebiscite, taken by the Turks on the eve of their departure, might have genuine popular support, and would place us in an awkward situation.

To disregard it would be difficult in view of our championship of the principle of "self-determination" in the Arab countries, Armenia, etc. To countenance it would perplex our relations with the Persian Government.

The request of the Russian Azerbaijan Republic for recognition by H.M.G. ought to be considered in the light of this possibility.

If we recognised Russian Azerbaijan, and then Persian Azerbaijan immediately declared union with it, the position would be very difficult for us indeed.

A. J. T.

12.10.18.

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15 MART 1918

*Memorandum on the Current
Situation in
Russia
March 15th 1918*

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The Trans-Caucasian Provisional Government.

So far as our information goes, the Provisional Government of the Trans-Caucasian Republic, or so-called Commissariat, which came into existence on November 26th, 1917, is still at the head of affairs. It will be recollected that it was a Coalition of all the Socialist Democratic elements (Menshevik only) in Trans-Caucasia, and was to act until the All-Russian Constituent Assembly should meet. One result, however, of the National Georgian Assembly (see below) has been to bring out its artificial and temporary character into the strongest possible relief. References to it both in speech and writing on the part of the Georgian community indicate that they regard it, and what it represents, merely as a passing phase. The new Caucasian Republic, they argue, lacks historical tradition. It is a geographical rather than a political and national unity and is as artificial as, say, a Balkan Federated Republic would have been. They consider that it will be "very difficult to maintain in one frame two rival Christian races like the Georgians, who are the legitimate owners of Eastern Trans-Caucasia, and the Armenians, who are largely guests in Trans-Caucasia, or to combine these two Christian races with the Tatars, who are still on a very low level of social development" (Zakharvilev, December 1, 1917). The adoption of such an attitude will naturally make it very difficult for the Provisional Government to work smoothly. It seems as if precious time and energy may be wasted in adjusting rival claims, and that in the end the Trans-Caucasian Republic will again split up into three independent republics - Georgian, Azerbaijan (Tatar) and Armenian. This process may, however, be temporarily hindered by the following considerations: (1) The mere recognition that affairs will eventually develop naturally in this direction may incline the constituent elements

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to prolong the regime of the Provisional Government in order to employ the interval for the conservation of the national energy. (2) Under the Provisional Government, the country may be better able to meet the conditions produced by the retirement of the starvin: Russian troops from the Turkish front, on the one hand, and the impending Turko-German invasion on the other. (3) Under the Provisional Government the Georgians in particular will be better able to safeguard their territory from any claims that may be made on the part of the South-Eastern Federated Republic. The latest Georgian papers (and of December 1917) show a very marked desire for the closest of arrangements and understanding with the Armenians in view of the coming common danger.

The Provisional Government has taken measure for issuing its own money - about 50 million roubles. The Notes are to be secured on the combined property of ^{all} the Trans-Caucasian Municipalities.

The Georgian National Assembly.

This Congress of 320 delegates met on December 3 in Tiflis under the Presidency of Mr Jordania, the veteran leader of the Georgian Social Democratic party. Its principal business was the election of a Supreme Council of 67 members to act as the leading authority for the Georgian nation and its representative in dealing with other nationalities. Members were elected in the following numbers, proportionate to the strength of the different parties: Social Democrats (Mensheviks) 20; Independent non-party, 18; National Socialist Federalists, 10; National Democrats, 9; Social Democrat Nationalists, 4; Socialist Revolutionaries, 3; Georgian Mussulmans, 3. Not a single Bolshevik finds a place upon the Council. The principal decisions reached by the Assembly were as follows: (2) With regard to the present political situation: (1) The ~~the~~ Georgian nation, as a hundred years ago,

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
18 OKTYABR 1918

Secret

SECRET.

173495

15th October 1918
OCT 17 1918

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The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to state that the following reliable information from a most secret source has been received from the J.O.C. Mesopotamia:-

- (1) On the 12th October orders were given for a special train to convey Ahmed Pasha, Enver Pasha's father, from Batum to Elisabetopol.
- (2) On the same date, Nuri, the Turkish commander in Baku, was informed by Enver Pasha that while the Turks were in a strong position in Azerbaijan they should take steps to leave no Armenians or Russians within the boundaries of Azerbaijan. The districts of Lenkoran and Astara should at once be cleared in order that no obstacle should remain which might prevent the Turkish frontier marching with that of Azerbaijan. Zhehil Pasha, commanding the Turkish Eastern Group of Armies, had reported that 300 Russians with 4 guns as well as a number of Armenians were fortifying Astara.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
18 OKTYABR 1918

SECRET.

3.I/594 (M.I.2).

Sulis

174486

OCT 19 1918

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18th October, 1918.

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to his letter No. M.I.2.595/13 of the 12th inst begs to state that the following absolutely reliable information from a most secret source has been received in this office.

- (1) On the 12th October Enver was of the opinion that the Germans would probably wish to send troops to Baku as they feared that the Azerbaijan and North Caucasus Government would shortly apply to the British and American Ministers at Teheran for recognition. As the entry of German troops into Baku would involve danger of a British attack on the town, the Azerbaijan Government was resolved to prevent their entry.
- (2) On the 13th October Self telegraphed to General Von Yress at Tiflis as follows:-
"For your confidential information.-
In our reply to America we could not help deciding to comply in the question of evacuation also, since, according to all information available here, - (Berlin) - our offer of peace would otherwise have been declined. Whether President Wilson wishes to see the Eastern border states also evacuated

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI

18 OKTYABR 1918

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evacuated, is not clear from his note. In any case the deliberations of the Commission will give us an opportunity to advance the objections that may be taken to that course.

Exclusively for your personal information:- Our opposition to a premature evacuation of the border states would be strengthened if the border states themselves would make objection thereto. In order not to expose ourselves to the reproach of double dealing, we must refrain from prompting such objection ourselves. You should, however, so regulate your language as to give the best prospect that the local authorities in your area will decide upon this step of their own accord."

- (3) On the 14th October Enver informed (?Nuri) at Baku that he foresaw that, in case Turkey concluded peace with the Entente, she would be compelled ostensibly to withdraw her troops from Azerbaijan and North Caucasus, leaving these regions to rely on their own national forces. He was accordingly arranging that these national forces should be maintained by putting in command of them Turkish officers who, while ostensibly becoming subjects of Azerbaijan and North Caucasus, would at the same time remain his (Enver's) instruments.

Major-General Thwaites ventures to point out that the information in (3) is the natural sequel to the message previously sent by Enver Pasha of which the gist was contained in his letter above mentioned.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN DEPEŞASI

26 OKTYABR 1918

M. Balfour

R/

War Office.

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W.B. (Enver's)
17/95, S.W.
25th October 1918.
OCT 29 1918

Dear Graham,

With reference to my letter of the 22nd October and the Eastern Committee Note on Azerbaijan, attached to it. I should be glad if you would substitute the following, which embodies more recent information.

We have reliable information that on the 17th October the 5th Caucasus Division, which had been ordered to Constantinople, received orders to remain in Azerbaijan and to become "subject to Azerbaijan", if necessary. It was known that on the 18th October Enver Pasha, anticipating the conclusion of peace, realised that Turkey would be obliged to order her armies to evacuate Azerbaijan and North Caucasus, and he therefore arranged that Nuri, with staff officers and non-commissioned officers, should remain in Azerbaijan, where they would work permanently. This fits in with other information which we have received regarding Halil and Nuri, who are Enver's relatives, being established in the Caucasus, and regarding Enver's father, whom he recently sent to the Caucasus, while he instructed Nuri to sound his officers in order to ascertain which of them would remain with him in Azerbaijan in any circumstances. Further, by the 20th October, 18 officers had left Constantinople to take up military appointments in the Caucasus and steps had been taken to send quickly officers from other parts of Turkey.

At the same time it should be noted that Enver issued orders on the 18th October that no Ottoman unit was to enter Armenian territory, especially Karabagh, and that Turkish commanders were not to intervene in disputes between Azerbaijan and Armenians. It is also reported that the Turks intend handing over to the Armenians, behind the backs of the Georgians, the district of Karakla-Lori, in the South of the Province of Tiflis and belonging to the Georgians. This may indicate Turkish intentions of compensating the Armenians for

further

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN DEPEŞASI
25 OKTYABR 1918

further losses at the hands of Azerbaijan, and an attempt to reconcile them to the presence of Enver's relatives, while providing an apple of discord for the future.

A Turkish plan has been revealed for the unification of Azerbaijan and North Caucasus under one Moslem Government which the Turks apparently hope will be able to claim our recognition. The intention of this is obviously that the State so constituted should harbour their Pan-Turanian agents, and the Turks are known to greatly fear that the Germans will send troops to Baku and so upset their schemes, for they cannot hope to get the independence of Azerbaijan recognised while German troops remain there. It may be noticed that, in accordance with the secret protocol signed by Talaat on the 23rd September, Germany, though not actually supporting, does not hinder Turkish plans for the formation of independent states in North Caucasus and Turkestan.

That Turkish fears of German interference have sufficient grounds is shown by the fact that on the 18th October the Germans had two wireless stations ready for despatch from Berlin for Tabriz and Teheran, but they had decided to send one to Tabriz via Tiflis, while the other was to be disposed of as thought fit; while as recently as the 18th October a German mission was on its way to Baku for the exploitation of the oil-fields, and the "economic plenipotentiary" had experts ready for Baku and Grozni. This connects with demands from Berlin earlier in the month for details regarding requirements of the Baku oil-fields in the way of machinery, etc. The Germans have also been making great efforts to supply Georgia with food-stuffs, although they have admitted that they cannot supply the full amount promised; two ships with a total of 118,000 pounds of wheat, are known to have sailed from Ukrainian ports to Poti.

It seems fairly obvious from the above that Germany and Turkey, or at least the C.U.P. faction in Turkey, are each trying to use the other in manoeuvring for as favourable a position as possible at the Peace Conference. It is probable that

neither

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25 OKTYABR 1918

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neither of them is letting the other know all that he is doing.* For instance, the Germans have stiffened up Constantinople with a division from the Crimea, perhaps in the hope that they could arrange peace with the Dardanelles still closed and so deny us access to the Black Sea. The C.U.P. may be quite prepared to accept a peace secured under the auspices of the new Sultan while they retain a foothold in Azerbaijan and may be more or less indifferent regarding the Black Sea, so they take advantage of the presence of German troops in Constantinople, which they apprise may enable them to get easier terms from us, by pushing their own troops out to the Maritza, while it enables them to counterbalance German activity at Baku by the retention of one of their own divisions there. At the same time they are undermining German influence in the Caucasus by stealing territory from Georgia, to whom Germany has made a loan and many promises.

The above will give some indication of the way our enemies' minds are working, and I should like to see all Turkish agents in Azerbaijan handed over by the terms of the armistice.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. Smith

* It is interesting to note that a German officer, in the Mosul area, stated about 22nd October that Turkey intended to make a separate peace and asked the German Military Mission at Constantinople for instructions as to whether he should risk travelling over the Aleppo - Adana stretch of railway or make off to the Caucasus.

The Turks, as recently as 17th October, ordered the advanced guard of two of their divisions up to the Maritza, though they were eventually to fall back to the Chatalja lines if necessary.

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN MEMORANDUMU
PAYIZ 1918

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MEMORANDUM

ON

the Republics of "North Caucasus" and "Azerbaijan", and
Enver'Pasba's policy there .

The territories covered by these two republics are shown in the attached map ("North Caucasus" red, "Azerbaijan", blue)

The "North Caucasus Republic" was set up last summer by the mountain tribes of Daghestan, who since the Russian Revolution had gradually freed themselves from Russian military control.

The tribes are so wild and split up (linguistically and geographically) that it is improbable that they have established any effective central administration.

The only organ of government of which we have any information is the delegation which went to Constantinople last summer and is probably still there.

This delegation claimed for the "North Caucasus Republic" a wide territory, including the country of the Terek and Kuban Cossacks, where the population is purely Russian and Ukrainian. But its authority is only acknowledged, if at all, by the Sunni Moslem tribes of Daghestan, in E.W. Caucasia. The remnants of the former Moslem population of E.W. Caucasia (Kabardians, Abkhazians, etc.) seem to be holding aloof from it so far.

The "Republic" and its "delegation" are chiefly important as a link between the Turks and the various de facto independent Daghestani tribes.

The "Azerbaijan Republic" was set up last May, when the common government of Trans-Caucasia fell to pieces.

The population (called by the Russians "Caucasian Tatars") is Turkish-speaking. Their dialect is identical with that spoken in the adjoining Persian province of Azerbaijan, and is closely related to Osmanli. The two Azerbaijanis were only separated by Russia's conquests at Persia's expense during

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN MEMORANDUMU
PAYIZ 1918

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during the first thirty years of the 19th century. But for the war and the fall of the Tsardom, they would ultimately, no doubt, have been reunited under Russia. The actual frontier between them is artificial.

The present government of the Azerbaijan Republic has developed out of the Tatar National Council, founded early in the Revolution, and is in the hands of the Tatar landowners.

As landowners these hate the Bolsheviks, as Tatars they hate the Armenians, with whom their national claims conflict in the Karabagh and Erivan districts, where there is a mixed population. As "Turanians" and Moslems they incline towards the Turks, with whom they have many common and no conflicting interests.

They did not get on well with the Daghestanis at the beginning of the Revolution (the Daghestanis, who are not Turkish-speaking, were afraid of being dominated over by them). But the influence of the Turks, and the common danger recently incurred from the British and Armenians at Baku, may have drawn them together.

Nor do they get on with the Persians. For though they have kept in touch with Persian culture since the time when they belonged to Persia, they have also picked up Western methods and ideas under the Russian régime (especially at Baku). They show no signs of wishing to reunite with Persia, but are working on the contrary to separate Persian Azerbaijan from her and join it to themselves in an independent state in close alliance with Turkey.

Relations with Turkey. The Caucasian Moslems generally gave Russia trouble in the Russo-Turkish wars of the last century (especially in 1877-8), and during this war the Turks, as soon as the Revolution gave them an opening, sent agents to Daghestan and Azerbaijan to stir up revolt.

Their advance into the Caucasus this summer has given them

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direct contact, and if they were to retain the territories they annexed in June 1918 (marked on the map) this contact would be permanent.

At this moment most of İkr Azerbaijan, both Russian and Persian, is occupied by the Turkish army. The Turks have been introducing technical advisers (even a Turkish financial expert) and military instructors, in imitation of German methods in the Baltic Provinces and the Ukraine. Baku was captured by a mixed force of Turks and Turkish-led Azerbaijanis.

The Russian Azerbaijanis claim Baku as their capital (though it is a cosmopolitan city) and this has been a source of misunderstanding between the Turks and the Germans, since the latter, in their supplementary treaty with the Bolsheviks, guaranteed the possession of Baku to Russia over the Turks' head. The Turks naturally support the Azerbaijani claim, which would give Turkey indirect control over one of the richest cities of the world.

Enver Pasha's designs. When Bulgaria capitulated, it seemed as though the C.U.P. had two alternatives:- either to take ship to Constanza and rejoin the money they had deposited in Switzerland, or else to fight to the death at Constantinople. But there are now indications that Enver contemplates a third course, - to retreat to the Eastern Caucasus and wage a guerilla warfare there, in repetition of his exploits in the interior of Tripoli after the Treaty of Lausanne (1912).

The Azerbaijan Republic has asked the British authorities in Persia for recognition, and Fuad Selim, the Turkish Minister at Berne, conveyed the same request recently to a British agent in Switzerland on behalf of the Azerbaijani delegates at Constantinople.

Again the Turks are reported (Sir P. Cox No. 871 of 10.10) to have promised to make the Crown Prince of Persia (who is ex-officio governor-general of Persian Azerbaijan) ruler of a united

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Azerbaijan - doubtless to be independent under Turkish protection. They have also spread a report in Teheran that H.M.G. have offered Persian Azerbaijan to Turkey (Sir P. Cox No. 880 of 13.10). It is rumoured further that they intend to unite Azerbaijan and Daghestan into a single state.

Thus the first aim of the Turks seems to be to bluff H.M.G. in to recognising the independence of Russian Azerbaijan, then to strengthen this state by adding Daghestan and Persian Azerbaijan to it (presumably through faked plebiscites), and to keep the whole area under Turkish control.

But should we not fall into the trap (and they can hardly be in earnest in expecting us to do so), they probably anticipate that they can hold this area by force. Its natural defences are extraordinarily strong: on the North the Caucasus range and the Daghestan bastion; on the West the mountains of Kara Bagh; and on the South the hills of Azerbaijan and Gilan, inhabited by wild Turkish-speaking tribes like the Shah-Sevens, and anti-British guerillas like the Jungalis.

The region might be made self-sufficing, since the oil and industry of Baku, the agriculture of the Aras and Kara plains, and the fighting material of the mountain tribes would be at the disposal of those who controlled it.

It is peculiarly inaccessible to British forces based on Syria and Mesopotamia, since the wide zone of Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan lies between, across which it would take months or even years to construct effective communications.

On the other hand, it lies entirely open towards Constantinople, since there are railways leading from the Black Sea ports of Batum and Poti to Baku and Tabris, and these railways are already under Turco-German control, while the Black Sea will remain so till the Straits are opened to the Allies.

As for the railways leading to European Russia, only that running from Baku along the Caspian coast is yet completed, and

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN MEMORANDUMU
PAYIZ 1918

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it is commanded by the Daghestani tribes.

These considerations suggest that it may be the policy of the C.U.P. (or an any rate of Enver) to hold on at-~~present~~ at Constantinople up to the last possible moment, pulling the wires of a puppet "Entente-phil" government, and then take ship to Batum when the game is up and the Straits are on the point of falling.

The campaign of 1912 in the Tripoli hinterland was a great success as propaganda, and it is evident that this is to be set going again by a new mission from Constantinople, which will proceed by submarine with the Senusel. This will keep the Pan-Islamic Movement alive in the Moslem Africa, where European prestige has been shaken (chiefly through Italian incompetence) during the war and where the Turkish débacle in the Arab provinces of Asia will hardly be realised.

The plan of campaign in Azerbaijan is no doubt designed to create a similar focus of un-rest in the North-Eastern parts of the Islamic World, and the outlook here is possibly more promising. The break-down of Russia must have had a more profound political effect in Central Asia than the Italian reverses have had in Africa. The scenes of Turkish defeat in Mesopotamia and Syria are equally remote, and any effect of these defeats on Turkish prestige is more than counterbalanced by the actual advent of the Turks in Azerbaijan as victors. Again the Azerbaijanis are bound to the Turks and not only by the Islamic tie, like the Tripoli Arabs, but by their community of language and nationality, which has recently been given prominence in the "Turanian" Movement. Above all, the Turkish designs in this area are favoured by the anarchy which the Russian break-down has caused. The conquest of Daghestan cost Russia nearly a century of laborious warfare. This work has been undone in a year, and the tribes are now independent again. With Turks to equip and lead them, they might be able to hold their own against all comers.

The C.U.P., in fact, have not given up the game. The war may lead

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PAYIZ 1918

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the opening of the Straits and the partition of the Ottoman Empire. But it has immensely weakened the orderly forces of civilisation, and loosened the hold of Europe over large areas of the Moslem world. There may still be room in this world for Enver.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
27 NOYABR 1918

1978. (M.I.2).

27th November 1918

NOV 29 1918

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with regard to his letter No.B.1/946 (M.I.2) of the 28th November, begs to inform him that he has received from a very reliable and most secret source, the following information.

On the 24th November, the Turkish Minister of War, Abdullah, issued orders to Shauqi, the General Officer Commanding the 9th Turkish Army in the Caucasus, to the effect that all Ottoman officers and men at that time in North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, were to join the 9th Army within two months, bringing with them all arms and ammunition.

Legal proceedings would be taken against those disobeying this order.

The 9th Army was to convey this order to Mursel, Muri and Izzet, fixing the 20th January as the date for the completion of the movement.

The deficiency of railway transport would not be accepted as an excuse for delay and Units were to march to Kers and Batum if necessary.

Major-General W. Thwaites reserves his opinion as to the exact value of this order, which undoubtedly passed between Constantinople and the Turkish Commander in the Caucasus.

Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,

MESOPOTAMIYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
20 NOYABR 1918

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SECRET.

Operations.

From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office, repeated C. in C. India, G.H.Q. Salonika for transmission to Wilson, Constantinople.

Despatched 1905 20th November, 1918.
Received 2230 21st November, 1918.

X.3960. 20th November.

Following report from Baku 1730 o'clock November 19th. Mursel Pasha is at Baladjari with large portion of recent garrison of Baku. Mursel's presence was at first denied by Turks but admitted later and Thompsons G.S.O.I. interviewed him. Mursel was directed to report last night the date by which last Turkish soldier will be clear of Baladjari.

Mursel said that Ottoman Army was not under the command of Muri and latter could not order evacuation of Petrovsk and that latter place was under Izzet Pasha. Staff Officer pointed out that when Armistice was signed Muri was in command, that he could divest himself of responsibility, and that Muri is responsible for evacuation of Petrovsk and of every Turkish soldier in Caucasus. An estimate of the time for evacuation being demanded, Mursel was reminded that the longer the time the stronger the Allied action in Constantinople would be.

3. It is reported that Muri is at Futa (4 miles S.W. Baladjari). Written instructions were sent to him by Thomson to keep him informed of his movements with dates and again emphasized his grave responsibility in complying with terms of Armistice.

4. Thomson reports there is plenty of rolling stock at Baladjari for evacuation of Turks from their and from Petrovsk and Russian traffic manager at Baku has been instructed to give Turks assistance in the matter.

5. Two German officers who were found in Baku have been arrested.

6. On November 19th, financial situation was investigated at meeting of representatives of banking and trade interests.

7. Regulations for control and running of mercantile shipping seized have been framed.

8. Arrangements are in hand for repatriation of selected Armenians from Enzeli to Baku.

M.O.X. Copies to:-

C.I.O.S.	M.O.3.	M.I.R.	D.S.D.	Dep. Ist
D.C.I.O.S.	M.O.4.	M.I.R.B.	Col. Paddon.	See Lond.
D.M.O.	M.O.5.	A.G.	F.O.	Capt. Aylmer.
D.D.M.O.	M.O.5.a.	Q.M.G.	E.C.	
M.O.2.	D.M.I.	M.O.O.	Lord Curzon.	
M.O.2.a.	M.I.1.	D.O.M.R.	Lord E. Cecil.	
	M.I.2.			
	M.I.2.b.(2).			

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
3 DEKABR 1918

B.I/1047.
(M.I.2).

3rd December, 1918.

99931

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and in reply to his letter No.194268/W/44 of the 28th ultimo, on the subject of the proposed official statement regarding British occupation of Baku and Batum, begs to suggest, for Lord Hardinge's concurrence, that the second paragraph of the draft communique enclosed in his letter above mentioned, might be modified so as to read as follows:-

"The objects of these measures, which were necessitated by the Turkish attitude in Trans-Caucasia, are solely to enforce the terms of the Armistice concluded with Turkey, and to facilitate the maintenance of order in these regions, of which the ultimate status must be reserved for the decision of the Peace Conference."

Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
4 DEKABR 1918

B.I/1092.
(M.I.2)

4th December, 1918

200035

DEC 5 1918

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward for his information extracts from a telegram No. X.4203 of 2nd December from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia:-

"A report from Baku dated 1st December stated that the last Turkish troop trains had past Balajari and that the Turkish railway staff had left for Elisabetopol."

On the 1st December McDonnell reported that he was leaving Tiflis on his return to Baku. On his arrival confirmations would be obtained of the damage, which is believed to be very considerable, done by the Turks on their retreat."

Major General W. Thwaites would draw the attention of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst to his letter No. B.I/1027 of the 29th November on this subject.

Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

1918/12/04 Russia

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
22 DEKABR 1918

B.I/1340 (M.I.2)

22nd December 1918
211768
DEC 27 318

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to inform him that he has learnt from a very reliable and most secret source that, on the 12th December, Nuri Pasha with 21 officers had left Elizabetopol for Batum.

In this connection Major-General W. Thwaites would draw attention to his letter No. B.I/943 (M.I.2) of the 23rd November and to telegram No.X.4443 dated 18th December from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia, regarding the move of Nuri Pasha from Elizabetopol.

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

MESOPOTAMIYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
22 DEKABR 1918

SECRET.

From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia. Desp.11.50. 22.12.18.
si:- G.O.C. Constantinople. Recd.01.00. 23.12.18.
Repeated D.M.I.

To

I.4809. Dec. 22nd. Advanced Warperforce Haku comments as follows on your I.4073 Dec. 16th.

There is sufficient rolling stock engines and oil for Turkish troops. 5 trains left Elizabetopol in one day. In addition at Fille 15 trains filled with troops were kept to repair brakes. Azerbaijan is now practically clear of troops. Railway is open via Alexandropol to Kars. There is no reason why the Turks should not go behind their old frontier without delay.

Commander of 9th Army has given orders to collect 1 month's supply to go with the troops. Turks seizing these supplies by force. In addition they are looting as they withdraw.


Action at Constantinople to make commander of 9th army personally responsible will effect speedy withdrawal.

HİNDİSTANDAKI BAŞ KOMANDANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
20 İYUL 1918

SECRET.

From C.-in-C., India.
To War Office.

Despatched 27/7/18
Received 1/8 a.m.



22000 July 20th.
C.I.L. & THE LINE.

Operations.

Following received from Lallesh under No. K.D.00044
dated July 18th despatched 8 a.m. July 20th. RCANS.

Following main points Teague and Jones. Message RCANS.

1. British officers were given every facility travelling on central Asian railway and no hindrance of any kind.
2. Complete disappearance of Bolsheviks on line between Krasnovodsk (one group undecipherable) Tokmakhan is confirmed.
3. All quiet going to and returning from Krasnovodsk.
4. All large steamers on Krasnovodsk and Baku line removed to Volga, small steamers capable of carrying up to 100 passengers in all maintain daily service.
5. So long as we are in no way identified with any projects for restoration of monarchy general good feeling prevails towards the British any hint to the contrary would cause extraordinary revelation of feeling against us and for us to make any headway against cause would be quite impossible.
6. Extremely difficult position M'Donnell at Baku. He is (2 groups) headed and has only one sink officer who can give him no help. The Bolsheviks have twice tried him for his life yet he remains great local influence and still establish control (1 group) situation there.

Teague (TAM) Jones own view is that situation at Baku is very critical and depends on two factors (a) Co-operation with us of Caspian fleet (b) active intervention by us. Although actual commanders of fleet are nominally Bolsheviks crews as whole are strongly anti-Bolshevik and by persuasion that we alone can save country from the alternative of enemy rule or anarchy, and by making them (?) possibly independent

HİNDİSTANDAKI BAŞ KOMANDANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
20 İYUL 1918

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(2)

- of Bolsheviks could be gained over to our side.
6. The Armenians have greatly injured our cause in Caucasus amongst the Tartars by openly boasting that they were special proteges of the British. This gave rise to the pernicious belief that British had deliberately adopted an anti-Armenian policy inasmuch as Armenians massacred large numbers of Tartars.
 9. Baku Bolsheviks almost certainly in enemy pay and would obstruct as much as possible active British intervention. But their position is insecure and their fate would almost certainly be precipitated by active measures by us.
 10. Enemy propaganda extremely active and anti-British Great play made (one group undecipherable) stories of our brutal misrule in India which is reported and commonly believed to be on brink of mutiny. Enemy agents swarm everywhere and pan Islamic and pan Turanian doctrines everywhere (2 groups undecipherable) whilst there is discussion everywhere both in press and verbally of approaching German invasion of India.
 11. On his return through Krasnovodsk Jones interviewed (1 group undecipherable) Khan Yamatki who is chief Yamat Turcoman. Latter said we need be under no misapprehensions but that Turcomans to a man were pro-Turkish due to active pan Islamic propaganda and that they would not oppose enemy's advance into Transcaaspia. Though he did not profess any personal sympathy with Turks he regarded enemy victory as assured.
 12. Referring to Keshik Khan Jangali chief, he emphatically declared he was not out-law as presumed by us but the paid agent of the Persian Government whose orders he was carrying out. Keshik had sustained no defeat but was actually increasing his activity and influence and at appropriate time would be let loose by Persian Government against us.
 13. Papers were recently intercepted by M'Donnell showing definite agreement between the Austrian Government and Chief of Masanderaloç providing for despatch to the coast of Masanderaloç an Austrian force not less than 2,000 strong whose

HİNDİSTANDAKI BAŞ KOMANDANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
20 İYUL 1918

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(3)

objective was (?) further penetration into Persia.

14 The general impression of Tongue and Jones is that situation is critical and can only be saved by prompt appearance at Baku of British forces.

... telegraphed.

62 copies to

H.I.I.A.

SER P. KOKSUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
22 DEKABR 1918

(This Document is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use).

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24 918
POLITICAL.

PERSLIA.

Decypher. Sir P. Cox, (Teheran),
December 22nd, 1918.

D. December 22nd, 1918.

R. 23rd, "

No. 1068.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

My telegram No. 1068. Following from His Majesty's Representative at Zanjan.

Vladica telegraphs following from Tabriz. Consul of Musulman Republic of Caucasus at Tabriz has requested Spanish Consul to report to British Government and United States Government that Armenians in Caucasus are massacring Musulman Population. Trouble appears to be that Armenian National Council at Xrivan invited Armenian Refugees to return to take possession of their property; Musulmans object to Armenian ownership of any property. Similar situation exists at (?Kar)abagh.

German Consul preparing to flee from Tabriz and only three afghan (group undecypherable) left for Mosul. All arms and ammunition removed from factory to Consulate. Allies reported reached Alexandriapol. (enla).

Addressed to Foreign Office, No. 1068.

Reported to (?Baghdad) Baku.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
30 YANVAR 1918

S I C H A T.

404

From D.M.I.

To Colonel Pike. Repeated Rowlandson for Dunsterville.

Despatched 6.55 p.m. 30.1.18.

21311 cipher.

In telegram dated 24th January Neel describes former somewhat friendly attitude of Tartars at Baku changed to suspicion and hostility owing to:-

- (1) The impression that we are showing preference to Armenian interests.
- (2) Fact that Armenians are trading upon this impression.
- (3) Priority we are giving in deference to view of Russian General Staff to formation of Armenian National forces.

Neel says German Shiraz prisoners who have been released at Baku, are conducting propaganda campaign in conjunction with others.

With reference to above it is very essential that the Tartars should be given every assurance that not only do we not favour one nationality more than another, but that our sole desire is to see and support a united Caucasus bloc.

Consider also advisability of informing them that should they desire we are prepared to give the Tartars assistance in organising their national forces, both financially and by lending services of officers who have had long experience with and sympathy for Mahomedan soldiers. Doubtless there are such officers among those whom Dunsterville selected in Mesopotamia.

Addressed C.M.A. Repeated Rowlandson for Dunsterville if this arrives in time to catch letter.

0.2. copies to M.I.I.A.

Sent to
C.I.G.S.
D.M.I.
M.I.G.
M.I.G.A.
M.I.G.B.
F.O.
Treasury
M.P.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ KOMİSSARIN TELEQRAMI
22 DEKABR 1918

33

3404

High Commission,
Constantinople.
12nd December 1918.

7/12/18. SIR,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a paper which was sent to the Commanding Officer of R.K.S. "LIVERPOOL" while at Batoum by the Chargé D'Affaires of the so-called Armenian Republic.

It will be noted that whereas on the one hand the Armenians state they are being plundered and murdered by Ottoman troops, the Turkish Government on the other hand state that they hesitate to evacuate Azerbaijan owing to the frenzy of the Armenians who are now even avenging themselves on the unprotected and innocent Moslem population. It appears probable that the real facts will only be obtainable after the arrival in that district of British Troops.

I also enclose copy of a letter received from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs giving an account of the situation of the Turks in these regions.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

Nickard
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

The Right Honourable

A.J. Balfour, M.P., O.M. etc. etc.

SER P. KOKSUN ŞIFRLI TELEQRAMI
20 DEKABR 1918

210050

(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's
Government and should be returned to the Foreign
Office if not required for official use.) DEC 23 1918

483

PERSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher from Sir P. Cox (Teheran) December 20th.

D. 5.40 p. m. December 20th. 1918.

R. 8. a. m. 22nd.

No. 1066.

-----oO-----

Since despatch of my "Clear the line" telegram
1054 news received from Tabriz of arrival of number
of refugees from Nakchivan and neighbourhood and
circular telegram to five Legations here from Munshilman
Committee complaining of Armenians' attack on certain
Mahomedan villages. Reports are doubtless exaggerated
but position is serious and it does not appear that
anything short of appearance of Allied troops along
Alexandropol-Julfa line is likely to have deterrent
effect.

MESOPOTAMİYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞIFRLI TELEQRAMI
20 NOYABR 1918

SECRET.

321

From:- G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia.

To:- D.M.I. repeated C. in C. India.

Despatched 1515 20th November, 1918.
Received 1000 21st November, 1918.

X.3942 November 20th.

Your 70980 November 17th. Term "Local
troops" was used to denote those of so called
Azerbaijan Republic Army. These have now left Baku
and orders have been given for all Turkish officers and
men serving with them to be dismissed.

2. On November 19th North Persian Force
wired from Baku that Huri Pasha was reported to be
at Elisabetpol but stated in later report that he is
now at a place called Puts 4 miles south west of
Baku.

C.2. Copies to:- M.I.I.a.

FORIN OFİSİN MEMORANDUMU
11 İYUL 1918

MEMORANDUM no. BAKU.

*July 11th 1918
London. 21337 153*

The following was reported here to-day by an American
driller who left Baku on May 17th by Astrakhan and Volga
and a Northern port to Newcastle.

In the early part of April the Bolsheviks had control
of Baku. The Tartars were the only strong anti-Bolshevik
party in Baku. The Armenians joined forces with the
Bolsheviks against the Tartars hoping to profit by the
comparatively well armed condition of the Bolsheviks to
wipe off old scores against the Tartars. Heavy fighting
took place, the sailors on the gunboats joined the Bolsheviks,
shelled the Tartar quarter, and the Bolsheviks and Armenians
were victorious. The Tartars thereupon gathered their
co-religionists from other parts of the Caucasus and North
Persia and were advancing on Baku with large forces. My
informant was requested by the acting American Consul to
leave on account of the imminent danger to life, which he
did on May 17th.

The position seemed to be that the Armenians had thrown
in their lot with the Bolsheviks against the Tartars who
are assisted by the Turks, whilst the Georgians for safety
have made terms with the Germans.

Thus it appears that the two Christian races, Armenian
and Georgian are at present on opposite sides.

My informant stated that any Britishers who tried to go
through Northern Persia were arrested.

SER Ç. MERLİNQİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
17 APREL 1918

594

63557

PERSIA.

MILITARY APR 18 1918

Decypher. Sir C. Marling (Teheran) April 17th, 1918.

D. 11.15 p.m. April 17th, 1918.

R. 8 a.m. April 18th, 1918.

No. 316.

.....

His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz reports that
news from Tiflis stated April 14th Caucasian
Government issued manifesto calling on all patriots
to fight the Turks. It said they were prepared to
cede Ardahan and Kars but would never give up
(? Batoum).

Armenians were beaten by Moslems in fighting
near Nakitchevan but destroy(?) ed a newly (?) repaired
railway bridge.

Addressed to Foreign Office, sent to India.

SER P. KOKSUN FORİN OFİSƏ MƏKTUBU
25 YANVAR 1918

402

From Sir P. Cox, 25th January 1918.
(Addressed to Foreign, repeated to Secretary of State for India.)
(Received at India Office, 6 p.m., 26th.)

Demi-official. Following from Nool, dated 24th January:—

"Private. Baku, 22nd January. When I was here six weeks ago heads of Tartar community were distinctly inclined to be friendly. Now on my return to Baku I find that their attitude has changed to one of suspicion and scarcely veiled hostility. This appears to be due to (1) general popular impression that we are showing preference to Armenian interests. (2) Fact that Armenians are fostering this impression and trading on it freely. (3) Priority given to formation of Armenian national Unit. I understand it is in deference to view of Russian General Staff that we are backing Armenians and distrusting Mohammedans. In my opinion policy is a mistaken one and likely to lead to disaster. Mohammedan interests are too strong to be ignored, especially when there is so little hope of any early regeneration of Russian Army. Policy of cold shoulder is calculated to throw them into arms; they would, therefore, be impregnable. Tartars will raise their own national units in spite of Russians, and it is therefore better that it should be done under our auspices. Tartar rising, to which we are approaching, will interrupt our only line of communication with Caucasus as well as communication with Don.

"Regrettable that Bolshevik aims in Caucasus are obviously identical, viz. to set various natives at each other's throats and take advantage of ensuing confusion—the Turk to occupy Tiflis—the Bolshevik to undermine Kaledin's movement in Don provinces.

"Recent collisions between soldiers and Tartars at Elizavetpol and between Cossacks and Caucasus mountaineers at Groznyi are doubtless work of German, Turkish, and Bolshevik agents.

"All Shiraz prisoners, among others, have been set at liberty here and are openly conducting propaganda campaign.

"Addressed to Marling, repeated to Cox."

HƏRBİ KƏSFIYYATIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
16 NOYABR 1918

162. (M.I.2.)

16th November, 1918.

37205

19 1918

The Director of Military Intelligence presents

his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and in continuation of his memorandum No. B.I/846 (M.I.2.) of the 15th November, begs to attach for his information a copy of a telegram from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia, containing further details of the situation in Baku, and War Office telegram in reply No. 70803 of the 16th November.

This information has been transmitted to

Admiral Calthorpe.

under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
18 OKTYABR 1918

I/601 (L.I.2).

SECRET
175475
OCT 21 1918

18th October, 1918.

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to forward for his information a reliable report from a very secret source that on the 14th October the Turks proposed to form one Government out of North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, as they feared that, if these two states remained separate, they would be too weak to maintain their independence.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
16 NOYABR 1918

SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

From: War Office.

To :- General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia.
Repeated C. in C. India, Mudros, Norperforce, G.O.C. in C.
Salonica, Lt. Col. Murphy and G.O.C. Egypt.
70803. 16th Nov.

Your X.3817 of 12th Nov. para. 4. Our policy is to police area between Caspian and Black Sea as may be required to maintain order and enforce terms of armistice pending final settlement at Peace Conference of various Territorial questions involved. Above should be announced. Addressed G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia. Repeated Norperforce, Mudros, C. in C. India, G.O.C. in C. Salonica and Lt. Col. Murphy who will inform Admiral Calthorpe.

SER Ç. MERLİNQİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
19 MAY 1918

PERSIA

MILITARY

89377

MAY 20 1918

Decypher. Sir C. Marling. (Teheran). May 19th. 1918.

7. 10.5.a.m. May 19th. 1918.

R. 8.0.a.m. May 20th. 1918.

23

No. 424.

Governor-General of Azerbaijan has informed His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz he and Democrats desire to organize force officered by Russians and financed and armed by us to oppose Turks should they advance on Tabriz. His Majesty's Consul replied that Jelu question must be settled first, otherwise force might be used to attack them and Armenians. Governor-General concurred, as also a suggestion that British officers, who could go as secretaries to Consulate, would be necessary to help in organization.

Present Cabinet would certainly reject Governor General's proposal.

His Majesty's Consul reports Armenians at Julfa have reported Turks have arrived at Alexandropol and have demanded use of railway to attack British. This definitely cuts wireless to Tiflis.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 424. Sent to India; repeated to Bagdad.

SER P. KOKSUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
3 YANVAR 1918

399

(3631/1.38).

From Sir P. Cox, Bagdad, 3rd January 1918.

(Addressed to Foreign, repeated to Secretary of State.)

(Received 4th. 10 a.m.)

22. My telegram, 6259, dated 22nd December.
Following from No. 476, dated 31st December:-

"Bare scheme for propaganda among Mahometans in Caucasus suggests itself.

"That we should move King of Arabia to send influential deputation to Caucasus to invoke assistance of all Mahometans there and in Crimea in struggle of Arabs to liberate holy places from Turkish yoke, and urging them therefore to continue war and retain maximum number of Turks on Caucasian front.

"Second plan in propaganda programme would be ventilation in Press of project for great pilgrim railway connecting Caucasus and Mecca, to be built with Mahometan capital from all over the world. Commercial evolution of Tartar community has reached a stage as to give great importance to question of future foreign commercial relations, and from propaganda point of view, it would seem necessary to show that we are interested in this question, and are ready to open up communications capable of supplying materials required for the development of trade and natural resources of the country.

"So far, practically nothing has been done in way of propaganda, and Germans have the field to themselves."

His Majesty's Government will doubtless issue such instructions as may be called for. In absence thereof I am taking no action.

NAZİRLƏR KABİNETİ ŞƏRQ KOMİTƏSİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ

8 AVQUST 1918

WAR CABINET
EASTERN COMMITTEE
AUGUST 8th 1918

47

5

Mr. Judson. Mr. Diplomat also alluded to the decision taken in February to depreciate French co-operation in Persia, and submitted for consideration whether to give support now to the Americans might not raise a difficult point with the French.

Mr. Sherburgh said that the India Office proposed to telegraph privately to the Viceroy about the Mission, explaining the situation. The Committee decided—

That facilities should be given to Mr. Judson's Mission to proceed to Persia subject to the following provisions:—

- (1.) That, before the Mission started, our policy in Persia and the question of the exchange should be carefully explained to Mr. Judson.
- (2.) That Mr. Judson should give no undertaking that he could do nothing without consulting Sir P. Curzon.
- (3.) That the Mission should be directed to those parts of Persia where British influence was predominant.

Baku and the
Caucasus

7. General Macdonogh said that the Baku garrison originally held a position some 40 miles from the town. This, however, had been turned from the north and a new position had been taken up, which was only 4 versts from Baku, which was consequently under shell fire. The enemy had at present only 10 guns and some 7,000 Turks and Tartars. Opposing them were a miscellaneous crowd of 8,000 combatants under five different leaders, and about 40 guns. Our own reinforcements proceeding in that direction were 8 armoured cars, 300 men of the North Staffords, 2 machine gun sections, and, in addition, 7 officers and 40 other ranks which had been sent up by Dunsterville. Stokes had gone to Baku and was trying to get into touch with Bicharakov, who had moved to Chachman on the 4th August. According to the fleet, Bicharakov was coming south, but this report had not been confirmed. Stokes further stated (E.C.-1073) that it was impossible to arrange for the destruction of the oil-fields as the latter were full of Tartar workmen who were pro-Turk and unwilling to destroy the means of their own livelihood, while a number of Russian troops were similarly interested. General Macdonogh said that the principal object of our troops now at, or on their way to, Baku was to get the fleet away from that place to Enzeli or Krasnovolok. Most of the fleet was said to have gone to Astrakhan, where it was reported that it might be employed in transporting Bakhlevika to Krasnovolok. We had cut one of the pipe-lines, but the damage caused had been insignificant. In reply to questions, General Macdonogh said it would be quite possible to run off the reservoirs into the sea if we could get control of them, and also to drop incendiary bombs on the reservoirs, though this might cause great loss of life to the local inhabitants.

Lord Robert Cecil enquired whether the Admiralty fully realised that the key to the whole situation was the control of the Caspian.

After a brief discussion, the Committee decided:—

- (a.) That Lord Robert Cecil should arrange to meet an officer of the Naval Staff and the Director of Military Intelligence to discuss measures to be taken to secure control of the Caspian, and to report the result to the Committee.
- (b.) That the War Office should again telegraph to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia, urging the supreme importance of destroying the pipe-line and reservoirs, if by any means practicable.

General Macdonogh, proceeding, explained the position of enemy forces in the Caucasus. At present the only troops in front of Baku were the 5th Caucasian Corps, which was not of high fighting value. He thought that, against the existing enemy, we had a chance

[363—22]

NAZİRLƏR KABİNETİ ŞƏRQ KOMİTƏSİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ

8 AVQUST 1918

6

of being able to hold Baku, where our garrison would not be in danger so long as they had shipping to get them away. The best defensive position for Baku was about 15 miles out. As regards German troops, these were being brought into the Caucasus by degrees; four battalions were already there and two more were on their way. The Germans were probably experiencing considerable transport difficulties, but it was no doubt that they meant eventually to undertake an offensive in Azerbaijan. The 5th Turkish Division was at, or about, Urumia; its intention was to dispose of the Jelus, whom, unfortunately, we were unable to assist, and to get into touch with the 6th Army, while the 11th Caucasus Division was to concentrate at Tabriz and reconnoitre towards Mianeh. The Turkish plan was possibly to evacuate Armenia, and to bring up a force in the Urumia-Tabriz area of 7 divisions, which might provide a force of about 12,000 rifles, for an advance on Kasvin. The Turks evidently did not wish to be entirely dependent on the German lines of communication from Georgia, and were anxious to start alternative lines from Erzerum, and also further south through Mardin and Karpuz.

The Strategic
Situation.

8. General Smuts said that the strategic situation in Persia was one which must give rise to the gravest apprehensions. The Turks were withdrawing from in front of Mosul with the intention of concentrating against our forces on the Hamadan-Resht road, whereby our whole position in Persia would be exposed and turned. He thought it the duty of the Committee to examine the whole situation most carefully with the least possible delay, and to ascertain both the probable strength of forces that might be brought against us, and the maximum number of troops we might be able to oppose to them. Our line of communication was strategically bad, as it was parallel to the front of the enemy's advance, and simply invited attack. He enquired if we could not find and prepare alternative lines of communication, say from Bushire or Bunder Abbas, through Shiraz and Isfahan.

General Macdonogh agreed that, strategically, the situation was bad. There appeared to be three alternatives:—

- (a.) To run a railway from Khauikin to Kasvin. This would take at least a year, and to carry it over the Tak-i-Ghirreb pass would be a very difficult engineering feat. Over the pass itself a ropeway might be all that would be possible.
- (b.) To run a railway from Ahwaz to Khorramabad, and thence to Hamadan. This route had been surveyed, and was feasible, and the project would be sound strategically. If this were done, we might feel confident about our power to resist a Turkish advance unsupported by German troops.
- (c.) To carry a line up the Tigris and into North-West Persia, over the Varna pass, which was much less formidable than the Tak-i-Ghirreb. This would not be a good line for the support of our troops on the road, but it would threaten the enemy's flank, and attract his troops into Mesopotamia.

Any railway, to be really useful, would take at least a year to construct, and the great difficulty about motor transport was the oil supply, which would be very greatly facilitated if oil could be brought from Baku to Kazali.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
24 SENTYABR 1919

POLITICAL 228

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis). 24th Sept. 1919.
D. 6.30.p.m. 25th September 1919.
R. 3.p.m. 26th September 1919.
No. 31.

.....

If nothing unforeseen prevents me I propose to leave for Baku on Saturday for a first visit for three days. I am assured my presence there would be useful just now.

(? New) Cabinet of Monsieur Ussubbekow will probably consist of seven instead of fifteen members as at present and he seems inclined to dispense with Socialists a policy (which may ?) lead to some friction as I am told there are many Mussulman Bolshevik workmen well organized in Baku: Monsieur Ussubbekow evidently (relied on?) armed forces Azerbaijan which are well disciplined and believed to be entirely on side of Government which is composed chiefly of landowners and industrial magnates.

As soon as possible after my return to Tiflis I shall go to Erivan. My visit to that place will follow my visit to Baku at suggestion of Armenians themselves. I had told them that I wished to go first to Erivan.

Captain Gracey left for Erivan on (Monday?) to reside there (as my?) representative and his appointment has given great satisfaction to Armenians.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

Tiflis,
October 2nd. 1919
No. 25.
23 OCT 1919

37A

My Lord,

I have the honour to report that at 6 p.m. on September 27th I left Tiflis, by a special train, accompanied by Mr. Waite and by Fariss Bey Vokiloff, acting diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Tiflis, and Dr. Alshebaia, Georgian representative in Baku.

2. On my arrival in Baku at 3 p.m. on September 28th I was met at the railway station by M. Jafaroff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and other representatives of the Government and Municipality. After inspecting a guard of honour, the men of which presented a smart and soldierly appearance, though they have only been under training for a few months, (as Your Lordship is aware, Mussulmans in Transcaucasia under the old regime were exempt from military service), I was taken to the so-called palace of the aged M. Yagiev, the richest man in Baku, where that gentleman acted as my host on behalf of the Azerbaijan Government. The city was decorated with flags on the occasion, and the railway station was festooned in foliage and carpeted with oriental rugs.

3. The Prime Minister, J. Ussubbekov, had paid me a visit in Tiflis and I sent a messenger to ask when it would be most convenient for him to

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

(2). 35

to receive my return call. He expressed his readiness to see me at once, and I went to his modest lodging on the top floor of a tall tenement house and spent about an hour with him in conversation. I had only been back in my quarters about half an hour when he came to join me again and we then spent another hour together.

4. M.Usubbekov is a man of wide reading, high education, liberal ideas, amiable manners, witty and interesting and with considerable personal charm. The more important passages in our conversations will form the subject of a separate communication, which I shall submit to Your Lordship by telegraph.

5. Later in the evening I spent an hour with M. Jafareff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and General Agabekoff, Acting Minister for the Interior. These two men are well educated in the Russian manner and are of considerable ability. M. Jafareff, as a former member of the Cadet party in the Russian State Duma and a leader of the Mussulman fraction thereof, has played a large part in the history of Russia and Transcaucasia during the war and the revolutions; he has had great success as a popular orator. General Agabekoff served many years in the Russian Army in Central Asia and was, I believe, Assistant Military Governor of Turkestan sometime before the war, when, finding that as a Mussulman he could not hope for any further promotion he retired, but re-entered the service in 1914 on the outbreak of hostilities and had a distinguished career. They are both comparatively young men, vigorous and of agreeable appearance and cultivated manners.

6. During my journey from Tiflis I had several opportunities of seeing the havoc wrought by the demoralised

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

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demoralised Russian Army after its abandonment of the front in Asia Minor and subsequently by the Bolsheviks during the period when they were active here. The Azerbaijanis maintain that the local Armenians took advantage of their alliance with the Bolsheviks to massacre a considerable number of Mussulmans and to starve the poorer classes; Shamsian was only a pseudo-Bolshevik according to them.

7. I was struck by the excellent order and discipline apparent in Baku, the well-kept streets, the general appearance of comfort and even luxury visible in the shops and among the population. At the Club, on the evening of September 26th, when I was present at a symphony concert, I found the vast and magnificent building and grounds crowded with thousands of extremely well-dressed people. It should, however, be remembered that the suspension of some of the large industrial enterprises necessitates a large grant to keep part of the working class population in idleness.

The cost of living is high indeed, yet the price of bread in Baku is only Roubles 2.50 as against Roubles 11 in Tiflis. Azerbaijan is supplying bread to Georgia. There is practically no epidemic disease in Baku and no famine.

8. In view of the large amount of British capital invested in the oil industry, I thought it well to visit, on the morning of September 29th, the field at İbbi Zibat, where a large additional tract of land has been reclaimed from the sea and will be available for further boring. Work, (even now boring) is going on, though to a greatly diminished degree. I understand the present total production is about one third of the normal pre-war output. There is hardly any demand, pending the reopening of the Volga to traffic, and large

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI

2 OKTYABR 1919

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large stocks are accumulating the government are about to undertake the construction of vast underground reservoirs for oil. The lack of sufficient employment renders it necessary for the Government to grant sums of money to the workmen who are idle, and Roubles 300,000,000 have already been advanced in this way. The wages of unskilled men actually engaged amount to about Roubles 1,000 per month. The present rate of exchange is well over Roubles 400 to the £. From Bibi Eibat I drove to the Black Town and went over a part of Nobel's refinery. On the whole, the oil properties seem to be well looked after, and to have suffered no particular damage from war or civil commotions.

9. On the forenoon of September 25th I paid the necessary official visits and had a conversation with M. Jafaroff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on which I shall make a separate report by telegraph.

10. Later in the day I had an early dinner with M. Usubbekov, M. Jafaroff, General Schiklinsky (acting Minister for War and an expert in Artillery), M. Melik Aslanov (Minister of Communications) followed by a private conversation of some duration with M. Usubbekov who was good enough to give me much information about his internal policy, his attitude toward the present local political situation and other matters. I am bold enough to think that he is sincere and frank with me and that I have as much of his confidence as could be expected under the circumstances, and that he is willing to treat me honestly and do what

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI

2 OKTYABR 1919

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he can to help me. He ^{is} begged to assure Your Lordship that he would use his utmost endeavours to prevent any friction with General Denikin, but said he had difficulty in restraining public opinion under the provocation given by local officers of the Volunteer Army in Daghestan and the N. Caucasus. For the English he said it was necessary to do something without delay, and he thought the best plan would be to appoint some British Officer as Governor to rule the country with a representative council of the inhabitants; failing some such arrangement he said Azerbaijan would be willing to take over the responsibility of keeping Daghestan quiet up to the old demarcation line running South of Petrovsk.

Derbent as he pointed out was still, as it has always been since the dawn of history, the Eastern gate of the Transcaucasian isthmus, and whoever held it held the whole country; he would be quite content to see either England or America holding that gate, but for any persons he preferred Great Britain. He added that Azerbaijan was playing the game and absolutely refused to aid Daghestan in spite of strong appeals from the tribes to do so.

He also asked me to point out that the long delay on the part of the Allies in determining the political status of Azerbaijan rendered his task very difficult. He hates the Bolsheviks and he will have no dealings with Pan-Islamism; his ideal is a civil and not religious, and his sympathy with Turkey is of a wild sort. That he wants is independence for his country.

There seems little doubt that he is the controlling force in politics at present and I think we may congratulate ourselves that he holds a strong position. He and his colleagues are a very good team and

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

(6). 39

and as a Cabinet would do credit to some European countries I could mention.

10. On September 30th I was fully occupied in receiving visits, including one from a deputation of Daghestanis whose wishes I am communicating to you by telegram. In the evening I was entertained at a banquet held on a high terrace overlooking the city and the sea and attended by all the ministers and other personages. Speeches were made by the Prime Minister, the President of the Parliament and the leader of the Nationalist (Musavat) party, who all expressed their strong desire for the closest possible friendship between Great Britain and Azerbaijan. I was accompanied to the railway station by the whole party, and left by special train at midnight.

11. On October 1st I made a stay of about four hours in Ganja (Elisavetpol) the second largest city in Azerbaijan (50,000 inhabitants and 20,000 Tatar and Armenian refugees at present) and the native place of the Prime Minister and a large proportion of the men in power. Your Lordship will remember that Ganja gave to Persia many of her best men, including the great poet Nizami whose tomb I passed near the town.

On my arrival I was met by the Governor-General (Dr. Dudaşad Beg Rafibekov) and all the chief authorities, civil and military. The railway station was decorated with verdure and carpets and the inhabitants had hoisted national flags.

Accompanied by a cavalry escort, I visited the chief places of interest, being taken first to the Mosque and then to the Armenian Church, both of which were built and endowed by that liberal minded monarch

Shah

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

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Shah Abbas the Great. The Mussulman and Christian clergy, with whom were their parishioners, including refugees, of both religions, made speeches of welcome in warm terms of admiration for my country. I assured them of the great satisfaction I felt in visiting a city which had during this trying period shown to Transcaucasia an example of toleration, of true human brotherhood, not only by preventing excesses among a population of mixed religions and nationalities (there are about 40,000 Mussulmans and 10,000 Armenians), but by harbouring and comforting the wretched innocents who had fled from persecution.

I told them I would not fail to report to His Majesty's Government this magnanimity of theirs.

At the Town Hall the Armenian Acting Mayor also made a pleasing speech. I was then, in spite of the fact that this is the Muharram (or time of mourning when festivities are forbidden by the Moslem religion) entertained at a banquet, with more speeches, and at half past two I left for Tiflis, where I arrived at 6 p.m., being met on my arrival by representatives of the various ministries and the Georgian officers attached by the Government to my mission.

12. I was assured from many quarters, both in Baku and in Ganja, that my visit had been useful and that it would tend to promote internal peace.

For my part, I have brought back from Azerbaijan the conviction that the people and Government of that region were better disposed to Great Britain than any other country, that if we care to help them they will loyally work with us

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us and that they are well qualified to manage
their own affairs and most anxious to fit themselves
to take their place in the new world which all
good men are eager to see.


I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

humble servant,



CƏNAB P. STİVENSDƏN TELEQRAM
2 İYUN 1919

Document 3

*Telegram No. 99, dated Warsaw, May 27, 1919, 23.43.—Received
May 28, 1919, 9 hours*

(Continuation of telegram 98)

Furthermore I would add for the information of your Excellency that the
sequence of events appears to have been as follows:—

The original position of Haller's Divisions was along the portion of the
Volhynia front opposite to the fortress of Lustk and extended beyond this on
Galician territory opposite Rawa-Ruska north-west of Lemberg.

On Mr. Paderewski's return, Col. Haller, the chief of the Polish General
Staff, reported that the Grey Divisions of Iwaskiswicz were alone advancing
in Galicia in the sector south-west of Lemberg. But as a matter of fact
Haller's Divisions in front of Rawa-Ruska also took part in this movement.
It was only later that Haller's second Division left its position north of
Lemberg in order to take up a position along the Silesian frontier in front of
Czentochau; and it was only yesterday that the Polish General Staff reported
that Haller's 1st Division had left this sector of Volhynia in order to take up
a position on the right of the 2nd Division on the Silesia front.

PRALON

No. 236

*Mr. Grant Watson (Libau) to Earl Curzon (Received June 2)
No. 87 Telegraphic [82871/82871/38]*

LIBAU, June 1, 1919

On May 23 Herr Zommerle [Zimmerle], Civil Governor of Lithuania,
left for Berlin with an Esthonian engineer named Covert who is a Bolshevik
Commissary and had recently reached Kovno from Moscow. From well
informed sources I learn Germans are still negotiating with Bolsheviks
because they do not expect Koltchak will reach Moscow this year and they
hope by agreement with Bolsheviks to safeguard their left flank in case of
hostilities with Poland.

No. 237

*Mr. Stevens¹ (Batoum) to Sir R. Graham (Received June 23)
No. 24 [92815/11067/58]*

BATOUM, June 2, 1919

Sir,

At the risk of repeating one or two of the statements I made in previous
correspondence on this subject, I consider it my duty before the false step
connected with the withdrawal of our troops from this country actually takes

¹ H.M. Consul at Batoum.

CƏNAB P. STİVENSDƏN TELEQRAM
2 İYUN 1919

place, to again dwell with some stress on the immense political importance which the great bulk of the population of the Caucasus attaches to our remaining and continuing to perform the duties we have been engaged in during the past six months.

It is maintained that national and party divisions are still prevalent in the Caucasus and have not been operating to advantage and for the public good since the outbreak of the revolution if judged impartially and from what is taking place in most localities of the recently formed Republics. This is a statement which I believe admits little dispute.

Again for the past year the laws and institutions of the Trans-Caucasian Republics, as they are applied by their Central and Local Governments, have been very much of a failure. This is also generally admitted.

Furthermore diversity of opinion upon almost all principles of politics have drawn a strong line of separation between parties and nationalities.

The present restraints upon trade, traffic and other conditions which the Governments of the Republics seem bent on maintaining, tend to place obstacles in the way of progress and reform and should therefore be modified or completely discontinued.

Administrative and fiscal reforms should occupy more serious consideration and should receive more prominent places in the programme of the Republican governments, than they have hitherto done.

The taxation imposed on the exportation and importation of goods lies as a regular burden on trade and as long as this sort of policy endures it obviously remains a menace to the development of commercial relations with the outside world.

Railway rates must be reduced. They are far too excessive at present and out of all proportion to the distances run and over which goods have to be transported.

Independent taxation by the various Republics does not present itself as a working problem. A uniform fiscal system must be devised. The States taken singly are far too small for separate taxation.

The resources of the Trans-Caucasus are great and their development offers possibilities of the utmost importance provided they are judiciously handled. I can here safely say it is difficult to find another part of the world which possesses so much latent wealth as this country does and in the hands of a sound State could be rendered one of the most prosperous and happy corners of the universe. It is felt by all that Great Britain alone can achieve this end and reinstate the political and economic equilibriums which at present are so shaken.

I feel sure that all traders of British nationality who have visited the Trans-Caucasus recently and have had an opportunity of observing the situation will fully agree that the economic conditions obtaining may well excite great anxiety and apprehension² and as I have already said a fatal blunder will be made if we relinquish our hold of the country at this stage.

² Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople, had reported to Lord Curzon in a dispatch of May 27, 1919 (received June 7), the views of a prominent

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A point of interest in the question of the withdrawal of our troops from the Trans-Caucasus at the critical period of its history we have reached, is that our departure is calculated to be misconstrued by Eastern people and especially by Moslem society all round us who strongly lean towards a policy of British orientation, and by being interpreted into weakness and incapacity to continue with the task we undertook at the end of last year to restore order, a heavy and probably irreparable blow will be dealt at our prestige. Nothing will dissuade the people that we are not accountable for the unsatisfactory and dangerous state in which the country is being handed over to another power and strenuous efforts should be made to avoid the consequences of such misinterpretation. To abandon at the present juncture, in favour of another power, a country with a people willing to respect equitable laws and to enter upon an era of complete tranquillity if only allowed to by a mere handful of adventurers, a country that possesses unlimited fertile soils, varied climates, mineral resources, natural facilities for the development of great industries and vast commerce, at a moment when it most needs nursing by giving it sound advice, prudent handling, judicious institutions and the introduction of other pressing reforms, is universally regarded as a mistake which undoubtedly will produce consequences to the peace and resources of the Trans-Caucasus.

As an instance in support of the statement made in the last paragraph of this despatch, I am compelled to draw attention to the movements, during the last few days, of the Volunteer Army along the Western shore of the Caspian Sea and the reported occupation of Baku by troops belonging to it.¹ These movements indicate that in no circumstances are Denikin and his followers prepared to suffer the presence of other than our forces at that important point and serve as a prelude to a series of events which forebode naught else but evil results in the immediate future for this country should the contemplated withdrawal take place.

I have, etc.,
P. STEVENS

British representative of a private firm, just arrived in Constantinople from Batoum. Admiral Calthorpe stated: 'He makes the strongest representations imaginable on the question of replacement in the Caucasus of the British troops by Italians. He says that the situation was most unsatisfactory at first, but during the last month or six weeks an immense improvement has set in. Without dwelling on his statements as regards political and military conditions or question of relief, which he states is very grave in the Northern part of Trans-Caucasia, he affirms that the loss to British Commerce due to the withdrawal of British troops will be immense. . . . These considerations are in my opinion very weighty, and as so much depends in the future on our foreign commerce, I venture to call Your Lordship's serious attention to them.'

¹ This report proved to be incorrect. It was considered in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office that it was 'probably merely an exaggerated account of Denikin's recent push to Derbent'.

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Memorandum BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE
MARCH 5th 1918

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2. *Russian Armenia, or the Republic of Erivan.*

This Republic was proclaimed in May 1918, and its natural territory would seem to consist of the districts of Erivan and Etchmiadzin in the Government of the former, and of at least a part of the province of Kara. This latter province is at present under British military government, pending the return of the Armenians expelled by the Turks.

The ultimate destiny of this Republic is no doubt incorporation with Armenia proper. Its significance in Trans-Caucasian politics lies in the hostility prevailing between the Armenians and the Georgians on the one side, although fighting between the two has now come to an end, and the Tartars of the Azerbaijan Republic on the other. This hostility has even given rise to a belief that the Armenians have an agreement with Denikin for common action against Georgia (see Major McDonnell's report, Constantinople, No. 4643 L).

3. *The Tartar Republic of Azerbaijan.*

This Republic was set up in May 1918, and in its present form appears to represent a Government by a land-owning oligarchy. Its stability is gravely compromised by the presence in Baku of General Nizharakov's troops and flotilla (the result of the measures to be taken to deal with the latter has not so far been reported), as well as by the recent dispute on the oil question which had arisen with the Georgians, and by the bad financial situation. The Republic, if it can be consolidated, would seem to offer a bulwark against Bolshevism. Its relations with the Georgian Government appear strangely enough to be at present satisfactory, but it is hostile to the Armenians.

A delegation from Azerbaijan is now at Constantinople, and we are endeavouring to obtain permission for it to proceed to Paris.

4. *Daghestan, or the North Caucasus Republic.*

This Republic was established in the summer of 1918, and, although lying to the north of the main Caucasian range cannot be omitted from any review of the conditions in Trans-Caucasia.

The situation of the so-called Republic, a delegation from which is at Constantinople awaiting permission to proceed to Paris, is described as follows in P.L.D. Special 2:—

"The tribes are so wild and split up (linguistically and geographically) that it is improbable that they have adopted any effective central administration. . . . The delegation (now at Constantinople) claimed for the North Caucasus Republic, a wide territory, including the country of the Terek and Kuban Cossacks, where the population is purely Russian and Ukrainian. But its authority is only acknowledged, if at all, by the Sunni Muslim tribes of Daghestan in North-Eastern Caucasus. The remnants of the former Moslem population of North-Western Caucasus (Kalardians, Abkhazians, Az.), seem to be holding aloof from it so far."

It would not appear that we have any commitments towards Daghestan, except in so far as the general expression of good-will towards Georgia, Daghestan, and Russian Azerbaijan, which was transmitted to General Milne, may have been communicated to the Daghestan chiefs. If, however, as would appear to be the case, conditions for the establishment of a stable and independent Republic are lacking in Daghestan, we would seem to be only courting a repetition of our experience with Albania in attempting to withhold this territory from Denikin, except in so far as its occupation by his forces would jeopardise the maintenance of the line laid down by the War Office, namely, Kizil Burun-Zakhtali, and thence along the coast of the Caucasus to Tuzaps on the Black Sea (this line has already been broken by the advance of Denikin's forces through the Sochi district to the river Bakh).

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İYUL 1919

SECRET.

85684.

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No. 2492/35 "I"

INTERCEPTED TELEGRAMS DESPATCHED BY THE AZERBAIJAN
DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE
AT ERIVAN.

1.

From:- ERIVAN.

To:- BAKU, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

URGENT.

Delay the despatch of message for the Armenian Railways under some pretence, as events are expected shortly in the NAKHICHEVAN district.

British troops are leaving and one of their Brigades will stay at GORI. What has been undertaken in connection with the British decision as regards ZANGEBUR?

No. 189. (Approx. 2/6/19).

2.

To:- BAKU, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

URGENT.

Ref. your wire 1599. The Sharur - Nakhichevan district can put out about 6000 irregular troops with Cavalry, machine guns and one gun. They are good fighting men, this has been admitted by the British. In case of hostilities this number may be increased to 10,000. I think we should keep only 6000 men with the old staff and distribute them in the same places where they were before the Armenians came. Also on the hills on the Zangezur frontier.

It is rather difficult to keep account of the money expended. I shall give money to those who are in command and shall appoint special controllers. The Military Representative leaves tomorrow. You can discuss the situation with him. I have sent a messenger to NAKHICHEVAN.

No. 150.

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To:- BAKU, Prime Minister. Copy to Min. of P. Affairs.

Do not let the Armenians have a single pound of kerosine or masut until they repatriate the Mussulman peasants to their villages and return the land rented by Mussulmans.

No.151.

4.

To:- Baku, Min. of P.A.

The Armenian Council has ordered the Min. of Supplies to get 6 months stock of flour for the troops. I think it would be advisable to report this to the Georgian Govt. as hundreds of trucks of flour pass through Georgia.

No.198.

5.

To:- BAKU, Prime Minister and Min. of P.A.

Please consult my military Representative and give him instructions as regards the military organization in the Sharur Nakhichevan district. The Mussulman troops have gone back to their homes as help was not given in time. 300 volunteers still remain.

Armenia is the only enemy of Azerbaijan and therefore special attention must be paid to her. We must get the Kurds SHKUR on our side. Please give me authority and ask the Mil. Representative about SHKUR.

No.202.

6.

To:- BAKU, Min. of P.A.

Regret, but there are no reliable people here who could organize such a committee. I think the Armenians spread this rumour on purpose as it helps them to blame the Mussulmans. I know only about the existence of the Mussulman National Councils. I am in touch with them and supply them with money.

Please inform RECKLADIAN that I know nothing of such a Committee and that members of this Committee never had meetings at my house.

No.408.

7.

To:- BAKU, Min. of Supplies. URGENT.

Armenia has bought from the British 200 mules for 1 million 500000 Roubles.

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To:- BAKU, Min. of P.A.

The Conference must start working in the interests of our nomads who have crossed the frontier of Armenia.

It is no use Armenia taking part in the "military entente" as she will leave us in the most critical moment. Armenia sees her salvation in DENYING. Please let me know what measures are being taken as regards the Nakhichevan Ordubad area. I shall report the rest in another wire.

No.404.

To :- BAKU, Min. of P.A.,

URGENT.

(About July 10th).

The position of Beuk Vadi is very serious. Armenia is concentrating nearly all her forces. Mobilization has been announced. The priests call the expedition against Beuk Vadi a "sacred" one. Azerbaijan's armed intervention might save the Mussulmans. If the Armenian troops will take the village the Mussulmans will be massacred, that is why the Mussulmans are defending themselves. The British Mission is annoyed with the resistance of the Mussulmans. Fighting continues. I have told the Mussulmans that at present they cannot expect any help from Azerbaijan, but that the Azerbaijan Government will pay for all the losses. Great events are expected in the Sharur Nakhichevan Ordubad and Kars districts. Do not waste a single day and send money for Military Organization.

No. 420.

10.

To:- BAKU, Min. of P.A.

Mobilization in Armenia is in full swing. I have had an interview with Khatishev and he considers his actions as being right as they have been approved by Col. FLOWERS and the American Mission. Everson is expecting the British to go against the Mussulmans.

No. 425.

11.

To :- TIFLIS, Mil.Repr. Col. Mamed Bek Aliev.

Armenia has two inf.bdes. with two regts. in each bde. One regt. consists of 2 Bns.

2 Cavalry Regts., 6 squadrons in each Regt. but the formation of these squadrons has not yet been completed.

12 Batteries with 4 guns in each battery.

There is also a Karabagh detachment consisting of 1 Inf. Bn. 3 squadrons of cavalry and 4 guns.

In Kars there are approximately 500 guns from 8 inch to field gun. There are no officers or men to work these guns. Mobilization is continuing. I think mobilization will only help to complete the establishment of above mentioned Regts. as there is a large number of deserters. Please report this to the War Minister.

July 16th, No.432.

İRƏVANDAKI DİPLOMATİK NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİN TELEQRAMLARI
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12.

Te:- BAKU. Min. of P.A. URGENT.

No.0894. Please expedite reply to my 431 after discussing the question about Azerbaijan's help to the inhabitants of Beuk Vedi. Bear in mind that Beuk Vedi is one of the strongest Musulman positions in Armenia. FLONDEN has left for TIFLIS to report in favour of the Armenians. Do not take any notice of him. The conduct of the British is disgraceful.

July 16th. No.433.

13.

Te:- TIFLIS. Azerbaijan Mission, ALIEV.

Besides 6 Inf. Regts. there is another one called the Militia Regt. There is also a frontier Bde and part of the Staff. There are some Armenian detachments in Zangazur, but their strength is not known to me.

No.448.

14.

Te:- BAKU, Min. of P.A. URGENT.

Four howitzers have been sent towards Beuk Vedi. One can hear from Erivan the bombardment coming from direction of Beuk Vedi. Let me know what our Government intends to do to protect the Musulmans, besides sending protests. I repeat once more that Armenia takes no notice whatever of our "paper" protests. On the contrary these protests show the Armenians our weakness. And this makes the position of the Musulmans worse. If Azerbaijan is powerless, I think it would be better to pretend that we knew nothing about it.

19/7/19. No.460.

15.

Te:- ERIVAN TEKINSKY.

Your 432. If possible find out location of troops. Wire reply. Military Representative ALIEV.

No.2907.

Issued by General Staff "Intelligence"
Army of the Black Sea.
Constantinople.

4/9/1919.

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POLITICS OF AZERBAIJAN.Parliamentary 41.
System.

The Parliament has not been elected by the people but it is nominated on a proportionate basis by the various National Councils and Labour Parties. Roughly, two-thirds of it is Tartar, divided into three parties viz:- the Conservatives who support the Government, the Muscovet or Nationalists and the Tartar Socialists. The remaining one third is composed of Russians and Armenians, the Russian National Council (mostly Monarchists and Cadets) standing out.

Politics 42.

The politics of the Government are at present very limited in scope. The average Musulman has an intense desire for complete separation from Russia and does not wish for union either with the "Shah" Persian or with the Turkoman of Trans-Caspia. Musulman feeling is sympathetic to the people of the North Caucasus who are however recognised as very wild and unruly and who have only one financial asset which they could bring into a Musulman union:- the Grossy oilfield.

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ECONOMICS OF RUSSIAN AZERBAIJAN.

Before the British re-occupation of Baku, Azerbaijan had suffered from a series of temporary Governments, Bolshevik, Social Revolutionary, Turk and Tartar, each of which had been guilty of reckless expenditure not by a continuous output of paper money, issued without security.

Trade had almost entirely ceased, partly on account of the British Naval blockade, and partly on account of disputes with Georgia and the Northern Caucasus and unrest generally; as a result of this stagnation ships and railways had fallen into disrepair.

The value of the rouble had decreased and the price of living had increased and an industrial and financial crisis was imminent which the Turks could not have long staved off. The people had lost belief in the existence of just Governments and had no confidence in credit institutions. General re-organization was therefore necessary and the task was dealt with under the following main heads:-

- (a) Banking.
- (b) Labour.
- (c) Transportation.
- (d) Oil.

(a) BANKING.

The political situation did not permit of the opening of a British Bank, because this would have increased the intense suspicion and jealousy which existed as to the British intentions; further, the only available British Bank was the Imperial Bank of Persia, which was not in a position to finance the situation. It was therefore decided as a temporary measure to open a Re-organized State Bank.

This was done by taking a portion of the securities of

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the old Imperial Russian State Bank and amalgamating them with the existing Azerbaijan State Bank to form a new Russian State Bank. After prolonged and somewhat difficult negotiations this was effected and the new bank was opened under Allied control on January 4th 1919.

The Bank controls the issues by the Azerbaijan Government of Baku Bonds. The public has been assured that as long as the Bank remains under Allied control its financial methods will be sound. Now depositors have been guaranteed that money deposited will not be confiscated or misappropriated and that it may be withdrawn at any time.

The Oil Industry has been financed (in wages alone it requires some fifty million roubles monthly and in addition advances have been made to carry on oil businesses) and arrears of labour amounting to twenty eight million roubles have been paid. Generally speaking all industries have been assisted and an economic crisis averted.

Deposits of money have been coming in as fast as it is possible to handle them, altogether the business of Baku has been more satisfactory and there is evidence that public confidence is being gradually restored, but it is a slow business. Once railways are fully opened and trade revives, the Bank as constituted at present will have to be replaced by a more permanent institution.

The arrival of the Financial Commission which is reported to be on its way here is awaited in order to obtain a decision as to what should be done.

(b) LABOUR.

Throughout the Turkish occupation from September to November 1918 practically no wages were paid to any of the workmen on the oilfields and railways or in the factories. The sailors of the Ottoman Mercantile Fleet and the dockers were in a similar position. As the total number of workers in Baku alone amounted to some sixty five thousand of whom a portion were Bolshevik

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and anti-British in tendency the situation at the time of the British re-occupation of Baku on 17th November 1918 demanded immediate attention.

In addition to paying the men in full arrangements were made to supply food at cheap rates. The leaders of Labour were invited to discuss the situation and representative Unions were encouraged in order to get into touch with opinion.

It was found that the men had serious grievances, they were under-paid and without any means of representation to secure redress. Labour regulations are not being drawn up and the Local Government has been induced to consider the formation of a Labour Bureau to adjust labour difficulties.

On the whole the men as compared with labour in England are very patient but as a result of no work and the absence of all authority during the Revolution and the period of Bolshevik rule which followed it there is a spirit of unrest abroad which will require careful watching.

The men are well organised as was shown in a recent strike; it is believed that despite their undoubted Social-Revolutionary leanings they would respond to just treatment. At the same time labour is an undependable factor which will seriously affect future trade development.

There is a shortage of skilled labour owing to the number of men who have been killed or frightened away.

(c) TRANSPORTATION -Railways.

Before the British re-occupation the railways had been neglected for months. There had been rash rivalry between Azerbaijan and Georgia; the former owned the oil pipes which the railway system depended, the latter possessed the workshops through which repairs were effected.

At the time of our arrival no agreement had been reached and Georgia was converting her engines to burn wood fuel, while Azerbaijan was attempting to create workshops.

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A beginning was made by collecting information and starting work at Baku in repairing and cleaning engines and rolling stock preparatory to the arrival of the British DWT who has now taken charge.
Shipping.

Under the Russian Revolution the Caspian shipping was nationalised. At the time of the British re-occupation the bulk of it was under British control in harbour at Insell, another portion was with General Michorakov at Petrovsk and the remainder was at Astrakhan in Bolshevik hands. As a whole the shipping trade had suffered much from neglect and want of repairs. On the arrival of the British at Baku arrangements were made to take over the control of the Caspian mercantile fleet except the portion with the Bolsheviks.

All ships were denationalised and placed under a British Controller, assisted by a representative Board of Owners. In a whole this has been a success. The Russian mercantile owners are settling down but are restive under any control other than British. They are paid regularly and their families are rationed and billeted on shore (instead of in ships as before) which factors intend to establish confidence.

With careful handling they will agree to return to normal conditions although the time for this has not yet come. A recent attempt to turn over the ships to their owners was a signal failure as the sailors threatened to strike and the owners decided to lay up their ships.

Uncertainty as to the future, the Bolshevik possession of Astrakhan and prohibitive tariffs in Persia and Azerbaijan are all contributory causes which diminish the volume of trade but are all remediable in time. It is to our immediate interest to facilitate trade between Persia and Azerbaijan, and this has been recognised by the British Minister at

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Tuheran who has taken up the question.

At present the volume of Caspian trade is sufficient to employ only one third of the available shipping and consequently ^{opportunity} has been taken to overhaul the remainder of the ships and these will accordingly be ready for the spring trade in oil to Astrakhan, provided that that port is opened to trade and that internal conditions will allow of oil exports to Russia.

It is hoped that the D.D.C.F. will soon assume control of the shipping as the existing divided responsibility is unsatisfactory.

Another factor which prejudicially affects the transportation is a shortage caused by Turkish requisitioning of draught animals and of motor driven vehicles. The latter causes difficulty in handling local freights in the town of Baku while the former lessens the volume of trade which can reach the railway in the country districts.

(d) OIL.

Prior to November 1918 the oil situation had been much affected by the Naval blockade, by the disturbed state of Trans - Caucasia and by the tariff war between Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Although the output had been much lessened through shortage of labour, there were nevertheless enormous stocks of oil collected in Baku. Pumping of oil through the Pipe line had ceased as Azerbaijan had refused to permit export of oil into Georgia and in addition to this the pipe line was damaged.

On the arrival of the British the question was at once tackled and an agreement reached by which pumping was recommenced. The pipe line has been repaired and is now in working order but owing to Georgia's refusal to pay for oil taken pumping has again ceased recently. This matter is now under adjudication and a settlement will be effected.

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The oil situation has been fully reported on separately. It is considered essential that one control should be established and this is the view taken by the D.D.C.F.

There is a shortage of machinery and tools for refining, and there is a great need of money. Producers are awaiting funds to sink new oil wells.

The refining of oil is largely controlled by the firm of WIGL, who thus possess a preponderating influence over the export of oil and as the firm is financed by the JEROME BANK this privilege requires to be curtailed. On the other hand the financial control of the oil is at present in the hands of the producers who with the support of the local Government fix rates. This is temporarily satisfactory arrangement for us.

The financial Commission on its arrival will, it is hoped, deal with this question.

National 44
resources
of Azerbaijan
all.

The Baku oilfields naturally overshadow all other natural resources of the province; which in any case do not amount to a very great deal. Agriculture is very backward by reason of lack of knowledge due to Russian methods of stunting popular education.

The land is fertile and produces wheat, rice and barley in considerable quantities.

LENKORAN produces good timber. ZANJANLI and SHIRAZIA possess copper mines, iron exists but it is not yet worked and gold mining is carried out on a small scale.

Revenue 45
and
Taxation.

Under Russian domination the revenue was produced by taxes on income, land and industrial profits. Under that system the province of BAKU was more than self supporting as it is said to have produced from its ^{revenues} ~~output~~ for deficits in DASHKESAI, UZHENIA and ERIVAN.

The last taxes were collected was in 1917 (under WIGL'S) and then only in places accessible by rail.

The Turks made a levy of one tenth of the harvest in 1917.

The present intention of the Government is to levy taxes on the former basis and notices to that effect have been issued to

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tax payers. The Government affect to be confident as to their power to collect the revenue in paper money. Collection in kind is not contemplated.

46. Generally speaking the Azerbaijani both of town and of country side is quoted as being industrious; in BAKU for instance a few Mussulman idlers are to be seen.

The strikes which occur are largely political and engineered by Russian agitators.

47. Azerbaijan in common with all other communities in Trans-Caucasia tells a tale of occupations neglected under Russian rule.

Although fairly plentiful in BAKU elementary schools are few and far between in the country towns and villages; middle schools are numerous in BAKU but ELISAVETPOL and YEKHA have but one each and that ends the total list.

Higher education does not exist.

Such is the situation bequeathed by Russia and as exists today.

The Ministry of Education has however in hand a scheme for general free education from 7 years of age onwards and middle schools are to be instituted.

Beyond that the scheme does not at present go - higher education and agricultural and technical schools if they come at all are not yet completely contemplated.

48. In conclusion it can be said that at present great opportunities exist for trade because the country is wealthy and yet is starved of all manufactured goods; on the other hand its debased currency makes financial exchange difficult.

If real economic development is desired a central control is essential but this control will have many obstacles to overcome. Corrupt administration, graft, racial jealousies and labour unrest will all have to be dealt with. The confidence of the people will have to be secured and large sums of money will have to be found for which it is considered that a quick return could be expected upon.

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ASPIRATION OF RUSSIAN AZERBAIJAN.

General 49.
Orientation.

The moderate minded section of the Tartars appear to realize that the complete independence of Azerbaijan is impracticable and that given a sound democratic All - Russia Government, in a few years Azerbaijan will want to rejoin Russia and they therefore hesitate to cut the painter. As sign of this an influential Tartar member of the Government recently asked for advice as to whether the Allies would be with favour on immediate overtures by the Government to RUSSIA.

Relations with
neigh-
bouring
states.

Georgia is hated and despised by Azerbaijan their idleness, conceit and dishonesty about railways and oil payments leaves the Georgians without any sympathy from Baku where the industries and finance of Georgia are largely controlled through the oil trade.

Armenia and Azerbaijan could never unite.

Thus any federation of States on the Caspian Sea would be on a national (Tartar) basis, running North and South from the Terek River to the Persian Border.

Problems of
British
attitude.

One of the chief difficulties for us at the present time is that our minority is in question by all parties. The Volunteer Army see in your support of Denikin a desire to articulate Bolshevikism but they also see in our Hands Off attitude as regards Trans-Caucasia that our idea of regaining Russia is to lop off a very rich area on which the industries of Russia very largely depend.

In the eyes of the Socialists we are Imperialists and Monarchists, and are backing Denikin not only against Bolshevikism but also to deprive the proletariat of the freedom that they have won in the Revolution.

The Mussulmans are nervous as to our intentions. They

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have not received the same treatment as has Georgia & we are assured of our sympathy, we have been very good to DƏLƏKƏNOV and his Volunteer Army successors, while we have not permitted Azerbaijan to bring her troops into ERZURUM or to violate the full powers of appreciation in the provinces.

It is not however denied that the presence of British troops in ERZURUM has ensured the preservation of order and the protection of property and that the security thus afforded is beneficial as allowing of industrial development.

Furthermore British justice is appreciated; as also the fact that Great Britain is the protector of the greater part of the Mussulmans of the World.

Azerbaijan is however still confessedly sympathetic to Turkey - as being a co-religionist.

territorial
aspirations.

These are as shown on Map No. 1. (with applique)

(a) Azerbaijan enters a confident claim for the province of ERZURUM as having never been anything but a portion of Azerbaijan.

(b) As regards Armenian aspirations in the KARABAGH district of the ERZURUM province the Azerbaijanis regret that the establishment of a Mussulman Governor at ERZURUM has established order there and that there is nothing to prevent Tartars and Armenians living quietly in the same vicinity, quoting the towns of BAKU, ERZURUM and ERZURUM as examples and also the fact that until purposely stirred up in 1908 Tartar versus Armenian troubles had not arisen in Trans-Caucasia. So long, say the Azerbaijanis, as Armenians are isolated and far away from the backing of their own Government and are under Mussulman domination they live quietly; if they get power troubles arise.

This is a very pro-Mussulman argument and would meet with little or no agreement from the other side.

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(c) The applique to Map No 1 shows Azerbaijan as entering a grotesquely extravagant claim which would bring her literally within gun shot of YEREVAN, would give her both the secular and religious capitals of Armenia (in ERZURUM and ERZURUM respectively), and would give her a huge South Western Caucasian province in addition.

These claims need not be taken seriously and nothing outside the borders indicated by boundary lines on the applique need be considered.

Acceptance by Azerbaijan of the principle of mutual transplantation of Tartar vice Armenian (and the reverse) seems possible; with the proviso that force should not be employed to coerce an exclusive other race.

The Azerbaijan consider that the Mussulman would be easier to induce to move than the Armenian.

FORİN OFİSİN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA TELEQRAMI
31 DEKABR 1919

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FILES ONLY.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).
Foreign Office, December 31st, 1919. 7 p.m.
No. 154.

.....

Your telegram No. 208 (of December 17th).

There is no objection to an Azerbaijan Representative coming to London, provided a suitable man is chosen with your approval, and that he comes on the same unofficial footing as Georgian representative.

I have no objection to engagement of British experts, provided the appointments are made direct and that no responsibility falls on His Majesty's Government.

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EXTRACTS FROM INFORMATION OF THE CAUCASUS AND BARU AREA.

Feb. 11th. Evacuation of Germans.

The German troops are considered to be completely evacuated from the Caucasus. The former German Consul, Count Von der Schulenberg, at Tiflis, arrived at Constantinople with his staff.

Feb. 13th. The first party of Prisoners of War from Turkestan comprising 512 Austro-Hungarians arrived at Baku from Krasnovodsk on their way to Batum. Five Austrian Officers and 49 Austrian soldiers are to be repatriated from Teheran under the protection of Neutral Legations.

Feb. 4th. Repatriation and relief of refugees.

The Assyrian National Committee reports that there are 7,000 refugees at Tiflis and 1,500 in the neighbourhood of Elizabetopol, in need of relief. Also 6,500 in the neighbourhood of Tiflis, who although not in urgent need of food, lacked employment.

The Assyrians were getting $\frac{1}{2}$ lb of bread from the American Commission at Tiflis. This was not sufficient although the Assyrians are grateful for it.

British and American relief officials are arranging for relief of the 1,500 refugees in Elizabetopol area. The Assyrian Committee estimated that 10,000 of the 16,000 refugees could be repatriated to their homes during the coming Spring. They also suggest that with the help of a few British officers they could raise 3,000 armed men from these 10,000 refugees to keep order in the Urumia district.

The situation at Shusha remains unsatisfactory. Typhus is rapidly reducing the 30,000 Armenian and 10,000 Musulman refugees in this area. Their leaders instead of helping, quarrel over boundary questions.

Feb. 4th-17th. The situation at Vladikavkaz.

Hostilities broke out between the Ingushi and the Volunteer army.

On Feb. 4th the Volunteer army apparently occupied Vladikavkaz but quarrels arose over some land which the Ingushi had appropriated from the Khabardins and the Ossetins, with the result that the Ingushi joined the Bolsheviks and ejected the Volunteer army from the town. The Ingushi are apparently anti-Bolshevik and merely used the Bolsheviks to help them, as on Feb. 9th they arrested all the Bolshevik Commissaries in the town, although it was not till the 17th Feb. that the Ingushi had surrendered to the Volunteer Army.

On Feb. 9th the North Caucasus Government was reported to have ordered the immediate return of the appropriated lands to the Khabardins and Ossetins. Whether this was done or not is not clear.

On Feb. 17th, it was reported that Ingushi to the North East of Vladikavkaz had declared themselves hostile to the Volunteer Army. The Volunteer Army therefore sent detachments who captured the villages of Michailovskaya and Samash Kinakaya where the hostile Ingushi apparently concentrated, and also 450 prisoners, one armoured train and 4 red trains. This apparently ended their resistance as on Feb. 17th the Ingushi were reported to have surrendered to the Volunteer

Army

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Army and that they were organizing detachments to fight the Bolsheviks.

Feb. 9th. Situation in Sukhum and Black Sea Provinces.

The Georgian authorities stated that they were taking up a defensive line 15 miles North East of Oagri, a town just South of the boundary of the Sukhum province. This was due to the Volunteer Army occupying the Sochi district with detachments. No offensive action could be taken unless the Volunteer Army attempted to advance beyond this defensive line.

Feb. 10th The Georgian Army retired before the Volunteer Army which crossed the boundary of the Sukhum Province and occupied Oagri.

Feb. 12th. The Volunteer Army advanced further and their detachments reached the line of the river Baib (10 miles South East of Oagri). The Georgian Army retired to a line 12 miles S.E. of this river. Despite their statement of Feb. 9th the Georgian Army does not appear to have offered any resistance to the Volunteer Army. The Volunteer Army was reported on Feb 12th not to intend to advance beyond the river Baib.

Feb. 12th. The British Mission investigating the situation reported that the High Command of the Volunteer Army had ordered the occupation of Sochi, but that the further advance of the Volunteer Army had been ordered by a subordinate commander, who although he knew that this was in contravention of an Allied pledge, considered that it was justified owing to the Georgian misrule in the areas concerned.

Feb. 15th. The British Mission with General Denikin was instructed by wire to inform General Denikin that the immediate withdrawal of his forces was imperative.

Caspian Sea Situation.

The shipping situation at Baku appears to be fairly satisfactory. The shipping formerly under Gen. Bicharakov's control is now being paid off. The crews have agreed not to form Committees and political agitators have apparently not so far taken any steps to promote unrest among the discharged soldiers and sailors of Bicharakov's forces. It has been necessary to increase the wages 90% owing to the local economic conditions, and it is hoped that this will attract workmen from the Black Sea, and that the output of the dockyards will increase. It is reported from Astrakhan that the Bolshevik forces in that neighbourhood are preparing an expedition to the West coast of the Caspian. These forces were reported on the 9th to consist of one division of mixed Communist, Soviet and Musulman troops, including cavalry. Besides the organized forces there were 10,000 armed workmen and 1,000 sailors. It is reported that the inhabitants of the villages in the neighbourhood of Astrakhan are anti-Bolshevik.

The naval forces at Astrakhan, according to the same report, comprised 3 torpedo-boats, 2 submarines, 3 schooners and 6 steamers (apparently merchant ships.)

Disbandment

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Disbandment of local forces.

General Prejevalski is energetically carrying out the disbandment of the forces previously under General Bicharakov. Some are being discharged, others are being put on Volunteer Army rates of pay and sent to the Volunteer Army.

In the early stages of disbandment some of these forces were sent to join the Volunteer Army via Batoum but were unable to proceed owing to an agreement made with the Georgians, consequent on the hostilities in the Sochi district. Owing to the recent advance of the Volunteer Army across the Terek Province the remainder of the reorganized force are being sent to join the Volunteer Army via Petrovsk.

Andranik's Force.

The Armenian force under Andranik which has been at Gorusi since December 1st is now being disbanded. This force which once attained a strength of 3,500 is now about 1,600 strong. This force continued fighting the Turks up to the day the Armistice was signed. It was then moved towards Shusha till on December 1st, owing to the unsatisfactory effect produced by hostilities with the Tartars consequent on this advance orders were issued for this force to return to Gorusi. Since that date it has maintained order amongst 30,000 refugees in the Gorusi area. Lately owing to lack of funds it was feared that unless the force was disbanded in some regular manner it would break up into small bands which being forced to live in the country would cause fresh trouble in the Shusha district. On December 1st back pay was owed to the men to the amount of 1,600,000 roubles. It has been suggested that as the Allies previously financed this force, 200,000 roubles should be paid to Andranik monthly until the force is disbanded.

Situation in Georgia.

The attitude of the Georgian Government has become more openly hostile owing to the occupation of the Volunteer Army of part of the Sukhum Province. The Georgian Government are convinced that every act of General Denikin is supported by the British and an encroachment on Georgian territory subsequent to an Allied announcement that such encroachment would not be permitted has resulted in the scarcely veiled hostility of the Georgian Government, while the Press has been openly insulting. An apology has been demanded from the Georgian Government for the behaviour of its Press. The Georgian Government has also been informed that General Denikin has been ordered to withdraw from the recently invaded districts.

The Mission which investigated the situation in the disputed areas reported that although the occupation of Georgian territory had been carried out in contravention of an Allied pledge, yet it had been done with the highest motives. Should the Volunteer Army detachments be ordered to withdraw, a refusal to allow the Georgian Government to re-occupy the territory would be justified owing to the misrule that had obtained there. British prestige in Georgia demanded however, the complete evacuation of these territories by the Volunteer Army.

Azerbaijan.

Baku.

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It would appear that the Azerbaijan Government is increasing in strength, and is assuming more control, although still dishonest, over affairs in Baku. Russian and Armenian parties which had held aloof up till now are coming forward to join the Government. What their object is, is still obscure but they probably think that the Azerbaijan Government has increased sufficiently in strength to make it desirable that these parties should take part in local administration.

The Azerbaijan Government has repeated its demand to send Azerbaijan troops to Baku. Their previous demand had been refused owing to General Bicharakov's troops being in the town and it was thought that collisions might occur between them. General Thomson has suggested that now General Bicharakov's troops are leaving Baku, a limited number of Azerbaijan troops might be permitted to enter the town and that on their arrival the British military governorship of Baku and Martial Law in the town might be established. The Azerbaijan Government would then become responsible for order amongst the civil population.

Political agitation has decreased in Baku recently but attempts may be made to stir up trouble amongst the disbanded men from General Bicharakov's troops and shipping.

Lenkoran

General disorder was reported on February 2nd in this district. The Azerbaijan Government offered troops to restore order, but as this would entail bloodshed it was considered advisable to wait until British troops could be sent. A British mission left Baku on Feb. 12th to investigate and report on situation.

Armenia.

Moslem delegates from Makhichevan, Ordubad, Shurur and Derailgas (unlocated) arrived at Teheran on Feb. 4th with a petition to the Persian Government at Tabriz to take steps to join the above districts to Persia. The delegates also informed the British and American Consuls of their desire for inclusion in Persia, and requested that their desires might be conveyed to the British and American Legations at Tabriz.

Economic.

Baku.

Owing to local prices and the depreciation of the value of the rouble, it has been found necessary to raise the wages of the dockyard workers by 90%. This should result in an increase in the output of the dockyards. Wages being fixed it is hoped that it will be possible to import skilled labour which is much needed, by obtaining workmen from the Black Sea Ports.

Exports from Persia being under British control the volume of trade is not increasing as much as was hoped, and freight may have to be raised 10% to cover expenses.

The price of bread remains satisfactory because it is under British control, but meat and fish are being exploited by profiteers, who are connected with the local

Government

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Government administration becomes corrupt if supervision is relaxed.

n.6th. Trade with Persia.

General Thomson wrote to the British Minister at Teheran on the desirability of opening trade between Azerbaijan and Persia. Azerbaijan wishes to open trade giving oil and other exports for foodstuffs. A further letter was sent on Jan. 31st as no action appears to have been taken on the first letter: as the Caucasus can only supply oil and paper money of doubtful value in exchange for the many commodities required from Persia. It was therefore not unlikely that Persia would be reluctant to open trade with the Caucasus. Since however, the Caucasian railway system, and the shipping on the Caspian Sea, were not being controlled by the British, it would be greatly to the advantage of Persia to open trade. The Azerbaijan Government was still being urged to open trading negotiations, but her present attitude was unsatisfactory, since her chief method of obtaining revenue was extortion of high customs duties to the Caspian littoral. It was suggested that the Persian Government should inform the Azerbaijan Government that a large supply of food-stuffs had already been supplied to the Caucasus by the Persian Government through the British Authorities, and that if the Azerbaijan Government could return trade at similarly low rates, unrestricted trade would be resumed. If, however, the Azerbaijan Government persisted in its present attitude, it was suggested, no exports from Persia to the Caucasus would be permitted at all, with the exception of supplies to the British and to the Allied Relief Committees.

ADMİRAL SER C. DE ROBEKİN MƏLUMATI
4 NOYABR 1919

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EASTERN.

[November 14.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 9.

[152036]

No. 1.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 2067.)

Constantinople, November 4, 1919.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report on the situation in Transcaucasia which has been prepared by Lieutenant-Commander H. C. Lake, R.N.V.R., of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

2. As the messenger is leaving for England within an hour, there has not been time to copy the report, and one copy only is therefore enclosed.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Report on the Situation in Transcaucasia.

"Iron Duke" at Constantinople,
November 2, 1919.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the present political and general situation in Transcaucasia, made as the result of my recent visit to that country.

2. Transcaucasia, that is to say the region bounded on the north by the main Caucasian chain and on the south by the old Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian frontiers, is at present divided into four separate territories, namely, the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia (sometimes called the Ararat Republic), and the province of Batum, which is under British military administration. There are also various small neutral zones, composed of districts in dispute between Georgia and Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan and Armenia, which do not require separate enumeration. The mountainous region known as Daghestan does not form a part of Transcaucasia, but will be referred to in this report in so far as it is concerned with Transcaucasian affairs.

3. The separation of Transcaucasia from Russia dates from the assumption of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks having surrendered Batum and Ardahan to the Turks, the Georgians, considering these districts to be Georgian, decided to break away from Russia, and with the Tartars and Armenians formed the joint Transcaucasian Republic. This Republic shortly afterwards split up into the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, with capitals respectively at Tiflis, Baku, and Erivan.

The British military province of Batum owes its origin to clause 15 of the Armistice with Turkey, Batum having been at the time of the conclusion of the Armistice in Turkish military occupation.

4. The crucial question in Transcaucasia, a question on which all other problems in the country are dependant, is that of the recognition or otherwise of the independence of the three republics by the Peace Conference. The question has multitudinous aspects, conditions in the three States differing widely, but there are two facts common to the situation, namely:

- (1.) Recognition, if granted, will run counter to the aims of Denikin and Kolchak for an "Undivided Russia."
- (2.) Recognition must necessarily be accompanied by a mandate in order to protect the three States both from reconquest by Russia, and from internecine warfare.

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ADMİRAL SER C. DE ROBEKİN MƏLUMATI
4 NOYABR 1919

5. Before submitting any observations as to British policy with regard to recognition, I propose to outline briefly political conditions in the three republics severally.

GEORGIA.

Of the three States, Georgia has had the longest continuous independent existence, and perhaps the most pronounced national consciousness. She has a distinct language, script, and an ancient literature, and an independent national Church co-extensive with the kingdom. Kingdom and Church were forcibly absorbed by Russia in 1801, but they never abandoned the hope of recovering independence. When Georgia declared her independence of Russia in 1918, the Church of Georgia similarly renounced its dependence on the Church of Russia, and, while remaining in full communion with the Russian and other Orthodox Churches, has resumed its status of an "autocephalous" and independent Church.

The present Georgian Government is Social Democrat, but anti-Bolshevik. The Georgian people are probably much more conservative than their Government, and it is thought that at the forthcoming elections the parties of the Right will be far more strongly represented than they are in the present Constituent Assembly.

The instinct of the Georgian people is naturally sympathetic to any Power that is opposed to the Bolsheviks, with whom they have nothing in common. Any manifestation of Bolshevism in Georgia is rigidly suppressed, and the bulk of the Bolshevik agents in the country are Russians and Jews, not Georgians. On the other hand, Georgians are in a quandary as regards Denikin. They sympathise with him in his war against Bolshevism, but they cannot but regard him as the principal opponent of their independence. Denikin has made it abundantly clear that an independent Georgia is incompatible with what he is fighting for, namely, an undivided Russia; so to the Georgians, the ultimate success of Denikin means the end of their independence, unless some mandatory intervenes to preserve it.

With Azerbaijan, Georgian relations are on the whole cordial, despite several points of difference, mainly commercial. Georgia has, for example, lent the Azerbaijan army a number of her officers; and both countries are united by a common dread of reincorporation by Russia, and to a lesser degree, by a common dislike of their mutual neighbour, Armenia.

As regards the latter, Georgian antipathy is directed against Armenians individually rather than against the Armenian Republic. Georgia is quite capable of making common cause with Armenia and Azerbaijan for the purpose of preserving Transcaucasian independence as against Russia. She probably dislikes the Armenians within her own borders more than those beyond them, the reason being that the bulk of the wealth of the country has found its way into Armenian pockets.

All the best houses in Tiflis are owned by Armenians; and although the Armenian Republic is as a neighbour somewhat of a *malus in conviva*, Georgia is inclined to see in its existence a means of ridding herself of a number of unwelcome guests.

To the Turks the Christian Georgians, who form the overwhelming majority of the race, are unhesitatingly hostile. Moslem Georgians living in Batum province have bonds of sympathy with the Turks, but carry no political weight. At the same time, there is said to be a Georgian representative at the headquarters of Mustafa Kemal, the reason doubtless being that Georgia, in her desperate urgency for independence, is prepared to accept recognition wherever she can get it. This reason also explains Georgia's friendly relations with Germany prior to the German collapse. Germany, aware of the importance of Georgia's geographical position on the direct route to Persia, Afghanistan, and India, bargained with her ally Turkey to secure Georgian independence, which she was the first officially to recognise, and even now Germany is making efforts to capture Georgian sympathy and Georgian trade. Her argument to Georgia is as follows: "Russia and Germany are bound to come together once Russia has been reconstituted. Russia will need German help, and Germany will make the independence of Georgia one of the conditions on which she will afford that help. In return, Germany asks for the monopoly of the concessions granted by Georgia." Quite recently, again, Germany has invited Georgia to send 300 Georgian children to Germany, to be educated free of charge in German schools.

AZERBAIJAN.

The national or separatist movement in Azerbaijan is of much more recent growth than in Georgia or Armenia. It was, in fact, unheard of until 1917, when

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Georgia took the lead in the idea of separation from Russia; and from the purely ethnological point of view there seems to be no more reason for the separate existence of the Tatars of Baku than of any similar group of Tatars elsewhere. But the idea of independence has by now taken deep root; and the Azerbaijanis, while very friendly to the Russian people, and while anxious for economic reasons to be on good terms with Russia, who is their natural customer, would be prepared to fight rather than go back to the old régime of incorporation with a centralising Russia.

The members of the two principal political parties in Azerbaijan, the Musavat and the Ittihad, belong to the property and land-owning classes, and are anti-Bolshevik. Their attitude to Denikin is thus similar to that of Georgia, namely, sympathetic so far as his fight against Bolshevism is concerned, suspicious as regards his Pan-Russian aims.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Denikin have not been improved by the latter's policy in Daghestan. Azerbaijan alleges that all Daghestan south of Petrovsk was originally allotted to her by the British military authorities, and the fact that Denikin has now occupied that region, and has proceeded to conscript the Moslem population (which under the Tsarist régime was exempt from conscription) has caused risings in the country which Azerbaijan (and Georgia) are unofficially abetting. Towards the end of October, Denikin notified Azerbaijan that he would not tolerate the Azerbaijani flag on the Caspian, and this, together with the events in Daghestan, has caused much alarm at Baku, where it is feared that an attack by Denikin may be impending.

The natural dislike of the Azerbaijanis to the Armenians is made use of by the Turks and the Kurds, who do their best to incite them to attack Armenian villages and massacre their inhabitants. This they do in the belief that, the smaller the number of Armenians in the world, the smaller will be the territory to be transferred from Turkey to Armenia.

There is a certain amount of sympathy for Turkey in Azerbaijan, but the feeling, due largely to pan-Islamic propaganda, is sentimental rather than practical. It is diminished to a considerable extent by the fact that three-quarters of the Moslems of Azerbaijan are Shi'ahs, and only one-quarter Sunnis; and the Azerbaijanis, who are a practical people, are well aware that Turkey is not in a position to do anything for them. This does not prevent them from making use of Turkish officers to stiffen their army.

It should be added that the republic of Azerbaijan has no connection with the Persian province of the same name. The inhabitants of the Persian province of Azerbaijan are Tatars also, but there is no question of their withdrawing from Persian rule and joining the republic.

ARMENIA.

The Republic of Armenia, as it exists at present, lies entirely within what was formerly Russian territory, but it is understood that three schemes for its ultimate boundaries have been propounded. These schemes are:-

- (1.) Nubar Pasha's project of a vast Armenia running from the Black Sea and Persian frontier to the Mediterranean at Alexandretta. In this area the Armenians form only about 3 per cent. of the total population.
- (2.) The "Six Vilayets" scheme, namely the existing Armenia with the vilayets of Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput (Mamuret-el-Aziz), Diarbekr, Bitlis and Van.
- (3.) The so-called "Erivan project," namely existing Armenia with the vilayet of Erzerum, that part of the vilayet of Trebizond east of Kerasund, and roughly the portions of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis north of the 30th parallel of latitude.

The latter more modest project, which corresponds more closely to the realities of the situation, is said to be that advocated by the leaders of the present Armenian Republic.

The President of Armenia, M. Hatissian, is a wealthy Georgian Armenian, who has been a successful Mayor of Tiflis, and has with commendable patriotism left Georgia and his business in order to devote himself to the new Armenia. In politics he is a moderate man, but unfortunately his colleagues are mostly members of the Dashnak party, which controls and even terrorises the Government. The Dashnakists showed much heroism in the field, in leading the Volunteer Bands

POLKOVNİK HASKELİN ALYANSIN ALİ ŞURASINA MƏRUZƏSİ
14 NOYABR 1919

COBEN HD.92 NOVEMBER 14 1919 10:30A

It was decided:

to accept the recommendations of the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen, contained in the three joint notes (see Appendix A).⁴

4. MR. POLK explained that Colonel Haskell, Inter-Allied High Commissioner for Armenia, was leaving Paris that night and that prior to his departure he thought it would be well for him to give the Council a brief summary of the conditions in Armenia.

COLONEL HASKELL informed the Council that the three republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were at daggers drawn with each other on almost all points. Georgia and Azerbaijan had perhaps some slight degree of good feeling towards each other, evidenced by a loose defensive alliance concluded between them as a protection against a possible advance southward of General Denikin's army. Armenia had refused to join this alliance. Political and economic conditions in each of the three countries were in as bad a condition as could be imagined. He wished to point out that these three countries had been arbitrarily carved out and delimited. The only railway system from the Black Sea through to Persia traversed all three of these republics and either one of them had it in its power, under present conditions, to paralyze traffic. Aside from the animosity existing between these states, further material difficulties resulted from their arbitrary delimitation: for instance, all the railway repair shops were in Georgia and all the fuel for the operation of the railway system came from Baku in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, between these three republics there were various contested districts, and neutral zones which had been marked out by the British which it had not been possible to change because they gave rise to such burning questions that no change could be adopted until all three republics were consolidated under one administration. He had been entrusted by the Supreme Council with representing it in Armenia,⁴ but he could not efficiently carry out the necessary work as long as Georgia and Azerbaijan remained without his jurisdiction. Moreover, owing to the fact that these two latter republics did remain without his jurisdiction, an anomalous situation was presented. Thousands of inhabitants of Azerbaijan were receiving relief in Baku and other localities, and the same was true of many Georgians at Tiflis and other points; though those destitute people were entirely dependent on the relief they received, the Relief Administration had no control whatever over the who, in good faith, can be considered as having tangible ties with the country, will be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. The Commission has received plenary powers from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to apply this decision.' (iii) A note to the Supreme Council, dated November 11, 1919, proposing a draft letter from M. Dutasta to the President of the existing Interallied Control Commission at Teschen concerning the communication of its archives and information to the Plebiscite Commission. 'As to the powers of the Control Commission, they will cease when the Plebiscite Commission, assembled at Teschen, will officially inform it, at the same time as the Conference, that it begins its operations.'

⁴ See Vol. I, No. 3, minute 3.

CƏNUBİ QAFQAZDAKI HADİSƏLƏRİN GÜNDƏLİYİ
FEBRAL 1918 - Sentyabr 1919

G.S."I", G.H.Q.
No. 5671 "I".

DIARY OF EVENTS AFFECTING

THE SITUATION IN

TRANS-CAUCASIA AND TRANS-CASPIA.

February 1918 - September 1919.

(Period November 1918 to September 1919 compiled
from records of General Staff (I), General H.Q.
Army of the Black Sea.)

CƏNUBİ QAFQAZDAKI HADİSƏLƏRİN GÜNDƏLİYİ
FEBRAL 1918 - Sentyabr 1919

DIARY OF EVENTS AFFECTING THE SITUATION IN CAUCASIA AND

TRANS-CASPIA.

(February 1918 - September 1919).

Beginning of Turco-German advance into Trans-Caucasia.	13.2.18. (app.)
Peace negotiations between Turkey and the Trans-Caucasian Government at Trebizond begin.	--.3.18.
Peace negotiations between Turkey and the Trans-Caucasian Government interrupted.	--.4.18.
Independence of Trans-Caucasia again proclaimed: Georgian Pre-Turk party leading.	22-23.4.18.
Negotiations between Turkey and Trans-Caucasian Government re-opened.	23.4.18.
Dissolution of Trans-Caucasian Government.	26.5.18.
Declaration of Independence of Georgia.	26.5.18.
Declaration of Independence of Azerbaijan.	26.5.18. (app.)
Declaration of Independence of Armenia.	26.5.18. (app.)
Treaty of Batum, between Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.	4.6.18.
Turkey recognises sovereignty of Georgia.	4.6.18.
Treaty between Turkey and Union of North Caucasian mountaineers.	8.6.18.
First German troops reach Trans-Caucasia.	8.6.18.
Germany discovers existence of Treaty between Turkey and Azerbaijan.	10.6.18.
German Military Mission established at TIFLIS.	12.6.18.
Georgian Delegation arrives at Constantinople.	19.6.18.
Ughestan Delegation arrives at Constantinople.	19.6.18. (app.)
Azerbaijan Delegation arrives at Constantinople.	19.6.18. (app.)
Armenian Delegation arrives at Constantinople.	24.6.18.
German-Austrian-Bulgarian Delegation located at Poti, on route for Tiflis.	20.7.18.
Armenia requests postponement of ratification of Batum Treaty pending conclusion of Constantinople Conference.	5.7.18.
Terek Cossacks declare against Bolsheviks.	10.7.18.

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2.

Bolshevik Government at Baku overthrown and Centro-Caspian Government established.	25.7.18.
Germany recognises Georgia "de facto".	25.7.18. (app.)
First British detachment lands at Baku.	27.7.18. (app.)
Treaty concluded between British and Jangalis.	12.8.18.
Germano-Russian Supplementary Treaty (Germany recognises Georgia only).	27.8.18.
Turkey refuses to allow Persia to remain neutral.	5.9.18.
Ratification of Germano-Russian Supplementary Treaty.	12.9.18.
British evacuate BAKU.	18.9.18.
Azerbaijan Government establishes itself at Baku.	18.9.18.
Enver Pasha orders Turkish occupation of North Caucasus.	20.9.18.
Turkey recognises Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.	23.9.18.
Germany recognises Georgia only.	23.9.18.
Turkey agrees to withdraw from Azerbaijan and Armenia, except for railway guards.	23.9.18.
Turkey agrees to German administration of oil and Trans-Caucasian Railway.	23.9.18.
Turkey recognises integrity of Persia and will withdraw from N.W. Persia when anti-British operations are concluded.	23.9.18.
Turkey agrees to withdraw boundaries laid down by Brest-Litovsk Treaty.	7.10.18.
British Caucasus Military Mission arrested by Bolsheviks.	7.10.18.
Persia requests Turkey to evacuate N.W. Persia, stating that British will do the same.	7.10.18.
Enver gives orders for elements to remain in Azerbaijan.	14.10.18.
Turkey proposes to unite Azerbaijan with the Union of North Caucasian Mountaineers.	14.10.18.
Turkish Supreme Command orders withdrawal of Turks to within Brest-Litovsk frontiers.	24.10.18.
Turkey establishes North Caucasus Republic.	26.10.18.
Great Britain signs armistice with Turkey.	30.10.18.

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3.

Bolsheviks occupy Grcznl.	17.11.18.
British re-occupy Baku.	17.11.18.
Turkish evacuation of Petrovsk begins.	19.11.18.
Andronik ceases hostilities.	1.12.18.
Turkish forces evacuate SHUSHA.	4.12.18. (app.)
Coalition Azerbaijan Government formed.	7.12.18.
Hostilities break out between Georgia and Armenia.	9.12.18.
British military mission established at TIFLIS.	11.12.18.
Turks complete evacuation of Azerbaijan.	16.12.18. (app.)
Armenia declares war on Georgia.	21.12.18.
British forces land at Batum.	22.12.18.
Georgia evacuates Sochi district by agreement with the Volunteer Army.	26.12.18.
Local Government of Batum established.	30.12.18.
British mission sent to SHUSHA.	31.12.18.
Armistice arranged between Armenia and Georgia.	31.12.18.
Plot to overthrow Kraevvedsk Government discovered.	31.12.18.
General Bicharakov agrees to disband his force.	4.1.19.
General Beach arrives at Tiflis.	6.1.19.
Russian State Bank re-opened at Baku.	6.1.19.
German Military Mission leaves TIFLIS.	7.1.19.
British Military Governor sent to Kars.	7.1.19.
British occupy Petrovsk.	13.1.19.
Bolshevik plot at ASHABAD discovered.	14.1.19.
Volunteer Army advances into North Caucasus, begins.	14.1.19. (app.)
Georgian-Armenian Peace Treaty signed.	17.1.19.
British Mission sent to Kars.	21.1.19.
Armenian-Tatar hostilities at Devali end.	21.1.19.
Fall of Orenburg to Bolsheviks.	22.1.19.

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4.

Anti-Bolshevik rising at Tashkent.	22.1.19.
Georgia sends Diplomatic Representative to Denikin who refuses to recognise him.	25.1.19.
Akhalkalaki district taken over by Georgia.	26.1.19. (app.)
British Missions sent to Nakhichevan and Akhalkalaki.	26.1.19.
Southern boundary of Volunteer Army laid down as Tuapsa-wrest of Caucasus-Zakatali-Kizil Burun.	1.2.19.
Turkish evacuation of Trans-Caucasia completed.	2.2.19. (app.)
All Kifayat arrested for destroying Kars W/T station.	2.2.19.
General LIASHOV appointed by Denikin as G-in-C Terek and Daghestan.	2.2.19.
Volunteer Army captures Vladikavkaz.	4.2.19. (app.)
Ingushi begin to resist Volunteer Army.	4.2.19. (app.)
Murozi Pasha arrested.	4.2.19.
Volunteer Army troops land south of Sochi.	6.2.19.
Detachment of Bicharalov's disbanded men interned by Georgia while en route to Novorossia.	7.2.19.
British occupy Kasbek.	7.2.19.
Armistice arranged between Georgians and Lopolmo in Akhaltsikh district.	7.2.19.
Georgia declares existence of State of War in Sukhum and Black Sea Provinces.	8.2.19.
German Military Mission embarks at DAFUN.	8.2.19.
Volunteer Army crosses frontier of Sukhum Province.	10.2.19.
Tartar forces re-occupy Akhaltsikh.	11.2.19.
Volunteer Army advance in North Caucasus ends.	11.2.19. (app.)
Last German troops leave Trans-Caucasia.	12.2.19.
British Mission sent to Lenkoran.	12.2.19.
Volunteer Army forces reach River Balb.	12.2.19.
Georgians intern detachment of Volunteers en route for Turkestan front.	16.2.19.
Ingushi resistance to Volunteer Army concluded.	17.2.19. (app.)

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Capture of Mission proceeding from Amir of Afghanistan to Khan of Khiva.	23.2.19.
German Bank at Tiflis taken over by British.	24.2.19.
Azerbaijan government resigns.	25.2.19.
British take up position along River Balb.	27.2.19.
Georgia releases Volunteer Army troops en route for Turkestan front.	28.2.19.
Russian Caspian fleet seized by British.	1.3.19.
Chechen resistance to Volunteer Army begins.	1.3.19. (app.)
Volunteer Army Southern limit (Zakatali-Kizil Burun) modified to apply solely to anti-bolshevik military operations.	3.3.19.
Georgia recaptures Akhaltsikh from Tartars.	7.3.19.
Negotiations opened for Armenia to take over part of Kars Province.	7.3.19.
Georgia recognises Armenia as an Independent State.	8.3.19.
Disbandment of Bicharalov's forces completed.	13.3.19. (app.)
Andronik's forces leave Gertsal for Krivan.	20.3.19.
Denikin proclaims Zakatali-Kizil Burun boundary at Petrovsk.	21.3.19.
North Caucasus Republic resigns.	22.3.19.
New Georgian Cabinet elected.	22.3.19. (app.)
New Trans-Caspian Government elected.	24.3.19.
General Bicharalov leaves Constantinople for U.K.	25.3.19.
New North Caucasus Republic elected.	25.3.19.
Outbreak of hostilities in Zed district.	28.3.19. (app.)
Armenia permitted to occupy and administer Igair district.	28.3.19.
British evacuate Askaniya.	1.4.19.
General Halderson arrives at Masulu.	3.4.19.
Negotiations opened for removal of German Consul from Tabriz.	6.4.19.
Azerbaijan troops enter Baku.	5.4.19.
Conference convened for abolition of Borchalinsk Neutral Zone.	6.4.19.

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6.

Outbreak of lawlessness at SOCHI.	9.4.19.
Conference between Chochans and Volunteer Army at Grozni.	11.4.19.
Kars Shura deported from Kars.	12.4.19.
Andronik's forces reach Behriadin and are demobilised.	13.4.19.
Chovki Pasha leaves Erzurum for Constantinople, on parole.	14.4.19.
New Azerbaijan Cabinet formed.	14.4.19.
British assume administration of Batum Province.	15.4.19.
Armenia re-establishes authority in Zed.	15.4.19.
Attempt in Trans-Caucasia to revive S.E. Confederacy.	--.4.19.
Stacks Volunteer Army on River Kizil.	16.4.19.
... offices as President of Armenia.	17.4.19.
... River Kizil.	19.4.19.
... R.A.K.O. at Tiflis.	19.4.19.
... as into Kars Province begins.	21.4.19.
... arms opens.	23.4.19. (app.)
... abris deported to Tiflis.	24.4.19.
Azerbaijan ... ity proclaimed in Karabagh.	25.4.19.
Andronik leaves Erivan for U.K. Disbandment of his force completed.	27.4.19.
Shmagailov, Djunkovskii etc. handed over to British by Georgians.	2.5.19.
Liaikov replaced by Erdeli as O-in-O of Terak and Daghestan.	2.5.19.
Negotiations for abolition of Borehalinsk Neutral Zone break down.	2.5.19.
Armenia permitted to take over Kars Province, less Olti district and part of Ardahan.	2.5.19.
Armenia begins to take over the Nakhichevan district.	3.5.19.
Repatriation of refugees into Nakhichevan district begins.	3.5.19.
Bolshevik offensive in Trans-Caspia opens.	5.5.19.

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7.

Junkin states his intention of opening negotiations with tribes of Daghestan.	5.5.19.
Bolshevik established at Lungeran.	9.5.19.
North Caucasus Republic resigns.	15.5.19.
Georgia permitted to assume administration of Potskev district.	15.5.19.
Anti-British demonstration at Gorumi, by Armenians.	15.5.19.
Bolshevik outbreak near Temir Khan Shura.	16.5.19.
General Briggs negotiates with General Beush and Georgians.	21.5.19.
Bolsheviks recognise independence of Afghanistan.	21.5.19.
Attempt to repatriate Armenians into Diadin, Bayasid and Alashgirt districts abandoned.	21.5.19.
Trans-Caspian force withdrawn from Bairam Ali.	21.5.19.
Volunteer Army advances into Daghestan.	23.5.19.
Massacre of Christians at Urumi.	24.5.19. (app.)
Bolsheviks reach Kusk.	27.5.19.
Armenian Government declares independence of United Armenia.	28.5.19.
Volunteer Army offers autonomy to Daghestan.	29.5.19. (app.)
Junkin quotes Zakatali-Kisil Surun line as the Southern boundary of his area and assures Azerbaijan that he will not cross Azerbaijan frontier unless provoked.	31.5.19.
Outbreak of hostilities at Shusha.	4.6.19.
Caucasus Press reports that Persia has recognised independence of Azerbaijan.	4.6.19.
Armenians complete the taking over of the Nakhichevan district.	6.6.19.
Armenia requests permission to take over Olti district.	8.6.19.
Caucasian Governments informed of first line of demarcation.	13.6.19.
Mr. Sultanov withdrawn to Baku from Shusha.	14.6.19.

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8.

Armenia permitted to take over the Aralikh district.	15.6.19.
Defensive Alliance concluded between Georgia and Azerbaijan.	16.6.19.
Georgian Government requests formation of neutral zone north of line of demarcation.	19.6.19.
Volunteer Army Commander at Aerbent receives instructions from Denikin that his forces will not withdraw from Aerbent.	22.6.19.
General Beleb visits Tabriz.	28.6.19.
General Denikin visits Sochi.	28.6.19.
General Katiuff murdered at Batum.	28.6.19.
Armenia permitted to take over Olti district.	3.7.19.
Trans-Caspia Government moves from Aklabad to Kraenovedsk.	5.7.19.
Denikin proclaims mobilisation in Daghestan.	4.7.19. (app.)
Tartar rising in Araxes valley opens.	4.7.19.
Denikin proclaims that, while reckoning Azerbaijan as part of Russia, he recognises her temporary independence pending the decision of the All-Russian congress.	7.7.19.
General Beleb leaves Tabriz for Tiflis.	9.7.19.
First period of unrest in Daghestan begins.	15.7.19. (app.)
Azerbaijan Government permitted to send troops to Lenkoran.	19.7.19.
Relief convoys by road from Batum to Kara et via Artvin started.	20.7.19. (app.)
Georgian troops arrive at Baku.	20.7.19.
Turcoman delegation forward petition for independence.	21.7.19.
Treaty between Georgia and Azerbaijan ratified by Georgia.	22.7.19.
Khalil bey proposes terms of peace with Armenia in Araxes valley.	27.7.19. (app.)
Operations of Oranburg - Tashkent railway prevent further Bolshevik offensive in Trans-Caspia.	27.7.19. (app.)
	28.7.19.
	29.7.19. (app.)
	29.7.19. (app.)

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handing over of Caspian fleet to Volunteer Army begins.	28.7.19.
Azerbaijan Government sends Diplomatic Mission to Denikin.	29.7.19. (app.)
First Daghestan rising practically quelled.	29.7.19. (app.)
Lenkoran captured from Bolsheviks by Mughans.	29.7.19.
Armenia proclaims general mobilisation.	30.7.19.
Georgian Government presents note regarding maintenance of British in Trans-Caucasia.	1.8.19.
Georgian Government presents note regarding future of Batum Province.	1.8.19.
General Baratov arrives in Tiflis.	1.8.19.
Nakhichevan Mission withdraws to Tabriz.	2.8.19.
Italy notifies Trans-Caucasian Governments that Italian troops will not come to Trans-Caucasia.	2.8.19.
Armenia negotiates with inhabitants of Olti for control of Olti district.	3.8.19.
Second line of demarcation notified to the Trans-Caucasian Governments.	4.8.19.
Second line of demarcation notified to the Volunteer Army.	4.8.19.
Lenkoran Bolsheviks seize Ashuredok.	4.8.19.
Azerbaijan Government requests maintenance of British in Azerbaijan.	4.8.19.
Kraenovedsk evacuated by British.	4.8.19.
Georgia urges other Trans-Caucasian States to re-open Trans-Caucasian Conference.	6.8.19.
Ashuredok re-captured from the Bolsheviks.	7.8.19.
Azerbaijan recalls Tekinxi (Diplomatic Representative with Armenia) for mis-behaviour.	8.8.19.
Escape of Nuri Pasha from Batum.	8.8.19.
Azerbaijan agrees to revive Trans-Caucasian Conference.	8.8.19.
Anglo-Persian agreement signed.	9.8.19.
Armenia attempts to take offensive in Araxes valley.	10.8.19.

CƏNUBİ QAFQAZDAKI HADİSƏLƏRİN GÜNDƏLİYİ
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10.

Armenia agrees to revive Trans-Caucasian Conference.	11.8.19. (app.)
Azerbaijan authority established at Lenkoran.	11.8.19.
British withdrawal from Trans-Caucasia begins.	15.8.19.
Colonel Haskell arrives at Tiflis.	17.8.19.
Shusha Representative withdrawn.	21.8.19. (app.)
British evacuation of Baku completed.	24.8.19.
B.L.R.s of Erivan and Nars withdrawn.	28.8.19.
British evacuation of Petropavk completed.	29.8.19.
Lonkin reports indications of massacre of Russians in Azerbaijan.	29.8.19.
Envoys from Khiva and Bokhara arrive at Taganrog.	29.8.19.
Trans-Caspian front taken over by Erdeli and included in the North Caucasus Command.	29.8.19. (app.)
Mr. Wardrop arrives at Tiflis.	30.8.19.
B.L.R.s of Akhalkalaki and Ardaghan withdrawn.	1.9.19. (app.)
Part of Volunteer Army troops destined for Trans-Caspian front diverted to Naghistan.	1.9.19.
Second rising in Naghistan begins.	2.9.19. (app.)
Handing over of Caspian Fleet to Volunteer Army completed.	2.9.19.
Azerbaijan troops return from Lenkoran to Baku.	4.9.19.
British evacuate Gagra.	9.9.19.
British evacuation of Tiflis completed.	9.9.19.
British evacuation of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan completed.	9.9.19.
Attempt of life of General Baratev at Tiflis.	13.9.19.
Railway line from Tashkent to Orunburg captured by Bolsheviks.	13.9.19.
Azerbaijan Government resigns.	13.9.19.
"Near East Relief" organisation established.	16.9.19. (app.)

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11.

Decided that British shall continue in occupation of Province of Batum, pending final decision of policy.	10.9.19.
Afghan Mission leaves Tashkent en route for Moscow.	24.9.19.
General Harbord shot at, near Kars.	29.9.19.
National State Bank of Azerbaijan opens at BAKU.	30.9.19.

Issued by General Staff "Intelligence".
Army of the Black Sea.
CONSTANTINOPLE.

1-11-19.

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GENERAL C. MİLNİN DEPEŞASI
6 FEVRAL 1919

GENERAL C. F. MILNE, LOND CONSTANTINOPLE TO THE CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF
FEBRUARY 6TH 1919

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- (c.) On the railway to Tiflis on the Azerbaijan boundary, one battalion.
- (d.) At Akhailalaka and Alaverdi, half battalions. This half battalion is required to maintain order in the district which formed the scene of conflict between Georgia and Armenia, and was one of the conditions by which peace was attained.
- (e.) At Kasbek, guarding the north of the province, one battalion.

These detachments are required solely for the purpose of maintaining troops on the spot to keep order, but, in addition, it is essential to have a central force which would have two distinct rôles to fulfil, (a) the subjugation of the territory comprised in the Georgian Republic, in case of opposition or anarchy; (b) the timely reinforcement of all or any of the permanent detachments mentioned above.

The best locality for this force for the province already mentioned is Tiflis. A force concentrated here has a complete hold on the province of Tiflis. The old province of Kutais, incorporated in the Georgian Republic, is in many ways different in thought and policy from Tiflis, and has even more pronounced Bolshevik sympathies. Nevertheless, Tiflis seems the best place from which Kutais can be kept in order, and on account of lines of communication it is the best place from which to reinforce the various detachments in Georgia, Batum, Kara, and Nakhichevan. Here, I consider, two infantry brigades, a squadron of cavalry, artillery, and cyclists should be concentrated, but, under existing circumstances, I have not the necessary battalions to carry this proposition into force. Another reason for keeping a strong force at Tiflis is to deal with the conditions which may arise after the Peace Conference has given its decision. If, for instance, Georgia, Kara, and Nakhichevan, the three most irreconcilable elements are disappointed in their aspirations, any or all of them may begin to fight, in which case the troops at my disposal are insufficient to deal with the situation which may arise.

Situation in Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan Republic came into existence in March or April 1918, after the Armenians and Bolsheviks had turned the Mussulman out of the Apostolic Peninsula. It then had its seat of Government at Elizabetpol as an anti-Bolshevik administration imbued with Pan-Islamic ideas. It, however, only really became a governing organisation after the capture of Baku by the Turks, and under their protection it moved to Baku. At the time of the capture of the town the Tartars massacred 15,000 Armenians. The territory claimed by the Republic comprises the Baku Government, the Elizabetpol Government, the district known as Zakatalak, and the portion of what is known as the Erivan Government. The population of these districts is approximately 2,000,000 Mussulmans or Tartars, 700,000 Armenians, and about 200,000 Russians.

The name Azerbaijan, which is really a district in the north-west of Persia, was given to this new Republic at the instigation of the Turk and the Pan-Islamic "Mussawat" Society. In Persian Azerbaijan, the same language is spoken, and the majority of the inhabitants are of the same Mussulman sect. The hope of the Pan-Islamic was that under the protection of a successful Germany and Turkey the Republic would eventually absorb the Persian Azerbaijan, which for some time past has been practically kept by Russia, and would so form a large Tartar-speaking Republic on the shores of the Caspian. If the Azerbaijan Republic is to remain in any shape or form, it would be advisable to change its name.

The Government consists of a Parliament and a Council of Ministers, the former self-elected, the latter formed by arrangement, and has anti-Socialistic tendencies. On the reconquest by the British in November 1918 the Tartar Government was allowed to continue, but its position was substantially changed. It was the British intention to form a moderate representative Government, in which all three races—Tartars, Russians, and Armenians—would be represented. Difficulties have taken place in carrying out this arrangement. At present the Russians are represented by members of the Slavonic Society, who are not recognised by the Russian population, and the Russian National Council has refused to enter the Government. The Armenians have so far obtained from all co-operation, though the latest information showed that they were beginning to think of coming in. The reins of Government are therefore practically in the hands of the Mussulmans, all of whom are former residents of Baku, and some of whom have considerable interest in the town. With the exception of the Minister of War, no member of the Government has ever held any sort of administrative post; the result of such a state of affairs can be imagined.

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Z

GENERAL C. MİLNİN DEPEŞASI
6 FEVRAL 1919

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Politically, the Russians actively support the Armenians, and on our arrival expected a free hand to deal with the Tartars. Our attitude of working through the existing Government has puzzled them, and, despite declarations to the contrary, the Russians are firmly convinced that the British intend to annex Azerbaijan and steal the Baku oil. There is a strong anti-British movement among the Russians, of which General Bicharakov's troops and fleet, paid largely by British money in the past, is the centre, though Bicharakov himself is strongly pro-British. Hence the necessity of getting rid of this army. With British support, the present Government would be capable of maintaining order within the territories claimed for itself. It is hoped that the Russians and Armenians will become gradually reconciled and busy themselves with trade. The chief agitator against us is M. Minorsky, of the Russian Legation at Teheran. The Tartars themselves are led by Hun Hoisky, an educational lawyer, who realises that their only hope of autonomy is through Great Britain, but is opposed by Pan-Islamic fanatics of the "Mussawat" party, who do not sufficiently recognise the victory of the Allies. A recent rising organised by this party near Shusha was put down by Azerbaijan troops. As a result, in Baku city the "Mussawat" leaders, who have Bolshevik leanings, are inclined to join the Russians in an anti-British policy.

The general situation in Azerbaijan depends almost entirely on the town of Baku. Once this question is settled, the rest of Azerbaijan will probably resolve itself into a settlement of the agrarian question between the Armenians and Mussulmans. There is even a strong opinion that if the Baku district was held by an International Commission, other questions would be settled with comparative ease. Owing to its wealth, the town of Baku has an influence out of all proportion to its size, and owing to the fact that the industries of Russia are largely dependent on Baku oil for their motive power.

Before the war the population was 250,000; it is now about 260,000, divided equally between the three races. The Russians supply the skilled labour and have the prestige of belonging to the ruling race in the past. Despite a proclamation to the contrary, every man is armed, and it is probable that there are field guns and machine guns hidden in the city and its vicinity. There are ample supplies of ammunition. The Russians can produce some 11,000 armed men, the Armenians some 8,000. The result of a prolonged strike might bring about a collision. The last strike showed that the labour population of 65,000 was well organised and led by the Russians. At the present, another general strike is in prospect. This is being staved off for the present, but a climax is likely to arrive sooner or later, when it will be necessary to use armed force. It would not be advisable to leave the Tartar Government to settle this strike. In order to overawe the inhabitants by a show of force, it is necessary to keep a minimum of an infantry brigade and a brigade of artillery in Baku, while further troops should be kept on the oil-fields. The eventual disarmament of the population must also be considered.

In determining other garrisons, the Bolshevik movement in the north has to be considered. The Bolsheviks have a base at Astrakhan carry on an active propaganda, and state that in the spring they intend to advance by sea and land on Baku. Roughly, they occupy the line of the Kasi Yurt, where they are held by the North Caucasian and Terek forces. At Petrovak, where a British naval base has been reestablished, and where Bicharakov had a force of about 2,000 men, the general officer commanding at Baku considers there ought to be a British brigade, but at present I have been able to spare only one battalion. To keep off the Bolsheviks it is essential to encourage the North Caucasian people.

Centre of Unrest.

Shusha, some 70 miles south of Evlakh railway station, the centre of an agricultural district, was garrisoned at the time of our occupation of Baku by two Turkish battalions, and was about to be attacked by Andronik's Armenian army. It has now been overrun by Armenians, who are murdering the Tartars, who are naturally retreating, though their Government is trying its best to keep order. It has been necessary to send a company of British infantry to maintain order, but a battalion would be safer.

On the Caspian, south of Baku, at Lenkoran and Mughan, there is a Russian colony capable of producing an armed militia of 8,000, at present assisted by 2,000 of Bicharakov's army. The general feeling is Bolshevik and anti-British. The Tartar is held in suspicion, and on the northern borders of Mughan is constantly raided by armed Russian and Armenian bands. To allow the Azerbaijan Government to enforce their authority here would lead to much bloodshed, and a British garrison will eventually become necessary.

GENERAL C. MILNIN DEPEŞASI
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At Elizahopol is the headquarters of the Azerbaijan army, said to be 25,000 strong of all arms, but as yet I have not been able to obtain accurate information. Once certain that they would not again be handed over to Russia, the Government would probably demobilise their army and thus save money. It is a possible danger, lying astride our lines of communication, but one on which I do not set much store at present, and it would be advisable that a brigade of British troops should be distributed between Elizahopol, Shusha, and Lenkoran.

The following notes on the various populations may prove useful:—

Muslims.—These may be divided into two parties, the followers of the Society of "Mucammat" and the followers of "Itikhat," or the Musliman in Russia. The former is Fan-Islamic, and has worked successfully against the war. It is now working in contact with many of the advanced Socialists, is strongly anti-British, and it aspires to a Musliman state from the Caucasus to India, through Persia, Trans-Caspian, and Afghanistan. It is convinced that the British have come to Trans-Caucasia to stay, with a view to stopping what they call the road to India. Though strong in Azerbaijan, the society finds little support among the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus. The party "Itikhat" maintains that no individual state in the Caucasus can stand alone without some great protecting power. It looks to the re-establishment of Russia as their natural protector. The followers of this party consist mostly of the trading and commercial elements, and for the time being are willing to accept the assistance of the Allies. They are increasing in strength, but are becoming less confident of the Allied policy, owing to the strong propaganda carried on in their ranks by the Russian National Council, who, fearing that we are going to support the Azerbaijan claim to independence, are striving against us.

Speaking generally, our presence is not acceptable to the Musliman community in Baku. The Musliman, as a whole, is convinced that we are favouring the Armenians.

Russians.—It seems correct to say that all sections of the Russian public resent our presence. All seem to consider that we shall eventually recognise the independence of Azerbaijan. The large labouring community is very advanced Socialist, and therefore mistrusts Great Britain. The counter-revolutionary elements are using the force of labour to suit their own purposes. It must not be forgotten that Baku was once a Bolshevik stronghold, and that, although the leaders left the town, the mob has remained. Another disturbing element is the presence of some 7,000 Armenians and Russians, who were formerly in the Red Army. The presence of General Bicharakov's army, and what he terms his fleet, is causing a considerable amount of unrest. His policy is undefined, and his men have nothing to do. He poses as a representative of Russia, which does not recognise him; he is not a follower of Denikin, but is anti-Bolshevik. His personal friendship for the British has been of some assistance but, as we are now in stronger force, the time has arrived to get rid of him.

The Russian National Council is very bitter against the British. They refuse to recognise the Azerbaijan Republic and to enter into the Ministry or Parliament. They maintain that we should hold the country in trust for Russia. They will only enter the Government with the assurance that Azerbaijan will be returned to Russia. They are more inclined to support Denikin than Bicharakov. The Russian Society calling itself the Slavonic Russian Society supports the Allies, and has representatives in the Azerbaijan Government. It does not represent Russian opinion, and maintains that Tartar rule is better than Bolshevik. Generally speaking, the Russian population is anti-British, because they are at heart Bolsheviks. They would support Denikin only as representing Russia against the Tartar, but they are strongly anti-monarchical.

Armenians.—The Baku Armenian is a distinct disappointment. This is probably due to the Socialism of the lower classes, who formerly joined the Bolsheviks, and the strength of the secret society Dachuchatsoun in the Armenian National Council. They cannot forget the past, and, being convinced of their own independence in Armenia, are supporting Russia's claim to Azerbaijan. They are working hand in hand with the Russian National Council, and have no other object than revenge on the Tartar.

Trade and Commerce.—The whole country is starving for supplies, and the first necessities are clothing, boots, shoes, and every sort of household necessity and machinery. The money crisis is such that even the wealthy are unable to find sufficient cash to pay for their goods. Prices can be brought down solely by competition, and, until this is thought about, labour unrest will continue as a fertile soil for Bolshevik propaganda. Speculation and hoarding of goods is the order of the day. Traders are

GENERAL C. MILNIN DEPEŞASI
6 FEVRAL 1919

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doing their best to maintain high prices. Indiscriminate importation of goods would result in the wealthy merchants buying up wholesale, and thus cornering supplies. The Russian bank has been taken over by the British, and is being conducted by them, but this can only be a temporary arrangement. Undoubtedly, steps will have to be taken at an early date by the Allied Governments to encourage imports and bring down prices. The financial question caused by the unstable position of the rouble requires also careful consideration, not only in Azerbaijan, but in the whole of Trans-Caucasia. Financially, the whole country seems to be rushing to ruin. It is to be noted that the French representatives are already broking trade orders in considerable quantities, and it might be advisable that British representatives, who have some knowledge of trade conditions in Russia, should be sent out to look after British interests. In each case, some form of granting credit would have to be arranged at by the British Government. All imported goods would have to be sold to the consumer, and under Allied control, otherwise cornering and profiteering will be rampant.

General

From the above it will be seen that the situation in Azerbaijan is more complicated and more full of danger than in Georgia. These dangers are:—

1. The lack of anybody holding the confidence of the people and administrative capabilities.
2. The anti-British attitude of the labouring and lower classes, due to their idea that the British Government intends taking Baku from Russia.
3. The fact that the population is armed.
4. The proximity to the Bolshevik army, and the hope of support from them. A strong Bolshevik propaganda is in progress.
5. The lack of employment for thousands of people, who naturally get themselves into mischief.

An official declaration of the Allied policy in Trans-Caucasia would do away with many of these difficulties, though it may necessitate the employment of troops to insist on that policy being carried out. While Georgia and Azerbaijan are endeavouring to maintain their independence, the Russians in Trans-Caucasia are strong upholders of some form of Russian Government there, and the same may be said of the Armenians outside Armenia. Whatever is decided, it is very doubtful whether these small States can ever be wholly independent. Free trade between the States, with one railway, postal, and telegraph system, appears absolutely essential owing to the interdependence of one part of the country on the other, and the governing factor that the Baku oilfield supplies not only the motive power, but the money for fuller development.

(Signed) G. F. MILNE, General,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Salonika Force.

G.H.Q., Constantinople, February 6, 1919.

APPENDIX II

(P. 1/2487. M.I. 2.)

March 3, 1919.

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Acting Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to transmit herewith, for Sir Ronald Graham's information, copy of a report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, received from General Headquarters, Constantinople.

The Acting Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office

CƏNUBİ QAFQAZA DAİR QEYDLƏR
9 APREL 1919

1.

Notes on Trans-Caucasia.

- (1) On attached map a suggestion is made for the delimitation of the 3 Republics. The Mussulman S.W. Caucasus Republic, which is entirely Turkish in conception and orientation, is ignored as also is the N. Caucasus Republic except that Dagestan is incorporated with Azerbaijan. Thus a Christian bloc is formed on the Black Sea and a large Mussulman state on the shores of the Caspian, where hatred of Russia and the memory of Shemyl are strong and not likely to die out. The strategic frontier against Russia is easily held at Gagri, Esabek and Petrovsk, the only 3 approaches. That part of the treaty of Turkmanchai which made the Caspian into a Russian preserve should be abrogated.
- (2) Turkish and Russian Armenia must be untied, they should have a port and railway of their own and not be dependent on Batoum for transit through Georgia. Trebizond would probably be the best port with Erzerum as the capital.
- (3) The 3 Republics all require a Mandate. The businesslike Armenians will absorb them all in time, Armenia with a big power behind her would absorb Georgia and Azerbaijan economically in a decade.
- (4) The main idea in the attached suggestion is, while adhering broadly to self determination, to give the 3 Republics each a share in the mineral wealth, to give them weak frontiers against each other so as to induce federation sooner or later, and to allot the railways evenly, and with regard to existing conditions. The Julfa Alyat Railway on completion for example will lie entirely in Azerbaijan, the Armenian Government will get the workshops at Sansin which are a necessity to them.
- (5) Transplanting will be necessary but not on a large scale. For example the Armenian enclave in Karabagh can not remain, nor can the hostile Mussulman sit round the S.W. of Erivan as at present. When the worst cases have been dealt with the races will settle down quietly together as in the past or will migrate voluntarily to the country ruled by their compatriots.
It is obvious however, that Armenian skilled labourers in Baku will prefer to live under Mussulman Government in peace and comfort to hording coats on Ararat. The Caucasian peoples have lived together before and, with Russian, Turkish and other inflammatory propaganda removed, will do so again.
- (6) The status quo is not being preserved. In a country which is living on its capital, for Baku although producing oil from the ground, cannot turn it into money by exporting it - the rates progress cannot continue indefinitely. A stable currency, a reopening of trade and a definite policy of the Allies towards Trans Caucasasia become more urgently necessary every day.
- (7) Finance is chaotic, prices and discontent are rising, the railways approach the day when after many months of disrepair and illusage, they cease to move the minimum food-stuffs now forthcoming. Trans-Caucasia cannot wait indefinitely for the Peace Conference.
A decision now which enables a mandatory power to take charge, would save vast expense and labour a very few months hence. The question of humanity and famine relief alone compels attention.
By July 1920, with present prospects, the population

CƏNUBİ QAFQAZA DAİR QEYDLƏR
9 APREL 1919

2.

of Trans Caucasasia and Turkish Armenia will be very small.

(8) Urgent requirements:-

- (1) Mandate to some power.
- (2) Trans Caucasian Currency.
- (3) Trade.
- (4) Railway Repairs.
- (5) Limitation of Turkish Armenia.
- (6) Repatriation into Turkish Armenia, so that Autumn Crops may be sown and food got in for winter.

(signed) T.H.T.

9/4/19.

Above were note written for Sir. J. Hewett.

GENERAL-MAYOR V. TOMSONUN QEYDLƏRİ
26 MAY 1919

1.

Appreciation of the situation as it was when I left it. - May 13th 1919.

Written on Route Home and typed at Malta. Not used except verbally in interviews with Winston and Curzon. June 1919.

by. Major General V.F. Thomson, Comdg. Northern Persian Force.

Notes on Trans Caucasia.

The situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Our occupation has brought no material benefits, on the contrary prices continue to rise, the purchasing power of the rouble is 1/20 of what it used to be, we support Denikin who in the eyes of the young republics is a far worse enemy than Bolsheviks - Denikin and all those out to restore "sole" Russia with pre-war frontiers are alarmed at our occupation of the richest portion of the Empire where there is outwardly no Bolshevik menace, and our support of the "self determined" Republics is stigmatised as being purely selfish with a view to penetrating Trans Caspia and cutting Persia off from Russian Control.

Thus while Denikin gladly accepts our support he does not pretend to like or trust us. The Republics are entirely befogged at our supporting both sides, our efforts at a rapprochement between Denikin and Georgia are uphill work. The tendency is for Socialistic Georgia and Pan Islamist Azerbaijan to embrace Bolshevism against Denikin and "Imperialist" British who are going to restore the Russia of the old regime. Lenin's policy becomes more moderate daily, he may very easily hold up Kolchak yet and destroy Denikin by an offer of complete independence, under democratic autonomous governments, for the Ukraine, Don, Crimea, North Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan and he may raise the cry "Russia for the Russians, out with the exploiting French Greeks, Italians and British." Allied prestige has not risen in Russia this last 6 months and Lenin will make a bid to hold South Russia with some prospect of success. Denikin seems incapable of establishing civil government, wherever he goes he is increasingly unpopular, consequently his military successes lead to nothing and the existence of his force is most precarious.

GENERAL-MAYOR V. TOMSONUN QEYDLƏRİ
26 MAY 1919

2.

It appears very necessary that the Peace Conference should decide whether they will appoint any mandatory power to look after Trans Caucasia. If they decide not to, or to withdraw the British Troops and perhaps re-occupy Georgia and Azerbaijan at leisure later the following points are of importance :-

- (1) Denikin will cease to exist. He is entirely dependent on us. Georgia and Baghestan will attack him in rear the moment our backs are turned. Oil tankers will at once leave Baku for Astrakhan and the Volga and the Bolsheviks will recover from the present almost complete paralysis of their railways and industries.
- (2) Armenia will starve. At present the American Relief trains reach Armenia owing to our pressure on Georgia through which the railway runs for half the distance. This question is a constant difficulty, in order to reduce friction we supply the Georgian railway employees with American flour but this does not placate the Georgian Government who only bow to force.
- (3) We have given pledges. We have told Georgia that F.L.G. view their aspirations with sympathy, we have worked since December last on the instructions that "we wish to see strong Independent Republics in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan." A withdrawal then will be looked upon, in Trans Caucasia, as an act of perfidy.

The first of the above questions, that of Denikin is purely military. He will no doubt express an opinion as to his prospects of success both by land and on the Caspian, with a hostile Trans Caucasia behind him added to his troubles with the Don Government and the results of the conduct of the French in Odessa and Sebastopol. The question of Armenia is one of sentiment and humanity, efforts are being made to supplement the railway service at the present time by organised road transport between Batoum and Kars, but without troops in Tiflis, Armenia will not get her share of the railway traffic, and you cannot feed Armenia by road from Batoum and Trebizond - snow alone renders it impossible.

The third question, that of policy and pledges is a political one. Trans Caucasia stands on the edge of two problems. That of Russia, and the far more important one for us, the future of Mahomedan Power. Two of the great Mussalman powers have ceased to exist, Russia and Turkey - we alone remain. Are we going to accept that position? Are we going to support the temporal power of the Caliph in the Turkey that remains?

GENERAL-MAYOR V. TOMSONUN QEYDLƏRİ
26 MAY 1919

3.

Are we going to see Persia and the Arab Kingdom through? Are we going to do anything for the Mussalmans of the late Russian Empire? It must be remembered that half the population of Trans Caucasia are Mussalmans. They have appealed to us, also representatives of the Turkomans, Bokhara, Khiva and even Bashkiria have come to Tiflis and Baku and asked for British protection and help. Trans Caucasia therefore may be of importance to us. On the other hand it is a commitment in Europe of 2 divisions also some cash and credit and good administration and would earn the undying hatred of Russia and be a constant source of jealousy to France. Italy, if there is no interval between our departure and their arrival, can hold the country with 2 divisions, if we withdraw promptly it is very doubtful if Italy will ever get there at all.

(signed) W.H.T.

26/5/1919.

İRAN XARİCİ İŞLƏR NAZİRLİYİNİN TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

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MASSACRE OF MUSLEMS BY ARMENIANS.

From the Persian Foreign Office
To Sir P.Cox.

October 21st 1919.

No doubt the British Legation is informed of the recent events at Erivan, Nakhichevan, Kars and on the whole border of Armenia, atrocities committed by Armenians on the Moslems in those parts, by massacre and plunder.

The Foreign Office has also received information that the Armenians have spared no acts of violence against the Moslems of those parts irrespective of their nationalities. Families of the Moslems have been scattered, innocent men and children have been massacred, women violated, properties ~~ruined~~ plundered and villages destroyed without any provocation. Only a small party of Persians, consisting of over 5,000 men and women, who, owing to the want of transport, have been obliged to leave their children behind have escaped. Some of these have been able to reach the Persian frontier and the province of Maku.

The Foreign Office is sure that these atrocities committed by the Armenians, which are most repugnant to equity and justice, will not remain unpunished.

The evil consequences of this news in Persia coupled with the odious and lamentable memories left by the Nestorians, Assyrians, Jews etc in Urumia, Khoi, Salmas and in fact on the whole border of Azerbaijan during the international

İRAN XARİCİ İŞLƏR NAZİRLİYİNİN TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

international war, of which the Legation is partly informed, will be of a most unpropitious and dangerous character.

Knowing the desires of the Great Powers in respect of the liberty of nations and the peace of the human race irrespective of their religious creeds the Foreign Office brings the matter to the notice of the Legation and requests that the Officials of the British Government may be instructed to restrain the Armenians from their evil deeds and to protect the lives of the peaceful inhabitants on the borders of Armenia.

Since the representatives of the Great Powers are witnesses of the barbarous practices of the Armenians they are expected to take measures for the prevention of the atrocities and for the punishment of the perpetrators.

Whereas the Great Powers have, since the Armistice, taken the destinies of the small nations in hand and in this connection they supervise the affairs of the nations of the Caucasus, the Persian Government consider them responsible for the reparation of the unforgettable atrocities committed on the Moslems of the Caucasus, whether Persian subjects or otherwise, and for the prevention of the recurrence of those untoward incidents by taking effective measures.

Sd/- Etela ul Mulk.

KAPİTAN QREYSİNİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
3 DEKABR 1919

Inclusion No. 6 in Captain Gracey's despatch No. 10, 293
Conv. 5 DEK. 1919

MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER KHATISSIAN, REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMENIA, AND PRIME MINISTER USSUBBEKOFF, REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF AZERBAIJAN.

This agreement, made and concluded at Tiflis this twenty third day of November, nineteen hundred and nineteen, by and between Prime Minister Khatisian, representing the Government of Armenia and Prime Minister Ussubbekoff, representing the Government of Azerbaijan, witnesseth:

1. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms.
2. That the Government of Armenia and Azerbaijan agree to take effective measures for repairing and reopening for peaceful traffic the ~~roads~~ roads leading into Zanzézar.
3. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan pledge themselves to settle all controversies, including boundaries, by means of peaceful agreement pending the decisions of the conference convened in the following paragraph. In case this is not possible, then to select a neutral party as arbitrator, whose decisions both Governments agree to abide by, said neutral party for the present being Colonel James, C. Shea, United States Army.
4. That the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan pledge themselves to jointly appoint an equal number of delegates to meet in conference in Baku on Wednesday November 20th and to adjourn to Tiflis on December 4th when the sessions of the Conference will continue unless, by common agreement, they are transferred elsewhere. The conference will discuss all questions which are the cause of dispute or friction between the two Governments and will have full authority to settle all questions by agreement or arbitration.
5. That this agreement becomes effective on the date of signing and becomes permanent when ratified by the Parliaments of the two Governments, and the Prime Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan hereby bind their respective Governments to faithfully support and carry out all the details of the above agreement, in evidence of which they place their respective signatures to this agreement, in triplicate, in English and Russian, at Tiflis, this Twenty third day of November, nineteen hundred and nineteen, one copy of each being delivered to the representative of the Allied High Commission, one of each to the Prime Minister of Armenia and one of each to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan.

M. KHATISSIAN,
Prime Minister of Armenia.

N. USSUBBEKOFF,
Prime Minister of Azerbaijan.

J. C. Shea,
Colonel, C.S.U.S. Army
Acting Allied High
Commissioner.

GEORGECHKORI,
Minister of
Foreign Affairs
of Georgia,
Acting President.

AZƏRBAYCAN-ERMƏNİSTAN KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLU
21 NOYABR 1919

Incluse No. 68 in Mr. In Gracev's despatch No. 10.
of 5 Dec. 1919.

REPUBLIC de l'ARMENIE.

Erivan the 1st Dec 1919.

Nob 193.

Ministère
des affaires étrangères.

Representative of the
Chief British Commissioner in
Transcaucasia—Captain Grassy.



- I have the honour to transmit to you herewith
- 1/ a copy of the conversation that took place in the Allied High Commissioner's office, in Tiflis, on the 21st of November between the Prime Ministers of Armenia and Azerbeidjan and the Acting Allied High Commissioner—Col. Rhea.
 - 2/ a copy of the proposal of Armenia.
 - 3/ a copy of the Azerbeidjan proposal.
 - 4/ a copy of the cable dispatched by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbeidjan on the 20th of November 1919, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia and the
 - 5/ a copy of the sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia to Baku answer.

Very sincerely yours,

A. T. TER-AKOPIAN,
General Secretary.

P. Bekasoff,
for Secretary.

AZƏRBAYCAN-ERMƏNİSTAN KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLU
21 NOYABR 1919

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Tiflis, 21st November 1919.

After a Conference of about an hour, the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbeidjan made the following statements to Col. Rhea:

Mr Usasubekoff presented in writing the proposition of his Government (see Exhibit "A" attached);

Mr Anatlissian: Our proposal will be typed out and put into better form and sent in within an hour's time. We wish that our proposal shall be as nearly similar to the Azerbeidjan proposal as possible. (Armenian proposal Exhibit "A" attached)

The question of peacefully deciding all pending questions between the two states we are agreed on but for the moment we have not the authority to sign a treaty of that kind. We will get the authority and it will be signed because we are all for it.

I again state that we will give the two propositions to you and questions on which there is a difference. We both agree to abide by any decision you make.

Mr Usasubekoff: I have already chosen Col Rhea to decide questions of Zangezur.

Mr Khatissian: In the name of my Government, I thank you for all the trouble you have had and for all the work you have done.

Mr Usasubekoff: I wish to express the same.

Col Rhea: It has been a pleasure to me to get the two Prime Ministers together and I hope that this is the beginning of the solution of all your difficulties.

I will look over these two propositions, get them correctly translated, see what the points of difference are and give them an answer. But maybe they could point out to me what their differences are and I will try to give them an answer as soon as possible.

Mr Khatissian: The first point is about the Governments not taking any military actions to subjugate different territories where the population does not recognise the authority of the government. I think that as this question is only of Zangezur, I do not reckon it to be the same kind of question as subjugating the inner population of a country. I do not think that this point should have place in the proposal.

AZƏRBAYCAN-ERMƏNİSTAN KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLU

21 NOYABR 1919

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2.

Mr Ussubbekoff: Suppose that to morrow the Armenian Government would like to subjugate the population of Vedic-Basar, of course, the Azerbaidjan Government would probably have to declare war on Armenia, so it would be the same thing as is going on in Zangezour and I believe that this point is absolutely necessary to the agreement.

Mr Khatissian: The 3rd point- disarming the population. The Armenian Government is ready to withdraw its troops but it would be very difficult to take away from the local population the arms they now have or even impossible on account of other districts, like Sharoor Nakhichevan being armed and I do not think that it is the right moment to do this.

Mr Ussubbekoff: In order to prove absolute belief in a peaceful life, I have nothing against the disarming of the civil population of Sharoor-Nakhichevan and also other districts, because generally civil population have no business to have arms at all as this is the business of the Government. In order to establish general peace, it will be necessary to disarm all the civil populations.

Mr Khatissian: The fifth point of the Azerbaidjan agreement says that the Zangezour refugees are to return to their places. The refugee question is a very sore one and a very big and the whole thing ought to be decided in one. It is better to take our proposal, which says that the Conference is to decide the refugee question as a whole. There are about six or seven different types of refugees. In the first place the refugees of Zangezour went away from their districts about a year and a half or two years ago. If we speak about returning the Zangezour refugees then we must also speak about returning those from Nakhichevan, which are in even worse conditions. The refugees from Nukha and other places must also be returned. This whole question should be decided by the Conference.

Mr Ussubbekoff: I regard this refugee question as most important because the refugee question has been really the chief reason for these military hostilities. I consider that as we both are agreed on the principle that some general understanding should be reached to day in order to avoid misunderstandings later.

Mr Khatissian: The last question is about where the conference is going to take place. It was at first decided that the Conference should be in Baku. Now conditions have somewhat changed and on account of the strained relations between the two Governments we think it is better to have the Conference started at Tiflis, which is equally convenient for both parties. In a week or two when things are little more settled and if both sides agree the sittings may be continued in Baku or Erivan. This would have a very good impression on public opinion to start here and sign it in Tiflis.

AZƏRBAYCAN-ERMƏNİSTAN KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLU

21 NOYABR 1919

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3.

Mr Ussubbekoff: It was agreed that the conference should be summoned at Baku and to change the place at this present late moment would make a very bad impression. The formation of the new Government of Azerbaidjan has been very protracted- has taken a long time and the Government is not quite formed yet. The new members would not be able to leave Baku just on their beginning to take office and as it is these new members who are most familiar with these questions the Government is anxious for them to take part in the Conference. Therefore I emphasize the necessity for summoning the Conference in Baku.

Mr Khatissian: These are the points which are pending and we have already chosen you to decide them. Also if the conference were held in Georgia this also would create a good impression and improve the friendly relations of the three countries: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidjan.

Mr Ussubbekoff: I wish to point out that the proposal of Armenia mentions Sharoor and Nakhichevan which have no bearing on the Zangezour district and it is understood that you (Col. Rhea) have been chosen as arbiter for Zangezour and the general question.

Col. Rhea: I realize that you are in a hurry to meet your other appointment so in the meantime I will have these propositions typed and will go over them.

When does (want Mr Ussubbekoff) to go back to Baku?

Mr Ussubbekoff: Sunday morning.

Col Rhea: And Mr Khatissian?

Mr Khatissian: Not before Monday.

Col Rhea: I would like to have the gentlemen arrange to see me before they go. I wish to talk to each on other questions. I will be available any time; any time that is convenient for them I will be here.

Mr Khatissian: The President objected to putting the question of Sharoor-Nakhichevan in our proposal. I think that it should go in as it is closely connected with the question of Zangezour. If there is peace and quiet in Sharoor-Nakhichevan there is very likely to be peaceful conditions in Zangezour.

Mr Ussubbekoff: I should like to meet about ten or eleven tomorrow. (Granted for ten).

Col. Rhea: the question is now settled- to stop the fighting.

Mr. Ussubbekoff: It was stopped before I left for Tiflis.

True copy for Secretary Bekسادoff.

AZƏRBAYCAN-ERMƏNİSTAN KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLU
21 NOYABR 1919



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Tiflis, 21st November 1919.

ARMENIAN PROPOSAL.

1. The Government of Azerbaidjan pledges itself to withdraw their troops and artillery from the Zangezour district and make no attempts in future of military occupation of Zangezour and also retain and move troops at peace time strength in Karabagh on terms laid down in the treaty between the Azerbaidjan National Council and the Government of Azerbaidjan (Paras. 16 and 16)
2. The Armenia Government recalls troops and artillery which were sent to Zangezour during the period of fighting.
3. Azerbaidjan and Armenia give their assistance in reopening the roads which lead out of Zangezour in all directions in order that they may be utilized for economic purposes, with the approval of the Zangezour National Council.
4. To put into execution without delay, the project of the Allied High Commissioner concerning the Sharoor-Nakhichevan question.
5. The Armenian Azerbaidjan Conference is to be convened in Tiflis. The order of the day will be decided beforehand and will include the question of refugees. During the conference by common agreement the sittings may be transferred to Baku or Erivan.

/ Exhibit "B" /

True copy

for Secretary Beksadoff.

AZƏRBAYCAN-ERMƏNİSTAN KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLU
21 NOYABR 1919



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Tiflis, 21th November 1919.

Azerbaidjan Proposal.

1. The Governments of Azerbaidjan and Armenia pledge themselves not to resort to force of arms in order to subjugate the territories which at present do not recognise the authority of the respective Governments.
2. The Governments of Azerbaidjan and Armenia pledge themselves to settle all controversies by means of peaceful agreements.
3. The Government of Azerbaidjan Republic will withdraw the military force which was sent to Zangezour and placed at the disposal of the Governor-General of Zangezour Karabagh. The government of Armenia will also withdraw military units, officers, instructors and commissaries from the Zangezour district and will by every means assist in taking away from the local population all artillery, machine guns and other arms of a special military character. Simultaneously measures must be taken to level trenches and fortifications in the area.
4. The Governments of Azerbaidjan and Armenia to take effective measures for the opening of the roads leading from the Zangezour district and assist the unhindered traffic of the population on them.
5. Return to their places will be made possible for the refugees of the Zangezour district.
6. All controversies between Azerbaidjan and Armenia are referred to the Azerbaidjan-Armenian Conference, which is to meet in Baku.

(Exhibit "A")

True copy.

For Secretary Beksadoff.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASI
20 DEKABR 1919

Confidential.

No. 132.

Tiflis,

20 December 1919

170790

JAN 15 1920

My Lord,

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit copy of a useful report on the political situation in Azerbaijan by Colonel Stokes (despatch No. 18 of December 18).

b.1. Ras-ul-Zadeh was described to me by Djamalbekov as a very Chauvinist pro-Turk whom he had heard for four hours addressing the Committee of Union and Progress in Constantinople. On the other hand, he made a very eloquent speech at the banquet in Baku in my honour on September 30 and expressed friendly feelings for Great Britain.

b.4. I may remark that M. Djamalbekov (see my despatch 127 last para.) assured me that he was a Menshevik and that some other person whom he did not name was the only Bolshevik in the Azerbaijan Parliament.

c.1. M. Unsubbekov seems to have enough influence to retain the Premiership.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble
servant,

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
20 DEKABR 1919

Inclosure in Mr. Vordrop's despatch No. 132 of 20 Dec. 1919

COPY.

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No. 18.

Baku, 18th December 1919

170790

JAN 15 1920

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report on the situation in Azerbaijan.

(a) The Cabinet Crisis.

The formation of a new cabinet is still delayed. The chief cause of this delay has been the demand of the Ittihad Party that the post of Minister of Interior should be allotted to them. The motive for this demand is that, if it were acceded to, they would have control of the police and be able to manipulate the new elections, due to take place in March 1920, in such a manner as to secure a considerable majority in Parliament. A solution has been found in the selection of M. Gadjinsky as Minister of the Interior. He, being a moderate Musavatist, is acceptable to the Ittihadis. There still remains the question of the inclusion of a Socialist in the Cabinet. M. Unsubbekov has agreed to include one Socialist and has requested the Socialists to nominate three candidates of whom he will select one but the Socialists decline to do this and demand that they be allowed to nominate the Minister themselves. At present a deadlock exists in this matter.

(b) Political Parties in Parliament.

The Parliament consists nominally of 120 members but as 10 seats allotted to Russians 10 to Armenians and 5 to Jews and others have not been filled, the actual numbers of members is 95.

This number is made up as follows :-

(1)

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
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- (1) Müsavat 27
Leader Mühəmməd Amin Rəsulzadəh
- (2) İttihad 13
Leader Karabekov
- (3) Non party, but supporters of new Müsavat Cabinet. 11.
- (4) Ahrar 7
Leader Aslan Beg Karadasov.
- (5) Socialist 12
of whom one is a Bolshevik viz Kasim Beg Jamalbegov and 11 are Mensheviks led by Samad - gha Agha-malov and Ali Haidar Karaiev.
- (6) Non party who do not support new Müsavat Cabinet. 3.
- (7) Non party, who apparently avoid the political arena 3.
viz. Ali Mardan Beg Jopchibashov
(now at Paris), Sayad Beg Mehmandarov
(Minister of War), Khudadad Beg Melik-Aslanov (Minister of Ways etc.)
- (8) Non party 1 Abdullah Beg Effendiev (apparently an Independent).
- (9) Russo-Slavs. 4.
- (10) Armenians, National Party 4.
- (11) Armenians, Dashnaks, 6.
- (12) Miscellaneous.
German, Von Lutis (?) Bakalovich.
Jew, Kaz Khan Moiza.
Polish Jew, I.A. Vansovich.
Ukrainian, Khuzhim Vassili.

(c) Policies of chief Political Parties.

(1) Müsavat.

This party started by being pro-Turk but when it realized that Turkey wished to obtain control of Azerbaijan it became and remains anti-Turk. M.Ussubbekov is a member of the party but his influence in it is not great and he obeys its instructions rather than leads it. In internal affairs an interesting development is the adoption by the Müsavat party of "land for the peasants" as a plank in their platform. This has hitherto been
the

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the cry of the İttihadis and has been adopted by the Müsavatists in order to secure votes at the next elections.

Neither party I think has any intention of putting the policy into practice.

(2). İttihad.

Led by Karabekov, who does not appear to have any fixed principles or ideas, this party was originally pro-Islam but not pro-Turk. When however the Müsavatists became anti-Turk the İttihadis adopted a pro-Turk policy, i.e. they are pro-Turk only because they wish to oust the Müsavatists and to this end they are utilising Nuri Pasha, who enjoys considerable influence in Baku.

(d) Turkish Activity.

There are four separate Turkish organisations at work in Azerbaijan.

(1) 7000 "Volunteers" under command of Major Yusuf Zia Bey, an agent of the Committee of Union and Progress. These are organised in regiments of their own, separate from the Azerbaijan Army, and paid by the Azerbaijan Government, but are not under the orders of the Minister of War.

(2) Turkish Bolsheviks. Lieutenant Hilmi, who is assistant to the Turkish Military Attaché at Tehran, Captain Shafkat Bey, and one Osman Effendi. They are engaged in Bolshevik propaganda and are in direct touch with the Turkish Government at Constantinople.

(3) Nuri Pasha and 15 Turkish Officers, at present in Daghestan.

(4) Turkish Political propagandists.

A few officers, one of whom is Captain Basri Effendi, working under the orders of Yaqub Effendi and in close touch with the İttihad Party.

In addition to the above, working under Major Yusuf Zia Bey (see (1) above) is a Captain, Bulgarian
Mussulman

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Musculmen, Ibrahim Adham Effendi, who at one time was in Daghestan. He started by collecting a small armed band in Baku which has now increased to 1000 men. At first openly pro-Turk he now pretends to be anti-Turk, because the Muscovatists are in power but is still at heart pro-Turk. It is he who recently gave İsmail Pasha a great reception on his arrival at Baku. He has great influence in Baku and he himself said that he can upset the Government whenever he likes.

(e) Bolsheviks in Baku.

Bolshevik agents are active in Baku and there is reason to believe that considerable numbers of workmen are infected with Bolshevik ideas.

Three newspapers, one of which is published in Azerbaidjan are distinctly Bolshevik in tone. I suggested to Usubbekov the suppression of these papers. He replied that the Government realized the situation and had it well in hand. He maintained that practically all the workmen are Muscovatists, but reliable information from other sources, indicates that many are Bolsheviks.

The recent reverses sustained by the Volunteer Army have encouraged the Baku Bolsheviks to come more into the open and, were the Volunteer Army to suffer a serious defeat, I think a Bolshevik rising would take place in Baku and possibly result in the overthrow of the Government.

The Persian Commissioner, now at Baku, shares my opinion that the Government ought to take prompt measures against Bolshevism and he and I propose to represent this matter to the Azerbaijan Government at the earliest opportunity.

(f) Traffic on the Caspian Sea.

Ships are now leaving and arriving from Zuzeli and Simsnovodsk fairly regularly but the larger ships are still not permitted to be used.

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(g) Daghestan.

More recent reports have reached me but Ali Khan Kantemir, the Daghestan Representative at Baku, informs me that his Government have some 1400 Russian prisoners and a number of Russian women on their hands, the feeding of whom is a serious burden on the Daghestanis.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient humble servant.

(signed) C.B. Stokes.

Lieut.-Colonel.

Chief British Commissioner
in Transcaucasia.
Tiflis.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI

16 NOYABR 1919

INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY REPORT (CONFIDENTIAL) No. 19

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 21-22 & 23 NOV

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60. In regard to the Armenian-Georgian frontier in the ARDAGHAN district, Colonel HASKELL suggested at the conference mentioned above that both the Armenians and Georgians should withdraw all their troops from ARDAGHAN. The Armenians, however, stated that since they were responsible for ARDAGHAN town, the presence there of a small body of troops was necessary.

61. An agreement was eventually reached to the effect that the Armenians should retain not more than 50 men south of the River KURA, while the Georgians similarly agreed to retain not more than 50 men north of this River.

62. NOTE:- Prior to the British withdrawal, Armenia was not in touch with Georgia in the ARDAGHAN district, since the area situate between the River KURA and the KOTSKOV area (See Weekly Report No. 19 para 56) was added to the British Military Governorate of BATUM.

When the British withdrew, however, this area was taken over by Georgia, and it would appear that the frontier between Georgia and Armenia now follows the River KURA from the southern boundary of the Province of TIFLIS as far as ARDAGHAN, thence following the ARDAGHAN-AKTVIN road as far as the boundary of the Province of BATUM (see para 63 below).

63. According to the statements of an American officer who travelled through KARS with General HARBORD's Mission, Armenia has succeeded in taking over the administration of the OLTI district, and has occupied this area with a small garrison. If this statement is correct, Armenia is now in possession of the whole of the Province of KARS with the exception of the district north of the boundary quoted in para 62 above (which has been taken over by Georgia). The occupation of the OLTI district by the Armenians, however, has not been reported from any official source.

AZERBAIJAN.FORMATION OF THE NEW AZERBAIJAN CABINET.

64. The new cabinet has not yet taken office, but it is reported that its formation is nearly completed.

65. Of the Ministers of the former cabinet, URSU BEKOV is resuming his appointment of President and MELIK ABLANOV and MAJMANDAROV remain (probably in their former appointments of Minister of Ways and Communications and Minister of War respectively).

66. Two new members have already been appointed. The post of Minister for Foreign Affairs has been definitely accepted by FATALI KHAN MUSEY (President of the Cabinet which took office on 7-12-18 and resigned on 23-2-19 in favour of URSUBEKOV). Dr. RAFFIBEKOV, one of the straightest of the Tartars but a great Turcophile, has also been elected. His post in the cabinet is not yet clear.

67. If the proposed reduction of the number of Ministers from 14 to 7 is carried into effect, only two Ministers remain to be elected.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI

16 NOYABR 1919

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ARMENIAN - AZERBAIJAN BOUNDARIES.

68. The boundary dividing Armenian and Azerbaijan influence in the districts of ZANGEZUR, NAJICHORVAN and SHALOUR remains undecided. Colonel HASKELL has prepared a written proposal by which the districts of NAJICHORVAN and SHALOUR remain neutral, but Azerbaijan has refused to sign this settlement since she argues that it is not in accordance with the former (verbal) settlement proposed by Colonel HASKELL by which these districts were to be united with Azerbaijan.

69. Meanwhile the Armenian district of ZANGEZUR refuses to accept Azerbaijan authority and intercepted papers are reported to show that the Armenian Government still considers that her influence is in force in this district. The Azerbaijan Government has continued to attempt to negotiate with the local Armenian Council, but the latter remains obdurate and no progress has been made.

BOLESHEVIC ACTIVITY IN AZERBAIJAN.

70. It would not appear that internal Bolshevik activity has recently increased in Azerbaijan, but recent reports show that the Bolsheviks of Soviet Russia intend to devote considerable attention to Azerbaijan, probably with a view to extending their activities in Persia as well as to Trans-Caucasia generally. Colonel OLDFIELD reported recently that there were signs of pre-Mahomedan and anti-British agitation in BAKU on the same lines as the Bolshevik agitation in Turkistan. The Bolshevik Minister for Foreign Affairs, CHIGERIN, has recently written to the Azerbaijan Government, recognising the independence of Azerbaijan, and urging Azerbaijan to co-operate in anti-British action. It is not improbable that similar pan-Islamic agitation has influenced the anti-Volunteer Army rising in Daghestan.

DAGESTAN.PROGRESS OF THE ANTI-VOLUNTEER ARMY RISING.

71. Little recent information has been received.

72. It would appear that DERBENT is still holding out against the insurgents although parts of the town have been captured by them. TEMIR KHAN SHURA and PETROVSK have not been attacked.

73. Volunteer Army reinforcements are reported to have been sent to GAZI, PETROVSK and TEMIR KHAN SHURA.

OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE TRIBES.

74. Recent reports tend to confirm the view formerly held that, whereas Georgia has given considerable assistance to the tribes, Azerbaijan has been following a neutral policy.

75. On September 30th the British Intelligence Officer at BAKU reported that, according to information from a trustworthy source, a consignment of cattle and ammunition had been despatched from Georgia for Daghestan. At ELI JAVETPOL, however, it was detained by the Azerbaijani authorities.

76. With regard to Turkish participation in the rising and increase of Turkish influence at BAKU, the British Intelligence Officer at BAKU recently reported that Turkish influence had not increased to any great extent. A certain number of Turks who had remained in hiding during the British occupation of BAKU were now at large, but their

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20 NOYABR 1919

INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY REPORT CONSTANTINOPLE No. 42
FOR WEEK ENDING 20th NOVEMBER 1919

- 15 -

ARMENIA,
ARMENIANS

ZANGEZUR.

84. Reports have recently been received to the effect that AZERBAIJAN is about to undertake active operations against Armenians in ZANGEZUR district and have despatched a force estimated at approximately 5,000 rifles, 1,000 sabres, 8 mountain guns, 2 howitzers and 4 field guns. It is stated that this action has been taken as a reprisal for the action of Armenians in packing Russian villages. The number of Russian refugees is quoted as 50,000 but both this figure and that of the AZERBAIJAN troops to be employed, are considered to be exaggerated.

AZERBAIJAN,
AZERBAIJANIS

FORMATION OF CABINET.

85. The formation of the new Cabinet is not yet complete. AHMAD ZAKAI and GADJIMISKI is reported to have been offered the Ministry of Finance.

ARMY.

86. Shortage of boots is very serious. The old SETDAY type of rifle is still being used to a certain extent in the Regular Service, but it is stated that these are to be replaced by rifles purchased from Italy.

DAGHESTAN.

87. All is temporarily quiet. The Volunteer Army having been reinforced, has quelled the rising. MOULI PASHA has again been in BAKU but is at the moment temporarily absent. It is thought that he has recently paid a visit to DAGHESTAN. The AZERBAIJAN Government appears to have been particularly anxious to avoid the charge of having supported the DAGHESTANIS in their revolt and have taken military measures to prevent any aid being openly given to the insurgents by their friends in AZERBAIJAN.

ARMY ADVISERS.

88. The presence of three Germans in AZERBAIJAN is reported, but no details as to their activities have yet been received. It is stated that a German mission is at work in DAGHESTAN.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
4 DEKABR 1919

INTELLIGENCE - WEEKLY REPORT CONSTANTINOPLE No. 45
FOR THE WEEK ENDING DECEMBER 4th 1919

16.

116. As a result of this meeting an agreement was come to and was formally signed in TIFLIS.

The agreement was witnessed by Colonel NIEL (U.S.A.) who deposited himself as Acting Allied High Commissioner and Mr. GEMEKHORI, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION.

117. The general feeling throughout ARMENIA with regard to the action of the American Military Mission is one of great dissatisfaction. This is caused by the over-bearing attitude of the Officers and by their tactlessness in dealing with people and situations.

118. A fair example can be given in the case of Lieutenant-Colonel BALT (U.S.A.) who proceeded to KHACHIBEVAN to take over the duties of Military Governor on 24th October 1919. On arrival the town-people refused to have anything to do with him and stated no agreement had been made between Colonel HASENLI and the AZERBAIJAN Government (who are supervising this area pending the decision of the Peace Conference).

119. Colonel BALT decided that the best policy under the circumstances was to leave the town, which he did in due course.

AZERBAIJAN.

GENERAL SITUATION.

120. Azerbaijan is quiet and little is said regarding the defeat by the Armenians in ZANGEZUR (See para 115.).

ARMY.

121. It is reported that the Azerbaijan Army is to be increased by two Regiments.

MINISTRY.

122. The Cabinet, which is thought will be formed tomorrow, will consist of the following members:

Minister President	USHURBEKOFF.
Minister of War.	General MEHLANDAKOFF.
Minister of Foreign Affairs.	KHAN HOJSEKI.
Minister of Finance & Commerce.	GADJIMISKI.
Minister of Justice.	KHACHIBEV.
Minister of Education.	KAPLANOFF.
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs (Communication).	LELIK ARIFANOV.
Minister of Agriculture and Sanitation.	SAPIEV.

ECONOMIC.

123. Prices continue to rise and it is anticipated that bread will shortly be rationed.

Bread cost: 12 roubles per lb.
Flour " 1700 to 2200 roubles per sack.

KONSTANTINOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
4 DEKABR 1919

17.

FRANCE.

124. The Azerbaijan Press has published of late a number of articles referring to the closing of the pipe line between KOBULETI and BAKU.

125. The general tone of the press referring to this is not aggressive towards the British but simply puts forward the fact that if this order is not cancelled the main occupation of BAKU will be closed down for lack of storage. This will entail many thousands being thrown out of work.

RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES.

126. The Bolshevik propaganda is somewhat on the increase, which is considered to be due to the increased cost of living.

PAN-ISLAMIC DELEGATION.

127. The delegation mentioned in Report No. 44 para 19 who are proceeding towards SIVAS to attend the meeting of Muslims have not yet reached CONSTANTINOPLE.

ii. VEZIROV mentioned in Report No. 44 para 111, is still in CONSTANTINOPLE and is very active with the prime movers of the Muslim Union. VEZIROV is acting under guise of enrolling Turkish Professors for the University proposed to be opened in BAKU.

DAGESTAN.

TURKISH ACTIVITIES.

128. It is confirmed that MURI PASHA has recently visited DAGESTAN (Report No. 45 para 87).

It is reported that he had with him several Turkish and Georgian Officers.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

ŞİFRLİ CƏM.

RUSSIA.

Decypher. Mr. Vordrop (Tiflis) Oct. 2nd. 1919.

B. 12.30 p.m. 3.10.19.
A. 3.0 p.m. 4.10.19.

No. 49. Urgent.

Following are notes of conversation with M. Usubbekov Prime Minister of Azerbaijan on Sept. 28th.

1. M. Usubbekov is willing to submit to neutral (British or American or other) arbitration of all questions concerning Armenia.
2. Quite recently Armenians have destroyed 60 Mussulman villages in districts of Novo Bayasid, Alexandropol given.
3. Colonel Haskell has made his intervention in Dagestan deadlock dependent on acceptance of American proposals concerning Shahrur, Zangosur etc. and these proposals differ essentially from those agreed to and put into writing and have twice been modified under Armenian influence.
4. Azerbaijan is most anxious to come to arrangement with General Denikin and Usubbekov went to Tiflis to persuade Georgians but Denikin is not so well disposed to latter as to Azerbaijan where (for mixed) motives he allows Russian officers to serve in Army. It makes matter difficult that Denikin has no properly accredited agents in Trans-Caucasia.
5. Denikinist and Bolshevik rule are equally repugnant to Azerbaijan and their administration is almost equally bad. Azerbaijan wants to live and develop her people and resources. Full particulars to fight not yet received, last man falls rather than endure again old ex-tyranny. At present Trans-Caucasia is like tail of Russian dog and whenever (?) things happen in Russia successes or reverses of Denikin Kolchak and Trotsky the wretched tail is wagged. Azerbaijan only wants peace and has no wish to embark on panislamic pan Turk policies.
6. All Trans-Caucasia looks above all to Great Britain for such moral and material assistance as may be possible in creation of an independent life and is willing to do all she can to merit confidence and (?) favour) of His Majesty's Government.
7. Italians he came here on a Mission made a very bad impression by their greed for concessions and commercial advantages. (There is a rumour that they have secured contract to construct railway from Aliat near Baku to Djulfa).
8. As a proof of liberal principle of his Government M. Usubbekov told me Armenians and Russians were not only represented in Parliament but in Cabinet itself though Armenia for instance with a much larger (?) Christian) population gave no power. In Army are Russian and Georgian officers. Anyone who will serve country faithfully is welcomed. There is no fanaticism and Mussulman religion has ceased to be a factor in politics.
9. I may add I have formed a high opinion of M. Usubbekov's sincerity and of his ability to control policy of his country. Relations I have established with him are promising for the future.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
27 DEKABR 1919

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POLITICAL.

RUSSIA.

Docypier. Mr. Wardrop, (Tiflis),
December 27th 1919

D. P. 30. p.m. December 27th. 1919.

R. 2.45. p.m. December 29th. 1919.

No. 235.

Urgent.

Following from Colonel Stokes. Begins:-

Advent of Menshevik Cabinet in Azerbaijan gives probable check to pro-Turk campaign, but Ittihad Party will make every effort to secure majority (?at) elections in March 1920. Their (?success) (?would) mean consolidation of Turkish connection. If it be desired to minimize and possibly (?to) kill Turkish influence in Azerbaijan some definite (?announcement of) intention of Allies to grant Azerbaijan its independence is required.

If decision be not to grant independence nothing will stop (? close) alliance with Turkey.

If intention be to grant independence, but circumstances forbid grant at once, provisional recognition subject to confirmation later by Allies or League of Nations will enable Cabinet now in power to combat (?Ittihad) Party's pro-Turk policy. Pro-Turk means here pro-Enver and Co. which again means pro-Bolchevik. Present Cabinet is not master in its own house and only Allied support can make it so. Danger of

Bolchevism

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
27 DEKABR 1919

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(2).

Bolchevism in Baku is not immediate but is real (?and) increasing; daily owing to success of Volunteer Army, and absence of any definite sign from Allies that they will not compel Azerbaijan to go back under Russia.

Threat of attack by Volunteer Army engenders state of chronic restlessness which can only be removed by assurance from Allies that they will not permit Volunteer Army to attack Azerbaijan. Delay in reoccurring; Azerbaijan Government will mean continuous increase of Turkish influence. Ends.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 235. Repeated to Constantinople No. 80.

AZƏRBAYCAN-GÜRCÜSTAN MÜDAFİƏ MÜQAVİLƏSİ
18 İYUN 1919

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Extract from Constantinople Weekly
Report No.25, dated 11-7-19.

APPENDIX "A".

GEORGIAN-AZERBAIJAN DEFENSIVE TREATY.

The Government of the Georgian Republic, represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs, GUMGUTCHKORI, Minister of War and Interior RAMISHVIDI, Assistant Minister of War General ORDEVANOV and member of Military Council, General ODISHKLI DZE, and

The Government of the Azerbaijan Republic, represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs, DJAFAROV, Minister of War, General MEKHMAEDAROV and Chief of General Staff, SULKEVITCH, have entered into the following agreement in view of the serious threat to the independence of the Trans-Caucasian Republics:-

1. The contracting parties bind themselves to act conjointly, using all their military forces and military means, against any attack which threatens the independence on the territorial inviolability of one or both of the contracting republics.
NOTE. This para. does not apply to frontier conflicts which arise in respects to territorial boundaries of the Trans-Caucasian republics that may not yet be fixed.
2. If, during the course of military operations undertaken in accordance with Clause 1, any neighbouring power attacks either or both Allies with the object of deciding any frontier dispute by force of arms, such power will be considered to be at war.
3. The present Treaty is of a strictly defensive character and if one of the parties on its own initiative and without preliminary agreement declares war or commences military operations the other contracting party is not obliged to take part in such military operations.
4. The Contracting Parties find themselves to settle any disputes arising between them regarding frontiers by means of agreement or arbitration; decisions of which to be considered as final and binding for both sides.
5. This Treaty is concluded for a period of three years. One year before the termination of this period each of the Contracting Parties has the right to announce its desire to extend the time or to withdraw from the Treaty; in the latter case the Treaty will cease to exist only on the expiration of the period as stated above.
6. The Contracting parties agree jointly and severally to come forward and to carry on diplomatic conversations directed towards safeguarding the independence and the sovereign rights of the two States.
7. Should the terms of Clauses of 1 and 2 realize, the Contracting Governments bind themselves not to conclude a separate peace.
8. The Contracting Parties agree not to enter into any military conventions with other States without preliminary agreement of the Ally.
9. Before the expiration of the Treaty, as indicated in Clause 5, should a League of Nations be created which guarantees the independence and the inviolability of the frontiers of all the States forming part of the League then the present Treaty will

AZƏRBAYCAN-GÜRCÜSTAN MÜDAFİƏ MÜQAVİLƏSİ
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cease to exist from the moment that the Contracting Republics enter this League of Nations.

10. The third Trans-Caucasian Republic, Armenia, is given the right to announce its willingness to join this Treaty within two weeks from the date of the official announcement of the Treaty.

11. Exchange of ratifications will take place in Baku in two weeks time from date of signing.

12. This treaty is made out in duplicate.

Minister of Foreign Affairs.
GUMGUTCHKORI.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Republic of Azerbaijan
M.U. DJAFAROV.

Minister of War.
M. RAMISHVILI.

Minister of War,
MEKHMAEDAROV.

Assistant Minister of War.
Major-General ORDEVANOV.

Chief of General Staff,
Lieut-General SULKEVITCH.

General ODISHKLI DZE.

Tiflis.
16th June, 1919.

Certified true copy.

SER A. KROU ÜÇÜN MEMORANDUM
24 NOYABR 1919

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Communicated by American Delegation, November 25th,
1919.

MEMORANDUM FOR SIR EYRE CROWE.

November 21th, 1919.

157145

Following message, dated Tiflis, Nov. 21, received from Colonel Rhea, who represents Colonel Haskell in his absence (Haskell sailed from Tarento yesterday on his return to Tiflis):

"Serious attack in Zangezur by regular troops of Azerbaidjan under Turkish leadership, with orders to connect with Turkey through Zangezur and Nakhitchevan. Nakhitchevan is now controlled by Tartars officered by Turks. I am informed that their plan is to connect Azerbaidjan with Turkey, which will furnish arms, ammunition and troops, to combine in attacking Armenia, to concentrate Muselman forces in Daghestan, and strongly oppose Denikin.

"Our efforts to stop bloodshed in Zangezur through authority of Peace Conference are unavailing. These men have no respect for the Conference, nor for its agents transmitting its orders or promises.

"The solution which I propose is to bring in Allied forces whose mere presence would produce quiet; otherwise extension of anarchy or bolshevism will continue and our Armenian allies be destroyed.

"The only troops available are British. I request that a British battalion from Batoum or Persia be placed at our disposal as soon as possible, for such temporary use as may be needful to calm the present excitement."

A.B. No decision has yet been taken by the Supreme Council on Colonel Haskell's request, made November 14th, for extension of his authority to Georgia and Azerbaidjan.

ALYANS KONFRANSININ BƏYANATINDAN ÇIXARIŞ
11-13 DEKABR 1919

No. 62

I.C.P. 8.] *Conferences of the Allied and Associated Powers and of the British and French Governments, held at 10, Downing Street, London, on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, December 11, 12 and 13, 1919.*

TEXT OF RESOLUTIONS.

(A.) *Policy in Russia.*

(Discussed at conference of American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese representatives.)

1. The Russian policy agreed to at the conference may be summed up as follows:—

Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what has already been promised or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided upon between the Governments of the United States of America and Japan, as to furnishing assistance to the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material, or financial aid; the anti-Bolshevik elements still to be free to purchase war material in the Allied countries; each Power to have discretion to leave on the spot all political or other missions which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevik elements or the dispatch of which may already have been decided upon; and to leave Bolshevism Russia, as it were, within a ring fence.

2. The conference considered that a strong Poland was in the interests of the Entente Powers and left for further consideration the question of the form and extent of the assistance to be given to her for the defence of her territories.

3. The conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolshevik States at the present time.

4. As regards the border communities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government, the Allies will give them such assistance in defending their liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises.

ALYANS KONFRANSININ BƏYANATINDAN ÇIXARIŞ
11-13 DEKABR 1919

(B.) *Future of the Peace Conference.*

(Discussed at a conference of the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese representatives.)

It was agreed that—

1. The present session of the Peace Conference shall come to an end at Christmas or at latest within a fortnight of the first *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

¹ Note in original: 'An understanding was reached that each Government should announce this policy in the words and in the manner it considered most convenient, but in any case not before 3 p.m. on Monday, the 15th December.'

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
16 NOYABR 1919

No. 544

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)
No. 137A Telegraphic [155471/1015/58]

Your telegram No. 69.¹

TIFLIS, November 16, 1919

You will have learnt from my later telegrams that person referred to is again in Baku where he is playing a part in present troubles.

All their activities have been object of my solicitude ever since I arrived and steady private pressure on Azerbaijan Prime Minister had succeeded in bringing about temporary result stated in my telegram No. 106.¹

If His Majesty's Government could give me any assurance for Azerbaijan that they would be fairly treated and encouraged I (? believe) they would not adopt an actively Turkish orientation. Their present policy is one of despair. They might be made useful transmitters in checking pseudo-Bolshevik campaign in Central Asia with which they have (? really) no sympathy. With a very little vigour and tact we could clear out foreign intriguer(? s in) Trans-Caucasus and (? Cis-)Caucasus (? who are) becoming stronger the longer we leave them.

Reports from Tashkend, Bokhara and Samarcand tend to show that Soviet power there is tottering and a direct British offensive would clear out Bolsheviks there. Volunteer Armies' operations in Trans-Caspia are evidently ineffectual and rather conducive to (? diminish) our prestige in Asia.

I believe presence in Daghestan of an energetic tactful sympathetic British Representative independent of Denikin's influence would probably have an immediate wholesome effect in restoring peace and hampering Turkish Bolshevik intrigues thus improving situation in Asia generally.

¹ Not printed. In Tiflis telegram No. 106 of November 2, 1919 (received November 3), Mr. Wardrop had reported that Nuri Pasha, brother of Enver Pasha and formerly in command of Turkish forces in the Caucasus, had been 'sent away' from Azerbaijan. In reply Foreign Office telegram No. 69 of November 4 asked Mr. Wardrop: 'Can you do anything to secure arrest of Nuri, who escaped from Batoum after two of his British guard had been shot?'

SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
4 NOYABR 1919

No. 517

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 4)
No. 717 Telegraphic [148577/1015/58]

TEHERAN, November 4, 1919

Owing to the meagre information which we possess here and to various conflicting reports as to the probable future developments, position (? in) Caucasus which closely affects Persian interests is very confused.

In about a week's time the Persian Government contemplate sending a (? trust)ed confidential agent to Baku and Tiflis to ascertain first-hand real attitude and intentions of Caucasian principalities towards Persia.

It would be very convenient if you can kindly let me have before that latest information that can be unobjectionably imparted to me on the above subject; for instance

- (a) Are we likely to resume military control over Batoum-Baku route?
- (b) If not is any power likely to take Mandate for Caucasus?
- (c) Are Caucasian principalities likely to obtain their complete independence from peace conference or will they probably revert to Russian Suzerainty?
- (d) Can it yet be said when peace with Turkey is likely to be signed?

No. 518

Memorandum from the French Embassy in London¹
[148722/1015/58]

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE, À LONDRES, ce 4 novembre, 1919

M. Pichon désirerait connaître l'avis du Gouvernement Britannique en ce qui concerne le statut de Batoum.

¹ This memorandum was handed to Lord Hardinge by M. de Fleuriau, Minister in the French Embassy, on November 4, 1919.

No. 519

Mr. Rattigan (Bucharest) to Earl Curzon (Received November 14)
No. 494 Telegraphic [151742/1321/19]

BUCHAREST, November 5, 1919

Russian Minister told me yesterday that Denikin had now authorised him to give assurance to Roumanian Government that he wished to establish friendliest relations with Roumania, and that as regards Bessarabia he agreed that the question must be settled by diplomacy and not by sword. Russian Minister hopes that this will be sufficient for Roumanian Government.

I consider that above assurance may improve Roumano-Russian relations, but I hardly think that it will have any far-reaching effect.

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CƏNAB BALFORUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
6 İYUL 1919

No. 296

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received July 7)
No. 1126 Telegraphic [9888/11067/58]

PARIS, July 6, 1919

From what Tittoni said to me recently (in a) private conversation, I do not think Italians mean to go to the Caucasus. In any case, I think it would be well to base our policy on this assumption.¹

¹ On July 2, 1919, the Foreign Office had received a telephone message from the War Office stating that 'the Italian Military Representative in Paris' had informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff authoritatively that Italy had abandoned all idea of sending a military force to the Caucasus. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff was taking steps to inform Mr. Balfour. In telegram No. 1155 of July 15 (received July 16), replying to Lord Curzon's telegram of June 28 on this subject (No. 284), Mr. Balfour referred to this communication and that reported in the present telegram, but stated that 'no answer has been received from Italian Delegation in reply to official enquiry addressed to them'.

No. 297

Letter from Mr. Selby to Colonel Kisch (Paris)
Unnumbered [99642/61232/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 7, 1919

My dear Kisch,

I have been meaning to answer your letter to me¹ for some time, but as I was asked to put forward officially the views expressed to you in my private letter,¹ and did so in a memorandum² on which you have now commented to Mr. Balfour officially, I thought it better to await further operations [sic] from Paris.

I am very grateful to you for having allowed me to see a copy of your comments³ on the official memorandum, to which I have nothing to say. My whole object was to raise the issue of the many difficulties we have encountered in dealing with the Russian problem in the course of the past nine months, with a view to drawing attention to them and eliciting a considered opinion as to how they could be dealt with. I hope we may now be successful in laying down some procedure, but the point which must first be determined is through what channel Russian problems are to be dealt with in future, and whether we are to regard the Peace Conference in Paris as having washed its hands of Russia with the despatch of the Koltchak note. From certain indications I have received, it looks to me very much as if the Paris Conference will not now have either the time or the inclination to pursue the subject, and I am sure you will agree with me that if that is the case, it should be laid down that Russia should be dealt with through the ordinary diplomatic and military channels, or such new machinery as it may be decided to create for the purpose.

For your own confidential and private information, I may let you know that I have drawn the Secretary of State's attention to the inconvenience which results from the present more or less dual control, and have suggested that he should consult the Prime Minister as to his wishes in regard to the future.

¹ This private letter was apparently not entered on Foreign Office files.
² No. 296.

³ No. 292.

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LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB BALFORA TELEQRAMI
28 İYUN 1919

No. 284

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)
No. 925 Telegraphic [92379/11067/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, June 28, 1919

(Italians and the Caucasus and Caspian.)

My telegram No. 755¹ (of May 23rd).

Admiralty are again pressing me to urge the Italian Government to expedite the despatch of their naval personnel to take over control of the fleet in the Caspian. Am I to understand that question of transfer of the fleet as well as of the military command of the whole Caucasus is now definitely settled and that I am to approach the Italian Government officially on this basis?

I would point out that an occupation of Georgia alone such as appears to be contemplated by Signor Tittoni (see Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 438)² would constitute an entirely new proposition and would, in my opinion, be open to the gravest objection from the military as well as from political point of view.

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed. This telegram of June 24, 1919, reported a general conversation which Sir R. Rodd, H.M. Ambassador in Rome, had had with Signor Tittoni, the new Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which the latter was reported as having said that 'as regards Asia Minor what Italy needed were facilities for obtaining raw material and her sphere of influence must secure access to mineral areas. I suggested danger of undertaking tasks beyond her resources. He agreed but argued that she would only place herself in hands of League of Nations. She did not wish to be brought into ultimate conflict with Russia. But he thought she could contemplate protection of an autonomous Georgia. If eventual League of Nations called upon her to retire he would be quite ready to do so provided she were guaranteed permanent interest in exploitation of such minerals etc. as had been developed during her mandate.'

SIR R. RODDUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
29 İYUN 1919

No. 285

Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to Earl Curzon (Received June 30)
No. 448 Telegraphic [95854/11067/58]

ROME, June 29, 1919

Your telegram No. 925¹ to Peace Conference.

I think name Georgia was only used vaguely by Tittoni as reported in my telegram No. 438² and that there was no intention to suggest occupation of Georgia alone.

Having no instructions as to what it may be contemplated that Italy should take over, whether by mandate or temporarily, I have no means of controlling statements of this nature made in conversations with Italian Ministers and have to disguise my ignorance of matters on which they suppose me to be informed rather than discourage their tendency to be communicative by disclosing it.

Repeated to Peace Conference.

¹ No. 284.

² See No. 284, note 2.

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
12 OKTYABR 1919

No. 472

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 14)
No. 70 Telegraphic [141222/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 12, 1919

Following is substance of long proclamation widely circulated through Transcaucasia, signed by Chicherin and Dr. Nariman Narimanof, head of Near East Mussulman Section of Moscow Commissary for Foreign Affairs (see my telegram No. 30,¹ 2nd October).

'To workmen and peasants of Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan. Denikin is coming to restore authority (autocracy) and put you again under Russian yoke.

'But how can Denikin do this when your lands are declared to be under British protectorate? England is trying to crush Russian revolution, and Denikin is attacking you with knowledge of England, which, on account of its internal condition, is obliged to abandon Caucasus.

'But on leaving Caucasus England wishes to hand you over to Tsar's general, and prevent you from joining your Russian brothers who are about to triumph in their struggle against capitalism.

'Your Government, fearing dictature of proletariat, accepted first German then English protectorate, and now England is handing you over to Denikin.

'But why do your governing classes declare war on Denikin? Because they know they will be contested by Governors-General and old Tsarist régime will be restored.

'But it is even now possible that at England's dictation your rulers may say that if Denikin does not come, Soviet Russia will come and break up your peaceful life and *bourgeois* régime, and submit to Denikin to save themselves from Bolsheviks.

'All this is possible, and both England and your governing classes, who have carried on policy of duplicity and sold your rights, are capable of doing this.

'We therefore declare before whole world that Soviet Government has never gone out to seize other peoples' land or to establish Soviet power on foreign territory by force of arms. It has only defended itself.

'Soviet Russia has no intention of marching against your republics to establish its power. It upholds principle of self-determination even for backward races, and has given autonomy to Bashkirs and Kirghizes.

'And if you, Mussulmans and Georgians, are satisfied with form of Government of your republics then live at peace, self-determine yourselves and establish neighbourly relations with us.

'Soviet Russia expresses firm hope that workmen and peasants of Daghestan, Azabaijan and Georgia will not let their liberty be trampled under foot by the Tsarist General, the English hangman, Denikin.'

It is interesting that Chicherin treats Transcaucasian Governments as decidedly anti-Bolshevik, and yet asks for their collaboration and admits possibility of their being after all truly representative.

¹ No. 453.

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
14 OKTYABR 1919

No. 473

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)
No. 78 Telegraphic [143080/1015]58]

TIFLIS, October 14, 1919

At a meeting of Georgian Cabinet, lasting from 8 p.m. 13th October till the early hours of 14th October, it was decided by eight votes to one that Great Britain should be requested to accept mandate. Solitary opponent favoured American mandate.

No. 474

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)
No. 77 Telegraphic [143079/1015]58]

TIFLIS, October 14, 1919

In connection with Georgian Mission to Rome under Sahtarshvili, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, following confidential information obtained from a trustworthy source may be useful: Georgia[n] Government recently decided that they would grant concessions in proportions: 40% to Great Britain, 20% to Italy, 40% to other Allies and neutrals.

They are now offering Italy the forests in Svanetia and [? Bor]jom' district, the coal deposits at Tzvarcheli near Poti and all water-power in Georgia on condition that Italy grants them recognition. These four concessions seem to me to form an excessively liberal interpretation of 20% above referred to.

It may be observed that above percentages were apparently those agreed upon between Colonel Gabba, head of Italian Mission, and Azerbaijan Government with collaboration of Ismaria Litemi¹ (see my telegram No. 44¹ of September 27th).

Though Azerbaijan has not actually given to Italians concession for Aliati-Djulfa railway (see my telegram No. 49⁴ of October 2nd, paragraph 7)

¹ The text here is uncertain.

² The reference is uncertain but it appears probable that it was to a person mentioned in telegram No. 44 cited below, namely, a 'famous film actress, Maria Notmi, divorced wife of German chief of propaganda'. In Rome dispatch No. 462 of October 22, 1919, reporting the arrival of the Georgian Mission in Rome, Mr. Kennard, British Chargé d'Affaires, stated that 'Maria Carmi, or Princess Matchabeli, as she is now called', was also in Rome, 'but I have been unable to ascertain what connection she may have with the Mission'. In the same dispatch Mr. Kennard reported that 'in newspaper interviews M. Sabachtarachvili states that the object of the Mission is to effect more intimate political and economical relations with Italy and to further develop the work begun by Colonel Gabba's mission in Tiflis. He draws attention to the fact that the Italian maritime services were the first to re-open communication with Batoum and that Georgia can supply Italy with coal, iron, copper, manganese, timber, tobacco, wood and petroleum, of which she is specially in need.'

³ Not printed.

⁴ See No. 453, note 1. In Tiflis telegram No. 106 of November 2 (received November 3) Mr. Wardrop further transmitted the following 'notes of a private unofficial conversation

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
14 OKTYABR 1919

I hear privately that this will be granted if? Italy effectively supports recognition of Azerbaijan at Paris.

Georgia urgently needs ready money as pay of officers of regular army six weeks in arrear and that of all ranks of national guard 3 months. Exchange on London about 700 roubles to the £.

General opinion here is that any commercial, financial or industrial advantages given nominally to Italy are really for benefit of Germany.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 77, repeated to His Majesty's Embassy at Rome No. 1.

Lasting two hours between Colonel Stokes and Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Umubbekov at Baku on October 24.

¹ Italians have offered Azerbaijan arms, munitions of war, uniforms and Azerbaijan officer has gone to Italy to arrange details, patterns, etc.

² Aliat Julfa (? railway) concession has not been given to Italians but they have offered labour. No concession can be granted without knowledge of Parliament.'

No. 475

Mr. O'Reilly (Vladivostok) to Earl Curzon (Received October 19)
No. 846 Telegraphic [143065/11]57]

VLADIVOSTOK, October 15, 1919

I hope phrase 'all our authorities' in your telegram to Washington No. 1847¹ will not be so interpreted as to include me, as American representatives know I have telegraphed to you in a different sense, e.g. in my telegram No. 814.²

Admiral Koltchak is certainly instrument by which Bolshevism (? may be) defeated with greatest convenience to us but he is not the only instrument nor perhaps even best in other respects.

The dilemma 'Koltchak or Bolshevism' is a bogey by which we have been scared too long and until we show that we have seen its falseness we shall be unable to give advice at Omsk with any effect because it will be thought that in last resort we would always do anything rather than allow Koltchak to fall.

I am repeating to Washington to save time, also to Omsk.

¹ No. 466.

² No. 458.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
27 DEKABR 1919

No. 622

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 4, 1920)
No. 237 Telegraphic [167584/1015/58]

TIFLIS, December 27, 1919

Your telegram No. 146¹ very mutilated.

Following is repetition of my telegram No. 218.¹ Begins.

¹ *Secret.*

'Situation in Transcaspia and its bearing on Transcaucasus causes me some anxiety.

'Bolsheviks evidently intend to take Krasnovodsk. They are sending numerous agents to Caucasus and Persia² with large funds, including forged

¹ Not printed. Foreign Office telegram No. 146 of December 25, 1919, had requested the repetition of certain passages in Tiflis telegram No. 218 of December 21 which had been received on December 24 in a mutilated text.

² In Tiflis telegram No. 234 of December 26, 1919 (received December 29), Mr. Wardrop had transmitted and endorsed a report from Colonel Stokes which stated in part:

'According to reliable information some 1,500 Bolsheviks from Georgia and Azerbaijan are being sent via Baku to Persia. First 500 are now leaving Baku in small boats for Lenkoran, whence they will enter Persia by land. Persian Commissioner at Baku has asked his Government to take precaution on frontier, and is also, I understand, suggesting that two armed ships flying Persian flag but with some British personnel be placed on Caspian to guard Persian littoral.

'Question of control over Caspian Sea in my opinion demands immediate consideration.

'Denikin's fleet is unsatisfactory, and is expected to join Bolsheviks if they take Krasnovodsk.'

In reply Foreign Office telegram No. 23 of January 10, 1920, to Tiflis stated:

'We concur with War Office in regarding the despatch of 1,500 Bolsheviks to Persia as

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
27 DEKABR 1919

Bradburys,³ and are trying to buy over the Turkomans. He [sic] has seen their two leaders, who are co-operating with Volunteer Army, but inefficiency of latter and ill-treatment of troops have alienated their sympathy. They ask British support (? for their) claims of future independence, and declare they could form anti-Bolshevik barrier from Caspian to Merv threatening enemy's communications. He says His Majesty's Government refused four months ago to entertain proposals for British protectorate or small British mission, but thinks matter worthy of reconsideration in view of present danger to Persia and Caucasus.

'Saiid Zia Uddin considers threat to Persia serious, and says several commissaries at Askabad are Persians, and Bolsheviks are active in Persia. Colonel Stokes could get into touch with Turkomans through Saiid, Persian Commissioner in Baku, if authorised, and he has suggested present telegram as matter is urgent.

'Small vessels have resumed regular sailings from Baku to Enzeli and Krasnovodsk.

'I do not feel competent to express decided opinion on above, especially as I am not thoroughly aware of extent of Afghan activity in Central Asia. I could not go further than to submit that sending British Mission to Turkomans to enquire and report might have temporary good effect in Transcaspia.

'See my telegram No. 160 and your Lordship's reply No. 110.'⁴

Sent to Constantinople, No. 73 and Teheran No. 12.

highly dangerous and you should protest strongly to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments against such a measure.

'His Majesty's Minister at Teheran is being instructed to urge Persian Government not to allow them to land.'

³ British Treasury notes.

⁴ Not printed.

SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
20 NOYABR 1919

No. 851

Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 28)

*No. 745 Telegraphic [156488/150/34]*¹

TEHRAN, November 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 574² of 29th October.

I am about to submit separately some further observations regarding Bolshevist outlook and Russian position in Northern Persia, including Azerbaijan, but there are certain points in your telegram above mentioned on which I venture to comment:—

1. Our proposal was that detachment for Tabriz should be sent, not from Batoum, but from Kasvin. There seems nothing in that opposed to policy, nor any difficulty save that of expense.

2. Sphere of influence having by common consent ceased to exist, and South Persia Rifles having already been advantageously employed in Ispahan province as far out as the neighbourhood of Kashan at the request of Persian Government and without demur from Russian Legation, it is not clear to me on what grounds their employment in Azerbaijan is open to objection.

There can hardly be question of Cossack division being disbanded on assembly of commission. Their services are needed until they can be replaced by something else or given a new form.

Sent to India.

¹ The file copy of this telegram is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print. ² No. 828.

LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
28 NOYABR 1919

No. 854

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)

No. 239 [157613/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 28, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called upon me by appointment this afternoon for a final discussion of the various points concerning his country which still remained unsettled between us, before his impending departure for Paris.

On the occasion of his previous visit, he had left with me a map¹ on which he had traced the demands for rectifications of frontiers which the Persian Delegation desired to put before the Peace Conference, whenever that body should take up the question of Peace with Turkey, and as to which he had sought my advice and, if possible, our support.

I informed him that, having made a careful study of these demands, I would speak to him with absolute frankness. The First Persian Delegate in Paris, Mushaver-ul-Mamalek, had, in my opinion, wrecked all chances of success in the summer by the extravagance of the territorial claims that he had put forward. The Peace Conference would simply have treated them with ridicule. Although the rectifications now suggested were on a very different scale, I felt, nevertheless, bound to tell the Minister that, in their present form, I thought that their chances of realisation were remote. If the Persian Government desired to put them forward on their own responsibility in Paris, they were, I said, fully entitled to do so. The claims would then represent their political and territorial aspirations, and the Persian Delegates could advance in their favour all the arguments which he had used, or would use, with me. I had no right, nor did I desire, to veto such action on their part. On the other hand, I must candidly say that the majority of these claims were such as, in present circumstances, it would be practically impossible for us to support, and that he must balance the desirability of stating the full national claims of Persia before such an audience as the Peace Conference against the advantage of putting forward a more modest case with our support behind him.

¹ See No. 845, note 1.

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Taking the suggested rectifications in geographical order from east to west, I began with the proposed readjustment of the Persian frontier in Seistan, involving the acquisition of a not inconsiderable angle of Afghan territory.

His Highness informed me that he had no desire to bring this point before the Peace Conference, and that it was a matter for domestic discussion and arrangement between the Persian and British Governments. He would be prepared to bring it up with us at a later date.

This, I said, he was quite entitled to do, though, from my knowledge of the Seistan question and of the Afghan attitude towards it, I could hardly conceive that we should receive any assistance from the Afghan Government in arriving at the conclusion he desired.

The next extension of Persian territory was that which was to embrace a large slice of Transcaspia, starting from near Askabad, including Lutfabad, Tejend, Sarakhs, Merv, Yletan, and Penjdeh, as far south as Kushk.

I asked the Minister if he really thought that there was the slightest use in making such a proposal. The country in question was at the present moment in the military occupation either of the Bolsheviks or the Afghans, or of both. What was the relation between these two parties it was difficult to determine. Although they were now ostensibly friendly, they might presently fall out. But that both of them, or either of them, would ever consent to surrender this triangle of territory to Persia was, I thought, out of the question. Sarakhs, it was true, had been in Persian territory in the course of the last century; but Penjdeh was an Afghan place, which had been stolen from the Afghans by the Russians; Merv was an important centre on the Transcaspian Railway, which no Government of that region could be expected to surrender; and I failed to see what advantage there was in putting forward a claim which could be substantiated only by military occupation: an operation which the Persian forces were quite unable to undertake, and one in which we could not assist them. I could not myself understand why the Persian Government were not content with the line of the mountains, which formed a very good frontier in this region, and beyond which I thought they would be ill-advised to endeavour to push.

Nosret-ed-Dowleh answered that it was solely a question of water; that troublesome questions between the Persians and the transborder Turkomans and Russians were continually arising over the waters of the streams that flowed into Khorassan; and that, although the moment might not be propitious, the claims could be justified both by logic and by expediency.

I replied that I feared neither would be of much avail in the presence of a greatly superior enemy force, and that, personally, I thought the Persian Government were making a mistake in pressing, for instance, for a connection at some future date between their proposed Tehran-Meshed Railway and Lutfabad on the Turkoman side of the frontier.

The Minister, I think, was persuaded that this particular extension of territory was out of the question, and he went so far as to admit that it had been put forward only in order to satisfy the *amour-propre* of his Government.

When he subsequently put to me the question: if the rectification was not

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urged or conceded now, how could the Persian Government ever afterwards obtain satisfaction, I reminded him that his country was a member of the League of Nations, and that it was to that body that reference should be made.

He appeared to think this a somewhat slender and speculative form of protection, and asked why his Government should not proceed to come to terms with the Afghans and the Bolsheviks without delay.

To this I made the rejoinder that such an attitude appeared to be quite inconsistent with his recent appeals to me to protect the frontier of Persia in that quarter from her hereditary enemies, and that, if he seriously contemplated entering into negotiations with the latter, he must not be surprised if the British force under Colonel Mallezon, which we had been augmenting with a view to helping the Persians, was withdrawn from the scene of action.

This prospect seemed somewhat to discourage the Minister, who hastily abandoned the subject.

The third rectification which the Minister had proposed was the absorption of a part of Russian Armenia and Azerbaijan from a point south of Erivan to the Caspian Sea.

He had explained to me on a previous occasion that this was intended to include in Persian territory the watershed of the River Aras (or Araxes), i.e. the streams flowing into the main channel from the north.

I pointed out to his Highness that this was a proposal on the part of his Government to acquire Astara and Lenkoran on the Caspian coast, and Nakhichevan in the interior. I reminded him that, at the present moment, his Government were contemplating discussions with the Azerbaijan Government, and I asked him what the latter would think of their Persian friends, and what would be the chance of success, if the first indication of friendship on the part of the Persians was a demand for a considerable slice of territory, bringing them almost up to Baku?

The Minister conceded the point about the Caspian ports, but seemed to think that the demands in the interior were quite reasonable, and that his Government would not find much opposition on the part of Azerbaijan.

I expressed some surprise at hearing this, but said that I would await with interest the result of the contemplated discussion between the two parties.

When his Highness asked me if we would accept any line of demarcation upon which they agreed, I said that I could not at present give any such pledge, because we had not so far recognised the Azerbaijan Government, and therefore I could not feel sure that any decision at which they arrived would be either obligatory or lasting.

I added, however, that I thought the Persian Government were probably quite wise in entering into negotiations with the Azerbaijan Government, and in seeking to come to a friendly arrangement with them. The Azerbaijan Government seemed likely to continue to exist in some form or other; Persia had large interests in the region under their control; there were a good many of her people in Baku; a strong party in Azerbaijan, as he had told me, was in sympathy with Persia, and represented Moderate, as opposed to Extremist, opinions; in these circumstances, I thought it desirable that amicable

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arrangements and relations should be established between the two neighbours, and I wished success to the endeavour.

Passing on to the fourth extension of the boundary suggested by the Prince, on the western or Kurdish side of Persia, I abstained from giving any opinion upon the particular line that had been drawn on the sketch-map by his Highness. I said, however, that I could not fail to note with some astonishment that it proposed to add considerably to Persian territory in an area over which the Persian authority was so slight that the British vice-consul, for instance, had just been obliged to leave Urumia, while the entire Assyrian community who lived to the west of the lake of the same name had been driven out at an earlier stage of the war, and were unable to return, owing to the complete lack of local security, moreover the neighbouring mountains appeared to be in the hands of a Kurdish bandit named Simko, who ravaged Persian territory and did pretty well what he pleased. This did not seem to me a very favourable omen for an extended exercise of Persian authority; nor did I think that even the attractions of tribal unity would induce the Turkish Kurds to ally themselves with their Persian brethren in a single community on the Persian side of the frontier under Persian rule. Although, however, I regarded the extreme pretensions of the Persian Government in this quarter with a good deal of doubt, I had always believed that it was on this part of their frontier that some rectification could fairly be pressed for in Persian interests. I could not, I said, in reply to the Minister, point out exactly where the new line might be drawn; but if, after a study of the geographical and ethnographical features, we were able to support his Government in making claims in this direction, we should be very glad to do so.

I should add that Nosret-ed-Dowleh justified his general attitude, not on the ground of the feasibility of the particular proposals, but on the plea that the present opportunity should not be lost of stating claims which, unless formulated, might be treated as abandoned, and some of which, in the general Asiatic welter, there might be a chance of realising. Why should not the Persians be given as good a chance of recovering territories that had once belonged to them, as Afghans, or Russians, or anybody else?

To this, without for a moment contesting the absolute right of Persia to state her claims in her own way, I gave the double and obvious reply (1) that if other claimants or pretenders were more successful it was because they had the military force with which to sustain their pretensions—which Persia unfortunately had not; and (2) that, so far as I was aware, Persia was the only neutral State that, having taken no part in the war and borne none of its burdens, having indeed only been saved from serious invasion, and from the probable overthrow of the dynasty by British intervention, and having recovered its pre-war frontiers owing exclusively to the same agency—now sought a wide extension of its territory, as a reward for its inaction. His Highness must remember that his case would not be decided by this country, which would naturally be sympathetic, but by the Allied Powers in Conference; and he could judge for himself whether, when the Conference reassembled to discuss the Treaty with Turkey, and would be yearning to

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arrive at an early decision, they would be likely to devote several days, or even hours, to the investigation of ancient territorial claims, or to the task of reconstructing the entire map of Central Asia.

The Minister said that he would report my views to his Government, and acquaint me at a later date with their reply.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

No. 855

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)

No. 102 [165447/150/34]

TIFLIS, November 28, 1919

My Lord,

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit for Your Lordship's information copies of two letters from Prince Mirza Riza Khan¹ and of an anti-English proclamation,² believed to be printed in Switzerland, which is I understand being widely circulated.

Copies of the present despatch are being sent to Sir Percy Cox and to Colonel Stokes³ for their guidance.

I may remark that His Highness somewhat exaggerates the length of my acquaintance with him.

I have, &c.
O. WARDROP

ENCLOSURE I IN No. 855

TIFLIS, ce 28 novembre 1919

Monsieur le Haut Commissaire,

Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de Vous l'exposer hier, le jour de mon arrivée à Tiflis, le gérant de notre Consulat Général s'est rendu immédiatement chez moi et m'a mis au courant de ce qui se passe ici et à Bakou parmi la colonie persane. Il m'a dit que la semaine passée les leaders des différents comités Libéraux et Démocrates se sont rendus à la mosquée et ont décidé de protester auprès des représentants des Puissances et des nouvelles républiques du Caucase contre le dernier arrangement anglo-persan. Ils ont en outre décidé de former, éventuellement, un comité National, dans le but de diriger leurs affaires courantes sans l'aide du consulat, auquel ils refuseraient leur confiance. Le gérant m'a dit en outre que quelques-uns parmi la jeunesse

¹ Persian diplomat and politician.

² Not printed. This manifesto was headed 'Appel du parti national persan' and was signed Ayn-Lam-Ber. The manifesto began: 'Après cinq ans de protestations contre l'impérialisme, la Grande-Bretagne se propose aujourd'hui d'annexer la Perse à son Empire. L'accord qui vient d'être signé à Téhéran nous ravit notre indépendance. D'aucuns prétendent que cette convention a l'assentiment du peuple persan. L'affirmation est mensongère.' The manifesto concluded by demanding (1) the withdrawal of British troops from Persia; (2) 'qu'on mette un terme aux persécutions et qu'on libère les déportés'; (3) that the Anglo-Persian Agreement should enter into force only with the consent of the League of Nations.

³ British representative at Baku.

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inexperimntée à Bakou invitent constamment les Persans de cette ville, qui sont au nombre d'au moins 20,000 ainsi que les habitants de l'Azerbeïdjan persan, qui sont plusieurs millions, de protester en bloc contre le dernier traité et au cas où une réponse satisfaisante ne leur serait pas donnée, de s'unir à la république de l'Azerbeïdjan du Caucase.

Gholam Riza Khan m'a prié d'appeler les notables commerçants et les leaders des partis susmentionnés, de les calmer et de les empêcher de mettre leur plan en exécution.

Je n'ai pas eu besoin de les appeler, car quelques instants après Ali Eliber Cheidaïef, notable commerçant, vint me trouver de la part de toute la colonie pour me questionner sur les conséquences de cet arrangement. J'ai fait de tout mon mieux pour lui expliquer l'intérêt que notre pays pourra tirer du traité, et je lui ai montré le journal *L'Eclair*, où, à la tête d'un article, est imprimée la manchette suivante: 'L'Angleterre respectera l'indépendance de la Perse'.

Hier après avoir eu le grand plaisir de renouveler avec Vous notre connaissance de trente années, j'ai reçu la visite de quatre notables commerçants choisis par notre colonie. Ils m'ont déclaré venir de la part de tous les Persans pour me poser deux questions brèves auxquelles ils demandent une réponse aussi nette que possible.

1. Le gouvernement persan pouvait-il arranger ses affaires financières et militaires sans s'adresser à l'aide d'un gouvernement étranger?

2. En cas de nécessité, ne pouvait-il s'adresser à l'aide de la France ou de l'Amérique, sans avoir recours à notre puissante voisine qui peut à chaque instant oublier sa promesse et annexer notre pays?

Naturellement, je répondit [sic] non aux deux questions. Pour calmer leur crainte, je leur ai répété le dernier discours de Lord Curzon au Gild Hall, en présence de S.M. le Shah, et leur ai assuré que la Grande-Bretagne était sincère. Ils sont partis très satisfaits et je les ai priés d'informer de ce que je leur ai dit la colonie persane à Bakou, où je me rendrai dans quelques jours, et où, si l'occasion se présente, je tiendrai aux Persans le même discours.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

P. M. RIZA KHAN

ENCLOSURE 2 IN No. 855

TIFLIS, ce 28 novembre 1919

Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire,

J'ai reçu hier la visite de Mr. Vekilof, représentant de la république de l'Azerbeïdjan du Caucase, avec son secrétaire.

Je leur ai dit que leur gouvernement doit empêcher par tous les moyens que des gens irresponsables et ignorant les relations internationales ne fassent une propagande dangereuse pour les deux pays, à Tabriz.

Leur intérêt vital est d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec la Perse et de gagner la sympathie anglo-persane.

J'ai dit qu'on ne peut comparer le sort de la république de l'Azerbeïdjan avec celui des autres républiques du Caucase.

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Dénikine et les Bolchevistes peuvent facilement renoncer à la Géorgie et à l'Arménie, mais comme ils l'ont déjà déclaré, ils ne peuvent abandonner les richesses pétrolières de Bakou.

Lors du régleme[n]t des comptes, qui pourra aider à la république de l'Azerbeïdjan du Caucase, si ce n'est la Grande-Bretagne?

Vekiloff me dit que les républiques transcaucasiennes veulent faire une confédération entre elles. Je lui ai fait remarquer qu'il serait plus logique à l'Azerbeïdjan de se confédérer avec la Perse, car, vu le dernier arrangement anglo-persan, il s'assurera ainsi l'appui de la Grande-Bretagne.*

Sur ce, ils m'ont remercié et m'ont prié de les recevoir encore avant mon départ.

Veuillez agréer, etc.

P. M. RIZA KHAN

* Cf. Volume III, No. 600.

No. 856

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 29)

No. 103 [165448/150/34]

TIFLIS, November 29, 1919

My Lord,

Supplementary to my despatch No. 102¹ of November 28 I have the honour to submit for Your Lordship's information the following:

Referring to the present situation in Persia, Prince Mirza Riza Khan told me he thought there was no real opposition to the British policy, but unfortunately the Persian statesmen now in office imagined they had an opportunity of permanently establishing their power and getting rid of their rivals, so they had exiled all the leaders of the opposition to Kashan, 'a place', said His Highness, 'with a disagreeable climate and a large quantity of scorpions'.

These unhappy persons were not *en fond* anti-British and would be quite amenable to kindness, but they naturally thought they were being harshly treated and were thus disposed to seek sympathy in other quarters.

I have, &c.

O. WARDROP

¹ No. 855.

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No. 865

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)

No. 264 [157900/150/34]¹

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 6, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called here on the 1st instant and

¹ This file contains Mr. Oliphant's note of the conversation recorded below. The present despatch, based textually upon this note, subject to minor alterations of form, is supplied from Confidential Print.

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stated that after reflecting on his interview with me of the 28th ultimo (see my despatch No. 259² of the 28th November) he was afraid that any telegram which he could draft to the Prime Minister in Tehran would only be of a very discouraging nature. He added that he himself saw the full force of a great many of my arguments, but he was in some doubt whether Vossugh-ed-Dowleh would be as convinced when receiving them from him and he had, therefore, abstained from reporting his interview.

His Highness explained that he had been considering how he could possibly furnish any encouragement to the Prime Minister when reporting the interview, and expressed the opinion that a satisfactory solution might be found in one direction, namely, in the matter of Azerbaijan.

His Highness realised that our hands were somewhat tied *vis-à-vis* of the Azerbaijanis by the fact that we had not recognised the Republic; but he was convinced that if I were to let it be understood by the Azerbaijanis that at any future date His Majesty's Government would not be prepared to extend sympathy and support to them unless they came to a working understanding with Persia, it would have both a very good effect locally and also prove an asset to Nosret-ed-Dowleh himself when telegraphing to the Prime Minister. He said that so far as he could see such observations by our local representatives would not commit us in any embarrassing way, and he earnestly hoped that some such statement might be agreed to.³

His Highness then raised the question of Persia's claims consequent upon the war, and explained that had he not hesitated to lengthen unduly his conversation with me on the 28th ultimo he would have mentioned the matter to me then.

His Highness thereupon handed in a memorandum⁴ on the subject and asked for my observations. A copy of this document, which is now being considered, will reach you shortly.

His Highness then drew attention to the fact that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company are about to issue new shares up to £7,500,000 sterling, for which applications from existing members of the company and the Burma Oil Company will be given special consideration. His Highness understood that two-thirds of this new issue would be offered to His Majesty's Government, and the remaining one-third would be taken up by existing holders of shares, and he pointed out that it would be most deeply appreciated in Teheran if His Majesty's Government were to offer to the Persian Government some of

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¹ No. 854.

² In this connexion the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs was informed in a Foreign Office letter of December 5, 1919, that a record of this conversation had been submitted to Lord Curzon who 'is prepared to instruct the local British representatives to inform the Azerbaijan Authorities that it would be a source of gratification to H.M. Government to hear that the Azerbaijan Authorities and the Persian Authorities were well disposed to each other and that any strengthening of the bonds between the two countries could not but increase the satisfaction of H.M. Government.' See Volume III, No. 615.

⁴ The reference is uncertain but was probably to an undated Persian memorandum (not printed) entitled 'Droit aux Réparations'. This memorandum advanced Persian claims to reparation for losses due to Russian and to Turkish action and to German responsibilities.

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their new shares in view of the fact that they were not procurable by any other means. His Highness was unable to say how many shares the Persian Government were likely to be able to take up, but expressed the view that it would not be a very large sum.

As I believe that it would be desirable on political grounds to give the Persian Government a further financial interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I am asking the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury whether anything can be done in the matter.

Prince Firouz then expressed great appreciation of the decision taken some time ago to develop a boys' school in Teheran. He added that one means of excellent propaganda and of great utility in establishing British influence throughout Persia would be to develop some educational establishment for women and girls in Teheran; as if English could be spread in the 'Anderuns'⁵ it would have a very far-reaching effect. He was told that we had great difficulty with the Treasury in getting any help for the boys' school in Teheran, and that there was some doubt whether we could do much in this direction.

His Highness then referred to the appointment of Prince Ain-ed-Dowleh as Governor-General of Azerbaijan, and stated that his first act, before even proceeding to his post, was to insist on the recall from Tabriz of Prince Firouz' younger brother, Mohammed Vili [Vali] Mirza, whose presence at Tabriz was of the utmost use to his family in looking after their properties there. His Highness stated that his own position in the matter was somewhat complicated owing to the fact that when Vossugh-ed-Dowleh intended to send Saram-ed-Dowleh to Tabriz the other day his Highness made strong representations against the appointment, as he considered it essential that Saram-ed-Dowleh should remain in Teheran as Minister of Finance in view of the fact that he gets on well with foreigners. If, therefore, he now protested against the appointment of Ain-ed-Dowleh, the Prime Minister could retort by saying that it was his fault that the appointment had been made. I therefore have telegraphed to you on the subject (No. 636⁶ of 3rd December).

His Highness addressed a letter⁷ to Mr. Oliphant on the 29th ultimo respecting a decoration for the Persian Prime Minister (a copy of which I transmit herein), and in view of the important part Vossugh-ed-Dowleh has taken to bring about the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, I am recommending that the King should confer upon him the G.C.B.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
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⁵ Women's quarters.
⁶ Not printed. In this telegram Lord Curzon stated that he would be glad if Sir P. Cox would, if he found it possible, express the hope that Mohammed Vali Mirza 'may be left at Tabreez, if necessary even without an official post'.
⁷ Not printed.

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LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB VORDROPA TELEQRAMI
22 İYUL 1919

No. 329

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop¹
[102622/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 22, 1919

Sir,

I have to inform you that you are appointed to proceed on a special political mission to Transcaucasia, with the title of Chief British Commissioner.

Although the *de facto* authority of the Governments of Georgia, the Armenian Republic of Erivan, and of Azerbaijan has not as yet been formally recognised by His Majesty's Government, you will be required to keep in close touch with these Governments, who will be informed of your mission through their Delegations at the Peace Conference in Paris.

You will be accompanied by a staff composed of Mr. Vice-Consul T. E. Milligan Grundy, Mr. Vice-Consul J. A. Waite, and another secretary to be selected.

The objects of your mission, in addition to that already mentioned, will be—

(a) To report on the political situation in Transcaucasia.

(b) To do your utmost to prevent friction between the volunteer army and the Transcaucasian Republics, and to ensure respect for the line to be drawn between their respective spheres.²

Should this line at any time in the future be so defined as to leave the territory of Daghestan, or the North Caucasus Republic, on its southern side,

¹ Formerly H.M. Consul-General at Moscow.

² On July 17, 1919, the War Office, in agreement with the Foreign Office, had sent a telegram to the British military representatives at Ekaterinodar and Constantinople instructing them that General Denikin should be informed that 'his troops must not penetrate south of the following line (Reference Map of Caucasia, 32 miles to one inch): from mouth of Beyd river northwards along that river to the frontier of Sukhum province, thence eastwards along northern frontiers of provinces of Sukhum, Kutais, Tiflis, thence south-eastwards along the southern boundary of province of Daghestan. In informing him of this division Denikin must be made to understand that the continued support of H.M. Government depends upon the loyal observance of this line. The Caucasian States must be informed that they must abstain from all aggression against the Volunteer Army and co-operate with Denikin at least to the extent of supplying oil and other supplies for the Caspian Fleet and withholding them from the Bolsheviks. They should be warned that if they fail to comply with these conditions they will be deprived of British goodwill and it will be rendered impossible for H.M. Government to insist upon the retention of Denikin's troops north of the line.' The line hereby established represented a modification of a line of demarcation previously notified by the War Office on June 6, 1919, in that Daghestan was now included within the area of the Volunteer Army. In this connexion the above-quoted telegram added as confidential information: 'The uncertainty regarding the despatch of Italian troops to replace the British in the Caucasus has considerably altered the situation since the original line of demarcation was defined and it is felt that it would not be wise now to attempt to dislodge Denikin's troops from Daghestan since British troops will shortly be withdrawn and it is improbable that they will be replaced by Allied troops.' The announcement of the new line of demarcation was arranged for August 4, 1919.

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you will be required to maintain relations with its Government in the same way as with those of the three Transcaucasian Republics already mentioned, and in any case you should endeavour to obtain information as to the political situation in Daghestan and report from time to time to His Majesty's Government.

(c) So far as the personnel at your disposal and the circumstances permit, to advance the interests of British trade in Transcaucasia and to report on trade matters.

(d) So long as British military forces remain in Transcaucasia, matters of a purely military character will, of course, continue to concern the General Officer Commanding; but in political matters, especially in the advice to be given to the Governments of the various States mentioned, you will be independent of the British military command, though you should make a point of consulting the General Officer Commanding in the various questions which may arise. It will at the same time be the duty of the General Officer Commanding, in so far as political questions may affect his work, to consult with you, and not to act without your advice and consent.

You will correspond direct with the Foreign Office, with the exception that, in matters of supply and relief, your communications should be made direct to the Supreme Economic Council in Paris, and in matters of trade to the Department of Overseas Trade. Copies of your communications with these bodies should be sent to the Foreign Office and also, in the case of relief and supply, to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, for communication to the representative of the Supreme Economic Council at that place.

Detailed accounts of the expenditure of the mission should, of course, be kept, and it will be convenient that the first account should be rendered in respect of the period from the commencement of the mission to the 30th September next. Accounts should be rendered quarterly thereafter. Suitable forms of accounts and vouchers will be supplied by the chief clerk to the member of the mission who will be charged with the preparation of the accounts.

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB BALFORA TELEQRAMI

23 İYUL 1919

No. 330

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour (Paris)**No. 4970 [107336/11067/58]*

FOREIGN OFFICE, July 23, 1919

Sir,

In the course of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador to-day, I asked if he could give me official confirmation of the intimation which had reached me some time ago from Paris that the Italian Government had abandoned their intention to take charge either of the Caucasus or the Caspian (see your despatch No. 1257¹ (14809) of the 10th instant).

I told him that we were proceeding upon the hypothesis that this was the case, and were accordingly making arrangements to hand over the Caspian flotilla to General Denikin prior to the withdrawal of the military forces from the Caucasus.

The Marquis Imperiali replied that he believed me to have correctly represented the decision of his Government. There had been a change of policy when M. Tittoni became Foreign Minister. He would, however, telegraph to his Government to obtain official confirmation of the fact.²

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

¹ This despatch transmitted a note by Mr. Balfour of an informal meeting held in Paris on July 3, 1919, between the heads of the American, British, French and Italian delegations at which general questions affecting Italian policy and interests were discussed. At this meeting the question of Italian intentions in the Caucasus was briefly raised by Mr. Balfour and answered by Signor Tittoni in the sense here indicated. (For the text of Mr. Balfour's note of this meeting see Vol. IV, Chap. I.)

² The Italian Ambassador called on Sir R. Graham at the Foreign Office on August 1 and, according to a minute of that date by the latter, referred to Lord Curzon's request 'for a definite statement as to whether or not the Italian Government intended to despatch Italian forces to the Caucasus. The Marquis Imperiali had consulted Signor Tittoni, and was authorised to state in reply that the Italian Government had definitely abandoned any such intention. They had, however, at the present moment a Military Mission in Georgia and Azerbaijan. In view of the important economic future of the Caucasus and the possibilities for Italian commercial activities in that region, the Italian Government did not intend to withdraw this Mission and they might even develop it to a certain extent but only from the commercial point of view.'

SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 OKTYABR 1919

No. 820

Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received October 20)
No. 689 Telegraphic [143404/1015/58]

TEHRAN, October 19, 1919

My telegram No. 676.¹

Russian Chargé d'Affaires called to-day having heard that Persian Government were contemplating recognising in some form Government of Azerbaijan. I told him position as (? reported) to you in my telegram above-mentioned; and he earnestly expressed hope that we should adhere to advice previously given on the ground that reception of an Azerbaijan agent here would make position of his Legation extremely difficult.

He said he believed Persian reports of ill-treatment of Persian subjects by Azerbaijan Government were overdrawn and in any case if Persia was seen to be coerced by such maltreatment into complying with Azerbaijan demands it would be easy for Denikin to follow suit and obtain compliance with his demands on Persian Government by adopting unfriendly attitude towards Persians within his reach. I hardly know what to recommend but think that I should acquaint you with Russian representations.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of October 10, 1919 (received October 11) Sir P. Cox had reported that 'Persian Government again asks advice as to expediency of their receiving a representative of Azerbaijan Government of Baku at Teheran. They are placed in a difficult position in the matter. Owing to their refusal to give recognition to said Government Persian subjects and interests are receiving short shrift at Baku and elsewhere and Azerbaijan is (it appears) more or less openly encouraging rebellious Persian subjects such as Jungalis and Shahsevends.'

SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

No. 821

Sir P. Cox (Tehran) to Earl Curzon (Received November 24)
No. 169 [154949/150/34]

TEHRAN, October 21, 1919

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose the translation of an extract from a Caucasian newspaper which reached the Persian Government, and was shown to me unofficially by the latter.

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SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

It purports to be a declaration, signed by Chicherin, of the Russian Soviet Government's policy towards Persia, reaffirming the intention to abrogate all Russian treaties or other agreements which encroached upon Persia's rights and declaring that the Soviet Government refused to recognise the validity of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9th last.

I have, &c.

P. Z. Cox

ENCLOSURE IN No. 821

Translation of an extract from an Azerbaijan Newspaper

One of the first and firmest opinions of the Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry has been to declare that all nations, weak and strong, independent, or forced to be under other Powers, must be free and must not be under foreign influence, and no Government should bring them under its own authority by force.

My colleague, Trotski, in his note of January 14th, 1918,¹ declared to the Persian nation the abrogation of all secret treaties between Russia and Great Britain and other Powers violating the rights of Persia.

The Russian nation will return to Persia whatever has been taken from her by the Imperial Russian generals. The Persian Government has, on the other side, declared all such treaties null and void.

Under these circumstances we expected Persia to have a new political life and to put an end to the oppression of savage foreigners.

Now that the victorious, but cruel, English are strangling Persia and want to bring her under their yoke the Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry most emphatically declares that it will not recognise the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which will lead to the slavery of Persians. Russian labour considers the Persian labourers as their sincere friends and brothers and that they must share its liberty.

The Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry regards that weak agreement as a scrap of paper having no legal validity. The agreement shows that the Persian statesmen have sold themselves and the independence of their nation to the oppressive English.

We have cancelled all the guarantees which the Persian Government, under pressure, had undertaken towards the Russian Imperialism. Henceforth the Russian Government will not interfere in Persian affairs. The delimitation of the Russo-Persian frontier will be in accordance with the liberty of the local inhabitants. The Caspian Sea has been cleared of the formidable ships of English Imperialism and commercial ships, under Persian flags, will sail on that sea with full liberty. All Government privileges will be abolished. The extra-territorial rights will be abolished, the Banque d'Escompte in Persia, railways, roads, buildings, harbour administrations, telegraphs, and telephones will be handed over to Persia. All

¹ A text of this note is printed in the War Office publication, *Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, Series 5, No. 76, p. 748.

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LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

Russian administrations and arrangements which may interfere with the domestic affairs of Persia will be abolished and cancelled.

CHECHERIN, *Foreign Commissioner*.
NARIM[AN]OF, *Commissioner of the Muslem Affairs of the South-East*.²

² Cf. Volume III, No. 453.

No. 822

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)

No. 229 [144505/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 21, 1919

Sir,

At a recent interview with me, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs¹ expressed the following views with regard to certain minor aspects of the Persian situation, which in its general bearings we had so often discussed together.

He was a good deal concerned at the attitude that had been taken up by Colonel Starosselski, the Commanding Officer of the Cossack brigade in Tehran. This officer was an openly avowed supporter of the old Russian régime in Persia; he would gladly ally himself with any force that was likely to bring back Russian predominance in that country; and he could not be expected to welcome any such arrangement as that which had recently been concluded between the British and Persian Governments. Indeed, the conversations which had already been reported to us showed what a serious menace he might become. At the same time, the Minister and his colleagues were faced with this difficulty, that the Shah placed great reliance upon Colonel Starosselski, whose force he looked upon—as in a sense it actually was—as a personal bodyguard, securing and protecting his throne. Colonel Starosselski was also a pleasant man, and he had rendered himself personally agreeable to the Sovereign. His Highness thought that, as long as the Colonel remained in command of the brigade, and could at any time collect its forces, he would be a potential danger to the stability of Persia. He informed me, therefore, that his colleagues and he were seriously discussing the question of terminating the employment of Colonel Starosselski on their own account—which they could easily do—and of keeping the brigade split up in relatively small units, so that there would be no chance of an unfriendly combination.

I did not express any view as to the wisdom of this policy, which was one for the Persian Government rather than for ourselves. I asked if, in the absence of the Shah, they would be able to carry it out without difficulty, and the Minister seemed to have no hesitation in replying in the affirmative. Personally, I should be glad to see the disappearance of this Russian element, both because it is an absurd anomaly that the British Government should have continued for years to pay, and should now be paying, for a force upon the

¹ The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs had recently returned to London.

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LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

loyalty of which we cannot count, and because the danger anticipated by Nosret-ed-Dowleh is one which I could not ignore.

The second point raised by the Foreign Minister was the question whether, in the interval before the creation and arming of the new uniform Persian force, we could supply a number of arms and aeroplanes from Mesopotamia or elsewhere to the already existing Persian gendarmerie in the north of Persia, with a view to the protection of the north-west frontier.

This, I said, seemed a not unreasonable request, and I would make enquiries about it.

Thirdly, the Minister spoke to me about the large number of Russian representatives and agents still in Persia, even at the Russian Legation in Tehran, who were, he believed, by an aggravation of the anomaly already described, paid for by Great Britain. By what Government these persons were accredited, or whom they represented, he was at a loss to know. He supposed that they would claim authority from M. Sazonof, who was a sort of self-constituted Foreign Minister to Koltchak, Denikin, and company. Whether this was so or not, the Minister thought their presence in his country both an anomaly and a burden; and his Government were inclined to get rid of them as quickly as they could.

In the fourth place he mentioned the overtures that had recently been made to his Government by the Azerbaijan Government, and argued that it was worth while entering into relations with them,² in order to stop the movement, which might otherwise become a serious danger, for the incorporation of Persian Azerbaijan with the Azerbaijan across the border. This was the object for which the Turks were striving, and the Pan-Turanian idea was one which appealed to many. He felt that the north-western provinces of Persia might be seriously imperilled by this sort of propaganda, and the Persian Government were anxious to arrest it by every means in their power.

I had not sufficient information about the position and prospects of the Azerbaijan Government to offer any remarks upon this proposal.

Lastly, the Minister, with marked trepidation, opened to me the question of the possible grant of the Garter to the Shah on the occasion of his approaching visit to this country. He argued that the Shah, whose grandfather and great-grandfather had received the same decoration, would be placed in an invidious and humiliating position if he were not similarly honoured, particularly on the morrow of the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. It would hardly be worth his while to visit this country if the Order were not to be bestowed, and the Minister's own position would be gravely jeopardised if he did not succeed in procuring the Garter for his Sovereign.

I said that the bestowal of this Order was not a matter for me or for any Department of the Government. It involved the prerogative of the Sovereign, and I had no right to express a definite opinion upon the matter without knowing what views were likely to be entertained at the Court. I felt, however, that the Minister was hardly well-advised in putting the case in the way he had, and he must not be surprised if objections were entertained

² Cf. No. 820, note 1.

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LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
21 OKTYABR 1919

which it might not be easy to overcome. For instance, I said the two previous Shahs who had received this honour had, as he knew, received it only after considerable difficulty. They were men in the prime of life, one at least of whom was a great Sovereign, and had been for many years upon the throne. The feeling was strong in some quarters that the Garter was a decoration that should be as far as possible confined to Christian monarchs, and if this rule had on occasions been departed from it was only because a justification was found in the special conditions of the cases concerned. The present Shah was a young man, only 21 years of age, who had attained to the throne by the accident of the expulsion of his father. He had not yet had an opportunity of showing the metal of which he was made. This was his first visit to Europe; the ink was barely dry upon the agreement which had just been concluded between us; and it seemed to me a rather strong order if His Majesty expected in these circumstances that he should receive as a matter of right the honour which had on previous occasions been conferred only in such different circumstances.

I went on to say that I thought the position might very well be taken that it would be more appropriate to raise the question of this decoration when the Shah again visited these shores, when the Anglo-Persian Agreement had justified itself by its success, and when the Shah had had the opportunity, by his conduct on his return to Persia, of showing that he was loyal to the agreement and had by his action contributed to its success. None of these conditions existed at the present moment, and although I was speaking for myself only in making these observations, I felt that it was only right to point out to his Highness that the road might not be altogether smooth.¹

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

¹ In Tehran telegram No. 694 of October 23, 1919 (received October 24) Sir P. Cox stated: 'Prime Minister hears from M.F.A. that question of conferring certain high order on the Shah is under consideration in high quarters. He fully recognises difficulty of problem regarded from other cogent points of view but begs me to say on his behalf that grant or non grant will probably have considerable permanent influence on Shah's future line of conduct and in the interests of our joint policy he much hopes that if it is at all possible Your Lordship will support the idea.'

CƏNAB BALFORUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
26 MAY 1919

Document 2

His Excellency M. Lozynsky,
37, rue la Pérouse, Paris.

May 26, 1919

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 24th May, and in reply thereto to state that the question of the establishment of an armistice on the Polish-Ukrainian front is now in the hands of the Council of the Principal and Allied Powers. As the draft armistice proposed by the Armistice Commission has not been accepted by the Poles, the mandate of the Commission is at an end, and the matter has been referred to the Council for such action as they deem fit under the circumstances. In view of the above, I cannot see the advantage of an interview, nor do I think such interview would at the present time be advisable.

I am, however, doing my best to attain the much-desired cessation of hostilities.

Yours faithfully,
L. BOTHA

No. 228

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received May 27)

No. 813 [79984/1015/58]

PARIS, May 26, 1919

My Lord,

M. Toptchibaschef, President of the Azerbaijan Delegation to the Peace Conference, and M. Jalinsky, a Minister in the present Azerbaijan Government, and a member of the delegation, called on Sir Louis Mallet¹ on the 23rd May, bringing with them M. Sakarof as interpreter.

2. They stated that they would submit a detailed statement of their desiderata in due course to the Conference and to this delegation. Their territorial desiderata appeared to comprise the two Russian departments of Elisabetopol and Baku. They asked whether His Majesty's Government would support their claim for a recognition of their independence, and whether there was any possibility of His Majesty's Government accepting a mandate for Azerbaijan. No hope was held out in the latter direction, and they were informed that their claim for a recognition of their independence and the question of mandates were not matters which concerned His Majesty's Government alone, but must be decided by the Conference. It was impossible to say when or in what manner, however, the question of the Caucasus was likely to be discussed by the Conference.

3. In reply to an enquiry as to their relations with the rest of Russia, M. Toptchibaschef stated that they did not expect a stable Government to be established in Russia for some time, but that they were prepared to await the march of events, and in the meanwhile hoped that the four separate

¹ An Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and member of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference.

CƏNAB BALFORUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
26 MAY 1919

Governments in the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan) might form some kind of confederation on the lines of that formed in 1917 and destroyed by the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus.

4. In the course of further conversation the delegates emphasised their intention of dealing fairly with any racial minorities which might be left within the boundaries of their future State, and pointed out in this connection that, when they left Azerbaijan, the Armenians were represented in the Azerbaijan Government by three Ministers and twenty members of the Assembly.

5. In conclusion, M. Toptchibaschef paid a special tribute to General Thomson¹ and the British military authorities, with whom the Azerbaijan Government had excellent relations, and from whom they had received advice and assistance. M. Toptchibaschef said that they had heard rumours of the departure of General Thomson and the withdrawal of the British troops, both of which possibilities they viewed with great misgivings.

6. The delegation intend shortly to visit London and to call at the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.,
(For Mr. Balfour)
LOUIS MALLET

¹ General in command of British forces in the Caucasus until May 1919.

No. 229

Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon (Received June 5)
No. 896 [84429/11067/58]

PARIS, June 4, 1919

Mr. Balfour presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copy of the undermentioned paper.

Name and Date.

Subject.

To Italian Delegation. May 26th. British evacuation of Georgia.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 229

The British Delegation at the Peace Conference to the Italian Delegation

PARIS, May 26, 1919

1. The Secretary to the British Delegation to the Peace Conference presents his compliments to the Secretary to the Italian Delegation to the Peace Conference and begs to refer to the decision taken at the meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles on April 9th that Italian troops should replace the British troops now maintaining order in the Trans-Caucasian countries.¹

¹ For the background to this decision, cf. the records of the Council of Four printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. V, pp. 4 and 467-8.

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CƏNAB BALFORUN CƏNAB LLOYD CORCA MƏKTUBU
9 AVQUST 1919

No. 364

Letter from Mr. Balfour (Paris) to Mr. Lloyd George
No. G. T. 7949 [Confidential/General/229/4]

PARIS, August 9, 1919

My dear Prime Minister,

I am concerned about the situation in the Caucasus. Evidence is reaching us from every quarter that the withdrawal of British troops will be followed by the most appalling massacre of the Armenians and general bloodshed throughout the Caucasus. I am entirely in favour of the policy of withdrawal. In fact I think it is essential from every point of view. But I confess that I do not like to look forward to the day when it will be said that while they had the fullest warning beforehand, the British precipitated a massacre of Armenians by deliberately withdrawing their troops in the face of the advice of all local authorities as to the probable consequences. Coming on the top of the withdrawal from Archangel I do not think it will make a very pretty story.

There is only one way out and that is that America should take charge. It is right that she should do this because she has always professed interest in Armenia, and always given the Council the impression that she intended to take a mandate for that country. But I am quite certain that she will not do anything so long as we are prepared to carry the burden ourselves. On the other hand, I do not think it is a good plan that she should be induced to go in through a massacre precipitated by a British withdrawal, unless she has been given the opportunity to save the situation herself and has refused it.

I should like, therefore, to be able to say to Mr. Polk¹ on behalf of the British Government that we are just as much concerned as are the Americans about the possible consequences to Armenia and the Caucasus from a withdrawal of British troops, but that for various reasons it is quite impossible for the British troops to remain; that our intention of leaving was made known to the '4' as far back as March and April; that if the Americans are prepared to undertake to find the necessary officers and men to protect the Armenians by the 30th September the British Government will allow its troops to remain there until that date; but that if America cannot relieve the situation by that time there is nothing for it but for the withdrawal to proceed as from August 15th.

Obviously, however, I cannot make this statement to Polk without your authority, because it involves the retention of British troops in the Caucasus

¹ Representative of the United States on the Supreme Council.

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9 AVQUST 1919

a further six weeks, and I appreciate fully the objections to this course. I am most reluctant to recommend it. But I think the consequences of a general massacre precipitated by our withdrawal must inevitably be more serious than any that can follow a further delay of six weeks in evacuation. Moreover, I understand, that if the British withdrawal begins on August 15th will not be completed till October 8th. If that is so the Americans ought to be able to move in gradually, thus only involving a comparatively short prolongation of our stay.

As usual it is the Italians who have got us into this mess. Ever since April they have said they were going to the Caucasus, and now they say they cannot. But, if as a result, we can secure the Americans in their place, we shall have made a good exchange. I am sending a copy of this to Curzon.

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

No. 365

Mr. Hoare (Archangel) to Earl Curzon (Received August 11)
No. 520 Telegraphic [114718/3669/38]

ARCHANGEL, August 10, 1919

My telegram No. 506.¹

Throughout the past week Government have been in consultation with a small committee representing all parties in Zemstvo and municipality who have laid aside party differences. Committee have no real illusions as to possibility of raising moral to a point which would render it possible to hold Archangel district after we have gone but they hope to accomplish something to facilitate orderly evacuation and strengthen the position on Murmansk front should it be decided to hold out there. I am encouraging them to work on these lines. They have asked whether there is any hope that British troops or military mission will after all remain. I have replied decision to evacuate all British may be regarded as final.

Today reconstruction of Government as the result of recommendations of Committee is announced. Three unpopular Ministers resign and the Mayor who has good reputation becomes Minister of the Interior while representative of the Town Councils and Zemstvos respectively is to be included in Government, they will be selected at meeting of these bodies with Government on August 12th . . .² convince public opinion that Government is on real democratic basis are that Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs drops title and functions of Governor General and that Director of Labour is appointed.

These measures may have good effect in calming the town population but things have gone so far in the Army that it is difficult to believe anything short of announcement that British troops will remain here would restore moral.

I have perhaps failed in the past to establish sufficiently close touch with Socialist opinion here but I now realize as I did not before the full effect of

¹ See No. 349, note 2.² The text here is uncertain.LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB LİNDSEYƏ MƏKTUBU
11 AVQUST 1919

initial mistakes made by (? General Poole).³ His conduct of affairs neutralized for many months the work done by Mr. Lindley and the present General Officer Commanding and it is only in the present extreme that Socialists have finally realised that we have endeavoured to live up to our professions as regards internal politics. Though they appreciate in a measure the reasons which have decided us to evacuate they will always hold the opinion that had these initial mistakes not been made reasons for evacuation would not have arisen. Every conversation with Socialists comes back at one time or another to Chaplin episode.⁴

It may be now in some respects outside my province but I trust His Majesty's Government will not exclude the possibility of maintaining a strong mission at Murmansk to support the Russians should they endeavour to maintain themselves on that front. Appeals for support are about to be sent to the Prime Minister, French President of the Council and President Wilson direct by Zemstvo and Municipalities while Socialist organisations will send similar messages to Labour organisations in Allied countries. It is further intended to send deputation representing Bourgeois and various Socialist parties to Great Britain at an early date.

³ Former British G.O.C. North Russian Expeditionary Force.⁴ For this episode, which concerned a local and temporary *comp d'état* effected at Archangel on September 5-6, 1918, against the social-revolutionary government of M. Tchekovskiy, cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928: Russia*, vol. ii, p. 521 L

No. 366

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)
No. 459 [115267/512/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 11, 1919

Sir,

The American Ambassador called upon me at his own request this afternoon in order to enquire about the position in the Caucasus.

By a fortunate coincidence, there had arrived only twenty-four hours before a letter from Mr. Balfour,¹ in Paris, in which, anticipating the massacres that were almost universally prophesied as certain to follow our contemplated evacuation of the Caucasian regions, he had suggested that, while our troops were being withdrawn, an attempt should be made to interest the American Government as the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce the American Government to send military forces to take the place of ours.

I accordingly explained the situation with complete frankness to Mr. Davis; told him the circumstances in which we had decided to withdraw our troops; explained the stage which arrangements for withdrawal had already reached; referred to the abortive attempt to introduce the Italians on to the scene, and

¹ No. 364.

LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB LİNDSEYƏ MƏKTUBU
11 AVQUST 1919

confirmed Mr. Balfour's apprehensions as to the local consequences that might be expected to follow the departure of our troops.

I then asked the Ambassador these questions: Did he think that the American Government were at all likely to entertain such a request if it was made to them? Had they the troops available in Europe or elsewhere who could be used for the purpose? Was it likely that Congress would be willing to accept a mandate for Armenia or any other portion, larger or smaller, of the Turkish Empire? If so, what was the earliest date at which such a decision might conceivably be reached? If the American Government decided to assume responsibility for Armenia, was it probable that they would extend their interest to the Caucasus as well?

The Ambassador was very careful to explain in reply that he could not speak authoritatively or officially for his Government on any of these matters. In so far, however, as he was entitled to express an *a priori* opinion, he had very little difficulty in doing so. In the first place, he said that the Americans now had only 100,000 troops remaining in Europe, the bulk of whom were under orders to return to their country, and any of whom it would be impossible, in existing conditions, to move to the Caucasus. Indeed, any despatch of American troops to that region could not be attempted without the knowledge and consent of Congress. As regards the larger question of a mandate, although he was aware that, on humanitarian and philanthropic grounds, the American people were deeply interested in Armenia, yet he personally did not believe that these considerations would induce his country to depart from the twofold traditional basis of its foreign policy, namely, (a) the refusal to be entangled in foreign alliances or commitments; (b) a strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover as soon as the American public began to realise—which they probably did not at present—the inherent difficulties, political, ethnographical, physical, and otherwise, of the Armenian problem, he felt very doubtful whether philanthropy would survive in the contest with expediency. As to an American mandate for Constantinople or any other portion of the Turkish Empire, while it was conceivable that the American nation might be attracted by such an idea, here again, expressing his personal opinion, he did not believe that, in the last resort, it would take effect.

Summing up the situation, therefore, the Ambassador said that, while he saw no reason why the request suggested by Mr. Balfour should not be made to the American Government if we wished to make it, he did not anticipate that it would be attended by any practical results.

In reply to further questions which I put to him, he informed me that he did not think it probable that the American decision on the mandatory question would be reached in a period of less than three months from now.

With this very uncertain and rather disquieting forecast of events, which promised little relief from our impending anxieties in respect of the situation in the Caucasus and of the position in Asiatic Turkey in general, the American Ambassador took his leave.

I am, &c.,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA TELEQRAMI
2 OKTYABR 1919

No. 451

Viscount Grey¹ (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received October 3)
No. 1407 Telegraphic [136709/11157]

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1919

Secretary of State informed me yesterday that one American soldier had been killed and (? non-commissioned officers and men) flogged at Vladivostok by Russian General Rozanoff² who was violently anti-Ally though making exception in favour of (? Japan). Secretary of State considered attitude of Japanese in this matter very unsatisfactory and expressed great concern at seriousness of situation which made it very difficult for United States Government to get supplies through to Koltchak and increased pressure on United States Government to withdraw from Siberia.

I said I knew nothing of the circumstances and I am only repeating language of Secretary of State for Your Lordship's information.

Repeated to Canada by post.³

¹ H.M. Ambassador in Washington.

² In a telegram of September 30 (Vladivostok No. 804; received October 3) Mr. O'Reilly had reported that 'outrage reported in my telegram 786 [No. 443] has been followed during last week by two cases of shooting of an American and a Czech soldier (? respectively by) Russian officers on slightest provocation'. Mr. O'Reilly further reported upon the joint action with regard to these incidents taken by the Allied Military Representatives in Vladivostok, for which see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: Russia*, p. 521 f.

³ In reply to this telegram Lord Curzon telegraphed to Lord Grey on October 11, 1919 (tel. No. 1853 to Washington): 'Our reports indicate that some misunderstanding regarding Rozanoff's part in the dispute seems to have arisen, but Japanese do not appear to be especially concerned. I continue to hope earnestly that the United States will leave their troops in Siberia.'

No. 452

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 28 Telegraphic [136702/1015158]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 2, 1919

Your telegram No. 29.¹

It is most important that at this moment when Denikin's progress against the Bolsheviks promises great success he should not be hampered by fear of

¹ Not printed. Cf. No. 454.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI

2 OKTYABR 1919

attack in the rear. Defeat of Bolshevism, even if we do not take active part in operations, is interest of this country.

You should therefore do all in your power to prevent Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments from taking any unfriendly action themselves against Denikin or encouraging such action in Daghestan, where insurrection financed and led by Bolsheviks is reported to be spreading.

No. 453

*Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 4)**No. 50 Telegraphic [137269/1015/58]*

TIFLIS, October 2, 1919

During my conversation with M. Jasarof at Baku, Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 29th September, he told me Azerbaijan Government was being vigorously attacked for not doing something to help Daghestan, but Mahommedans' appeal from that region for help had been sternly refused.

Ittihad Party, which has been one of progressive international parties, and is really affiliated to Turkish Committee of Union and Progress, is trying to rouse public opinion.

2. Bolsheviks are turning most of their attention to Central Asia, and, if they are driven out of Moscow, will make Tashkend their headquarters.

3. Tchitcherin has as his assistant a Baku doctor, Narimanof, who wrote from Astrakhan to Azerbaijan Government urging them to join Persian and Indian efforts in a great movement against England. Dr. Narimanof pointed out there was no desire on the part of Bolsheviks to impose on Mussulman countries Soviet form of government; only necessity was an anti-British policy.

4. 'To this I may add that Prime Minister, when I was at his house,'

¹ In a telegram of even date (Tiflis No. 49: received October 4) Mr. Wardrop communicated some 'notes of conversation with M. Umubbekof, Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, on the 28th September'. These notes included the following: 'Azerbaijan is most anxious to come to arrangement with General Denikin, and Umubbekof went to Tiflis to persuade Georgians, but Denikin is not so well disposed to latter as to Azerbaijan, where (for mixed motives) he allows Russian officers to serve in army. It makes matters difficult that Denikin has no properly accredited agents in Transcaucasia. Denikinist and Bolshevik rule are equally repugnant to Azerbaijan, and their administration is almost equally bad. . . . At present Transcaucasia is like tail of Russian dog, and whenever things happen in Russia—successes or reverses of Denikin, Kolchak and Trousky, the wretched tail is wagged. Azerbaijan only wants peace, and has no wish to embark on pan-Islamic-pan-Turk policies. All Transcaucasia looks above all to Great Britain for such moral and material assistance as may be possible in creation of an independent life, and is willing to do all she can to merit confidence and favour of His Majesty's Government. Italians, who came here on a mission, made a very bad impression by their greed for concessions and commercial advantages. (There is a rumour that they have secured contract to construct railway from Abat, near Baku, to Djulfä.) . . . I may add I have formed a high opinion of M. Umubbekof's sincerity and of his ability to control policy of his country. Relations I have established with him are promising for the future.'

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showed me a letter in Russian and Turkish just sent to him by Tashkend Soviet exactly to same effect as Dr. Narimanof's letter. Tashkend message was carried in the double bottom of a teapot by an Erivan Tartar, who was forced to do this in return for permission to leave Tashkend.

5. M. Jasarof seems very anxious to attract British experts of all kinds to help him by organising country. My own opinion is that, if we could spare good men, it might be well to gratify this wish; such experts would only be responsible to head of State for advice on such matters as finance, railways, education, and any use of word 'control' would be inexpedient. I may mention that our acting vice-consul, Mr. Hewelcke, who is manager of Russian State Bank at Baku, was offered 1,000,000 roubles down and a very large salary to enter service of Government, and a similar offer was made to Major Anderson as a railway expert.

No. 454

*Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 7)**No. 57 Telegraphic [137986/1015/58]*

TIFLIS, October 4, 1919

Urgent. Your Lordship's telegram No. 28.¹

My telegram No. 29 (? refer)s to patrolling of railway near Batoum so reference must be to some other telegram of mine.

Statement that movement in Daghestan is financed and led by Bolsheviks is not (? confirm)ed by my (? information) but it is possible that mountaineers would accept help from any source. Denikinists use the word 'Bolshevik stipendiary' as a term of abuse to describe all with whom they disagree.

I never miss an opportunity of impressing on Georgians and Azerbaijanians absolute necessity of (? avoid)ing any unfriendly act against Denikin, and Governments of those countries detest Bolshevism and know that they personally would be (? overcome) at once if Bolsheviks had power.

So far as I understand situation in Daghestan trouble is due to oppressive conduct of Denikin's local officers and presence of Cosack settlers and absence of educated leaders.

Rumours of despatch of aid to Daghestan by Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments seem to me unfounded and malicious and have already been officially (? contradict)ed by both Governments.

I have to-day again verbally told Azerbaijan representative that any encouragement or aid given to Daghestan would be very seriously viewed by His Majesty's Government and I hope to make a similar communication to Georgian Government this evening.

¹ No. 452.

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No. 455

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 29 Telegraphic [131980/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, October 4, 1919

Proposed recognition of Transcaucasian Republics.

Your telegram No. 20¹ of 19th September.

The exact measure of recognition that could properly or safely be accorded to the Transcaucasian republics pending the final settlement of their status by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations is exceedingly difficult to determine, and your proposal that provisional recognition of *de facto* Governments should be accompanied by an assurance that acts of republics will not be disavowed would be tantamount to a *de jure* recognition that would prejudice that settlement, whenever or in whatever form it is ultimately arrived at.

Following are some of the further difficulties with which I am faced:—

1. Your arguments for recognition appear to apply to Georgia alone, while your conclusion is apparently for the recognition of all the republics. Am I to understand that, while recognition of Georgia is in itself alone desirable, recognition of Armenia and Azerbaijan must necessarily follow from it and synchronise with it? And what is then to be done with Daghestan?

2. I am quite in the dark as to what recognition will involve. It is easy to act independently if action is negative, as in the case of the Baltic States, but more difficult and perilous if we are to undertake obligations alone.

3. The internecine struggles of the republics themselves and the fact that their respective frontiers have not been even approximately settled, suggest that recognition might only be the incentive to increased disorders. If the Caucasus States would again form a federation or act together, or conjointly appeal to us or to the Allied Powers to act, it might be easier to deal with the case.

4. The problem of the relations of the republics to Denikin overshadows all the rest. I am constantly assured that Georgia and Azerbaijan are actively supporting the enemies of Denikin beyond their own frontiers, e.g., in Daghestan, and that although they may not have sympathy politically with the Bolsheviks, they are working hand-in-glove with them for Denikin's overthrow. Colour is of course lent to this by the agreement recently concluded between the two republics. Doubt is thrown on its purely defensive character, and evidence of active co-operation with Denikin's enemies is being constantly produced. Unless the republics are able to prove that these accusations are without foundation, and to give some concrete evidence of a desire to reach a friendly arrangement with Denikin, I do not see how it is possible in present circumstances to take any action on their behalf. We cannot afford to have Denikin's whole plan of campaign upset by intrigues in

¹ No. 435.

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his rear, nor can we, in order to defeat German schemes in the Caucasus, risk a wholesale defection to Germany of the greater anti-Bolshevik Russia which Denikin represents.

We have recently addressed a message to the Baltic States² pointing out that we have already recognised them as autonomous States and have dealt with them as such. We have told them that the question of *de jure* recognition of their independence is one which the Peace Conference, or the League of Nations sitting as sequel to the Peace Conference, is alone competent to decide, and have added that in any such decision His Majesty's Government may be relied upon to exert such influence as they may possess to secure the satisfaction of their legitimate aspirations so far as may be consistent with a final and peaceful settlement in North-East Europe.

Our [? But]³ Baltic States are acting together, and may even decide, in co-operation, to come to some arrangement with the Russian Soviet Government. In Caucasia it is not easy at present to discover any similar community either of interest or action.

I shall be glad of your views on all these aspects of the case.

¹ No. 445.

² The text here is uncertain.

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No. 562

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 25)
No. 1653 Telegraphic [155446/9/198]*

COPENHAGEN, November 25, 1919

Following from Mr. O'Grady:—

Litvinof arrived Copenhagen to-day. Met him at landing stage. Had interesting conversation with him on way to hotel. Meeting at 3 o'clock to-day to commence business of our mission.

Litvinof is accompanied only by two ladies, secretaries speak English fluently, so that whole business of Commission will be carried on in our language.

No. 563

*Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen) to Earl Curzon (Received November 26)
No. 1657 Telegraphic [155487/9/198]*

COPENHAGEN, November 25, 1919

Litvinof states that all military, naval and air force prisoners are now in Moscow.

Immediately before he left Russia he visited places where they live and saw representatives, including Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant Bremner. They are all well in health except in so far as some of wounded need special surgical attendance.

Litvinof has promised to send wireless messages to Moscow and Petrograd asking for names of civilian residents and state of their health.

This report will be forwarded to you at once. Think general purport of this telegram will ease public anxiety and suggest publication by you.¹

Above is from Mr. O'Grady.

¹ This suggestion was adopted and the substance of the present telegram was published in *The Times* on November 29, 1919.

No. 564

*Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received November 27)
No. 158 Telegraphic [156102/1015/58]*

TIFLIS, November 25, 1919

Prime Minister of Azerbaijan before leaving for Baku today spent about an hour with me privately, and thanked me for my initiative in (? suggesting meeting with Prime Minister of Armenia and for action generally in bringing about agreement communicated to Your Lordship in my telegram No. 156 [156],¹ paragraph 1.

¹ Not printed. This telegram of November 24, 1919 (received November 26), transmitted the text of an agreement signed at Tiflis on November 23 by the Prime Ministers of Armenia and of Azerbaijan. By this agreement the governments of the two states in question undertook, in particular, to cease hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms. A conference

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He said he knew your Lordship would always give a personal sympathetic hearing to any just claims by Azerbaijan and on his part His Excellency would be glad to use any influence he might have in Turkestan and Turkey to combat anti-British activities; he believed he might be of some use in this way if he had some general indication of British policy, but he was uneasy at reports of friction between Allies. I assured him that such reports could have little foundation; he had seen how I worked in complete harmony with Americans; he knew France and Great Britain were united by closest bonds of interest and affection; Italy was showing an extraordinary interest in Trans-Caucasian affairs, and seemed likely to out-distance other Allies in her exhibition of sympathy.

Mindful of your Lordship's telegram No. 78: I took the opportunity to ask who had offered arms and munitions of war to Azerbaijan. Prime Minister said offer was made by Colonel Gabba head of Italian Mission on behalf of Italian Government.

I returned to question of Nuri (see my telegram No. (?) 137¹ and your telegram No. 69²) and said his presence in Azerbaijan would not do that country any good. Prime Minister agreed and said he would again invite him to leave but thought he could do no great harm in Azerbaijan where his movements were controlled while in Turkestan or Daghestan for instance he might be troublesome.

Turkey was the best place (? for) him but it was difficult to send him there: I said I thought I could help him in this if he really wished to get rid of Nuri. The matter was then dropped, but I have asked (? Colonel Stokes) to take it up again on first opportunity.

Yesterday agreement was signed by Colonel Rhea as a witness and he describes himself as acting Allied High Commissioner.³ I do not know how far this might be construed as a formal recognition of all these Republics, for M. Gegechkori also signed as witness and as Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At a banquet last night to celebrate signature speakers insisted that Trans-Caucasus had now staked everything on Western Powers especially Great Britain and America, to whom they looked for sympathy and if necessary protection and where they would seek guidance in diplomacy, commerce, industry and education. Prime Minister of Azerbaijan said that now he had heard Armenian Prime Minister publicly declare Armenia really desired her independence his mind was at rest; all the strife and bloodshed between the

of Armenian and Azerbaijan delegates was to meet on November 26 in order to discuss outstanding questions under dispute, with authority to settle all such questions by agreement or arbitration.

¹ This telegram of November 11, 1919, to Tiflis reported that 'Italian Government deny officially that they are engaged in any transaction for supply of arms to Georgia and Azerbaijan and do not believe that private Italian firms are busy in that direction. Italian Government are bound by Arms Traffic Convention Protocol not to supply arms to Trans-Caucasia.'

² No. 544.

³ See No. 544, note 1.

⁴ Colonel Rhea of the United States Army was acting for Colonel Haskell.

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SER C. TILLEYİN CƏNAB DE FLÜRAYA TELEQRAMI
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two (? nation)s had been due to politicians and not to peoples who had lived one thousand years as good neighbours. Other speakers said this isthmus must not become a new Balkan Peninsula, and the only way to prevent this was by a strong confederation with wide autonomy.

Active measures are being taken to lay foundations at an early date of a strong (? Trans)Caucasian confederation.

No. 565

Sir J. Tilley to M. de Fleuriau
[148722/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 26, 1919

Dear Monsieur de Fleuriau,

The present position at Batoum¹ is that the withdrawal of the British troops has been temporarily postponed owing to the disorders that would be certain to follow upon immediate evacuation. The status of Batoum after evacuation will no doubt be determined by the Peace Conference.

Yours etc.,

J. A. C. TILLEY

¹ See No. 518. In an interim reply of November 10, 1919, to this French memorandum of November 4, Sir J. Tilley had informed M. de Fleuriau that Batoum 'is, as you know, at present in the temporary occupation of a small British garrison. It would no doubt be rather difficult to discuss its future apart from the general question of Trans-Caucasia. But we should like to know what your Government have in mind in making the enquiry.' In a subsequent undated minute Sir J. Tilley recorded that M. de Fleuriau 'has seen Mr. Churchill's statement in the House [of Commons] and M. Cambon wants to know what is to happen when our troops leave'. In answer to a parliamentary question Mr. Churchill had stated on November 4: 'No British troops are at Baku or in any other part of the Caucasus except Batoum on the Black Sea. A brigade of British and Indian troops is temporarily remaining at Batoum at the request of the Foreign Office to prevent serious local disorders occurring at this particular moment.' Cf. *Parl. Debs. 5th Series. House of Commons*, vol. CCX, col. 1290.

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No. 483

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 22)
No. 81 Telegraphic [144528/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 20, 1919

Your Lordship's telegram No. 29¹ of the 4th October arrived here mutilated on the 14th October and was not delivered to me until my return from Armenia this morning.

1. Arguments for recognition of Georgia are stronger juridically, politically and economically than those for other republics, so I laid greater stress on that side of the question, but I am of opinion that Armenia and Azerbaijan should at the same time be recognised and that Daghestan should be placed under British or Allied control with a view to its final independence. This barrier against Russia seems to me an absolute essential for safety of our position in Persia and India.

2. Process would involve risks, but to allow Transcaucasia eventually to fall under hostile influence would be still more perilous to us as an Asiatic Power. Most desirable event for us would be that America should commit

¹ No. 455-

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herself to some course of action in this part of the world which would make our interests identical.

3. You will have learnt from preceding telegrams that I consider further internecine struggles improbable, and a very small show of force on our part would keep the peace. Republics are already seriously engaged in attempt to fix their frontiers; declared intention of various Governments is in favour of a federation.

4. Fear of Denikin, and I believe it is well founded, is disturbing element, and even qualified recognition would greatly diminish it. If evidence can be produced that republics are really actively co-operating with Denikin's enemies, I shall confront Governments concerned with that evidence. So far I have nothing but rumours like that referred to in your telegram No. 41.² Both Georgia and Azerbaijan were trying to come to a *modus vivendi* through General Baratof³ before he was wounded, and I believe an agreement would be reached without much effort. Only impediment is fear of Denikin, and this fear is even shared by Armenia if I may believe M. Khatissian.

5. I have no confidence that a victorious volunteer army would be less pro-German than Bolsheviks.

6. If some such message as His Majesty's Government have, according to penultimate paragraph of your telegram, addressed to Baltic States were issued and accompanied by a solemn assurance that His Majesty's Government would effectively show their disapproval of any aggressive action on part of Denikin, I believe this would suffice for the present. Denikin would have more ground for objecting to what has been done in case of States in immediate vicinity of Petrograd than he could possibly have in case of distant regions like this.

7. There is a general and growing desire in three republics to work together, and national interest seems to me to be greater here than in Baltic States. There is here such variety of climatic and other conditions that a national economic policy and common fear of aggression would always furnish a guarantee for harmonious action in most fields. In all three republics Governments express their strong desire for abolition of customs barriers, for united currency, for collective control of railways, posts, telegraphs, &c. They have already shown their fitness for self-government and they (with the exception of Baku for a short period when it was in the hands of foreigners) are only part of what was Russia where Bolshevism had not had any success.

8. So long as we have garrisons in Batoum and North Persia mere gendarmerie would be sufficient to preserve order here, and I hardly think that would be necessary.

9. Failing some action such as I venture to suggest, there is a risk that Azerbaijan and Daghestan may incite Turkey to come in and that Mustafa

² Not printed. This telegram of October 13, 1919, referred to a report from a 'British liaison officer at Tiflis . . . that fifty Georgian officers and two hundred o[ther] r[anks], and one armoured train manned by Bolsheviks who originally came from Vladikavkas recently left Tiflis to assist Daghestan'.

³ General Baratoff was acting as representative of General Denikin in Tiflis.

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Kemal or someone of the kind may attempt here what von der Goltz tried in the north.

10. I understand General Harbord⁴ will probably propose a mandate for whole of Turkey and Transcaucasia together. He maintains that this would involve use of much less military force. Like nearly everybody else he admits that Americans had not necessary training to manage Eastern peoples and suggests that personnel under mandate should be British. I hardly think that such a large group could be worked harmoniously, as in it there would be competing economic interests and possibility of Mussulman predominance and a pan-Islamic movement.

⁴ General Harbord of the United States Army had recently visited Tiflis in the course of a mission of investigation in the Near East.

No. 484

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received October 23)

No. 85 Telegraphic [144901/1015/58]

TIFLIS, October 20, 1919

Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanied by Monsieur Ghambashidze (Georgian Delegate in London) called on me this evening and begged me to inform Your Lordship that there was great nervousness throughout country in Parliament and in Cabinet at continued silence of Allies and more especially Great Britain on the subject of future fate of Transcaucasia.

2. There was universal belief that as soon as Moscow had fallen Denikin would attack Caucasia and it was most desirable that some encouragement should be given to peoples here without delay.

3. Georgia had already made her views known to General Cory before I arrived here and had repeated them to me (see my telegram No. 4¹ and my despatch No. 5²). She was willing to accept any reasonable terms (? we) proposed for she knew her only hope lay in us.

4. His Government would ask that at very least they should be favoured with some message such as had been given to (? Baltic) States. Even a declaration on the part of Peace Conference that Trans-Caucasian question would be treated as an international question might have pacifying effect for a time.

5. After Lord R. Cecil's sympathetic words last January to Monsieur Ghambashidze and Avalov³ they had been hoping continually for some public declaration by His Majesty's Government and they could not believe it possible that they would ever again be abandoned to Russian rule under which they had suffered (? degradation), injustice and oppression.

¹ No. 412.

² Not printed.

³ MM. Ghambashidze and Avalov, Georgian representatives then in London, had had an interview with Lord R. Cecil in January, 1919. No minute of this interview has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

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20 OKTYABR 1919

6. Nervousness was not limited to any one of republics but was common to them all. They were already settling their territorial and other questions and were working together towards federation but uncertainty of their future status had a paralyzing effect and they were oppressed by constant fear of Denikin. When once they were relieved from this fear they would work in complete harmony.

7. German and Turkish Agents are spreading rumours that His Majesty's Government has a secret agreement with Denikin that occupation of Batoum was continued by agreement with Denikin and that Great Britain is willing to hand over Trans-Caucasus as part of a federated Russia and oppose Americans who favour (? complete) independence.

(General Harbord is alleged to have declared there need be no question of a Mandate for Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan.) It is pointed out that Caspian Fleet which British (? gave) to Denikin was (? used) to destroy Mussulman quarters of Derbent and that British guns are held ready by Denikin to (? attack) Trans-Caucasus.

8. According to M. Gegechkori all this creates an intolerable situation and hinders internal and external development; he therefore (? earnestly) and repeatedly begged me to (? press) this matter and I venture to do so in the hope and belief that Your Lordship may favour me with instructions enabling me to diminish (? present) state of tension and anxiety.

9. In connection with my telegram No. 78⁴ Your Lordship will notice that M. Gegechkori said nothing to me about a mandate. I understand after Cabinet meeting on October 13th Government realized that if after all America should take mandate she might reasonably take umbrage at a preference shown against her in favour of Great Britain.

⁴ No. 473.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
10 DEKABR 1919

ENCLOSURE IN No. 599

Resolution passed unanimously by the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets on December Fifth

The Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets wishes to live in peace with all nations and to direct its efforts towards the constructive work of improving production, transport and the administration of the country on the basis of the Soviet regime. This work has been hampered and obstructed up to the present by the pressure of German Imperialism, then by the intervention of the Entente and the famine-causing blockade.

The Workers' and Peasants' Government has many times offered peace to the Entente Powers, namely: on August the fifth 1918 by a note of the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs to the American Consul General Mr. Poole, on October 24th by a note to President Wilson, on November 3rd to all the Governments of the Entente through representatives of neutral countries, on November 7th in the name of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on December 23rd by a note of citizen Litvinoff to the representatives of the Entente in Sweden, then by radiograms of January 12th and 17th 1919, by a note to the Governments of the Entente of February the 4th, by the draft scheme worked out on March the 12th in conjunction with the Delegate of President Wilson, Mr. Bullitt, and finally by the statement made on May the 7th to Mr. Nansen. Fully approving of the steps taken in this direction by the Central Executive Committee, by the Council of People's Commissaries and by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Seventh Congress of Soviets confirms once more its unalterable desire for peace and proposes once more to all the Powers of the Entente, to Great Britain, to France, to the United States of America, to Italy, to Japan jointly and to each of these separately to enter immediately into peace negotiations and instructs the Central Executive Committee, the Council of the People's Commissaries and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to continue systematically this policy of peace in taking all the necessary measures for its success.

(signed) The Chairman of the Congress
Secretary.

No. 600

*Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 17)
No. 195 Telegraphic [162698/1015/58]*

TIFLIS, December 10, 1919

In conversation 7th December, Azerbaijan Prime Minister told Colonel Stokes that Persian Prince Mirza Riza Kahn had suggested that Azerbaijan should confederate (sic) with Persia and gave impression that His Majesty's Government approved.

Prime Minister asks whether His Majesty's Government authorised or suggested or supported proposal.

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
10 DEKABR 1919

He thinks confederation with Georgia and Armenia essential, but had never thought of Persia. He considers it is possible, however, that His Majesty's Government might prefer confederation of the two States.

I have told Colonel Stokes that I presume Prince was merely expressing his personal opinion.

Addressed to Teheran, No. 7.

No. 601

Earl Curzon to Mr. Grant Watson (Copenhagen)
No. 1564 Telegraphic [157707/67181/59]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 11, 1919

Following for Mr. O'Grady:—

Your telegram No. 1690¹ of December 2.

Although the matter is of course entirely outside your province, you are authorized to give an emphatic denial to the allegation, and to say that His Majesty's Government have never interfered to prevent the Baltic States from taking such action as they consider best in their own interests.

¹ No. 582.

No. 602

Lord Acton (Helsingfors) to Earl Curzon (Received December 12)
No. 734 Telegraphic [160765/67181/59]

HELSINGFORS, December 11, 1919

My immediately preceding telegram.¹

Esthonian Minister of War informed Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs that Bolsheviks had now fifteen divisions concentrated against the three Esthonian divisions. He added there was not the slightest doubt that German staff officers were directing Soviet forces in this region. Tactics of Bolsheviks had changed and improved immensely during last month. A Russian commissary who had recently surrendered to Esthonian forces had stated he did so because he could no longer endure German-Jewish intrigues at Petrograd.

¹ Not printed. In this telegram No. 733 of even date (received December 12) Lord Acton reported on the negotiations between Soviet Russia and Esthonia at Dorpat which had started 4th December. Bolsheviks on that date announced their readiness to accept an armistice and negotiations were begun on this line. On December 6th attitude of Bolsheviks underwent a sudden change and they demanded conclusion of completion of peace. Negotiations were temporarily broken off and were resumed again, December 8th, when Bolshevik attitude proved still more menacing. At Cabinet Council held at Reval December 9th, Esthonian Government decided to send Esthonian Minister of War, Mr. Hanko, to Helsingfors to ask for advice and beg for help from Finnish Government. Hanko arrived Helsingfors, December 10th, had at once long interview with Finnish Ministers which were [sic] resumed to-day.

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LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB LİNDSEYƏ TELEQRAMI
29 AVQUST 1919

No. 406

Mr. Lindsay (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received August 29)
No. 1310 Telegraphic [122411/775/38]

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1919

Your telegram No. 1514.¹

I understand view of State Department to be that their representatives only signed Murmansk agreement *ad referendum* and stated so at time; that it was only concluded to meet emergency of moment caused by danger of a German advance to North, a danger which quickly vanished; that necessity of confirming Murmansk agreement never arose as Murmansk was (? soon) absolutely absorbed by Northern Russian Provisional Government; that they would never have regarded Murmansk agreement as applying outside very narrow limits to which it purported to apply and that it certainly did not cover far wider commitment involved in financial support to Archangel Government.

United States Government has authority from Congress to make advances only to recognized co-belligerent Governments. State Department (? consider) themselves unauthorised to lend to North Russian Government and state that they certainly would be unable to get Congress' sanction to do so.

¹ No. 345.

No. 407

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington)
No. 497 [122311/11067/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 29, 1919

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 459¹ of the 11th instant, I have to inform you that the American Ambassador called on Sir R. Graham on the afternoon of the 26th instant to speak about the evacuation of the Caucasus. Mr. Davis said that he had received an answer from the United States Government to the enquiry which he had addressed to them after his conversation with me on the 18th instant, which was embodied in my despatch to you No. 477² of that date and the letter which I had sent to him on the following day, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

This reply was, that the United States Government had no funds at their disposal from which provision could be made to defray the expenses of the continued presence of British troops in the Caucasus. To obtain such funds they would have to ask Congress for an appropriation for this purpose. In view of the present political situation in America such action would be most inopportune and injudicious and might prejudice the prospects of the Peace

¹ No. 366.

² No. 388.

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LORD KERZONUN ABŞ SƏFİRİNƏ MƏKTUBU
19 AVQUST 1919

Treaty being accepted. Nor could the American Government give any assurance whether, or at what date, they might be able to send American troops to relieve the British forces. Such an assurance would be regarded by the Senate as prejudging their ultimate decision on the question of Mandates, and would be deeply resented. Mr. Davis was, however, instructed by the United States Government to make an official appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw the British forces in the Caucasus at the present moment, as such a withdrawal must result in chaos, and in the massacre of the Christian population, and although the United States Government fully realised the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in the matter, the latter would be held responsible in the eyes of the civilised world.

Sir R. Graham said that this reply meant, in effect, that the United States intended to do nothing, but required His Majesty's Government to continue to bear the whole burden in spite of the warning which had been given seven months ago that they would not be in a position to do so. I had, in my conversations and correspondence with his Excellency, explained the whole situation, and especially the position of His Majesty's Government, so fully to him that there was no necessity to recapitulate what had passed. No Government were more anxious, or indeed so anxious, to avoid the state of affairs which was foreshadowed as the result of British evacuation, and His Majesty's Government would no doubt do everything that was possible to prevent such a catastrophe arising, but their powers in this respect were strictly limited, and they were placed in a most unfair and unenviable position.

Mr. Davis replied that he realised this perfectly well and could only express his sympathy.

I am, &c.,
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ENCLOSURE IN No. 407

Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 19, 1919

My dear Ambassador,

You may remember that, in our conversation yesterday afternoon¹ about the Armenian question and the Caucasus, I expressed some surprise that, if American opinion was as deeply stirred as I was led to believe on the subject, no official representations had reached me from the American Government, and I was left to gather American sentiment from the reports and appeals and protests of private individuals. I further said that, anxious as we were to do everything in our power to satisfy American opinion and to protect the Armenians, it was difficult to modify our announced and already inaugurated policy of evacuation, unless we knew for certain for how long a period we were requested or expected to remain, and what part the American Government were prepared to play at its close.

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LORD KERZONUN ABŞ SƏFİRİNƏ MƏKTUBU
19 AVQUST 1919

Later in the evening Mr. Bonar Law, speaking on the same subject in the House of Commons, used the following words:—

'I can assure my noble friend that, if any sign of help were coming from America, as he suggests, we would only too gladly welcome it. Indeed, I think I might say more, with the consent of my right honourable friend. It is, if I may be permitted to say so, an American problem rather than a British. They are in a better position to deal with it. They have interests as great as ours—I think, greater. I can assure the House that if the President of the United States were officially to say to the British Government, "We wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements," we would certainly do our best to meet him.'

Mr. Bonar Law meant to add, what I may here be permitted to add on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that, in the event of the American Government addressing us in the sense indicated, it would seem only reasonable that the financial burden of retaining our forces in the Caucasus beyond the period already fixed by us should not be borne by Great Britain, but should be assumed by the State which expects to be, or is likely to become, the mandatory for the Armenian people. Our own financial responsibilities in those regions have already been so overwhelming that we should not feel justified in continuing them for a further period.

May I suggest to your Excellency that you should telegraph in this sense to your Government, since the matter is one that calls for very early decision?

I have, &c.,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

¹ See *Parl. Deb., 5th Series, House of Commons*, vol. 119, cols. 2086-7.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 Sentyabr 1919

No. 435

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received September 20)
*No. 20 Telegraphic [131980/1015/58]*¹

TIFLIS, September 19, 1919

Your Lordship's telegram No. 10² of 11th September.

I believe Germans are trying to send not only consul but a duly accredited diplomatic representative to this country, whose independence, as you are aware, was long ago recognised by them.

It will put Georgian Government, who have never been so friendly towards England, in a very awkward position if German officials, consular or diplomatic, succeed in reaching Tiflis, and I hope this may be prevented, for general public are overwrought and impatient at waiting so long for a sign from us, and might in despair welcome any outside offer of assistance, especially as Germans were on their good behaviour here³ and perfidiously posed as friends and protectors of Georgians against the Turks.

Municipal authorities have already received from Germany numerous tempting offers of water-pipes and other material, for which nine months' credit would be given. So far, only goods actually received from Germany were those *ex steamship Christian Indeel*, bought last year.

Germany is also trying by every possible means to attract young men to her educational and technical institutions, but, on the other hand, ten youths are leaving as soon as possible for England for technical training at their own expense with a British officer at present here; many more would go, but journey and cost of living and teaching are appreciably higher than in Germany.

Whole future of this country seems to me to depend upon speedy action calculated to clear political atmosphere by some authoritative statement on the part of His Majesty's Government or Allies generally regarding political future of Transcaucasia. It would be sufficient if this were a merely provisional recognition of *de facto* Governments, subject to final decision by Peace Conference, but with some assurance that acts of republics would not be disavowed.

¹ The file copy under this reference is missing. The present text has been supplied from Confidential Print.

² Not printed. This telegram briefly transmitted a report that a German Consul and staff were due to arrive shortly at Tiflis.

³ i.e. during the German military occupation of the Caucasus in the latter part of the First World War.

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 Sentyabr 1919

This would result in—

- (a) Flow hither of British capital, which is only waiting for some guarantee of reasonable safety to take up great industrial and commercial schemes announced, which would immediately steady exchange. I understand there are in circulation about 1 milliard roubles of paper currency, which, at present rate, are equal to only about £2,000,000, while one concession alone, in which Crisp has been interested for several years (electric work connected with Aragva and Saliek Rivers), is estimated to require about £15,000,000.
- (b) Complete establishment of public order and security for life and property. I should mention that impartial observers like Captain Gracey are deeply impressed by enormous improvement in this respect which has taken place since this republic declared its independence. Within last few days it is true there have been daily attacks on railway trains; but this is mere organised provocation, which is being vigorously dealt with, e.g., 800 Bolshevik Ossets,⁴ Jews and Russians have been arrested, I am informed, during last few days, and a very drastic policy, including military law for railways, is on the point of being adopted.

Agrarian question is a contributory fact to this unrest, for if once peasants knew Government was recognised as competent to deal with land-ownership they would readily pay tax, which, under Bolshevik influence, they are now frequently indisposed to do, and they would themselves see to suppression of brigandage. At present agitators (yesterday a Russian monk was arrested at Gudaut with a large supply of Bolshevik propaganda and letters from Denikin's army to well-known intriguers in Batoum) tell buyers of land that their titles are worthless, as Denikin will come here and restore monarchy and reactionary rule.

Your Lordship is well aware that, despite ratification of peace with Germany, that country is determined to carry on war against us here by political and economic methods, and it would seem desirable that public of Great Britain should be made fully aware of this fact. German agents are busy with most unscrupulous propaganda against us, using Bolsheviks and Jews for the purpose, and they are also trying underhand way(s) to capture trade and secure concessions. We need experienced financial and commercial men of standing to cope with situation. It is urgent that we should stimulate British manufacturers, merchants and capitalists to come in and dominate this market, where they would be received with open arms.

Italians have officially offered to provide free of charge twenty experts to advise all the departments of the Georgian Government, but latter, realising that this is merely disguised manoeuvre on behalf of German (who has already begun introducing his goods under Italian marks), have declined offer. They have been also offered a regiment to garrison Batoum, if we evacuate that place.

Vigorous action on the part of His Majesty's Government can alone save this country from falling into orbit of Germany.

A Caucasian people.

III 00

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SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 AVQUST 1919

No. 389

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received August 20)
No. 563 Telegraphic [118562/11067/58]

TEHERAN, August 19, 1919

I have before reported that replacement of our troops in Caucasus by Italians was contemplated with dismay by Persian Government and other elements in Northern Persia.

News that we are evacuating for certain and are not to be replaced by any other of Allies has caused general (? despondency).

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SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 AVQUST 1919

Persian Government have now made official representation urging me to apprise you of their misgivings and to enquire whether in our joint interests and in those of all elements affected our decision to evacuate cannot be reconsidered or at all events postponed until situation is regulated by action of Peace Conference.

Our withdrawal will probably mean closure of Caucasian route for mails and passengers to and from Europe; and spread of Bolshevism to Northern Persia will be greatly facilitated.

Is it not possible for us at any rate to maintain sufficient troops to keep communications open?¹

¹ No reply was made to this telegram. On August 23, 1919, the Persian Minister in London communicated to the Foreign Office a telegram from the Acting Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a sense similar to the above.

No. 390

Note by Mr. Gregory of a conversation with M. Nabokoff
[149756/116696/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 19, 1919

N.W. Russian Government

M. Nabokoff has just been to say that M. Sazonoff is much concerned at the report that has appeared in the press of the formation of the North West Russian Government, and has instructed him to make a formal protest to H.M.G. as regards the part played by General Gough and Colonel Pirie-Gordon in bringing it about under pressure.

M. Nabokoff said that the only information he had was the report in *The Times* and that of course he could not make any protest; but he did wish to say that what had been done was most objectionable in the eyes of M. Sazonoff, and would, he was sure, be equally so to Denikin and Kolchak. The latter, he said, could, for instance, never confirm the agreement contemplated between the North West Government and Esthonia. Moreover, M. Sazonoff objected to certain personalities who formed part of that Government; and he did not even know what rôle General Yudenitch had played in the negotiations - whether he approved or whether he had been forced into it by threats from General Gough of withholding his supplies. In fact, M. Nabokoff said, he and his friends were completely in the dark, and all they could say was that they strongly disapproved of action of this sort being taken independently, and without reference to the policy of the other Russian leaders.

He asked if we could obtain, through our Representatives, a report from General Yudenitch on the whole proceeding, in order that M. Sazonoff and the others might judge it on its merits.¹

J. D. GREGORY

¹ M. Shébéko (see No. 88, note 2) shortly afterwards proceeded to Helsingfors on behalf of M. Sazonov in order to investigate the situation created by the formation of the North-West Russian Government.

III L I

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LORD KERZONUN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA TELEQRAMI
20 DEKABR 1919

No. 615

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 141 Telegraphic [162638/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

Your telegram No. 195¹ (of December 11 [10]).

Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me recently² that he had been approached by Azerbaijan delegation at Paris with a view to his adopting a policy aiming at the eventual union of the Azerbaijan Republic with Persia.

His Highness handed me a paper which he declared represented the political desires of the Azerbaijan Delegation at Paris of which following is a précis:—

Azerbaijan:

1. To be definitely separated from Russia whatever Government be established in that country;
2. To be recognised as a free and independent Republic with Baku as its capital;
3. To be joined to Persia under Confederation to be agreed upon by both Governments and approved by Parliaments, foreign relations of both States being unified;
4. For above purposes Azerbaijan desires help of Great Britain for establishment and maintenance of her independence, etc., on lines similar to that accorded to Persia.

His Highness claims that the Ittihad party³ is in favour of a Persian policy while the Musavat⁴ inclines to the Young Turks, though an important section of the latter party is wavering and might be brought into the pro-Persian orbit. He is apparently in communication with the leader of the Ittihad party at Baku through Teheran and the Persian Consul at Baku. He represents strongly the danger to both Persia and Great Britain of allowing

¹ No. 600.

² The Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Firuz Mirza, had recently visited London and had conferred with Lord Curzon.

³ i.e. Freedom Party.

⁴ i.e. Equality Party

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
21 DEKABR 1919

the pro-Turkish party to gain permanent ascendancy in Azerbaijan and practically asks for our support of a policy aiming at little less than the eventual incorporation of Azerbaijan in the Persian Empire.

I have not encouraged him beyond giving a general assurance that we should favour the establishment of good relations between the two countries and offering to instruct you to assure the Azerbaijan authorities that any strengthening of the bonds between them would give satisfaction to His Majesty's Government. His Highness is not satisfied with this offer and asks for a more explicit assurance of support of his policy.

Is there any ground for supposing that the movement has any strong local support or that the initiative really came from the Azerbaijan Delegation in Paris?

Please repeat to Teheran.

No. 616

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received December 23)
No. 217 Telegraphic [164662/1015/58]

TIFLIS, December 21, 1919

Azerbaijan Prime Minister December 19th asked Persian Commission whether it would be possible for my representative at Baku to be present at negotiations there between Persia and Azerbaijan, chiefly referring to rectification of frontiers and proposed confederation of Persia and Azerbaijan.

Colonel Stokes asks whether he should accept invitation if given. Negotiations are on the point of beginning.

Subject to Your Lordship's opinion I am inclined to answer in the negative. Persian Commission would probably in any case give us full information of what passed and presence of our representative might commit us even if he preserved attitude of mere listener which would be difficult.

I should be grateful for early reply.¹

Sent to Foreign Office No. 217, Teheran No. 11, Constantinople 72.

Foreign Office telegram No. 147 of December 27, 1919, to Tiflis stated in reply² I agree with you that it is undesirable that your representative should attend the negotiations.

CƏNAB OLİFANTIN QEYDLƏRİ
20 DEKABR 1919

No. 872

*Note by Mr. Oliphant of a conversation with the Persian Minister for
Foreign Affairs*
[164472/15034]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

The Persian Foreign Secretary called on me this afternoon before proceeding to Paris to-morrow morning. He handed to me the accompanying letter¹ in reply to Lord Curzon's last note² about Persian territorial claims. In doing so he wished to amplify the statements therein with the observations which I set out below. He appeared to me exceedingly desirous of falling in with Lord Curzon's wishes to the utmost possible and told me more than once that his one object and wish was to be guided by His Lordship's advice and that in no case did he propose to act independently thereof.

As regards Turkestan, he said that there were two points to which Persia did attach the utmost importance. If His Majesty's Government was unwilling to support the Persian claims as hitherto set forth, he did most

¹ See annex below.

² No. 871.

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CƏNAB OLİFANTIN QEYDLƏRİ
20 DEKABR 1919

earnestly hope that they might find it possible to support Persia on two points:

(a) As regards Sarakhs. On this point Colonel Grey, Consul General at Meshed, told me two days ago that he did think that the Persians had a very strong claim as Russia had been acquiring parts of Sarakhs surreptitiously for years past.

(b) The district of the Yaourt Yamut, a migratory tribe in the neighbourhood of Astrabad. He explained that they wandered from one side of the frontier to the other in connection with their winter and summer quarters and if the whole of their territory could be included in Persia it would save endless troubles and would be a permanent advantage.

H.H. further said that the question of Ashurada required settlement. To be perfectly candid, he himself had been under the impression that since the Persians drove the Bolsheviks out it had been Persian territory; but he had just been told that it was not so. When I asked him who was at present in possession he said he did not know. The Russians had never acquired it by treaty but merely had acquired it gradually, and if it could be made Persian, as it undoubtedly ought to be, it would be a great asset.

He then explained his views regarding Nakhitchevan. He stated that it was both Shiah and Persian in religion and sentiment, and that the Persians had, since the collapse of Russia, received repeated requests from the inhabitants to incorporate it in Persia. It was a matter of the utmost importance to Persian sentiment, and he earnestly hoped that we might support him in his attitude regarding it. He thought that it was in the interest of both our countries to do so. Without our support he would not put it forward at the Conference. On the other hand if it were known that it was not put forward owing to the unwillingness of H.M.G. to support Persia, it could not but create an unfortunate impression in Persia. He therefore earnestly pressed for our support to the following extent. He would propose to inform the Peace Conference that if the Conference decided to deal with the questions of Armenia and Azerbaijan they should also consider the question of Nakhitchevan and its desire to be incorporated in Persia. He would be quite prepared to agree to the self-determination of Nakhitchevan and that an International Commission should go there to see whether or not it opted for inclusion in Persia. If the vote were to go against Persia he would be absolutely content that it should not be incorporated, but he had no doubts whatever on the subject. He added that he heard that the Armenians had recently turned the Azerbaijani out of Nakhitchevan and were in possession of it at present. In any case thousands of families had fled from Nakhitchevan as refugees to Persia.

H.H. appeared to me to desire to follow the advice of His Majesty's Government far more implicitly than ever before.

He added that as soon as he had Lord Curzon's views on the above points and on Part 3 of his previous Memorandum³ he would at once draw up the Persian case for submission to the Peace Conference.

³ The reference was to the memorandum referred to in No. 863, note 4. This memo-

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CƏNAB OLİFANTIN QEYDLƏRİ
20 DEKABR 1919

Qu[ery.] Agree on conditions given.

H.H. then referred to the recent publication in the *Paris Midi* of Lord Curzon's correspondence with the Americans about the Persian Agreement.⁴ He said that his Prime Minister was taking the utmost interest in the matter and it would be very helpful to him, especially during his stay in Paris, if he might be given the gist of the correspondence in question. I said that I would submit the matter to His Lordship. Qu[ery.] give him gist.

Qu[ery.] Record to Sir P. Cox.⁵

L. O.

ANNEX TO No. 872
The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Earl Curzon
(Received December 23)

CARLTON HOTEL, le 20 décembre 1919

My Lord,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 19 courant¹ concernant les demandes de rectifications formulées par mon Gouvernement.

Je regrette vivement de constater que votre Excellence trouve difficile de réconcilier les différents points de vue selon la suggestion que j'avais eu l'honneur de soumettre à son Excellence Lord Hardinge of Penshurst.

Quant aux deux alternatives proposées par votre Excellence, lors de notre dernière entrevue, et auxquelles vous faites allusion dans votre présente lettre, je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que je ne suis pas enclin, dans l'intérêt de la politique de mon pays et de mon Gouvernement, à choisir la première. Considérant la communauté réelle d'intérêts existante entre nos deux pays, et convaincu du désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de voir les frontières de la Perse garanties par une rectification justifiable quant aux conditions géographiques et ethnographiques, je pense qu'il est de première importance pour moi de m'assurer d'abord le concours et l'appui efficace de votre Gouvernement et de soumettre ensuite les propositions de mon Gouvernement au Conseil suprême.

Laisant de côté la frontière ouest de la Perse et la question du Kurdistan, où votre Excellence se trouve d'accord, en principe, avec les vues de mon Gouvernement, je désirerais connaître d'une manière plus précise les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en ce qui concerne les rectifications demandées sur les limites du Turkestan et du côté de Nakhdjavan. Je voudrais savoir ce que représente pour votre Excellence la deuxième alternative ainsi formulée: 'Une assertion modérée des desiderata de la Perse soutenus par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.'

Veuillez agréer, &c.

FIROUZ

random as a whole was noted on the file as being 'Chapter III of the [longer] memorandum which Prince Firouz proposes to lay before the Peace Conference.'

⁴ Cf. No. 876, note 2.

⁵ This conversation was not recorded to Sir P. Cox.

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LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
20 DEKABR 1919

No. 873

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)
No. 662 Telegraphic [164227/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

My telegram No. 638¹ (of December 4th. Cossack Division). India Office refuse categorically to share in the monthly subsidy to Cossack Division any longer and we cannot continue it after the end of this month. You should inform the Persian Government accordingly.

¹ No. 861.

No. 874

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)
No. 665 Telegraphic [156012/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

You may continue to pay Persian Government tomans 350,000 monthly till February 20th.

No. 875

Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran)
No. 280 [161963/150/34]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 20, 1919

Sir,

The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs called again at the Foreign Office on the 11th instant, and was asked whether he had any information on the question of Advisers who had been offered to the Persian Government by some Foreign Power (as stated in your telegram No. 759¹ of the 1st December). His Highness replied in the negative, but added that he was fully aware of the desire of the United States Government to obtain some footing in Persia.

2. His Highness stated that he had been considering this question of late and was disposed to think that it would be to our joint benefit to interest the United States in financial questions in the north of Persia. He himself had derived the impression that His Majesty's Government were not entirely at their ease wherever Russian interests in North Persia were at stake; and in his opinion it might be very useful if the United States were to take an interest in North Persia and thus in some measure form a commercial barrier against Russia. In this eventuality they would naturally be interested in the maintenance of order and the protection of Persia, and as the Anglo-Persian Agreement was aimed at gaining both these points, the Americans would look to that instrument for their success, and we should in the long run obtain their benediction for the agreement.

¹ No. 858.

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LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
20 DEKABR 1919

3. His Highness then referred to questions relating to the Republic of Azerbaijan, and said that during the war the Turks had shown considerable energy in propaganda in Azerbaijan and Georgia and had thus stolen a march on the Persians in those districts. He did not think that the telegram which I had informed him would be sent to Mr. Wardrop at Tiflis, expressing the hope that the Republic of Azerbaijan should live in amity with Persia, would meet the requirements of the case. If, however, the recognition of the Republic of Azerbaijan by His Majesty's Government (to which the inhabitants themselves attach, he felt sure, the utmost importance) were to be held out as a bait, it would then enable the Persians themselves to induce the Azerbaijanis to side with them and not with the Turks. He then said that, without wishing to be indiscreet, he would like, if it were possible, to know the views of His Majesty's Government regarding Azerbaijan and Georgia. He surmised that in both cases His Majesty's Government intended in the long run to see them not reincorporated with Russia but existing as separate States. He had grave doubts whether Azerbaijan could ever maintain its position without help from outside, and he concluded by expressing the view that for Azerbaijan as a separate State to look to Persia for support and co-operation was surely more desirable in the interests of His Majesty's Government than for Azerbaijan and Georgia to be perpetually at loggerheads and always to be a prey to Turkish intrigue.

4. His Highness was informed that His Majesty's Government cannot possibly make the recognition of Azerbaijan conditional upon the policy that it pursues towards Persia.

5. Turning to another subject, Prince Nosret-ed-Dowleh said that he had recently been informed by the Persian Railway Syndicate that Messrs. Vickers and Messrs. Armstrong had joined them, thereby strengthening the group. They had told him categorically that they were prepared to examine and make proposals for the extension of the railway (which runs at present from Bagdad to the Persian frontier) *via* Kermanshah and Hamadan to Tehran, and would undertake the survey at their own expense. The line itself would eventually be constructed at the expense of the Persian Government, and his Highness seemed to consider this a suitable arrangement.

6. His Highness added that the Mohammerah-Khoramabad Railway would also be taken in hand, in view of the concession accorded to the Persian Railway Syndicate some ten years ago, but that this would be of secondary importance.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

* See No. 865, note 3.

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PARİSDƏKİ BRİTANIYA NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ
16 OKTYABR 1919



No. 1960
347/L/C/19449

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS.
15th October, 1919

My Lord,

1. I have the honour to report the following resumé of the views expressed to Mr. Forbes Adam by M. Papadjanian, an ex-member of the Russian Duma and now a member of the Delegation of the Armenian Republic to the peace conference, which may be of interest in connection with Your Lordship's despatch No. 7896 (131930A, E. 56) of October 6th regarding the status of the Trans-Caucasian Republics.

2. Speaking first of the defensive treaty concluded between Georgia and Azerbaijan, M. Papadjanian said he did not consider that this treaty contained any secret clauses of alliance between these states and any Turkish authorities, nor did it contemplate any aggressive action against General Denikin or the volunteer army. Both the present Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments contained members such as M. Gegechkori and M. Ussbekoff, who realised to the full that the allies were deeply interested in General Denikin's success, and that the future fate of their Governments rested with the peace conference or the council of the League of Nations sitting in sequel to the conference. On the other hand both Governments were so anxious to obtain complete independence that if they eventually found that the conference or the League were not prepared to give them the support in this direction which they desired, they might look for support elsewhere, and in M. Papadjanian's opinion the Azerbaijan Government would, in that eventuality, be strongly tempted, owing to the racial affinity of the two peoples, to turn to an, for, of Turkish independent Government which the conference might leave

in

The Right Honourable
The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., P.C.,
etc. etc. etc.

PARİSDƏKİ BRİTANIYA NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ
16 OKTYABR 1919

in existence. Georgia might be dragged in the Azerbaijan Government's train.

3. Meanwhile, in view of their aspirations, neither Government could be regarded, at the best, as likely to be more than neutral in the struggle between Denikin and the Bolsheviks. They feel that a central Russian Government, formed under the aegis of Koltchak and Denikin would be unlikely to grant them even autonomy within a Russian federation, much less independence. On the other hand, they still hope that the conference will afford them moral aid in their relations with a central Russian Government and they appreciate that such aid would be forfeited by any support (even tacit) of the Bolsheviks.

4. M. Papadjanian then went on to explain that, precisely for the above reasons, the Armenian Republic could not join the Azerbaijan-Georgian alliance. The Erivan and Kars provinces were not important economically or strategically to Russia, and the Armenian Government are convinced that Denikin and any future Russian Government formed under his auspices would agree to the independence of the Armenian Republic if such independence were supported by the conference. The league, whether or not a portion of Turkish Armenia were added. At the same time they would gladly see Azerbaijan and Georgia independent, or, at the worst, given a large measure of autonomy within a Russian federation. But until this question was settled as between the future

Central

PARİSDƏKİ BRİTANIYA NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ
16 OKTYABR 1919

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Central Russian Government, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the conference of the league, they could not well join Georgia and Azerbaijan in any close relationship.

5. Lastly M. Papadjanian begged that the conference failing that, His Majesty's Government should consider at once the recognition of a de facto provisional independence of Armenia, a recognition which in his opinion should, in the interests of the allies, also be extended to Azerbaijan and Georgia. He urged this solely on the ground that a definitive solution by the conference or the council of the league could not take place for many months, owing to a delay in the negotiation of a treaty with Turkey and to the necessity of waiting for an American decision on mandates, and owing to the necessity of waiting for the result of the civil war in Russia, and that meanwhile the economic position of these countries was so bad that only such a recognition of de facto provisional independence could help them to obtain the financial facilities which would enable them to import the food and clothing which they so urgently required. At present they were receiving some financial aid from private sources, but a formal declaration by the allies or the conference could enable them to obtain this aid in a larger measure and from more solid and stable sources. They had securities to offer for such aid, but apart from this he was convinced that if the three countries were eventually to return to Russia no future Russian Government could in its own interests repudiate the debts of the three Governments. He added that there was no necessity for the conference at this stage to go into the question of the frontiers of the three states; that could be done when their definitive status came to be decided by the conference or the council of the league.

6. M. Papadjanian said he fully realized that a certain measure of recognition had been afforded to the Trans-Caucasian

States

PARİSDƏKİ BRİTANIYA NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ
15 OKTYABR 1919

States by the terms of the conference's correspondence with Admiral Koltchak earlier in the year, but this was not precise or definite enough to take the place of the formal recognition which he desired. He suggested that some formula could be found for the declaration which would safeguard the conference or His Majesty's Government as against Denikin and Koltchak, and show the latter clearly that there was no intention to modify the conditions laid down in the above-mentioned correspondence or anticipate the results of the negotiations which would eventually take place between the three Caucasian Governments and the Central Russian Government. The formula could also be drafted in such a way as to make it quite clear that it was only the inevitable delays in the settlement of the status of the Trans-Caucasian States and the resulting critical economic situation which led the conference or His Majesty's Government to issue a declaration recognizing the *de facto* provisional independence of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Caucasian Armenia.

I am, with great truth and respect,

Your Lordship's,

most obedient,

humble servant.

Egye A . . .

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
28 NOYABR 1919

INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY REPORT CONSTANTINOPLE No. 44

FOR WEEK ENDING NOVEMBER 28th 1919

- 18 -

ARMY.

110. Dissention is stated to be rife. This is probably caused by the fact that the men are very badly clothed, fed and paid, and act to the Bolshevik tendencies of the troops.

AZERBAIJAN.

POLITICAL MISSION.

111. It has been established that H. VEZIROV, Chief of the Azerbaijan Political Mission has arrived in Constantinople and has had a long conversation with the Turkish Foreign Minister on the subject of forming a Turko-Islamic Union, by an entente between the Turks and all the Turko-Turanian elements of the Caucasus and Persia. (see Report No. 43, para 16). The application of Mr. Vozirov for permission to proceed to Constantinople was refused by the British during last August.

MUGHAN.

112. There has been a minor outbreak of trouble in the MUGHAN district near the village of PIVLENNOE. This is attributed to the cause:- (a) Denikin's Agents stirring up dissention for the purpose of preventing a peaceful settlement of the district. (b) The local Azerbaijan Authorities seizing Russian property. The trouble has now ceased.

ECONOMIC.

113. The Government of AZERBAIJAN has issued Postage stamps of the following values:- 10, 20, 40, 60 Kopeks; 1, 2, 3, 10, 25, 50 Roubles. This is the first issue of stamps ever made by AZERBAIJAN.

VOLUNTEER ARMY ACTIVITIES.

114. The Volunteer Army Representative in BAKU is reported to have left on the 18th instant. The reason given was to the effect that owing to the withdrawal of General BARATOV's Mission from the Caucasus new organisation was necessary. He hinted that if Azerbaijan was to maintain friendly relations with Denikin it would be necessary for her to change her policy.

TURKISH ACTIVITIES.

115. Further information has been received regarding the movements of YURI PASHA. During this month he has been living in BAKU with DAHA-UT-DIN, former Turkish Chief of Police in BAKU and has almost certainly visited both DAGHESTAN and the SHUSHA-AGDAM district. He is expected to visit ELIZ-VEYPOL in the near future, where it is stated there are considerable number of Turkish Officers and men.

KONSTANTINOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
28 NOYABR 1919

- 19 -

116. The fact has been established that there are several Turkish instructors at work in the Azerbaijan Army and it is suspected that the Turkish element in the army personnel is rapidly increasing. A further report on this subject will be forwarded later.

117. As recently as July of this year the Azerbaijan Minister of War stated in a document that there were no Turkish officers in the Army, but of late strong evidence has come to hand to prove that this state of affairs no longer exists.

DAGHESTAN.

GENERAL SITUATION.

118. The situation between the North Caucasian tribes and the Volunteer Army is quiet for the moment. Owing to the fact that NURI PASHA is suspected to be taking an interest in this area, it is not contemplated that this state of affairs will continue for long.

LEUT-COLONEL ROWLANDSON'S PROCLAMATION.

119. Considerable excitement still exists in DAGHESTAN and AZERBAIJAN regarding the Proclamation issued by Lieut-Colonel Rowlandson, the text of which was forwarded under Appendix "F" of Report No. 43.

120. The press of Azerbaijan and even of Georgia have made several adverse criticisms.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

121. The Constituent Assembly of DAGHESTAN recently held a meeting at TEMIR KHAN SHURA, at which a resolution was passed advocating a meeting of representatives of Moslems of the former Russian Empire and Turkey. The general tone of the meeting was distinctly pro-Islamic, which demonstrates the fact that DENIKIN's wide spread statement to the effect that the North Caucasian Tribes desired to be under his jurisdiction, is somewhat inaccurate.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
11 NOYABR 1919

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RUSSIA.

152785
18 NOV 1919

POLITICAL.

Decypher from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) November 11th.

D. 8.45 a. m. November 11th. 1919.

R. 2.50 p. m. " 17th.

No. 127.

-----000-----

(? Your) Lordship is probably aware that Colonel Stokes has been living in this country since departure of British troops without any employment though Foreign Office telegram 12. September 13th and my telegram (? 11) September ^{6 & 10} simultaneously suggested that he would be very useful as Political Agent in Azerbaijan.

On his own initiative
(Group ~~undecypherable~~ *undecypherable*) ~~with a (one group)~~ he has been in Baku lately and at my request he has given ^{me} ~~(a declaration)~~ following.
Begins -

Supporters of Young Turk party are daily growing stronger on account of ^{Silence of Allies} ~~Silesian Alliance~~ and uncertainty as to fate of Azerbaijan. Government does not wish Azerbaijan to become an appanage of Turkey but it is weakening through inability to deny authenticity of assertion of Young Turk that Allies support Denikin in aggressive scheme(?s) (? against) Azerbaijan.

A month has passed by since Rowlandson's proclamation and as it has not been disclaimed it is believed to have approval of His Majesty's Government.

Donikin

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
11 NOYABR 1919

Denikin bombards Azerbaijan with provocative communications and is believed to be inciting Armenia to be 453 troublesome in Zangəzur in order to divide Azerbaijan forces and make capture of Baku easier.

Nuri, who had left Baku at the request of Ussubbekoff has now returned and unless Allies wish to drive (? Azerbaijan) into arms of Young Turks and conflict with Denikin some Allied policy should be declared and some representative should be sent to Baku to keep in touch with and advise Azerbaijan.
Ende.

I am inclined to think that Colonel (? Stokes) perhaps exaggerates influence of Young Turks but I agree with him in thinking that some early statement of Allied policy is most desirable. A (two groups and undecypherable) effect-at any place in Trans Caucasia where disorder (? particularly) feared, presence of one or two British officers would generally prevent trouble.

Repeated to Constantinople.

Sent to Foreign Office 127.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
23 OKTYABR 1919

INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY REPORT CONSTANTINOPLE No. 39
FOR THE WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 23rd 1919

- 8 -

2. CAUCASUS.

PROVINCE OF DAKU.

44. There is no change in the situation.

GEORGIA.

45. There is no change in the general situation.

46. The Indo-European telegraph line, which was reported on October 11th to have been broken in the Georgian area between POTI and the EZIG River (see Weekly Report No. 38 para 51) was restored on October 17th.

ARMENIA.

47. No recent information has been received.

AZERBAIJAN.

FORMATION OF CABINET.

48. The new cabinet has not yet assumed office. The members already elected proceeded to ELIZAVETOPOL on October 8th.

COMMUNICATION WITH TURKESTAN BOLSHEVISTS.

49. On October 4th the British Intelligence Officer at DAKU reported that to the best of his belief a certain YANOVITOL, a Serb, was the chief pan-Islamic agitator in DAKU. This man followed a policy similar to the agitators in Turkestan (see Weekly Report No. 38, para's 98 - 99), confining himself to the pan-Islamic side of the Bolshevik programme.

50. Early in 1919 this man was located at TASHKENT. During the summer he conducted Bolshevik propaganda in Trans-Caspia, in the area occupied by the Russian Trans-Caspian forces. He was arrested, at British instigation, at a small station on the KRASHNOVODSK - MERV railway, but was released after a few days imprisonment by reason of his personal influence with certain members of the ASKADAD Government, who refused to believe that he was working for the Bolsheviks. On August 3rd he was seen in KRASHNOVODEK, but all attempts to effect his arrest failed. He was later found to have crossed from KRASHNOVODEK to DAKU on August 4th (the date on which the British garrison of KRASHNOVODEK withdrew to DAKU).

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
23 OKTYABR 1919

- 9 -

51. On October 12th the British Intelligence Officer at BAKU reported that information had been received to the effect that YANOVITSH intended to proceed from BAKU to HASSAN KULI (on the East shore of the Caspian and on the Persian - Turkestan frontier). Arrangements were made by which it was hoped that the Volunteer Army authorities at KRASHNOVODSK would be enabled to intercept him, but he changed his plans, leaving BAKU eventually on October 8th and proceeding to LENKORAN. It was expected that he would cross from LENKORAN to HASSAN KULI.

52. A party of five men was reported to be accompanying YANOVITSH, including a certain Tartar named RAHIMOV who was known to be Anglophobe and pan-Islamist. Another member of the party, named LAPIN, was said to be the bearer of a letter from USSUDEKOV (ex-President of the Azerbaijan Government) addressed to KAZIM Bey at BAMI.

53. In the same report the British Intelligence Officer at BAKU stated that from trustworthy information it was clear that the route BAKU - HASSAN KULI was being used regularly for Bolshevik communication between Trans-Caucasia and Trans-Caspia. A party of twenty or thirty Turkish officers was reported to have gone to Turkestan by this route shortly after the British forces left BAKU.

54. From the above reports it is clear that the Turkestan agitators are in touch with certain individuals in Azerbaijan. At the same time, however, it is doubtful whether the Government of Azerbaijan is implicated. Certain politicians probably favour the establishment of friendly relations with the Mahomedan leaders in Turkestan, but since these leaders are at present working in conjunction with the Bolsheviks any rapprochement between the Mahomedans of the two countries would entail great risk of an increase of Bolshevik influence in Azerbaijan. Such a situation is undoubtedly aimed at by the Central Government of MOSCOW, but is not in accordance with the policy at present followed by the Azerbaijan Government.

55. The report mentioned in para 52 above to the effect that a letter from USSUDEKOV is being despatched to KAZIM Bey at BAMI is probably inaccurate. KAZIM Bey was last located on September 24th, on which date he was leaving TASHKENT for MOSCOW.

56. The report of Turkish officers proceeding to Trans-Caspia via HASSAN KULI probably explains the reports forwarded by General LALLESON at the end of September and early in October to the effect that Turkish officers were arriving at ASKARAD via ASTARABAD.

DAGHESTAN.

ANTI-VOLUNTEER ARMY RISING.


57. On October 12th the British Intelligence Officer at BAKU reported that he had received information of the fall of DERBENT to the insurgents on October 6th. This report, however, would appear to have been incorrect, since on October 14th the British Military Division with the Armed Forces of South Russia reported that after three days fighting the insurgents of DERBENT had tendered their submission. On October 17th the insurgents were reported to have been cleared from the PETROVSK - TEMIR KHAN SHOTA railway.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 DEKABR 1919

No. 129.

Tiflis,

19 December 1919.



My Lord,

The following appears today in "Borba" (the semi-official organ of the Georgian Government):

Persian-Azerbaijan Conference.

The diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Georgia has received from the Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs the following telegram:

"The Persian and Azerbaijan Conference was opened on December 15. Those present were: the whole Persian Mission headed by Agai Said Zia-ud-Din Tata Tatbai; our Ministers Djafaroff, Safikiurdsy, Melik-Aslanoff, Gadjinsky, our diplomatic representative in Tehran Adil Khan. Speeches of welcome were made by expressing firm conviction that henceforth economic and friendly political relations between the two nations of Azerbaijan and Persia would be strengthened still more. Three commissions were formed -

1. Commercial - customs - transit,
2. Postal and telegraphic, 3.
3. Political, juridical. Some meetings

of

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
19 DEKABR 1919

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"of the two commissions first named
"have already taken place. At present
"agreements for submission to the
"committees are being drafted".

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

SER P. KOKSUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
24 FEVRAL 1919

POLITICAL.
31420
26 FEB 1919

Decypher. Sir P. Cox. (Teheran)
24th February 1919.

D. 5.15.p.m. 24th February 1919.

R. 10.p.m. 25th February 1919.

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No. 150.

.....

On February 12th a local report reached me that Azerbaijan Government of Baku were sending a deputation to Teheran with co-operation of our Military Authorities and that object of deputation was to establish Diplomatic relations with Persian Government and set up a Legation at Teheran.

Cabinet realized that their coming might give rise to awkward questions and Russian Legation was extremely suspicious of them.

I accordingly asked General Thomson to give envoys friendly advice to postpone project until political situation was clearer.

He replies that departure of envoy has been delayed but that he hoped that visit will soon be permitted as ostensible cause of journey is to settle matters of customs, reciprocity of trade. Posts and telegraphs and other administrative matters settlement of which is in our interests. He offers to obtain definite assurance that the question of recognition and other political propaganda will not be indulged in but matters above cited are subjects of international import and before this deputation is allowed to come I request that H.M.G. will give me an idea of present tend of their policy in regard to Azerbaijan Government and instructions as to line that I should adopt in regard to them vis-a-vis of Persian Government and Russian Legation.
Repeated to Baku.

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
15 NOYABR 1919

Part East... 30 copies

152848/ME58/ 465

MEMORANDUM.

Evacuation of Batoum and Bolchevism
18 Nov 1919
in the Middle East.

Since it seems impossible to discuss the Province and Port of Batoum without raising the whole of the Caucasian question I propose to commence with a short resume of events leading up to the present situation in the Caucasus since August 4th. the date of the last meeting.

General.—British troops have been evacuated from the territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, with the exception of the Province and Port of Batoum.

Mr. Wardrop British Chief Commissioner in Transcaucasia has arrived at Tiflis with his staff. He has made a tour of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan and has been very well received by all sections of the public. Colonel Stokes is acting as Military Representative to the Azerbaijan Republic at Baku. Captain Gracey to the Armenian Republic at Erivan and Captain Hulle as liaison officer at Tiflis; all report through Mr. Wardrop. Major Teague Jones, formerly of the Indian Police is shortly proceeding to Tiflis to act as special Intelligence Officer to report on Bolchevic activities in Central Asia and the Middle East. Mr. Wardrop has applied for a Commercial Attache with a good knowledge of finance. Colonel Haskell, an American officer, has been appointed Allied High Commissioner for Armenia. His appointment seems originally to have been intended to deal mainly with relief and he was nominated at Mr. Hoovers instigation. This officer does not seem to have

made

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CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
15 NOYABR 1919

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made many friends either among the natives or his allied colleagues. His policy seems to alternate between domination and vacillation.

The remnants of the Italian Mission still remain in the Caucasus but are recognised as purely concession hunting.

Georgia has also sent a commercial mission to Rome.
Relations between the three Republics.

Georgia and Azerbaijan have concluded a defensive alliance against attack from the Volunteer Army for a period of three years. Armenia was invited to join the alliance but refused.

The Military Establishment of these three republics is approximately as follows:—

Georgia: 60,000 regulars 5,000 officers

Azerbaijan: 20,000 regulars 1,000 officers

do. 20,000 irregulars.

Armenia: 40,000 regulars 1,500 officers.

There has been a marked improvement in the relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan. Both the republics however maintain a very distrustful attitude towards Armenia on account of

1. Armenia's apparently friendly attitude towards Denekin.
2. Intrigues of the Dashnaks both in Georgia and Azerbaijan
3. Old outstanding territorial claims of Armenia against Georgia in Borchalinsk and against Azerbaijan in Nakhichivan and Zangazaur.

Georgia has however during the last week come to an agreement with Armenia granting her general transit through Georgia free of customs duties. This is due to strong representations made by Mr. Wardrop to the Georgian Government who were holding up relief supplies to Armenia.

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Trouble

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
16 NOYABR 1919

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Trouble and in some places fighting is taking place between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed areas round Zangazour. Colonel Haskell put forward a proposal for a temporary settlement. A neutral zone was proposed in the province of Nakhichivan to be administered by an Allied Governor General, but at the same time the province of Zangazour was granted to the Armenians, thus establishing Armenians on either side of the neutral zone and granting them a corridor to the north of that zone. This seems to have pleased nobody. The Armenians claim Nakhichivan Zangazour and Karabach while Azerbaijan claims Zangazour as an integral part of their republic; however they are apparently willing themselves to administer Karabach with Armenian officials. The Mohammedan inhabitants of Nakhichivan have now refused to accept Colonel Haskell's representative Colonel Daly as Governor General.

Azerbaijan seems convinced that Denikin is backing the Armenians who are moving troops to Nakhichivan.

Georgia is acting as intermediary between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the hopes of maintaining peace.

Relations of the Republics to Denikin.

Armenia.— The relations of these people to Denikin remain much the same. The Armenian Society "Dachnachtsaaron" which controls most of the Armenian policy, although strongly socialistic and revolutionary, willingly accepts Denikin's assistance and advice pending a settlement of the Caucasian question. The Russian offices with the Armenians are mostly under Denikin's Orders. Denikin has lately applied for leave to transport through Batoum to Armenia one battalion of Armenians raised and equipped from the Volunteer Army at Taganrog.

Georgia.— Relations between Georgia and Denikin are, if not more, strained than before and all attempts to come to an agreement seem to have failed for the following reasons:—

(1)/

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CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
16 NOYABR 1919

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Haskell

- (1) Denikin's policy of an united Russia destroys Georgian independence.
 - (2) Denikin continues to keep armed forces on the Bzyb front.
 - (3) Denikin contends that the Georgian Government is actively assisting the insurgents in Dagestan.
 - (4) His blockade of Georgia.
- on the other hand.
1. The Georgians consider their independence guaranteed by the doctrine of self determination and their national history.
 2. There seems to be no necessity for Denikin to keep any armed force on the Bzyb front since the Georgians have no intention of attacking him and that district is free of Bolchevists.
 3. Although there are undoubtedly individual Georgian Bolchevists and others stirring up Dagestan there is no evidence that the Georgian Government is in any way assisting the insurgents. Repeated assurances have been given to Mr. Wardrop that the Government deprecates any such assistance. The Georgian Government has offered to send a mission to Denikin to clear up all questions. This mission Denikin has refused to receive.
 4. The blockade affects the whole of the Caucasus including Azerbaijan and the Batoum Province.

Azerbaijan

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16 NOYABR 1919

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Azerbaijan.—Relations between Azerbaijan and Denekin were formerly of a more or less friendly nature. Denekin believed that Azerbaijan's claim to independence was only voiced by a few political agitators and that he would have no difficulty in eventually subjugating the Tartars. However lately relations with Azerbaijan have become strained owing to.

1. Denekin's demand that the Azerbaijan Republic cease flying their flag on the Caspian Sea. He refers them to the Russo-Persian treaty of Turcomanahai which also prohibits the Persian flag.
2. Denekin's accusation that Azerbaijan is actively assisting the Dagestan insurgents (in spite of the fact that in their Press and speeches the Insurgents show much bitterness towards Azerbaijan for not coming to the assistance of their brother Moslems).
3. The general attitude of Denikin's Fleet and his support of the Armenians.
4. His mismanagement of Dagestan and his proclamation in that district.

All these factors lead Azerbaijan and Georgia to consider the possibility of Denikin:

1. Attacking Azerbaijan by sea and land through Dagestan while the Azerbaijan Army is occupied with the Armenians, and the Bolsheviks at Astrachan are ice bound and Denekin's northern front forced into inactivity by the winter.
2. Attacking Georgia through the Bzyb front and Armenia with a view to occupying Batoum as soon as we evacuate.

Dagestan

250-11358

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
16 NOYABR 1919

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Dagestan and Denekin.

The whole of Dagestan appears to be in a ferment. Certain parts, where Denekin is strong enough in armed force, remain loyal.

This seems to be the result of—

1. Mismanagement on the part of Denekin's administration which has made a productive soil for Bolshevik and Turkish intrigues.
2. Bolshevik and Turkish intrigues.
3. Intrigues on the part of the former Hill Government and various Azerbaijan and Georgian sympathisers.

This country was always unsafe under the old regime and required a large garrison. Even then there were many parts of it which were wisely left alone by the Russians. The disturbances seem to be the natural outcome of handing over a large tract of wild and disturbed country to Denekin who cannot spare the necessary troops and has not got the Administrators skilled in handling natives.

Azerbaijan has applied for a mandate to run the country and undertakes to guarantee Denekin's rear.

Bolshevism.—Bolshevism undoubtedly exists in a latent form in Azerbaijan and Georgia, especially amongst the large Russian labour population in Baku.

Considering the unavoidable weakness of the governments of these Republics it seems greatly to their credit that they have been able to combat it. Nothing is heard of Communist activity in either Republic. Of both Bolshevik and Communist activity more is heard from Dagestan and Transcaucasia. In these districts the doctrines of Bolshevism seem more freely accepted as a possible antidote to bad local administration by the Russians, and also owing to the subtle overtures made by the Bolsheviks to the C.U.P. and various PanIslamic societies.

1/13/19

Denekin/

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
16 NOYABR 1919

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Denikin contends that Georgia is already Bolchevic, and that Azerbaijan may become so. This is not confirmed by any of our Civil or Military Representatives on the spot. In fact all information points to the contrary. They might however prefer Bolchevic, not Communist, rule to the old form of Russian administration.

The Moscow Bolchevics have access to Transcaaspia and information seems to point to their having prepared this country for their headquarters in event of Denikin and others pushing them out of Russia.

Batoum. This province is of course ethnologically Georgia. Before our evacuation it ought to be decided to whom we intend handing over. Should we evacuate without formulating some agreement between the contending parties it would be a signal for an occupation by Denikin and an attack on Georgia by his forces through the Bzyb front.

From information received Denikin's agents are intriguing in this area and protests have been received by Mr. Wardrop from the Georgian Government against our employing Russian officers in an administrative capacity.

Mr. Maskarashvilli an agent of the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was shot at and wounded by a Russian Customs official because he objected to the search of a Mr. Panmatti who was travelling on official business for the Georgian Government. A Russian Officer arrested the Georgian officials at a railway station because they refused to accept Don money in payment of his fare. Mr. Wardrop reports a good deal of discontent in the Batoum Province owing to the administration of Russian officials.

The administration at present is run by a locally formed executive with a Municipal Council under British control.

in
General Newcombe who is Trans Caucasian on a special Mission for the Treasury reports that the food question is

252-4358 becoming

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
16 NOYABR 1919

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becoming serious and considerable difficulty is found in getting supplies from the Kuban owing to Denikin's blockade of Georgia (against which we have protested) On September 12th the General Officer Commanding requested that no more refugees be sent to Batoum.

Oil Our requirements of liquid fuel are 4,000 tons monthly for Naval purposes and 2,000 tons monthly for the Anatolian Railway.

The General Officer Commanding Constantinople telegraphed on 20.9.19 advising our retention of Batoum to avoid a scramble for it on the part of the Georgians, Russians and Turks and saw no menace to our garrison provided we hold the Bosphorous.

The Italians have offered to Georgia to garrison Batoum while the Georgians ask us to retain it as a coaling station and naval and Military base.

The French Embassy enquired on November 4th as to the status of Batoum and we informed ^{them} him that it would be difficult to discuss the question without raising the whole question of Transcaucasian affairs.

(Signed.), R. McDonell.

15/11/19.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYAT DİREKTORUNUN TELEQRAMI
10 YANVAR 1919

B.I/1689. (M.I.2.)

6223

64

10th January, 1919.

The Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with reference to his letter No.B.I/1602 (M.I.2.) of the 7th January regarding a local rising in Azerbaijan, begs to inform him that he has received the following report dated the 7th January from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia:-

"Local rising is suppressed and communication with Shusha re-established. Search being made for local leaders who have not yet been arrested".

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

MESOPOTAMİYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
5 YANVAR 1919

SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

59

From:- G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia. Desp. 11.20. 5.1.19.
Recd. 00.30. 6.1.19.
to:- War Office.
repeated India.

X.4844 5th. Baku report Jan.4th.

1. Major Gibbon reports from Shusha that owing to local rising against Azerbaijan Government led by Turks of ?(Group omitted) road near Dudac is interrupted.

This confirmed by local government who have taken action.

Troops of Azerbaijan army now moving to arrest Turkish leaders and break up rising. Armenians are not implicated in this affair.

2. General Thomson with Brig.Gen. Beach and Lt.Col.Stokes left Baku Jan.4th for Tiflis to meet Gen. Forestier Walker.

3. Local strike of druggists and chemists is having greater effect than other strikes as Baku now is full of influenza. There is also a typhus epidemic some 30 cases among townspeople occurring daily. Among British Troops total of 10 cases. to date. Measures being taken.

4. Above communicated to General Milne.

BAŞ XƏZİNƏDARLIĞIN FORİN OFİSƏ MƏKTUBU
19 DEKABR 1919

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Any reply to this letter should be addressed to—
THE SECRETARY,
TREASURY,
WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W. 1.
and the following number quoted.

TREASURY CHAMBERS.

December 1919.

52157
19

My Lord,

With reference to your letter of the 4th instant (156991/M.E.58) and previous correspondence on the subject of the sums due by His Majesty's Government to the Provisional Government of Azerbaijan, I am directed by the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury to request you to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that General Newcombe has now returned to this country and that the questions dealt with by him during his Mission to the Caucasus were discussed, on the 11th instant between General Newcombe and representatives of the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Treasury. I am now to request that, if Lord Curzon sees no objection, Mr. Wardrop may be asked to inform the Provisional Government of Azerbaijan to the following effect -

(1) His Majesty's Government recognise as due to that Government the amounts advanced by the State Bank of Baku for direct military expenditure by British troops
in

Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

BAŞ XƏZİNƏDARLIĞIN FORİN OFİSƏ MƏKTUBU
19 DEKABR 1919

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in the Caucasus. My Lords understand that the Army Paymaster's accounts under this heading are being made up on the principles recommended by General Newcombe in his note to the Financial Adviser at Constantinople dated the 4th ultimo (T.R.10/8) a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

This account will be completed within a few weeks and the Azerbaijan Government will then be informed of the total amount due to them. The settlement of this amount, however, will not be made until the question of the future status of Azerbaijan has been settled.

(2) His Majesty's Government do not regard any liability as attaching to the British Government in respect of non-military expenditure incurred on behalf of, and for the benefit of, the population of Azerbaijan, and accordingly General Newcombe's letter to the President of Azerbaijan dated the 29th September last (T.R.1/8) is confirmed (a copy of this letter is enclosed with Treasury letter (46628/19) of the 19th ultimo). (*m/44211*)

(3) Further consideration has been given to the question of the securities belonging to the State Bank of Baku which were taken over by the military authorities from General Bicherakoff, in view of the fact that the Azerbaijan Government has recognised the State Bank as

being

BAŞ XƏZİNƏDARLIĞIN FORİN OFİSƏ MƏKTUBU
19 DEKABR 1919

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being a branch of the Russian State Bank and an independent organisation, It is now considered that these securities may be returned to the State Bank in exchange for a full indemnity against any claims in respect of the transaction which may be made by any future Russian Government or otherwise, *and a receipt on behalf of the Russian State Bank.* A copy of a letter of even date which They have caused to be addressed to the War Office on the subject is enclosed herewith.

I am,

My Lord,

Your obedient Servant,

B. H. H.

NEFT ADMINISTRASIYASININ İCLAS PROTOKOLU
18 YANVAR 1919

OIL SUPPLIES IN THE CAUCASUS.

478

A meeting was held at the Office of the Petroleum Executive on the 16th January to consider the above question. Representatives of the Admiralty, War Office, Ministry of Shipping, Foreign Office and Department of Overseas Trade were present.

It was pointed out that in view of the advance of the Bolshevik Forces the suggestion had been made that the stocks of oil at Baku should be evacuated and it was understood that as an alternative the question of destroying the stocks and oil fields had also been considered. As the stocks of oil at Baku amount to nearly 4,000,000 tons of all descriptions, and the production is about 300,000 tons of crude oil a month, it is obviously quite impracticable to remove any appreciable quantity to Batoum since the total capacity of the pipeline and available tank cars is almost certain not to exceed 50,000 tons a month. As regards the proposal to destroy the stocks and fields it was recognised that the matter was, in the first place, one of expediency and in the second, one of practicability. As regards the former it would probably be desirable from the point of view of placing obstacles in the path of Bolshevism, to destroy the oil but to make such a step really effective it would be necessary to deal not only with the Baku but with the Grosny fields. Even then there would be smaller areas such as Imba and Ferghana, from which considerable quantities could be obtained for military purposes. On the other hand it was strongly urged, particularly by the representatives of the Foreign Office and the Department of Overseas Trade, that the distribution of oil from Baku through Russia was essential to the restoration of industry and commerce in Russia, and this would form one of the most potent means of combating Bolshevism.

As regards the practicability of destroying the stocks and oil fields it was pointed out that this would be a very big operation and would be almost certain to excite the bitter hostility of the inhabitants. The Baku fields extend over practically the whole of the Apsheron Peninsula and there are over 50 refineries at Baku. The number of workmen employed is stated to be about 60,000 on whose passive, if not, active resistance

NEFT ADMINISTRASIYASININ İCLAS PROTOKOLU
16 YANVAR 1919

- 2 -

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it would be necessary to count. Large forces would therefore be needed, not only for the actual work of destruction, but to maintain communications. Further, it is extremely unlikely that the destruction under the most favourable circumstances could be so complete as to prevent partial restoration within a comparatively short time. As an alternative to the destruction of the fields it was suggested that if allied control of the Caspian were maintained, transport could be disorganised so as to prevent any of the oil going into the interior of Russia by the usual route via the Volga. This, however, would involve occupation of the port of Baku and the maintenance of supplies to the force detailed for this purpose.

It was mentioned as being conceivable that the Shell Group who have succeeded in starting the export of oil from Baku via Batoum on a considerable scale, might be able even if Baku fell into Bolshevik hands to continue to obtain supplies.

The conclusions formed at the meeting were:-

- (1) The evacuation of oil stocks was impossible.
- (2) The destruction of stocks, fields and refineries, whilst practicable would probably be only partially effective and would involve the employment of large military forces, and almost certainly great loss of life among civilians. Prevention of transport on the Caspian Sea was an alternative but this also would require armed occupation and the employment of large forces.
- (3) The destruction of the oil fields would render impossible any improvement in the internal economic condition of Russia.

AZƏRBAYCAN-BRİTANIYA MÜŞAVİRƏSİNİN PROTOKOLU
19 AVQUST 1919

C O P Y. of copy.

84

BRITISH HEADQUARTERS

Baku, August 19th. 1919.

No. 934.

To.-His Excellency,
The Minister President,
Azerbaijan Government.

I. I beg to confirm, as under, the agreement come to at the meeting which took place at your Ministry on August 18th. 1919, at which the undermentioned Ministers and British Representatives were present.-

HAZIB BEK USUBBEKOFF	Minister President.
ALI AGA GASANOFF	Finance Minister.
KHUDADAT BEK MELIK ASLANOFF	Minister of Ways & Communications /President of the Financial & Economic Commission/.

Brigadier-General E.J.F.VAUGHAN	
Mr.de BILINSKI.	British Government Agent acting for British Trade Corporation /Managing Director National Bank of Turkey.
Mr.T.HENWELCKE.	British Manager, Baku Branch Russian State Bank.

2/. A Proclamation, as per signed copy attached, will be published by me to-day.

3/. Although not in any way bound to do so, the British Military Authorities, taking into consideration the fact that the Azerbaijan Government provided, at their request, the Baku Branch at various times with Baku Bonds, consent to authorise that Bank to reduce the Finance Ministers account at the Bank by a sum of fifty million five hundred thousand Baku Bonds, advanced to the British Military Authorities by the Bank.

4 . The British Military Authorities further agree that

AZƏRBAYCAN-BRİTANIYA MÜŞAVİRƏSİNİN PROTOKOLU
19 AVQUST 1919

-E-

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this amount of fifty million five hundred thousand Baku Bonds to the credit of the Azerbaudzan Government in the same way as the sixty million Baku Bonds handed by your Government to the British Military Authorities.

- 5/. The two amounts mentioned in Para.4. amounting together to one hundred and ten million five hundred thousand are to be refunded to the Azerbaijan Government by such means as, and at such time as, decided upon by the Peace Conference.
- 6/. The British Military Authorities will also authorise the Baku Branch of the Russian State Bank to credit the Finance Minister, in a separate special account/by debit of the Azerbaijan Governments current account at the Bank/ with about sixty million Baku Bonds paid by the Bank, by order of the British Military Authorities, for Russian Account.
- 7/. The amount mentioned in § 6 will be refunded to the Azerbaijan Government by such means as, and at such time, as the Peace Conference decides upon, either through the Baku Branch of the Russian State Bank or through any other channels.

/Signed / E.J.F.VAUGHAN
Brigadier General.

Copy to Mr.Heweloke.

A True Copy.

KONSTANTINOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRBARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
30 OKTYABR 1919

SECRET.

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.
PARAPHRASE.

From B.H.Q., Constantineple.
To :- War Office.

1485 19

5 NOV 1919

241

espached 2000 30th October, 1919.
Received 0815 3rd November, 1919.

I. 7490x33th.

Continuance of my I. 7477 October 26th.
Information regarding supply to Azerbaijan has now been received.

Colonel Stokes interviewed president of Azerbaijan Government October 24th by whom he was informed that Italians had offered ammunition, arms and uniforms for Azerbaijan Army. Pattern of arms is to be decided in Italy. Azerbaijan officer has gone to Italy in order to arrange deal.

C2. Copies to :- S. of S. F.O. (Mr. Gregory).
Sec. F.O. (Mr. Kidston).
C.I.G.S. Ad (D.N.I.).
D.C.I.G.S. I.O. (Col. Pepsy).
D.H.O. D.D.H.O. F.O.
M.O.I. 2a. 3. 5. 6a. Versailles.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I. F.O. (I.D.C.E.).
M.I. 2. 2a. 2b.
M.I.H. Ra. Rf.
M.I.C.b.
D.S.D.
Lord Curzon.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN MƏLUMATI
9 NOYABR 1919

178

G.H.Q.
General Staff
"Intelligence"
Constantinople,
No. 3931/13 "I".

VERY SECRET.

NOTE ON SUPPLY OF WAR MATERIAL BY ITALY

to the

TRANS-CAUCASIAN STATES.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. On October 15th information was received from the War Office to the effect that, according to the statement of the Azerbaijan Minister of War, Italy was offering large supplies of munitions to the Azerbaijan Government. Further information on the subject was desired.
2. This information was forwarded to Colonel STOKES on October 18th with a request that he should forward any available information on the subject.
3. No further information on the subject of supply of munitions to Azerbaijan was received till October 24th (see para. 10 below) but meanwhile evidence from an entirely independent source showed that similar negotiations were being carried on between ITALY and GEORGIA.

SUPPLY OF MUNITIONS TO GEORGIA.

4. On October 18th the British Intelligence Officer BATUM reported that some days earlier he had been informed of the existence of certain documents relative to the Georgian Army copies of which could be obtained on payment. Copies were accordingly obtained. Amongst them was a report signed by General KAZBEK (Inspector of Georgian Artillery) and dated September 12th, 1919.
5. This list (copy is attached - see Appendix "A") shows in detail the numbers of rifles, guns, sights, instruments, etc. and quantities of ammunition, both for artillery and for small-arms, which it was proposed to obtain from ITALY.
6. A supplementary list (see Appendix "B") was attached showing material "Necessary to obtain in case of the impossibility of purchasing the material parts of the armament" which presumably implied impossibility of completing the equipment of guns already in possession of the Georgian Army.
7. In forwarding these reports, the British Intelligence Officer BATUM stated (presumably from information obtained by the Agent who provided the reports) that ITALY would be paid by export of Manganese peroxide and similar products. For this traffic POTI is the only suitable port BATUM being out of the question and no other port possessing suitable accommodation.

8.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN MƏLUMATI
9 NOYABR 1919

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- 2 -

8. In this connection the British Intelligence Officer BATUM pointed out that:-
 - a. It was reported that one or two months previously two Italian ships were laden at POTI. These were the S.S. "SCRIVIA" which was laden with 500 tons of Manganese peroxide, and the S.S. "ST. GEORGE" which was laden with 1,200 tons of washed Manganese. These ships were bound for GENOA to discharge their cargoes for the works of ALTI PORTI DI PIOMPINO.
 - b. According to an official announcement in the "SLOVO" paper dated October 16th, the Italian ferry service which had formerly run from Constantinople to POTI via BATUM, would in future run to POTI via ODESSA, calling at BATUM after leaving POTI.
 - c. One of the Italian Political Representatives at TIFLIS was also a commercial agent for the company MAFRA ITALIANO. His representative at BATUM was a certain VALATSI.
9. There being no Allied Control at POTI it is clear that arms and munitions could be freely imported into Georgia.

SUPPLY OF MUNITIONS TO AZERBAIJAN.

10. Having received the information forwarded from Constantinople on October 18th (see para. 2 above), Colonel STOKES held an interview on October 24th with the President of the Azerbaijan Government. The President informed him that ITALY had offered to supply arms, ammunition and uniform for the Azerbaijan Army. The pattern of arms was to be decided in ITALY and an Azerbaijan Officer had accordingly been despatched to ITALY to arrange the deal.

11. Further details were received from the British Intelligence Officer BAKU, who reported on October 27th that ITALY had offered to obtain for Azerbaijan 25,000 rifles, engineering stores and four 150 m/m guns. General USUPOV was arranging the deal.

NOTE:- General USUPOV had been reported a few days earlier to be on his way to CONSTANTINOPLE where he intended to recruit Turkish officers. This report was no doubt inaccurate in view of the later report that he was on his way to ITALY to arrange for the supply of armament.
There is as yet no news of his arrival at CONSTANTINOPLE.

Issued by General Staff
"Intelligence".
Army of the Black Sea
Constantinople.

9.11.19.

Copies to:-

War Office (2)
File (1)

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
3 DEKABR 1919

269

RUSSIA.

159016

DEC 6 1919
POLITICAL.

Decypher from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) December 3rd.

D. 8.00 p. m. December 3rd. 1919.

R. 5.25 p. m. 5th.

No. 173

-----oOo-----

Secret.

Following is substance of reports (? dated
(November 30th) from Colonel Stokes, Baku:

November 30th M. Ussubekov exhibited to Col.
Stokes copies of intercepted letters from Russians in
Petrovsk to friends in Baku stating that Donikin's troops
will soon be there.

Nuri attempted to agitate in Baku but Mussalat
(? party) sent petitions asking for his arrest and
Ussubekov personally told Nuri that he must be quiet
or he would be imprisoned so he has left Baku for some
unspecified destination but not for Transcaspia (as he ?)
wished.

Ussubekov said that Khalil Pasha is in Armenia.
(? He) gave no information about Enver and Kuchuk Talaat
but Colonel Stokes learns from good source that former
is not in Azerbaijan or Asia Minor.

Prime Minister also asserted pro-Turk activity in
Azerbaijan (group omitted) feeble (? and) only supported
by (group undecypherable) Tehad (? party) who have
little influence. (? He thought that) Enver and his
friends had ceased to count for much in Turkey where
leading

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
3 DEKABR 1919

270

2.

sewing party was (? neutral) including some Russian
Muslims of his acquaintance. Azerbaijan could hardly expel
Enver's friends who came as refugees but would see that they
did not agitate.

In Transcaspia Muslims are now anti-Bolshevik
and will probably make a coup d'état which could easily be
assisted from Azerbaijan if His Majesty's Government
(? approved) and supported and promised independence to
Muslims of Transcaspia. (~~undoubtedly~~ ^{Even}) without such
a roval ~~move~~ ^{movement} would happen but under control of Turkish
adventurers who are there.

Finally Prime Minister complained that Armenian
Government despite agreement of November 23rd were continuing
military operations, and had destroyed nine villages.

Above is 173. repeated to Constantinople 50.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
16 DEKABR 1919

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should
be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.

528

RUSSIA.

(162985.)

POLITICAL.

Telegram (en clair) from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

D. December 15th. 1919.
R. 19th.

No. 205.

-----oOo-----

Following telegram in English received from Baku
tonight addressed Haskell and Wardrop begins -

December 14th. First session Azerbaijan and Armenian
Conference took place, inaugurated by Minister Foreign Affairs,
who on part of Government addressed Assembly with short
speech and announced names of Azerbaijan Delegates; Khan
Khoisky also Chairman of the Delegation named Gassan Gadjinok
and Do Rza Aga Vekeloff of Tss, Armenian Prince Argutsky
Dologoroukoff, Bekzadian and Aroutiunian their Chairman. The
Members of Parliament headed by their President, Agaeff,
Government officials, the Georgian Diplomatic representative,
the Chairman of Georgian Armenian National Councils were
present. After opening of Conference, Khan Khoisky presiding,
he delivered speech of greeting remarking that present
Conference opens in condition favourable for successful
conclusion of its work, as ground for it has been prepared
by previous conferences which have worked out the way to solv-
ing all questions to be discussed between Azerbaijan and
Armenia. The Chairman of Armenian Delegation, Arouturian,
on greeting the Azerbaijan people in a free Azerbaijan
expressed hope that Conference will yield positive results.
Subsequently congratulatory telegram from Your Excellency
the

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
16 DEKABR 1919

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the Government Armenian National Council, Dasmaksiutian
party and Azerbaijan Parliament were made known. In
compliance with wish of some of members, who on acquaintance
with the questions put forth by both Governments expressed
necessity for complementary questions, Conference
decreed presentation by respective Delegations of complete
programme of questions liable to discussion on the next
sitting of the Conference fixed on Wednesday the 17th of
December. In these Conferences the chair will be
taken alternately by the Chairman of the respective
Delegations. Signed, Director of the Chancery
Chouremovir. Ends.

Sent to Foreign Office, 205
Reputed to Constantinople, 66.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
24 OKTYABR 1919

172

RUSSIA.

147980

24 NOV 1919

Decypher from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) October 24th.

D. 9 a. m. October 24th. 1919.

R. 2.45 p.m. November 1st.

No. 99.

-----oOo-----

Urgent.

Azerbaijan Government are greatly disturbed by fear of attack from Denikin.

I have today received from them Note on the subject of Caspian fleet handed over by us last August.

They say that this surrender in itself caused alarm and led to a protest in reply to which General Cory gave an assurance "that fleet would not (? undertake) any action against Azerbaijan" and he had previously said this more than once.

This did not altogether remove fears of Government and they are now fully justified by a communication from General Denikin's agent dated October 17th enclosing statement dated September 21st. signed by Vice-Admiral Gerasimon that in accordance with Act 8 of Treaty of Turkmenshai, signed in 1828 between Russia and Persia he will not permit any (? Azerbaijan) Naval force in Caspian or any merchant vessels under any (? flag) but (? Russian.)
Azerbaijan

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
24 OKTYABR 1919

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2.

Azerbaijan Government consider this demand an aggressive action against them by Denikin who is thus misusing naval power handed over to him by His Majesty's Government.

Government therefore have addressed protest to Denikin's agent saying:

- (1) That Turkmenshai treaty does not apply to Azerbaijan which being possessed of a national fleet will not put it under a foreign flag.
- (2) They consider General Denikin's demand as tending to disturb neighbourly relations between them and as an aggressive action inconsistent with Denikin's desire to enter into agreement or economic and other questions.
- (3) Azerbaijan Government therefore protests against demand and will continue to keep its fleet under its National flag.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate the above to Your Lordship so that measures may be taken to prevent possible complications.

I may add increasing nervousness of apparent dislike of Transcaucasia renders my task more disloyalty and more difficult.

If His Majesty's Government could enable me to give some comforting (? assurance) to the three republics, this would help me enormously.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 NOYABR 1919

RUSSIA

POLITICAL

48159

214

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop. (Tiflis). October 31st. 1919.

D. 10.0.a.m. November 2nd. 1919.

R. 10.0.a.m. November 3rd. 1919.

No. 106. Very Urgent.

Strictly Confidential.

Following are notes of a private unofficial conversation lasting two hours between Colonel Stokes and Prime Minister of Azerbaijan Ussubbekov at Baku on October 24th.

1. Italians have offered Azerbaijan arms, munitions of war, uniforms and Azerbaijan officer has gone to Italy to arrange details, patterns, etc.

2. Aliat Julfa (?railway) concession has not been given to Italians but they have offered labour. No concession can be granted without knowledge of Parliament.

3. Caspian flotilla (see my telegram No. 99 October 29th).

Following very secret confidential.

Ussubekov has secretly issued instructions not to fly Azerbaijan flag (?in) Caspian. He admitted that misconduct of certain persons on guard ship might have given pretext to General Denikin to act as he has done.

4. Nuri has been sent away but will not go to Daghestan. Also Baha-ed-Uddin who was prominent Turkish official in Baku last year.

5. Numerous Bolsheviks from Baku have been arrested and

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
2 NOYABR 1919

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- 2 -

and sent to Petrovsk.

Rising in Daghestan was not ~~Polish~~ ^{Bolshevik} either in origin or tendency but there are Bolsheviks in Daghestan whose people threatened with destruction by Denikin naturally accepted any kind of aid. If Daghestan were handed over to (Azerbaijan) Bolsheviks would soon be got rid of. Azerbaijan Delegation in Paris is being instructed to protest to Peace Conference against Colonel Rowlandson's proclamation.

7. Khan Khoisky will probably replace Jafarov as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister (gr.undec.) think that Jafarov was taking bribes from Italians or Nobel or others but his style of (? living) (according to information received from another source by Colonel Stokes) seems to justify some such suspicions.

8. As regards Jafarov's recent statement that Azerbaijan's best policy was to play off Great Britain against America Prime Minister said idea was absurd and he Ussubekov held no such opinion.

9. Monsieur Ussubekov was very anxious to know our general policy towards Islam especially (?with reference to) Turkey and Turkestan, etc. His Excellency said he would (?gladly) use his influence in our favour with Turks if we were friendly to them.

10. He seemed to be thoroughly alive to fact that fate of Azerbaijan lies in the hands of Peace Conference and that nothing should be done to alienate goodwill of Conference. But he fears Denikin may forestall Conference and by his present policy (?provokes) (gr.undec.) pretext for bombarding Baku and facilitating Conference (4 grs.undec.).

(Z.116-4).

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
18 OKTYABR 1919

RUSSIA.

547
143527
21 OCT 1919
POLITICAL

Decypher from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) October 13th.

D. 9.10 p. m. October 18th. 1919.
K. 10.45 a. m. 20th.

No. 75. Very Urgent.

(R.)

-----000-----

Supplementary to (? my telegram) 74 of October 12th
Gragy reports from Erivan October 12th. Begins:

1. Armenians negotiating with Azerbaijan for conference between them and Georgians to settle all boundary questions.

2. Azerbaijan ~~Does~~ ^{(?) fully} accepts Col. Haskell's proposal for neutral zone in Sharur, Nakhichevan Ordubad districts.

Following are chief points in proposal.

- a. ^{leaving} ~~said that~~ Zangezura district ^{with} ~~(group undecypherable)~~ (? Government) by National (? Council).
- b. Darlagouz (? district) remains in Armenia.
- c. Sharur (? and) Nakhichevan (? districts) including (? all of) (? Ordubad) (? district) form neutral zone under American military governor who will reopen railway (? on) December 1st.)
- d. Expenses of Government of neutral zone to be realised out of local taxation.
- e. Col. Rhea (Acting during the absence in Paris of (Col. Haskell?) proceeds to zone in about a week to organise Government.

I hope to leave for Erivan October 14th and I intend to visit also Yechmiadzın Novo Bayazid Dalijan Karaklis Alexandropol, returning to Tiflis about October 19th.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
17 NOYABR 1919

SECRET

Paraphrase.

From - G.N.O., Constantinople.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 14.00 17.11.19.
Received:- 20.00 30.11.19.

I.7621 November 17th.

Intelligence Officer Tiflis reports reliable information to effect that Azerbaijan will shortly take district Zangezura from Armenians by force. President Armenian republic informed Wardrop November 5th that Azerbaijan was sending 7,000 regular troops to Zangezura to join 5,000 Kurdish and 3,000 insurgents from Nakhichevan in contravention of agreement with Haskell. Armenian President requested Wardrop to intervene. Paragraph comments. Above indicates attitude of Armenians who maintain that Zangezura is part of Armenian republic whereas, pending further decision, this area has been included in Azerbaijan from the first although governed by local Armenian Council, plebiscite being principally Armenian.

O.2. Copies to:-

S. of S.
Secretary,
C.I.G.S., D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.P.M.O.
M.O. 1.2.2b.3.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2. & B.
M.I.R. & B.
M.I.6B.
D.S.D.
Lord Curzon.
F.O. (Mr. Kidston).
Ad. (D.N.I.).
Paris.
Versailles.
I.D.C.E.

FORİN OFİSİN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
13 FEVRAL 1919

Registry No. 22972/7.34.

(33059) W: 2572/178 10000 30/18 H & J, Ltd

338

F.O.,

Draft.

February 13 1919.

Sir P. Cox,

11-5

Teheran.

No. 00

Your telegram No.59.

Persian Minister states that he has received from his Government a despatch reporting that Armenians have broken agreement and committed atrocities.

Copy to D.M.I.
I.O.

Telegram refers to the appeal made to Persian Government by Naxtchevanis for protection and aid.

Have you any later report?

Lo 12 Feb

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
23 DEKABR 1919

his Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.

193

RUSSIA.

(166824.)

POLITICAL.

Telegram. (in code) from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)

D. December 23rd, 1919.

R. January 2nd, 1920.

No. 229.

-----oOo-----

Following substance of telegram received from Baku dated today begins -

December 21st. Plenary session Armenian-Azerbaijan Conference. Questions prepared in Committee submitted and supplemented by Azerbaijan with Judicial, by Armenia with Consular questions, Azerbaijan proposed discussion Confederation all Transcaucasian Republics as such political union best and most effective method to settle territorial disputes and other matters, Armenians while not opposing proposal in principle said it was unexpected and must consult Government and receive full powers especially as Georgia must be invited. Decided to adjourn Conference to Tiflis where representatives of the three Republics will discuss Confederation while parallel conference deals with exclusively Azerbaijan Armenian questions. Both parties declared all disputes must in future be solved peacefully. Ends.

SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
25 OKTYABR 1919

263

No. 7/1
British Legation,
Teheran.
25th October 1919.

24

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose translation of a memorandum which I have received from the Persian Government, charging the Armenians with committing atrocities upon Moslems at Erivan, Nakhichevan and Kars and holding the Allied Governments responsible for redressing these wrongs.

It is possible that the Armenians, seeing themselves threatened on so many sides, may have attempted to forestall attacks such as that against Erivan which appears to be contemplated (see my telegram No. 672 of October 8th). I have no information regarding Kars and such as I have about the other districts mentioned inclines me to believe that the extent and nature of the alleged excesses are probably exaggerated. In any case it is of course idle to maintain that the Allied Governments can be held responsible for what is nothing but the latest incident in a blood-feud on a large scale between Christians and Mohammedans which was in existence long before the Armistice.

I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the High Commissioner at Constantinople and to the High Commissioner at Tiflis.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
humble Servant.

The Right Honourable
The Earl Curzon of Kedleston K.G.
etc. etc. etc.

P. I. Cox

Ə. TOPÇUBAŞOVUN BRİTANIYA NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNƏ MƏKTUBU
3 OKTYABR 1919

(19366) 1 88235

République d'Azerbaïdjan
Delegation de Paix

1e 3d October 1919 OCT 1919

ridge's Hotel,
74 Avenue des Champs-Élysées.

87

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE BRITISH DELEGATION
TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE
IN PARIS

Mr. President

On August 26th, I received through the military section of the British Delegation a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijanian Republic, which I took the liberty to return to the said Section, with the request to explain its contents, which wanted clearness.

The above mentioned Section had kindness to carry out my request and forwarded to us a corrected form of the telegram, a copy of which you will find enclosed.

This telegram shows that the Government of the Azerbaijanian Republic demands from me as president of the Azerbaijanian delegation to apply to the British Government and ask them to give the Azerbaijanian Delegation money as a part payment of the debt owing the Government of Azerbaijan by the British Army Commandment in the Caucasus.

Of course the Government of the Azerbaijanian Republic was obliged to have recourse to this method by the great difficulties of communications between Paris and Baku, especially for forwarding currency.

Referring to the despatch received, I beg to ask you, Mr. President, to be so kind as to use your influence with the British Government in order to hasten the payment to the Delegation presided by me, of the advance on the debt owing to my country.

I beg to believe me to be most truly yours.

(Sd.) A. V. Topchibacheff

Président de la Délégation
de la
République D'Azerbaïdjan

MESOPOTAMİYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
26 NOYABR 1919

368

From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office. Repeated India, Salonika and Constantinople.

X.3096. 26th November.

Following from Thomson dated Baku November 23rd.

In Baku situation is favourable for coalition Government except for Professor Golavin of Ufa who tries to obtain unconditional promise from all parties to support his Government instead of drawing factions together in task of killing Bolshevism and restoring order before embarking on politics. Azerbaijan Army has now been placed at our disposal 20,000 is its reputed strength with nucleus of Turkish officers and men and renegade Russians. Immediate removal from the Army of all Turks has been ordered. 2. As to future following is Thomson's opinion which I submit without comment. (A) At an early date Allies should carry out complete demobilization and disarming at any rate of machine guns the 6 million inhabitants of Trans-Caucasus. (B) Provisional recognition should be given immediately by Allies to autonomous provincial Government in Georgia Russian Armenian and Caucasian Azerbaijan leaving question of Russian suzerainty in abeyance. A small Allied gendarmerie would suffice under these conditions and be welcomed. (C) The form of Russian central government of the future is source of intense suspicion and anxiety. If we force them to accept any supreme government before they can satisfy themselves that it bears no relation to the Old Russian regime in Caucasus, then for a considerable time a large army of occupation may be necessary.

SER KROUNUN QOŞMA MƏKTUBU
7 OKTYABR 1919

86



138895

BRITISH DELEGATION,
9 COVENTRY ST.

No. 1914.
342/13/4/19366.

Sir E. Crowe presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and has the honour to enclose the accompanying copy of a letter from the Azerbaijan Delegation to the Peace Conference, addressed to the British Delegation regarding the payment of certain monies alleged to be owed to the Azerbaijan Government by the British military authorities.

Sir E. Crowe would be glad if this matter could be referred to the Treasury and the War Office and if he could be informed in due course as to the reply which should be returned to M. Toptchibacheff.

7th. October, 1919.

ALYANSIN ALİ ŞURASININ İCLAS PROTOKOLU
18 DEKABR 1919

MEETING OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL HD 113 DECEMBER 18th 1919 10:30 AM
MINUTE 3 AND APPENDIX C

tory reply to the said note, it was impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to raise the blockade measures which had been taken towards Roumania on August 25, 1919.⁵

3. The Council had before it a telegram from Colonel Haskell, dated December 1, 1919, transmitted by the American Delegation. (See Appendix C.)

*Line of demarcation
between the Government
of General Denikin and
the states of the
Caucasus*

M. CAMBON asked whether the American Delegation supported Colonel Haskell's proposal.

MR. WALLACE replied that it did not, but was contented with transmitting it: Colonel Haskell, he would

add, had acted in this matter as an Interallied representative.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he feared that if Colonel Haskell's proposal were adopted, it would create serious difficulties. The zone assigned to General Denikin had been fixed a long time ago: he thought that if the line then fixed were changed, they would be raising a wasps' nest. The present situation was very confused; they had no authority over General Denikin. How could they tell him that he must retire beyond a new line which would be fixed by them? If he refused to obey, how could the Council enforce its decisions? The whole problem of the Caucasus was involved, and of that they knew very little and exercised over it no control. His opinion was very clear: they should leave things as they were; though of course, he was quite ready to draw the attention of his Government to that proposal.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Haskell proposal had made an extremely favourable impression on him. It was calculated to protect from troubles and disorders of all kinds a region most important for them, economically speaking. They knew what guerilla warfare meant as practised in those countries, and what ruins it accumulated. It would be to the advantage of those territories to fix a limit to the advance of the Denikin Army. Sir Eyre Crowe thought that a decision in that question was of considerable political importance; he agreed, but asked whether it would not be possible to say that the fixing of the new line of demarcation would not prejudice the final settlement of the problem.

M. MATSUI said that he was not informed on the subject; he was, however, very much struck by Sir Eyre Crowe's argument.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in his opinion the difficulties were greater than M. de Martino seemed to think. General Denikin actually occupied the territories in question; they would therefore have to drive him out.

M. STRANIERI said that, according to information in their hands, Denikin had occupied the northern slopes of the Caucasus, 'The Republic of the Mountaineers', but had not occupied the Daghestan.

M. CAMBON said that it seemed to him very difficult to take a decision in such a state of uncertainty.

M. DE MARTINO admitted that they should first make out exactly what the situation was and that the examination of the question might be then taken up.

563

LORD KERZONUN İTALİYA SƏFİRİNƏ TELEQRAMI
14 NOYABR 1919

No. 541
Earl Curzon to the Marquis Imperiali
[149045/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1919

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Italian Ambassador and with reference to His Excellency's confidential Memorandum of November 3rd,¹ has the honour to state that the question of the recognition of Georgia is involved with that of the other Transcaucasian Republics, which is in turn bound up with the settlement of the whole Russian question, and, in a lesser degree, with the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty.

The whole question is receiving the most careful attention of His Majesty's Government, and in the opinion of Lord Curzon it is impossible at the present juncture for His Majesty's Government to afford any indication of their policy beyond the expression of sympathy with Georgian aspirations which, as the Italian Government are aware, has already been given.

¹ No. 509.

LORD KERZONUN SER P. KOKSA TELEQRAMI
14 NOYABR 1919

No. 542
Earl Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Teheran)
No. 606 Telegraphic [148577/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, November 14, 1919

Your telegram 717¹ (November 4th).

Answer to (a) is in the negative.

It is quite impossible to give any answer at present to your other questions.

Mr. H. G. [J.] Mackinder, M.P. has been appointed British High Commissioner with General Denikin and will shortly leave this country for Denikin's headquarters. On his arrival we hope that it may be possible to come to some general arrangement with regard to Trans-Caucasia.

¹ No. 517.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
31 DEKABR 1919

13

Encl. to 0149/8552

Copy of Cablegram received

Paraphrase

From. G.O.C.in.C, Constantinople.

To. War Office.

31st December, 1919.

O.C.7640, December 31st.

Reference your telegram No. 82772 December 10th.

General Rycroft has returned after conferring with Mr. Wardrop at Tiflis and representative of Azerbaijan Government and Oil Fields Bureau at Baku. Misunderstandings had arisen and mistakes had been made but a satisfactory working basis, it is hoped, now been arrived at. Owing to distance of my headquarters, doubtful communication and large reduction of staff and fact the oil industry so largely controls the political affairs of Azerbaijan, I strongly urge that the administration and supervision of oil matters be transferred to British Chief Commissioner. Mr. Wardrop agrees provided a suitable official with business and financial experience is added to his staff. The small military staff, all temporary officers, now dealing with oil would also be transferred to B.O. Commissioner. Explanatory letter from myself and Mr. Wardrop following. After paying a contribution to Military Governor Batum the oil administration will be self-supporting.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
3 Sentyabr 1919

S E C R E T.

Pa. phrase. Despatched:- 1430 3.9.19.
Received:- 0630 4.9.19.

From H.Q., Constantinople.

To:- War Office. EASTERN DEPARTMENT
I B. 976 September 3rd.

On August 29th. Dennis reported, Volunteer Army Staff had received report of massacres of Russians in Azerbaijan. Dehikin very anxious to avoid conflict with Azerbaijan but if massacre occurred there was confirmed troops destined for Krasnovodsk now concentrating at Petrovsk would be diverted to Baku. I informed him in reply to I 6975 September 2nd. that situation was quiet according to latest information and Government appeared to be exerting full powers to maintain satisfactory situation. I also remarked that Baratov had made speech at Baku stating that hour of deliverance was at hand; a statement which would hardly help to maintain peace if addressed to Russian elements who have undoubtedly suffered from anti-Russian feeling recently. I commented that concentration of troops at Petrovsk would probably promote unrest at Baku owing to suspicion that they would be used against trans-Caucasus and added that "It is most important in my opinion to prevent any Russian advance on Baku which will inevitably lead to disorder".

C.2 Copies to:- M.O.X.

M.O.X. Copies to:- C.I.O.S. D.C.I.O.S. D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.I.2-3 M.C.2-A M.O.3 M.O.5-A D.M.f. M.I.2-B
M.I.6B M.I.8B D.S.D. Paris Versailles
P.O. (Mr. Gregory) P.O. (Lord Curzon) F.O. (Mr. Kiuston)
I.O. (Col. Paps) Admiralty (Capt. Coode) Ad. (D.N.I.) I.D.C.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
7 OKTYABR 1919

RUSSIA.

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
October 7th. 1919.

D. 3.0.p.m. October 7th. 1919.

R. 6.0.p.m. October 9th. 1919.

No. 62. Very Urgent.

Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me to-day and said Aliaty Djul(?) railway is being constructed by his Government. It is untrue that contract has been given to Italians, (see my telegram 49 Paragraph 7).

He assured me again that Azerbaijan is using every endeavour to preserve peace and good relations with all neighbours and thoroughly sympathises with General Denikin's campaign against Bolsheviks which is decidedly in harmony with interests of Azerbaijan but thought his action in Daghestan dangerous and provocative.

He is much disturbed at Colonel Haskell's continued intervention and asked me whether that officer was really authorised by Paris Conference to deal with political affairs of the whole of Trans-Caucasia. I replied I myself was still in some doubt as to exact amount of authority which Colonel Haskell possessed (see your telegram 19 signed by Mr. Edmonds) but in any case in view of existing close friendship between Great Britain and America I thought I could not be far wrong in advising him to do everything possible to conciliate Colonel Haskell.

He said his Government was already trying and would continue to try to follow my advice in this matter but they found military methods in diplomacy and departures from agreements already made (see my tel. 49 paragraph 3) very disconcerting.

M. Djveriaroff ended by saying he would content himself with a mere protest against those of Col. Haskell's proposals with which he disagreed, but would not in fact do anything to prevent their execution.

Col. Haskell leaves for Paris to-morrow but his staff remains.

KAPİTAN QREYSİNİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
19 DEKABR 1919

Enclosure No. 5 Capt. Gracy's Despatch No. 13 of Dec. 22, 1919. 570

PRESS NEWS.

(Translation)

No. 4.



"JOGHOVOURD" (The People)

19th December 1919.

IN THE DISTRICT OF ZANGIBASAR.

Continually news are circulating that the Tartar population of Zangibasar is making preparations, that Turkish agents have come from Bayazet (in Turkey) and that they are teaching the Tartar population not to obey the Armenian Government and they are promising assistance in the event of fighting taking place. They insist that the Tartar population of Zangibasar has received 18 camel loads of cartridges, 3 guns and also Turkish soldiers.

We wish to know what the Government of Armenia is doing? Shall we again see a repetition of the events of Beyuk Vedi?

THE ARMENO-AZERBAIDJAN CONFERENCE.

On the 14th of December in Baku the Armeno-Azerbaijan Conference was opened. The members of the Conference are: Azerbaijani, Mham-KhoySKI, President. Mamed Hasan Hadjinski and Dr. Riza Agha Vekiloff. Armenia, Haroutunian, President. Prince Arghoutian-Yerkaynabazuk, and Begzadian. The two Presidents of the Delegation have spoken together after which the Conference has decided to send telegrams to Allied High Commissioner Col. Haskell, to the Government of Georgia, to the Armenian National Council and to the Fraction of Dashnaktzoutune, and the Parliament of Azerbaijan. The next meeting will take place on the 17th of December.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN MOUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA

AND THE BOLSHEVIKS.

The French Representative in Berlin informs on the 14th of November that there has been an agreement made between Moustafa Pasha and the Bolsheviks according to which the Bolsheviks have promised to allow the transportation of munition in Germany to Asia Minor over the Black Sea.

According to the informations received Talat Bey, Nazim Pasha and Djemal Pasha are now in Berlin with false passports.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI KƏŞFİYYAT BÜROSUNUN MƏLUMATI
10 APREL 1919

(c) Armenia.

A certain amount of friction continues between the Armenians and Tartars in the Nakhichevan district, though the situation is stated to be improving. The former Khan of Nakhichevan Jaffa Koolle Khan, has been deposed, and an Armenian Democratic Council has been instituted in place of the former Council. It is expected that this will produce a general improvement in the situation.

(d) Kars Province.

In consequence of the suggestion that the Province of Kars should be taken over by Armenia for administration, the Armenian Government stated that it could not undertake administration of the Mussulman areas in this province.

On March 7th it was suggested by General Thomson that Armenia should take over administration of Kars and Kagizman, and would work the railway to Sarikamish (which she was willing to do); that Ardaghan, which is inhabited by Mussulman Georgians, should be taken over by Georgia; and that Olti should be included in the Military Governorship of Batoum. It was considered that this arrangement, with the handing over of the Akhalkalaki district to the Georgians with the Borchalinsk area to the Armenians, would produce a minimum amount of friction. In reply I suggested that Ardaghan might be added to the military Governorship of Batoum, as in the case of Olti. This point, however, could be best decided by the British Authorities on the spot. It was clearly understood that any settlement on the above lines was only temporary.

(e) Azerbaijan.

No further information has been received regarding the composition of the new Azerbaijan Cabinet. The Government is stated to be maintaining an obstructive attitude in small matters conducted by the British.

The situation in the Shusha district is stated to remain unsatisfactory owing to the attitude adopted by the Armenians, who comprise the majority of the population of the district. They are obstructing the local Tartar administration, and hold the view that Sultanov, the Tartar Governor General, is a Turkish agent.

The Armenian Government has been warned that no good is gained by this obstruction, and it has been pointed out that both Sultanov and the Azerbaijan Government are responsible to the British for the situation in the Shusha district. The President of the Armenian Republic suggested on March 28th that an Armenian Representative might be sent to the Shusha local Government. He was informed that there was no objection to this course being taken provided it was clearly understood that this Representative should act solely as a Liaison Officer with the Armenian Government.

(f) North Caucasus.

A report of April 2nd gives the following information on the method of Government of the North Caucasus tribes proposed by General Liankov, who is still retained as Military Governor of the Provinces of Terek and Daghestan.

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
4 FEVRAL 1919

Memo by Mr Macdonell.

2 ed

Transcaucasia and the Evacuation of Batoum

During the last two weeks the Cabinet have arrived at three decisions of great moment ~~xxxxi~~ as regards the Caucasus, namely-

1. The recognition of "de facto" government in the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus.
2. To supply these three republics with arms and munitions to resist any possible attack from the Bolsheviks.
3. The immediate evacuation of the British Garrison at Batoum.

I would respectfully point out that

- a) In the minds of the population and governments of these states "de facto" recognition implies a moral obligation on the part of H.M.G. to support the legitimate aims and aspirations of these people, their chief aim being independence.
- b) That the grant of arms and munitions implies a desire on the part of H.M.G. that these states should resist any attempt at Bolshevik aggression and that they should not enter into peace negotiations however profitable such action may appear.
- c) That the evacuation of Batoum must entail the handing over of that province to either Georgia, Deniken, Armenia or some independent party to be established and furnished with a sufficient armed force to maintain order and retain the province.
- d) That in whosoever's favour we evacuate that party will control all communications, exports and imports to the outside world
- e) That our evacuation will ruin all the morale of these republics and give full sway to Bolshevik, Turkish and Russian intrigue.
- f) That the Batoum Province is full of Bolshevik, Turkish, Georgian and Russian agitators and trouble has only been avoided by a just and strong British control.
- g) That the arms we are going to supply to these people will probably first be used in the Batoum Province, *hazarding their life for the preservation of the province.*
- h) That communication with our agents will become uncertain and our prestige in the Caucasus will be ruined.

Our main reasons for remaining in Batoum after the general evacuation from the Caucasus was to ensure communications and the supply of oil necessary for our fleet and the Abatolian railways. This made relief to the populations possible, ensured order, and minimized the risks of a conflict between Deniken and the Republics or any armed conflict for the possession of this province. These reasons appear to be even stronger now.

It is argued by the War Office that owing to Denikens collapse the Caucasus is threatened by the Red Army and that we should therefore immediately withdraw our troops before there is any chance of their becoming embroiled in an actual armed conflict, as the Caucasian States are incapable of holding their own. Surely then these people should be advised to make their own peace with the Bolsheviks even if as is argued the Bolsheviks will demand the passage of their troops into the middle east, for if they are certain to conquer the Caucasus their troops will get passage and we shall have a hostile Caucasus thrown in.

Are we not sure however that there is not a such subtle campaign being carried on behind our backs. The United Russians or followers of Deniken are determined to break the independence

CƏNAB R. MAKDONELİN MEMORANDUMU
4 FEVRAL 1919

2

of the Caucasus at all costs, they are certain of eventual success in their campaign against Bolchevism and the eventual reconstruction of a centralized Empire. This program could only be marred by the recognition of a Caucasian Federation by the Allies or the League of Nations. Such a Federation they realize would spread, first to the Ukraine and the Terek Kuban and Don cossack districts and then eventually all over the Russian Empire. Are we not sure that these people would not rather see the Caucasus definitely under Bolchevik rule for a period, than operating as independent nations hostile to Russia. Again how often have we not heard upholders of Denikin say that it is only when the Red Armies are actually attacking British Possessions that the British Public will consent to the aid in men, munitions, and money that is required.

Without going as far as this Denikin hopes to be called in to assist the Caucasus if they are seriously attacked and thus based on the Caucasus he undoubtedly hopes that pressure will be brought on Poland and Roumania to attack the Bolcheviki at their centre.

The removal of our troops at the present moment will certainly lead the people in the Caucasus to the belief that we have deserted them and knock the bottom out of all the work done by the Foreign Office and British Representatives on the spot.

Whereas with a Brigade in Batoum the Republic could be staffed in morale with every hope of their maintaining their position against a peril. Without these troops propaganda becomes impossible.

R. J. Donnell

4-2-20

ALYANSIN XARİCİ İŞLƏR NAZİRLƏRİNİN MÜŞAVİRƏ PROTOKOLU
20 YANVAR 1919

MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS PARIS CM I
JANUARY 20th 1920 NODD MINUTE 5

Mr. WALLACE said that if the Council ratified that decision, he would cable it to his Government.

It was decided:

- (1) that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations would be held at 10.30 a.m. on the 16th of January, 1920 at the Quai d'Orsay;
- (2) that Mr. Wallace would inform his Government of the date fixed upon in order that the President of the United States might issue the official convocation.

5. LORD CURZON said that Mr. Lloyd George had just raised the serious question of South Russia and the Caucasus. (H.D. 125).⁸ The Bolshevik victories had given rise to a grave military danger. The Versailles Council would take up that matter, but the problem had also a political aspect which he would like to put before the Council. The following were the considerations he had proposed to submit to the Heads of Governments:

There were three States in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The fate of Armenia would be decided by the Peace Conference when it made its decision upon the Turkish problem. There remained, then, Georgia and Azerbaijan whose independence for the last year and a half had been most precarious. These countries were exposed to a threefold danger: in the first place they lived in dread of the conquered army of Denikin which might perhaps come down upon them from the North; on the other hand, they were exposed to the Bolshevik peril, Bolshevik troops advancing upon them from two sides—along the Caspian and in pursuit of Denikin's armies; finally, on the west and on the south there was the Turkish danger—already in Azerbaijan Enver Pasha⁹ and his brother Joury were at work. The military authorities would take the steps required by the situation; but, on the other hand, there was a political step which the British Government was very anxious to see taken, and from which it anticipated happy results; he meant the recognition of the 'de facto' Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. British troops had occupied those regions since the armistice and His Majesty's Government had thus had, more than any other, the opportunity of manifesting its sympathy with those States. Later, they had evacuated those regions except Batoum; but they had consuls at Baku, Tiflis, and elsewhere. The countries he mentioned had shown a firm desire to become real states. Their Governments were socialist but decidedly anti-Bolshevist. They were living in dread of a Bolshevik invasion, at once political and military. They turned, therefore, towards Europe as suppliants. They asked the Allies to accord their support; to recognise their 'de facto' Governments would be equivalent to according them support. That was how they had acted towards the Baltic States.

⁸ No. 54 (minute 3).

⁹ Enver Pasha, the former leader of the Young Turks and Turkish Minister of War, had at the end of the First World War fled to Germany whence he proceeded to Azerbaijan by way of Russia. His activities in the Caucasus were somewhat involved but he retained his earlier Pan-Turanian orientation.

ALYANSIN XARİCİ İŞLƏR NAZİRLƏRİNİN MÜŞAVİRƏ PROTOKOLU
20 YANVAR 1919

M. BERTHELOT said that he had already discussed this subject with Lord Curzon in London. He had given M. Clemenceau an account of that conversation and he knew that he was willing to accord that 'de facto' recognition subject to the reserve that the recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan in no wise prejudiced the future frontiers of Armenia.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with him on that point.

M. SCIALOJA said that he was equally inclined to grant that 'de facto' recognition on the same conditions as for the Baltic States.

M. MATSUI remarked that, on a question of that nature, he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.

Mr. WALLACE said that he was in the same situation.

M. BERTHELOT added that the Powers who were already disposed to recognise those 'de facto' Governments would take such a step together.

It was decided:

that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognise the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as 'de facto' Governments, subject to the reserve that the representatives of the United States and Japan would request instructions from their Governments on the question.

6. M. BERTHELOT said that he had received from M. Adatci a letter in which he asked to be informed of the day on which the Commission appointed to examine the question of handing over Wilhelm II would meet. That problem would arise immediately: they were awaiting British proposals.

LORD CURZON asked whether he meant that the British Government should lay a special proposition before the Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he merely wished to know whether the Commission that had met the preceding day under the Presidency of the Lord Chancellor was to examine the question.

LORD CURZON said he did not think so. That Commission was concerned only with reducing the list of criminals whose surrender was to be demanded from the Germans, for the reason that it would be easier to obtain the surrender of 500 of these, than 1,000.

M. SCIALOJA stated that a special commission was indeed useless: the Treaty itself stipulated that the surrender of William II be demanded. It was merely a matter of finding the formula in which the demand should be made. The formula should be as legal as possible. The task of drafting it should be left to the Drafting Committee.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like simply to put the following question: the Peace Treaty provided for the handing over of William II to the Allies. Were they going to ask for it? In what form and at what moment?

M. CAMBON remarked that it would appear that it was for the President of the Conference to formulate that demand, it was for him therefore to instruct the legal experts with drafting it and consequently it would be sufficient for them to refer it to the Drafting Committee.

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BÖYÜK BRİTANIYA FORİN OFİSİNİN TELEQRAMI
4 MART 1920

1920	EASTERN.	88
	CAUCASUS.	E 1030
Eastern: Caucasus.	<u>Future of Nakhichevan.</u>	
<i>Original Number</i> E1030/1030/58.	States that both Azerbaijan and Armenia claim the district. The Armenians were in possession until a few months ago when their oppression led to a rising assisted by a small Turkish force under Khalil Bey, who holds it on behalf of the Azerbaijan Government. The Persian Government has ascertained that the Azerbaijan Government has no objection to it being assigned to Persia. Persia has always treated the Armenians well and both Governments are friendly. This would considerably shorten the frontier between Azerbaijan to Armenia.	
FROM <u>Foreign Office</u> <u>Minute.</u>	(Minutes)	
No.	R. Hu Smith	
Date: March 4th, 1920.	8-3-20	
Received: March 5th 1920.		
Last Paper.		
(Print.)		
(How disposed of)		
(Action completed.)	(Index.)	
JH 10/3	W	
Next Paper.		
11127-7132,2221-62M-128-W & S 121-196		

BÖYÜK BRİTANIYA FORİN OFİSİNİN TELEQRAMI
4 MART 1920

89

Note on future of Nakhichevan.

E 1030

1920

Azerbaijan and Armenia both claim this district. The Armenians were in possession until a few months ago when their oppression of the local Mussulmans led to a rising of the latter, aided by a small Turkish force under Khelid Bey (not the Pasha of this name) Khelid Bey now holds Nakhichevan on behalf of the Azerbaijan Government.

The Persian Commissioners at Baku have discussed the question of Nakhichevan with the Azerbaijan Government and find the latter have no objection to its being assigned to Persia.

The Persians have always treated the Armenians well and the two Governments are on perfectly friendly terms.

It may reasonably be hoped that Persia will shortly with our assistance, be able to administer Nakhichevan satisfactorily and the assignment to her of that district

BÖYÜK BRİTANIYA FORİN OFİSİNİN TELEQRAMI
4 MART 1920

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would considerably shorten the length of the Azerbaijan - Armenian frontier and so lessen the area in which otherwise conflicts between those two States might arise.

London

4.3.1920.

C.B. Stokes Lieut Colonel.

This arrangement would involve giving Zangazour to Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Govt would no doubt be prepared to yield Nakhichevan to Persia if ^{they} ~~it~~ would secure Zangazour to themselves. Armenia claims both provinces. At the same time the proposed arrange^{ment} would involve Armenia obtaining the province west of Nakhichevan - Shasur Davalaganz which, according to Major McDonnell is the natural mountain frontier of the E. Russian Republic. But the question would have to await discussion at an eventual frontier & economic conference between the Republics.

(Map attached.)

D. F. Osborne.

4/3.

Mesopotamiyadakı Baş Qərargahın şifrlı teleqramı
6 avqust 1920



24 229

7706

PARAPHRASE. S E C R E T.

From: G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office repeated G.H.Q. Constantinople and Simla.

Desp. 1625 7.8.20.
Recd. 1545 7.8.20.

X.9706 cipher August 6th.

Continuation of my X.963^h July 28th. According to reliable report 800 to 1,000 Russian Bolsheviki cavalry on July 30th reached Nakhichevan and are followed by 7,000 more whose arrival is expected (1 group undec.) Part of this force is said to be proceeding Shahtakhata to co-operate with Tartars against Armenians who are still fighting and refuse to make terms. Town quiet and Bolsheviki arrangements good. 12,000 refugees arrived Julfa July 29th from Nakhichevan but only being allowed to cross frontier disarmed. A second Bolsheviki column strength not stated but belonging to 11th Army is reported advancing on Ordubad from Gerusi. No authentic news of Turks but according to report dated July 26th from two independent sources they are between Shahtakhata and Haku and are awaiting developments.

C.2. Copies to: S. of S. U. S. of S. Sec. F.O. (Mr. Oliphant).
A.G. Q.M.G. D. Q.M.G. M.G.O. F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
C.I.G.S. D.G. I. G. S. F.O. (Mr. Gregory).
D.M.O. D.D.M.O. I.O. (Col. Papsy).
M.O. 1, 1b, 2, 2a, 2b, 3. I.O. (Mr. Garbett).
D.M.I. D.J.M.I. I.O. (Mr. Monteth).
M.I. 2, 2b, 6, R. Pa. 1c.
D.S.D. Lord Curzon.
L.D.C.E. Paris.
Ad. (D.N.I.).

ALYANSIN ALİ ŞURASININ İCLAS PROTOKOLU
10 YANVAR 1920

MEETING OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL HD 125 JANUARY 10th 1920 11:30 AM
MINUTE 3

MR. LLOYD GEORGE felt that the Allies would have no objection whatever.
M. NITTI approved the proposal submitted to the Council.

It was decided:

that the Interallied military organization should continue under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and have for instructions:

- (a) to act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in the military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany;
- (b) to execute the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and Plebiscite areas.

It was further decided:

that, should the occasion arise, the Council could be consulted upon all military questions of common interest to the Allies which the latter might be agreed to submit to it.

Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE told the Council that they had just received from the Caucasus very disturbing news. The Bolsheviks were advancing upon the Caspian; if, having entirely defeated Denikin's army, they should reach the sea, it was possible that the Turks might join with them, an event which would throw the States of the Caucasus into a desperate situation. It became incumbent, therefore, on the Council to find out whether it would be wise to support those States by sending them, for example, arms and ammunition to facilitate their resistance to the Bolshevik drive. He did not mean to express in that place an opinion upon so delicate a question, but suggested referring it to the military organization at Versailles which without prejudicing the political solution might be able to give them the information of a purely military nature which they required in order to take a decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it might be good if the British Delegation drafted a memorandum which the Council could submit to the military council at Versailles.

It was decided:

to refer to the Versailles Military Council the question of the aid it might be necessary to give to the Caucasian States against the Bolsheviks. The British Delegation would prepare a memorandum upon the subject which would be submitted to the Versailles Military Council for immediate examination and report to the Supreme Council.

QRAF DERBİNİN LORD XARDİNGƏ TELEQRAMI 1
20 YANVAR 1920

No. 652

The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 21)
No. 68 Telegraphic [172322/1015/58]

PARIS, January 20, 1920

Following from Lord Curzon:—

'At meeting on Monday, 19th January, Supreme Council accepted principle of sending help to Transcaucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in shape of arms, munitions of war and, if possible, food.¹ British and French General Staffs were instructed to consult as to means, and have telegraphed to General Milne to send an officer from Batoum to visit threatened States and report without delay as to their needs. Please instruct Wardrop and our other representatives in Caucasus to lend every possible aid to these enquiries.'

¹ The minute recording the discussion of this question in the Supreme Council is printed in Vol. II, No. 77.

LORD XARDİNGİN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA TELEQRAMI
15 YANVAR 1920

No. 645

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
Unnumbered. Telegraphic [170159/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 15, 1920

Your telegram No. 20¹ of 11th January.

Although whole question of assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan is still under consideration by Cabinet and Paris Supreme Council, I think it right to warn you that it is very doubtful whether any military assistance whatever will be given, or whether the sending of help to Daghestan can be 'authorised' in the sense of the Powers accepting responsibility for the consequences. You should therefore avoid giving any encouragement to the republics to take aggressive action against either Denikin or the Bolsheviks.

Please repeat to Teheran, Constantinople and Mr. Mackinder.

¹ No. 638.

SER H. MAKİNDERİN RAPORTU
21 YANVAR 1920

REPORT BY SIR H. MAKINDER ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH RUSSIA No. 1
JANUARY 21ST 1920 [176979/1089/38]

But such federal projects should not be spoken of publicly in England. They will be realised, I think, but at present they merely tend to divide Denikin's supporters.

The Caucasus and the Near East.

There remains to be considered the bearing of the Russian situation on affairs in the Caucasus and the Near East. Mr. Wardrop came to meet me on New Year's Day. We went into the harbour of Novorossisk at the same hour in two men-of-war. He described to me with pride his Georgians. He described the system of arbitration treaties which he had secured between the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. He told me that at that very time a conference was sitting in Tiflis which was studying the question of their federation. I asked him whether, if a sea of Bolshevism rolled forward and lapped against the northern foot of the Caucasus, he thought that his federation, and at any rate the Georgians, would remain true. He was very unwilling to think that they would go under, but in the end he admitted that possibly there might be such a menace as would prove irresistible. No sooner had he returned home on the 3rd January, than he sent me a telegram showing that the danger had suddenly burst upon him, and after that date I had a series of telegrams which indicated that the Georgian Government was under threat of disappearing in a revolution. The Allied recognition of the *de facto* Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan has for the time being again strengthened the orderly elements in those States, but I venture the opinion that we must not rely indefinitely on the storm of patriotism described in Mr. Wardrop's last telegram.¹⁰ The people of Baku have been Bolshevik before and undoubtedly may go Bolshevik again.

I am informed on reliable evidence that General Denikin's flotilla is likely in the first instance to remain proof, but that, deprived of its base at Petrovsk, it might attack Baku. This was undoubtedly the idea of the younger officers last September, but they were restrained by the senior officers under orders from General Denikin. I have already telegraphed to your Lordship suggesting that as a temporary measure this flotilla should be offered the hospitality of Enzeli in North Persia, and General Denikin has, I believe, asked that it should be received in a friendly way at Baku. These, however, could only be very temporary measures. When the Volga ice melts towards the end of March, the Bolshevik flotilla will make its appearance in the Caspian Sea, and may base itself upon Baku and Krasnovodsk. The oil trade may forthwith be set going up the Volga, and the resources of the Bolshevik State be enormously increased. On the other hand, the Bolshevik flotilla consists only of shallow-draught vessels, and British leadership would probably give victory to the Denikinite flotilla. Or, again, there are not wanting indications that in certain eventualities, if left to itself, the Denikinite flotilla might go Bolshevik, the crews overpowering the officers.

It is only by strong immediate measures, taken before the thawing of the Volga ice, that the advance of Bolshevism, sweeping forward like a prairie

¹⁰ Possibly No. 641.

SER H. MAKİNDERİN RAPORTU
21 YANVAR 1920

fire, can be limited, and kept away from India and Lower Asia, pending the advance from Poland and Odessa. It must be remembered, moreover, that the very success of that Polish and South Russian advance, on a line extending from the Gulf of Finland to the Sea of Azoff, would tend to drive the Bolsheviks into Asia, and it is essential, therefore, to regard the Caspian and Caucasian barrier as a part of the larger policy. But I cannot look upon a Caucasian barrier as more than a temporary expedient of a not very substantial character: the only final remedy is to kill Bolshevism at the source.

A very significant capture was recently made in the Crimea of two Turkish officers who had crossed the Black Sea from Asia Minor. The one was the nephew of Mustapha Pasha, the Nationalist leader in Asia Minor, and the other was an A.D.C. to Enver Pasha. They had expected that by the date of their landing the Bolsheviks would have been in possession of the Crimea. Thus the correlation of the Nationalist movement among the Turks with the Committee of Union and Progress is proved, and also their understanding with the Bolsheviks. In this connection, I must draw attention to the fact that Sevastopol in the hands of the Bolsheviks would, to say the least, be very inconvenient to us as a sea power in the Black Sea.

A similar understanding is, I think, indicated by the advance of Bolshevik cavalry from Astrachan southward simultaneously with Wardrop's warning from Georgian sources that a Bolshevik republic was to be proclaimed in the North Caucasus in a fortnight's time. Unfortunately, the congestion on the railways prohibited my travelling in the direction of Daghestan, nor did I think it wise to accept Mr. Wardrop's invitation to Tiflis until I could go there with Denikinite representatives to negotiate an alliance. I hope nothing untoward will occur in relation to Daghestan in the meantime. Now that Georgia has been recognised as a *de facto* Government, negotiations are not very practicable unless the Denikinite Government is also so recognised. Alone, I do not believe, from all I can gather, that the Transcaucasian republics would stand long against Bolshevism. In alliance with Denikin and Poland, they would be essential links in the chain confining the enemy. Therefore, the Daghestan problem must be regarded as subordinate to the problem of arriving at friendly relations between Georgia and Denikin. I tried to impress that view on Mr. Wardrop.

Two Political Difficulties.

I see two difficulties in the way of my proposals. The one is the possible jealousy of France, and the other is the hostility of certain classes of our own electorate. In regard to France, it is quite clear we must carry her with us. The awkward fact, however, remains, and has been quite frankly stated to me both by General Denikin and General Wrangél, that for reasons which are well known to your Lordship the French are for the time being hated in South Russia. I feel, therefore, that it would be wise if the French would allow us to take the lead in the economic organisation which I have outlined. I agree that they should subsequently be brought into any temporary monopoly.

ALYANS NÜMAYƏNDƏLƏRİNİN GÖRÜŞ PROTOKOLU
20 APREL 1920

*LC 98 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES
APRIL 20th 1920 11 AM MINUTE 3*

(b) That Lord Curzon should draft, for the consideration of the Supreme Council, a reply to the memorandum by the Council of the League of Nations, based on the proposals of Mr. Lloyd George.

3. LORD CURZON said that hitherto Batoum had been garrisoned by a British force. It had been proposed to constitute a free port at Batoum with a small hinterland, and it had been agreed that it was unreasonable that Britain alone should furnish the garrison. France and Italy had both agreed to send a battalion each, and the garrison was therefore to be composed of three battalions.⁷ However, France had been unable to fulfil her undertaking, and the best effort by General Franchet d'Esperey⁸ was a platoon of forty men. Italy also had been unable to find the promised battalion. Consequently, the garrison still remained exclusively British, and he thought this situation should be cleared up. Great difficulty had been experienced in determining the extent of the hinterland to be attached to Batoum. All the proposals made had raised objections by the populations most interested. It had been concluded that the best method was to obtain a common agreement between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Georgians claimed Batoum as part of their territory; the Armenians needed it as a means of access to the sea; and Azerbaijan was greatly interested, seeing that Batoum was the one port from which the oil of Baku was exported to Europe. Mr. Vansittart, on behalf of the British Foreign Office, had had several interviews with the representatives of the three States. He had brought great pressure to bear upon them, and was on the verge of obtaining an agreement. This would greatly simplify the question. The lines of the agreement were that Batoum should remain part of Georgia, but that access to the free port in it should be guaranteed to Armenia and Azerbaijan. There was a question pending as to whether the left bank of the River Chorok should be Armenian or not. He was inclined to think that it should. He thought it might be stipulated in the treaty with Turkey that Batoum was to belong to Georgia, and that a separate agreement between the three States might be signed at the same time as the treaty with Turkey. After this, he hoped it would be possible to withdraw the British troops.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, in regard to Italy's failure to send a battalion to Batoum, he would like to say that it had been understood that a later meeting in London⁹ had cancelled the resolutions of the first, at which Italy had made this promise. Nevertheless, he owned freely that Italy would have found it very difficult to send any troops.

SIGNOR NITTI said that the difficulty lay rather in the transporting than in the finding of troops.

MR. VANSITTART observed that, if it was desired to define the whole of the frontiers of Armenia in the treaty with Turkey, some mention of this disposition regarding Batoum would have to be inserted in it. In reality, however, Turkey was only concerned with the western frontier of Armenia.

⁷ See Volume VII, No. 27, minute 2.

⁸ French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of the Orient.

⁹ Cf. Volume VII, No. 72, minute 5.

ALYANS NÜMAYƏNDƏLƏRİNİN GÖRÜŞ PROTOKOLU
20 APREL 1920

M. BERTHELOT asked whether Georgia was prepared to give full guarantees for the free and equal use of the port, and for the safety of the pipeline.

MR. VANSITTART said that it was hoped to obtain this result.

M. BERTHELOT also asked whether the British garrison would remain only until the signing of the agreement, or whether it would stay after it.

LORD CURZON said that the British Government was anxious to remove the British garrison as soon as possible. It was in a dangerous situation, as, owing to the failure of French and Italian reinforcements, it was quite inadequate to withstand the threat to which it was now exposed. There was alarming news of the advance of Bolsheviks along the coast towards Batoum.

M. BERTHELOT asked how many British troops were present at Batoum.

LORD CURZON said that he would enquire.

SIGNOR NITTI said he understood the council to agree that the convention regarding Batoum should not be embodied in the treaty, but in a separate agreement to be signed at the same time, if not sooner.

It was agreed—

- (a) That it was highly desirable to obtain an agreement between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan regarding the port of Batoum.
- (b) That this agreement need not be incorporated in the treaty with Turkey, but should be signed at the same time as the treaty, or, if possible, earlier.

4. The Supreme Council had before it a memorandum from the Council of the League of Nations regarding minorities (A.J. 156A) (Appendix).¹⁰

*Minorities.
Memorandum
from the Council
of the League of
Nations*

It was agreed—

- (a) That a reply should be sent to the Council of the League of Nations in the sense that the Supreme Council have read and taken note of the memorandum by the Council of the League, who will be consulted in due course, as provided for in the suspensory clause substituted for articles 11 to 14.
- (b) That the suspensory clause substituted for articles 11 to 14 should be retained, and that this should be notified to the drafting committee by the secretary of the conference.

M. KAMMERER said that, regarding the minority clauses, a point had been raised by the Greek delegation.

SIGNOR NITTI asked that this point be raised on the following day.

¹⁰ Not here printed. This appendix contained the memorandum of April 11 printed in *Practs-Verbal of the Fourth Session of the Council of the League of Nations*, p. 53. The text in the appendix was, subject to minor variation in punctuation, the same as that printed except that the text in the appendix bore the dateline at foot: 'Sunderland House, Curzon Street, London, April 14, 1920'.

PARİSDƏN QRAF DERBİNİN LORD XARDİNCƏ TELEQRAMI
10 YANVAR 1920

No. 635

The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 11)
No. 19 Telegraphic [169528/1015/58]

PARIS, January 10, 1920

Following from Lord Curzon¹:-

Supreme Council decided this morning, in reconstituting Inter-Allied Military Council at Versailles under the presidency of Marshal Foch, to refer to it anxious situation in Black Sea, Caucasus and North Persia, described in Wardrop's telegram No. 5² and Sir P. Cox's telegram No. 10,³ with a view of seeing whether any inter-Allied action is possible for settlement of situation.

Simultaneously I proposed to Council that *de facto* recognition should be given by Allied Powers to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments, Armenia being omitted as falling within purview of Peace Treaty with Turkey. This proposition was carried unanimously with consent of French and Italian Governments,⁴ and you may announce it at once in case of Governments concerned.

At the same time, Secretary of State for India and I have agreed in consultation that military aspect of situation, which in main affects ourselves, should be considered at home.

We think meeting of Eastern Committee should be held on Monday⁵ under chairmanship of Lord Hardinge, at which responsible representatives of India Office, War Office and Admiralty should be present to discuss following points:-

1. Retention of British forces at Batoum.
2. Possibility of aid to Georgian forces.
3. Diversion to Caucasus of any balance of Denikin's 'packet.'
4. Protection of Baku in the event of Bolshevik menace from Krasnovodsk.
5. Recovery from Denikin of Caspian fleet and possible reconstitution of British marines, or in alternative, if this be impossible, destruction of Denikin's fleet.
6. Possible strengthening of advanced British force at Kazvin.

¹ Lord Curzon had accompanied Mr. Lloyd George to Paris for discussions between Allied Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs (cf. No. 633).

² No. 631.

³ Not printed. This telegram of January 6, 1920 (received January 7), from Teheran reported, in particular, that the 'capture or certainty of capture of Krasnovodsk [by the Red Army] has accentuated alarm here. Frontier officials are beginning to panic and Prime Minister now presses me to ask Your Lordship urgently for an announcement or indication of measures which His Majesty's Government are prepared to take, emphasising fact that Persia's danger is also our own, and that joint policy of two Governments cannot progress unless country is secured against being overrun by Bolshevism.' In reply Foreign Office telegram No. 11 of January 9 to Teheran stated that the matter was under Cabinet consideration.

⁴ The official minutes of these discussions in the Supreme Council are printed in Vol. II, Nos. 54 and 65.

⁵ January 12, 1920.

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QRAF DERBİNİN LORD XARDİNCƏ TELEQRAMI 2
10 YANVAR 1920

7. Despatch to Caucasus or Persia of aeroplanes from any other theatre of action.
8. Steps to be taken for watching or protecting Khorassan frontier.
9. Despatch of British officers to that quarter.
10. Strengthening and transferring to War Office of Anglo-Indian force at Meshed.
11. Prolongation of railway to Neh.

No. 636

The Earl of Derby (Paris) to Lord Hardinge (Received January 12)
No. 24 Telegraphic [169629/1015/58]

PARIS, January 10, 1920

My telegram of to-day.¹

Recognition of *de facto* independence of Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments does not of course involve any decision as to their present or future boundaries, and must not be held to prejudge that question in smallest degree.

LORD CURZON

¹ No. 635.

SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
11 YANVAR 1920

No. 637

Sir P. Cox (Teheran) to Earl Curzon (Received January 11)¹
No. 14 Telegraphic [169530/1015/58]

TEHERAN, January 11, 1920

My telegram No. 10² of 6th January.

Prime Minister is receiving from Persian Mission in Caucasus reports and views to much the same effect as those which are reaching His Majesty's Government from our representatives. These reports refer to primary desire of South Caucasian principalities to resist subjection to Bolshevism, and active inclination of Baku Government to enter into close relations with Persia with object of strengthening its position to that end.

In latter connection Prime Minister begs me to urge upon His Majesty's Government what an enormous advantage it would be to Persia and to British interests in Persian commerce and politics if independence of Azerbaijan Government could now be recognised and it were to place itself under friendly guidance of Great Britain and ally itself in some definite way with Persia. He emphasises that, should Great Britain or Allies in conference decide (as he hopes they will) to assist Caucasian principalities to hold the Batoum-Baku line and Caspian against Bolshevik aggression, the present moment is obviously most favourable for bringing about arrangement above indicated. Not only would it put an end to pan-Turanian idea of combining

¹ In this and subsequent telegrams addressed to Lord Curzon and received during his temporary absence in Paris, the date of receipt is that of receipt in the Foreign Office.

² See No. 635, note 3.

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SER P. KOKSUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
11 YANVAR 1920

Under Azerbaijan . . . under Turkish auspices, but it would also help to solve in a way favourable to Persia and Great Britain the future control of Southern Caspian.
In theory Prime Minister's arguments seem to point . . . How far his proposals are compatible with our policy and practical necessities of present situation I must leave to wise consideration. . . .¹

¹ The text here is uncertain.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
11 YANVAR 1920

No. 638

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 14)
No. 20 Telegraphic [170159/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 11, 1920

Following telegram from Colonel Stokes. (Begins.)
Azerbaijan Government ask if His Majesty's Government would authorise the sending of immediate help to Daghestan to prevent Bolshevik predominance.

I suggest withdrawal of Volunteer Army and affirmative answer to Azerbaijan request. Please instruct me urgently. (Ends.)

I am replying that question has been urgently referred to His Majesty's Government, and that meanwhile, though I cannot authorise crossing of lines, I see no objection to Azerbaijan taking immediate steps on frontier to prevent invasion of Bolsheviks, and give moral support against Bolsheviks pending your Lordship's answer.

(Sent to Mackinder, No. 9; Constantinople, No. 14; and Teheran, No. 9.)

LORD XARDİNCİN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA TELEQRAMI
12 YANVAR 1920

No. 639

Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
No. 26 Telegraphic [168506/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 12, 1920

Your telegrams Nos. 2, 3 and 5¹ (of January 3rd and 6th).

Questions of military and economic assistance are under consideration of the Cabinet.

¹ See Nos. 630 and 631.

LORD XARDİNCİN QRAF DERBİYƏ TELEQRAMI
13 YANVAR 1920

No. 640

Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Derby (Paris)
No. 44 Telegraphic [169528/1015/58]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 13, 1920

Your telegram No. 19¹.

Following for Lord Curzon:-

Eastern Committee meeting was held yesterday afternoon.

Chief Imperial General Staff said that War Office had been considering three alternative lines of defence against possible Bolshevik aggression:-

¹ No. 635.

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LORD XARDİNCİN QRAF DERBİYƏ TELEQRAMI
13 YANVAR 1920

(a) Constantinople, Batoum, Baku, Kraznovodsk, Merv. This would entail command of Black Sea and Caspian, two divisions in Caucasus, and five divisions from Kraznovodsk to Merv.

(b) Constantinople, Batoum, Baku, Enzeli, Teheran, Meshed. This would entail command of Black Sea, but not necessarily of whole of Caspian. Approximately same total of seven divisions would be required.

(c) Northern Palestine, Mosul. Some point about 100 or 50 miles from Khanikin. Meshed force, if attacked, to fall back upon Birjand. This was only alternative considered practicable by War Office, and even in this case it was not certain that we could retain Mosul or Meshed.

Figures for alternatives (a) and (b) were for British troops only. Co-operation of Allies would entail larger forces still, whose support and maintenance would become increasingly difficult as numbers increased. In any case War Office representatives were strongly of opinion that if there was to be any question of employment of considerable forces, even if only of two divisions, to hold the Batoum-Baku line, they would be more effectively employed in some such manner as an advance on Moscow through Poland with consequent heartening effect on anti-Bolshevik elements on all fronts, or in support of Denikin in Southern Russia.

Admiralty stipulated retention of Baku essential to command of Caspian, though existing stocks of oil at Enzeli might render maintenance of Caspian fleet possible for a limited time. They were prepared to control Caspian if Baku were held, and pointed out that opportunity was unlikely to recur.

Air Ministry could not contemplate provision of aircraft, as they were reluctant to release machines now available in Egypt and India.

Committee were of opinion that in view of our inability to find the force entailed in the holding of line (a) or (b), of the difficulties of reinforcing troops in areas south and east of Caspian, and of military argument that such a force would be more profitably employed in aggressive action elsewhere, it was inevitable that we should fall back on alternative (c).

At the same time it was not suggested that any immediate withdrawal should take place. It must first be established beyond question that there was no prospect of remnant of Denikin's force remaining in being as a screen against the Bolsheviks.

Committee suggest following reply to the eleven queries in your telegram:-

1. Troops to remain for time being at Batoum, but to be evacuated before they are forced into a position similar to that of the French at Odessa.

2. No military, naval or aerial assistance to the Georgian forces could be provided.

3. So long as Denikin remained in being, only such small part of his packet as could be regarded as diverted in his own interests by lessening the possibility of republics throwing in their lot with the Bolsheviks should be diverted to Caucasus. If he were to collapse altogether, supplies given to the republics would be merely a present to the Bolsheviks.

4. Protection of Baku could not be contemplated unless alternatives (a) or (b) were to be adopted.

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13 YANVAR 1920

5. Though Denikin would undoubtedly welcome return of British naval personnel to Caspian, this could not be done unless Baku were to be held. He would almost certainly not agree to the destruction of his fleet, nor could we well insist on such destruction.

6. Advanced British force at Qazvin to fall back when threatened, but not until forced to do so.

7. Despatch of aeroplanes impracticable.

8 and 9. General Malleston² to be asked whether he could make use of additional officers to watch the Khorassan frontier.

10. Strengthening of force at Meshed only desirable if alternatives (a) or (b) were adopted, in which case control should pass to War Office. In case of alternative (c) Malleston to fall back to Birjand if and when threatened. Transfer to War Office in this case unnecessary.

11. Prolongation of railway to Neh only justifiable if Malleston to be re-inforced. If he is to fall back on Birjand it will not be required.

Full report follows by bag to-day.

General Malleston was in command of a small British force based on Meshed.

No. 641

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 21)
No. 25 Telegraphic [172086/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 13, 1920

Recognition roused great patriotic demonstration in Tiflis. Within an hour of announcement the city was flagged, traffic stopped, offices, shops and factories closed. Whole garrison with cavalry and artillery marched past my house cheering and then at Palace Prime Minister and I witnessed parade joined by Trade Unions and population of all classes. Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs made patriotic anti-Bolshevist and strongly pro-British speeches to enormous crowd. I received continuous ovations during day and was carried on shoulders of crowd to my motor car. City illuminated and great pro-British demonstration at opera followed by banquet with numerous pro-British speeches lasted from eleven p.m. yesterday till after four a.m. to-day. Reports from Azerbaijan state that uncompromising telegraphic reply has been sent to Bolsheviks declaring adherence to Allies and agreeing in tone with Georgian reply.¹ Both Governments harmoniously together and Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs expected here tomorrow. Armenians were somewhat uneasy at their inclusion in recognition² but it have alladted their vears (? but it has allayed their fears). Prime Minister arrived from Erivan this morning.

Sent Foreign Office No. 25, Constantinople No. 16, Mackinder No. 10, Erheran No. 12.

¹ Cf. No. 631, note 3.

² It appears from other evidence that a premature report as to Allied recognition *de facto* of the Armenian Government (cf. No. 635) was then circulating. For the subsequent contentment of this recognition see No. 655.

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
3 YANVAR 1920

No. 629

*Earl Curzon to Lord Acton (Helsing fors)*¹
No. 749 Telegraphic [167089/91/38]

FOREIGN OFFICE, January 1, 1920

At the recent Anglo-French Conference in London during M. Clemenceau's visit² the following resolutions were agreed upon as regards Russia:—

1. Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised, or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided upon between the Governments of the United States and Japan, as to furnishing assistance to anti-Bolshevik movements, whether in the form of troops, war material or financial aid; the anti-Bolsheviks to be free to purchase war materials in Allied countries; the Allies to be free to leave on the spot all political or other missions and Bolshevik Russia to be left, as it were, within a ring fence.

2. The conference considered that a strong Poland was in the interests of the Entente Powers. The question of the form and extent of the assistance to be given her for her defence was left for further consideration.

3. The conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolsheviks at the present time.

4. As regards the border communities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government, the Allies will give them such assistance in defending their liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises.

The above is communicated for your confidential information and for your guidance.

¹ This circular telegram was also sent to Warsaw as No. 463, Vladivostok as No. 676, Riga as No. 7, Tiflis as No. 5, and Rostov as No. 1 for Sir H. Mackinder (Mr. Mackinder received the honour of knighthood on January 1, 1920).

² For the proceedings of this conference see Vol. II, Chap. II.

No. 630

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 6)
No. 3 Telegraphic [167947/1015/58]

TIFLIS, January 3, 1920

It would be prudent to consider possibility of complete collapse of Denikin at an early date.

This would immediately be followed by vigorous Bolshevik attack on Transcaucasus.

I suggest following action to protect our communications with Persia:—

We should endeavour to raise strong barrier in Transcaucasus.

Batoum requires at least a division of thoroughly equipped troops.

Civil administration should be strengthened by addition of trained civilians, and undesirable refugees should be expelled; present population includes numerous Bolshevik agents or sympathisers. Energetic measures should be

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CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
6 YANVAR 1920

taken to supply food, for there will be no bread in a few days, and hunger riots are impending.

North Persian Force should be strengthened and fitted to assist Baku against Bolshevik attack, and to detach troops to North-West Persia and perhaps North-East Asiatic Turkey, to prevent ingress of C.U.P.¹ agitators and armed forces.

Two breech-blocks for guns at Baku should be at once available to make possible some resistance to a naval attack. Aircraft should be sent to Enzeli. Submarines could be sent in sections and put together in Baku. Transcaucasian Railway needs material long ago indented for. Some at least of Caspian flotilla should be taken over by our naval authorities.

Georgia and Azerbaijan, with encouragement from us, would make a good fight, but they need material and financial and moral support. Daghestan also could be induced to expel Nuri and Turks, who have made themselves very unpopular.

It would seem necessary from point of view of our interests to recognise *de facto* existence of Daghestan as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and promise support for their future claims of self-determination.

Unless some speedy action is taken there is a grave risk of the crushing of Transcaucasia by Bolsheviks, who will then work their will in Persia and Transcaspia and beyond.

Repeated to Constantinople, No. 3, and Mackinder, No. 2.

¹ The Committee of Union and Progress, the organ of the movement of the Young Turks.

No. 631

Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) to Earl Curzon (Received January 8)
No. 5 Telegraphic [168506/1015 58]

TIFLIS, January 6, 1920

My telegram No. 2.¹

Acting Prime Minister and Minister of War came to me to-night and spoke at length on present situation. On behalf of Government and people, they handed over to me a note, of which following is substance:-

Bolsheviks, having failed to upset Europe, have made agreement with Mussulmans to attack Great Britain. Both Turks and Bolsheviks have adopted this as a policy of despair. Lenin has taken Wilhelm's place.

Denikin's early collapse is probable, and Transcaucasus becomes the bridge which Great Britain must defend to prevent union of two hordes. It, and especially Georgia, is natural barrier separating two forces hostile to Allies.

At present, in consequence of impending advance of Red Army towards the Caucasus, the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid, Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will

¹ Not printed. In this telegram of January 3, 1920 (received January 5), Mr. Wardrop transmitted and supported an urgent request made by the Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs for British assistance, especially in bread and cartridges.

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be unable to resist attack from both north and south, and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies, and especially for Great Britain. But if Allies help her, Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

Georgian Government therefore consider in its own interests that British Government should help Georgia in her struggle against men from south and north. They consider that it is essential for needs of present time that following effective aid should be granted:-

1. Recognition of independence.
2. Restitution of outlying parts of province of Batoum to Georgia, so that she may fortify southern frontier, which is quite unprotected, while British garrison, supported by British navy, hold port and vicinity as a naval base, in accordance with offer repeatedly made by Georgia.
3. Powerful aid in arms and ammunition, provisions and finance; most urgent needs are bread, cartridges, boots.

If such aid be given in time, it will rouse extraordinary outburst of enthusiasm and national energy, rendering quite feasible safeguarding of interests of Great Britain and Georgia, which are absolutely united at this historical moment.

But if, despite her interests, Great Britain denies this indispensable aid, Georgian people, being deprived of all hope of British support, may unwillingly be forced to some desperate course to save their existence.

I should most strongly impress His Majesty's Government of necessity of taking immediate steps to hold Transcaucasus against Bolsheviks and Turks. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have now Governments which I believe to be prepared to do their best to defend their frontiers against invasion, and if help be given without delay, there is reason to hope that defence would be successful.

I urgently beg that at an early date I may be enabled to give some encouraging message to Transcaucasian republics, and that I may remind your Lordship that it was only five days before fall of Batoum, 9th April, 1917 [? 1918], that Colonel Pike² was authorised to offer financial aid, which came too late.³

Repeated to Mackinder, No. 3, and Constantinople, No. 4.

² Colonel Pike was, in 1918, head of the British Military Mission at Tiflis. The local Transcaucasian administration received British financial support and encouragement against the advance of Turkish forces which, however, occupied Batoum in mid-April 1918.

³ In Tiflis telegram No. 11 of January 8, 1920 (received January 9), Mr. Wardrop further transmitted a report by Colonel Stokes of an interview which he had had on January 7 with the Azerbaijan Minister of Foreign Affairs who had given Colonel Stokes 'a copy of wireless message, dated Moscow, 2nd January, received at Baku, 6th January, from Norwcherin [Chicherin], addressed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, inviting them to attack Volunteer Army and then assist in giving it *coup de grâce*. He pointed out that successful advance of Bolsheviks on both sides Caspian Sea has brought Bolshevik danger to door of Transcaucasia, and Azerbaijan must decide very soon her policy towards Bolsheviks; indeed, in my opinion that decision may not improbably be taken out of hands of his Government by

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Bolshevik revolt in Baku itself. He stated that his Government is entirely anti-Bolshevik, but if Great Britain will not come to its assistance it may be compelled to make terms with Bolsheviks.' Colonel Stokes considered that the 'Minister for Foreign Affairs did not overstate his case', and recommended the 'immediate grant of full independence and whole-hearted support of Azerbaijan, despatch of arms and equipment . . . and prompt payment of all sums due by us to Azerbaijan in connection with our military occupation. . . . In regard to question of recognition of independent Transcaucasian States, I wish to state my conviction that no promise of autonomy in any shape given by any existing Russian Government, even if guaranteed by Allies, will carry any weight. Policy advocated above may be regarded as drastic, but in my opinion half-measures would be of no avail, and delay would mean disaster.' Mr. Wardrop commented on this message: 'I entirely concur.'

No. 632

Sir J. Jordan (Peking) to Earl Curzon (Received January 7)
No. 7 Telegraphic [168475/11/57]

PEKING, January 6, 1920

Following reports as to situation in Siberia received from His Majesty's consul at Harbin:-

Insurgents at Irkutsk have been reinforced by 9,000 fugitives from front with guns, machine guns and aeroplanes, and further reinforcements are continually arriving.

Semenof's forces have had to abandon area west of Chita, and position at Chita itself gives cause for anxiety. Immediate danger is rather of further risings along line east of Irkutsk¹ than of progress eastwards of Bolshevik forces from west.

Semenof is organising for his own defence strong detachment out of German prisoners in Trans-Baikalia, said to number about 3,000, under German General Hoffman. He has also asked for despatch of Japanese division to Irkutsk.

Telegraphic communication with Irkutsk still interrupted.

Repeated to Tokyo and Vladivostok.

¹ In Vladivostok telegram No. 5 of January 4, 1920 (received January 5), Mr. Leggett had transmitted the following report by Mr. Preston:

'As a mark of disapproval of present régime, strike was proclaimed on 3rd January by employees of all Government and public institutions. Strikers included all labourers in port, railway, tramways and electric-light stations. Proclamations were widely distributed, signed by central bureau of representative unions, deprecating action of Government in continuing civil war and murder of innocent people without proper trial, and stigmatising régime as one of generals and Atamans, who are kept in power against the will of the population by the bayonets of foreigners, to whom country is being sold. Allies are also treated to a hurricane of abuse in this proclamation, being described as world-wide marauders, who, under a pretence of charity and in spite of declarations of non-intervention, make most of Russians' unfortunate position to interfere with her internal affairs and rob her. This proclamation is typical of the feeling of the masses, and it seems that if violent attempts to overthrow Government are not made, it is only due to fear of foreign troops present (especially Japanese). Statement by military authorities that rioting in town would be put down by force prevented any taking place.

'So far I have no further reliable news of what is taking place between Irkutsk and Chita.'

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16 YANVAR 1920

MEETING OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES
PARIS 1CP 18 JANUARY 16th 1920 10:30 AM
MINUTE 3

It was agreed--

- (a) To approve the report of the committee appointed to consider the reopening of certain trading relations with the Russian people, as amended in the form shown in Appendix 3.⁴
- (b) To remit to the committee the task of giving effect to the report.
- (c) To reserve the question of the press communiqué until the afternoon meeting.

(M. Jules Cambon entered at this point.)

3. M. CAMBON said that on the previous day, as instructed by the council, he and Mr. Philip Kerr and the Marquis della Toretta had got into touch with the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan. They had begun by communicating to them the resolution of the council that the Governments of Georgia and the Azerbaijan should be recognised as *de facto* Governments.⁵ They were then asked for their observations and whether they had any requests to make. Two representatives (including M. Tseretelli)⁶ and two for the Azerbaijan had spoken in succession. They had thanked the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for giving them recognition as *de facto* Governments, but had asked for more. They desired that nothing should be done to hinder their endeavour to detach themselves completely from Russia, and they said that they might require financial, political and military aid to enable them to establish their old position. He and his colleagues had then put some questions to them as to their external situation, and particularly as to what dangers they might expect from Russia. They had shown themselves more preoccupied with the intentions of Denikin than of those of the Bolsheviks. In view of the situation of General Denikin's army at the present time, however, they were for the moment somewhat reassured. He and his colleagues, and particularly Mr. Philip Kerr, had then asked for particulars as to the military situation of the republics. At first they had not replied with any precision, but on being pressed they had stated that the Georgians could put in the field an army of about 50,000 men, while the Azerbaijan could provide an army of about 100,000 men. Their army was composed of a small force of regulars, which was provided with officers of the old Russian armies, including generals and major-generals, in addition to which there was a national guard. M. Tseretelli had considered that the forces were sufficient for the defence of Georgia and Azerbaijan against invasion by the Bolshevik armies. He had laid stress on the fact, however, that the people would not agree to any offensive war and that the army was only equal to a defensive.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that even this was doubtful.

M. CAMBON said that, even though the numbers of the forces of these republics were sufficient, they lacked arms and ammunition, and they asked the Great Powers to make good their needs in this respect. When Denikin

⁴ Not printed. This appendix was identical with appendix 1 subject to the three amendments proposed by Mr. Lloyd George.

⁵ See No. 65, minute 5.

⁶ A Georgian representative.

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had been prosperous he had imposed his authority in Daghestan, but, since Denikin's army had practically ceased to exist, Daghestan had been freed. Representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan had pressed the Powers to recognise the Government of Daghestan as a *de facto* Government in order to provide a buffer zone between them and the north. He wished to add one word as to one difference of opinion between the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Georgians, as could be understood from the situation of their country, expressed the opinion that the principal danger from Russia—whether from Denikin's forces or from the Bolsheviks—would come from along the coast of the Black Sea, and that there was no serious danger from the direction of the Caspian. The Azerbaijanians, however, whose State borders on the Caspian suggested exactly the reverse, and considered that the great danger came from that side. If the Bolsheviks, on the disbanding of Denikin's army, followed them as far as Derbend, they would easily take Baku, and the whole coast would be in danger. This danger was especially great, because some of the ships belonging to Denikin were frozen up, and there were no means of meeting an attack. There was only one ship there flying the British flag, and that would not be able to effect much.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for details as to what they had said about Daghestan.

M. CAMBON said that they had asked that it should be recognised as a *de facto* Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were really four States in the Caucasus: the Russian Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The two former were Christian.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked of what kind. He understood from the Georgian Minister that they were Gregorians, but when he asked him what Gregorians were he said he did not know.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he believed that these tribes would put up a most formidable resistance to the Bolsheviks. It had taken the Russians a long time to conquer them in the past. The trouble was that Denikin had shown himself hostile to them and had bombarded some of their villages. We had tried to stop him, but we had not succeeded in doing so. It was satisfactory that the representatives of Georgia and the Azerbaijan had not asked for any troops. The Caspian fleet, which was now in Denikin's hands, required 1,500 sailors to man it. The question arose as to whether it was worth sending sailors if Denikin was willing to hand it over. Possibly, however, he might not be willing. The British had four battalions of troops at Batoum. The Government now had to consider whether they would take these away or leave them to stiffen the troops in the Caucasus. If they were useful, they might leave them there, but only if they were useful. The Aga Khan had told him that the Mahometans throughout the world would be very well pleased if the Powers would recognise Azerbaijan and Daghestan, which were Moslem States. He thought it would be worth while to send ammunition to the Caucasus.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, if there were any to send.

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MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES PARIS ICP 21
JANUARY 19th 1920 1030 AM MINUTE 2 AND APPENDIX: DOCUMENT 1

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU: We will go on [to] the Caucasian question. I think that Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson or Marshal Foch ought first to be heard.

MARSHAL FOCH: A question on this subject was put to the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Versailles:² the committee pronounced an opinion. It is to that opinion that I am now going to refer.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You mean, I take it, the pronouncement of the 12th January; that has been circulated; everybody here knows it; have you nothing to add to that? (See Appendix.)

MARSHAL FOCH: No, Mr. President, I have nothing to add unless it be that since that time the situation cannot have appreciably changed, that in any case, if it has changed, that can only be to our disadvantage, and consequently that the restrictions we formulated are perhaps even more justified at the present moment.

SIR HENRY WILSON: I also am in the position of having nothing to add.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is necessary at the very outset is to collect all available information so as to be in a position to discuss the matter profitably later on.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We are agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The military advice, if I have understood it correctly, is that no barrier consisting of less than three divisions would be effective against the Bolsheviks; and Lord Beatty could not send his sailors unless there were already assurance of such effective military measures.

LORD BEATTY: I have nothing to add to that statement of the situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The situation may be regarded from another point of view. With the object of holding up the Bolsheviks, would it be any good to supply the Caucasian Republics of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Georgia with guns and war *matériel*? And, if so, ought it to be done immediately?

MARSHAL FOCH: That question is very difficult to answer from here. Only an officer on the spot would be in a position to say what effective force those countries can muster and whether therefore it is worth while supplying them with anything whatsoever.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Does the marshal suggest entrusting such a mission to an Allied general?

MARSHAL FOCH: There is an English general with Denikin and the French General Mangin is also there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: But what I want now is military advice. We have already been asked to send *matériel* to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient.

MARSHAL FOCH: I am entirely without information as to whether those populations are ready to receive *matériel* and to employ it to advantage or

² See No. 54, minute 3.

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whether all that we might send would not simply fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: In the meeting that took place the day before yesterday and at which we examined the defence of the Batoum-Baku line, the conclusion was reached that unless the British navy effectively held the Caspian, that line could not be effectively defended: and, inversely, that unless there existed the means of defending that line, it was impossible to send naval forces into the Caspian. For that matter, unless the Caspian is occupied and held, Baku will certainly fall.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I take it then to be Sir Henry Wilson's advice that we ought not to send war material to those peoples to help them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: That, Sir, is undoubtedly my opinion, if the Caspian is not effectively held by the British navy—I should then send nothing.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I entirely agree with Sir Henry's opinion on that point. Indeed, if the Caspian were not held, all that we might send would almost immediately pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

LORD CURZON: I should like to add a word. If, as General Wilson says, an Allied military expedition could not succeed, then obviously we ought not to send one, but the present question, it seems to me, is not so comprehensive. I have been speaking with the representatives of the Caucasian republics who are at this moment in the adjoining room. They have told me already that the Bolsheviks will attack them; they are anxious to defend themselves, provided we supply them with food, arms and munitions. So supplied, they believe that the danger could be averted. Without supplies, their fall, they say, is inevitable. In any case I suggest that we take no decision upon the matter without first of all hearing them.

MARSHAL FOCH: I repeat my question: can we inform ourselves sufficiently here? I am willing to accept the discussion which ought to be profitable, but I think that we cannot have really adequate information unless we send actually on to the spot a representative of the Allied Powers.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The reason for your remark is, I believe, that you did not quite understand what has just been said, to wit, that the representatives of the republics of the Caucasus are at present within the building and that it would be possible to hear them now.

(The representatives of the Republic of Georgia, MM. Tshaidze, Tseretelli and Avalov, and of Azerbaijan, MM. Topchibachev and Magaramov, were then introduced.)

M. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, the conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan, food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevik attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective, but we want to know the present state of your

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countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against the Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the *matériel* sent and thus to make matters worse.

M. TSERETELLI: I speak in the name of the Georgian delegation as well as in that of the delegation of Azerbaijan. We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks, but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the *Entente*, the Bolsheviks might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Am I to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?

M. TSERETELLI: That would be better still; but the mere fact of being protected on the sea and receiving the arms, munitions and food we require would be an invaluable help. The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the *Entente*, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately. We would like in any case to point out that the present situation in the Caucasus is dangerous from the point of view of the morals [*? morale*] of the populations. When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. To-day, our people see their independence recognised and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevik invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognise our independence.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?

M. TSERETELLI: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the *Entente* were to help us, the Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognise our independence and give up their attempts.

I should nevertheless like to point out that there are three Transcaucasian Republics—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. We would like to know why Armenia has not received *de facto* recognition. That recognition would help us all and render easier resistance to any aggression whatsoever. But, in short, it is in immediate help that our hope of resistance lies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?

M. MAGARAMOV: A military law has been passed by our Parliament; assuming that we have the necessary arms and munitions, we shall be able to put into the field some 100,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Have you the troops at the moment?

M. MAGARAMOV: We have a little army, in the command of a native

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Azerbaijan general, about 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined; but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: And in Georgia?

M. TSERETELLI: We have about 16 battalions of regular troops, each 600 strong, and nearly 15,000 men of the National Guard. These are well-disciplined troops. In a fortnight we could mobilise 50,000 men if we had the necessary arms and munitions. But on the other hand, in a war for independence we could count upon the support of our whole people, among whom national enthusiasm runs very high. I am myself not a military specialist; but, if the Supreme Council wishes quite accurate information we can ask our Government by telegraph to supply it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is compulsory military service the system obtaining in Georgia?

M. TSERETELLI: Yes, and in the Russian army Georgian officers were considered the best. Our troops too were among the flower of the Russian army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Have the young men of Azerbaijan received military instruction?

M. MAGARAMOV: There was no compulsory military service with us; but at the beginning of the war there were organised detachments of volunteers who distinguished themselves in the Iron Division. We had remarkable officers and generals. It was only two years ago that our republic was constituted. Henceforth all our youth must serve with the colours.

LORD CURZON: Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers of Azerbaijan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?

M. MAGARAMOV: After the conquest of Azerbaijan by Russia a great part of the population emigrated twenty-five years ago to Turkey. Later on, when the Turkish army invaded the Caucasus, a certain number of its officers were natives of our country and of Daghestan. Among these, some fifty preferred to remain in Azerbaijan, but they are native Caucasians, and we can be certain that they, like all our populations, will use their whole energy in fighting the Bolsheviks for the defence of our independence.

M. TOPCHIBACHEV: We, the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, dread Bolshevism even more than do our Georgian neighbours. We have had an experience of it. The Bolsheviks occupied our country for four months. I myself, head of a Transcaucasian committee, was a prisoner with them for two months and a half.

The danger threatens us from two sides—from the north and from the Caspian. On the Caspian side we hope that the English, who have a naval base at Enzeli, will give us, perhaps, marines and, in any case, arms and munitions. As for the northern frontier, we believe that in order to protect the whole of Transcaucasia, and especially Azerbaijan, it is expedient to recognise the Republic of the Highlanders,¹ which would then form a buffer

¹ i.e. Daghestan.

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State against Bolshevik attacks. These Highlanders are, indeed, a very brave people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Did the fight against Denikin take place in Georgia or Daghestan?

M. TSERETELLI: Denikin invaded Daghestan and the fight developed between the Highlanders and him. As for Georgia, it has always been threatened by Denikin; we displayed our sympathy with the Highlanders, who were defending themselves against him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why did Denikin attack Daghestan?

M. TSERETELLI: Denikin looked upon Daghestan and all Transcaucasia as Russian provinces. He judged it easier to invade those territories than to fight the Bolsheviks; it was against the peoples of the Caucasus that he turned the arms which were supplied to him to maintain the fight against the army of the Soviets.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: For that attack had he great forces at his disposal?

M. TSERETELLI: His forces were fairly large, how large I cannot say, exactly. Anyhow, he had to use a great many men in maintaining the strife of factions in which the Highlanders involved him. The fight lasted nearly a year; I do not know whether it is not still going on. We have no recent news. I believe that Denikin has issued an appeal to his troops. Whatever may be the number of his forces, they are disorganised and demoralised and are doubtless no longer worth very much.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is the Cossack's attitude towards Denikin?

M. TSERETELLI: According to reports we have received from Tiflis, confirmed by M. Bitch, president of the Kouban delegation, who is in Paris, great discontent reigns among the Kouban population; it is possible that the discontent is already receiving some direction. In the existing situation the Red army is able to invade Kouban. But resistance to the Bolsheviks is being organised under the direction of M. Magaramko, the President of the Rada of Kouban. But it is still necessary to have the guarantee that it is not Denikin who will profit by the defeat of the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How long has the Kouban delegation been in Paris?

M. TSERETELLI: For a year.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is there a Separatist movement in Kouban?

M. TSERETELLI: That is the political tendency of the Kouban delegation, which is keeping in touch with its own country. That delegation presented to the conference a memorandum asking for recognition of the independence of the Kouban Republic.

SIGNOR NITTI: If I have properly understood M. Tseretelli, the real objective of Denikin's army is the reconstitution of the old centralised Russia, rather than the defeat of the Bolsheviks—is M. Tseretelli quite sure about that?

M. TSERETELLI: I am certain. I do not know Denikin's personal ideas, but the unanimous opinion was that, had he managed to defeat the Bolsheviks, he would immediately have turned all his efforts towards the reduction of those nations whose independence has been proclaimed. That is not merely my

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conviction, it is that of all those independent States of which I speak and which defended themselves against him. It is the conviction also of our Azerbaijan neighbours.

SIGNOR NITTI: Do you believe that the recognition of the Caucasian republics, which exist already, or which will be recognised later, could arouse the spirit of resistance in the country?

M. TSERETELLI: I am convinced that that recognition will strengthen resistance to all aggression from whatever side the aggression comes. We entertain the high hope that after the first step which has just been taken, the Supreme Council will go to the full length of recognising our republics *de jure*. That is the hope that sustains the courage of our peoples and our Governments; our population will display all the more zeal, as they know that this *de jure* recognition will come about.

As for Denikin's policy, he has declared officially several times that he did not recognise the right of our nations to self-determination; in his eyes, we still constitute mere provinces of the old Tsarist Russia.

M. MAGARAMOV: The Georgian delegate, in explaining the dangers that might menace his country from the direction of the Black Sea, has shown that on that side the *Entente* could send ships of war. But for us, on the Caspian, the situation is entirely different. Sending ships of war there cannot be thought of. There is a Bolshevik fleet to the north of Petrovsk and a small fleet of Denikin's between Petrovsk and Baku; finally, at Enzeli, there is an English ship with some small gunboats.

Recently, the Azerbaijan Government protested against the allocation of a fleet to Denikin; but, at the present moment the volunteer army is beaten and the crews of his fleet, who manifested sentiments of sympathy with the Bolsheviks, are going possibly to join them; hence will arise a danger for Baku and for the defence of all Transcaucasia. That is why we should be happy if the conference would be good enough to take the necessary measures to prevent Denikin's joining the Bolshevik fleet.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Could you garrison Baku if you were given the arms? How many men could you find to defend that town?

M. MAGARAMOV: There is a strong garrison at Baku already.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Of how many men?

M. MAGARAMOV: We do not know now, as for two months direct communications have been cut off. Within that time the strength of the garrison may have varied. However that may be, two months ago there were 7,000 men in Baku, all natives of Azerbaijan, of which State Baku is the capital.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why did Denikin not receive the support of the peasants in Ukrania? Why did they abandon him?

M. TSERETELLI: I think that Denikin was considered in Ukrania the representative of the counter-revolutionary movement which was going to take the land from the peasants and restore it to the nobility. He was looked upon as a man who had placed the Ukraine under the yoke of a centralised Government reminiscent of Tsarism. In fact, both from the social and from the national points of view, the peasants looked upon Denikin as the enemy.

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To avoid all misunderstanding, allow me to supplement what I said a little while ago. I spoke of Kouban. I am not qualified to make known here the aspirations of its population, and I cannot say whether the Separatist movement is very strong in that region or whether it is merely destined to avert the possibility of a civil war. In any case, I should not like to give the impression that the cause of Azerbaijan and of Georgia ought to be considered from the same standpoint as that of Kouban. As you know, our populations are, from the national point of view, quite different. For centuries they have lived as independent States. I want it to be clearly understood that all I have said has merely the value to be attached to the information that can be given by a man who has read the newspapers. There is a Kouban delegation in Paris; only that delegation is in a position to speak precisely upon the national aspirations.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Was the Kouban delegation regularly appointed by the Rada?

M. TSERETELLI: Yes, and its president is the President of the Rada. He is M. Bitch, a man very well known in the Caucasian world. He has been here for nearly a year.

(At this point the representative[s] of Georgia and of Azerbaijan left the conference.)

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Could Marshal Foch tell us whether he looked upon the question of the defence of the Caucasus as a problem standing by itself or as a part of the problem of the general defence against Bolshevism?

MARSHAL FOCH: I have not considered the problem exclusively from the former point of view. To me it seems obvious that that question is part of the general problem of the defence against Bolshevism.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: On which side are the forces at present threatening the Caucasus most formidable, Denikin's or the Bolshevik?

MARSHAL FOCH: I believe that Denikin's forces may be considered so far reduced that in a short time they will not exist, but I have no precise information. I have still less information about the Bolshevik army; but it is beyond question that Bolshevism is in the ascendant, that it is led by a great number of German officers, who, having no occupation at home, are going to gain their living elsewhere. We can therefore count upon seeing it still carried on by its own momentum; I would not say victorious, but at least penetrating various countries under different guises. In those circumstances, it is high time to establish, wherever we can, at least a barrier.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Does Marshal Foch consider Poland in danger? Is he aware of concentrations of Bolshevik forces in that direction? And assuming that Denikin's forces disappear, does he think it probable that Poland will be attacked. In that case, when might the attack take place?

MARSHAL FOCH: I do not know that Bolshevik concentrations or attacks are in preparation, but that is quite possible at some undefined future date. Considering the extent of their resources, that seems all the easier; the Bolsheviks are going to have at their disposal vast territories of enormous resources, and also, as I already said, German officers who will imprint a

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military stamp upon bands hitherto rather loosely organised. There is therefore every reason for apprehension. I do not know that they are going to attack Poland, but such an attack might well take place. When it does they may easily be strong enough to get the better of the Polish army. Were Russia to recover all its former vast area, any calamity is possible unless serious precautions are taken to meet it. In a word, it is necessary to confront a vast Bolshevik Russia with strong, united efforts. It is not by Poland alone that it must be resisted, but by every State which can collaborate in the effort.

The forces that can be opposed to the Bolsheviks are those of scattered republics, organised or unorganised. Passing from Azerbaijan by the Caucasus there are Georgia, Bessarabia, Poland, Esthonia, Latvia—all new States which might be placed in a very difficult situation if they were abandoned. If, on the contrary, they are taken in hand, it is possible to succeed in establishing a system of military forces powerful enough to hold Bolshevism in check.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you propose a military *entente* between these different States with the object of attacking Soviet Russia, or, on the contrary, with the object of common defence in case the Bolsheviks attack?

MARSHAL FOCH: The first thing to be done is to stop the advancing Bolshevism and to consolidate the States which have just been founded. It is a matter of establishing a defensive organisation, a safety belt to protect Central Europe against the advance of the Bolsheviks. That is the goal to be reached first of all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You would not then propose equipping the Polish army to enable it to enter Russia?

MARSHAL FOCH: No, and I go further still. Even if the Polish army were equipped it could not accomplish that task. If I were asked for my opinion I should only propose to realise an *entente* between Poland, Roumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and Finland. An *entente* in the first instance, political, with the object of arresting the progress of Bolshevism. That league the Transcaucasian countries would join and Bolshevism would thus be surrounded.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you know whether the Bolsheviks are preparing to attack those countries?

MARSHAL FOCH: That one cannot know till after the event.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Could you now mention a single one of those countries against which the Bolsheviks contemplate a military attack?

MARSHAL FOCH: When that attack takes place, I shall be in a position to reply. I could not do so beforehand

(At this point the military experts left the conference.)

LORD CURZON: I should like to explain why, when recognition was given to Georgia and Azerbaijan, it was not also given to Armenia. I myself was responsible for the original proposal that Georgia and Azerbaijan should be recognised.⁴ Why I did not propose at the same time to recognise Armenia was that the question of Armenia had still to be decided by the Treaty of

⁴ See No. 65, minute 5.

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Peace with Turkey. It was felt that to give recognition at that time would be to anticipate the work of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, there are now strong reasons for giving recognition to Armenia. The present Armenian State forms part of the old Russian Empire with its capital, Erivan, just as did Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Armenian State is prepared to join in the defence of the Transcaucasian States against the Bolsheviks. Consequently, I think it would be just and wise to give it recognition on the clear understanding that that does not prejudice the ultimate delimitation of Armenia, the boundaries of which have still to be decided in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Are there any objections? As there are none, we therefore agree to recognise the Armenian Republic on the condition just proposed by Lord Curzon.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: The decision we have just taken, being of a diplomatic and political nature, does not solve the military problem. The present situation of the Armenian Republic, like that of the other Caucasian republics, remains precarious; attacked by Turks on the south, and threatened on the north by the Bolsheviks, its complete extinction is a possibility to be reckoned with.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am informed that the United States Treasury has made a recommendation to Congress that the sum of 25 million dollars should be allotted to Armenia. The recommendation has still to be considered by Congress and the Senate, but I understand that it will probably be adopted. That will be a very material help.

MR. WALLACE: I believe that Mr. Lloyd George's statement is accurate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That is one very important matter settled. We have now to decide what support, if any, ought to be given to the Caucasian States. Marshal Foch has said that three divisions are necessary. The British Government cannot possibly spare these.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Neither can we.

SIGNOR NITTI: Italy, too, cannot send any.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We must then find out whether we can send arms and munitions.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: That question is bound up with the Caspian problem.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That question does not quite arise at the moment, but may be considered later on. I do not see that any harm can come of sending arms and supplies. Before the Bolsheviks can reach the Caucasus, they have to pass through the most productive provinces of Southern Russia; consequently they would have no need to capture any food we might send to the Caucasus. As for war *matériel*, the Reds already have so many rifles that the capture of 25,000 or 50,000 more would not make much difference; they have captured from General Denikin some 600 guns, many of them made in Great Britain, and they have also captured some excellent tanks. In these circumstances, the danger from supplying a certain number of guns and rifles to the Caucasian States is not very great. These people claim that they

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can put up a good enough fight to impress upon the Bolsheviks that it is not worth their while to attack. The chances are, too, that the Bolsheviks do not want to wage a big fight in those regions except in order to secure Baku. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion to supply the Transcaucasian republics with all the material aid asked for, on the express condition that the Caucasian States will resist the Bolsheviks and garrison Baku with all their strength.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I hope that any grant of arms to the Caucasian States will not be deducted from the final 'packet' of supplies to be sent to General Denikin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I should like to point out that the final 'packet' to Denikin is purely a British affair.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Our immediate question is whether arms should now be sent or whether further enquiries on the spot should be made first of all. I myself agree with Mr. Lloyd George, and I think that the council has already sufficient information on the subject. Under these circumstances, I agree with Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. That, I think, is the decision that ought to be communicated to the military experts, telling them we have decided to send war *matériel* to the Caucasus as quickly as possible; and they should be asked to deal with the question of quantity and the means of despatch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am in entire agreement.

SIGNOR NITTI: The Italian Government cannot undertake in this matter any engagement at all, either in men or arms, since to do so would be contrary to a law which has been passed in the Italian Parliament by all parties, including the Conservatives, almost unanimously. The gist of that law is that Italy can take no part in any intervention against *de facto* Governments, such as that of Russia. The object of the Italian Chamber is to prevent the Bolshevik Government from increasing its strength as a Nationalist Government. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik Government has already assumed a sort of Nationalist character.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We are going to send that *matériel* to *de facto* Governments; that cannot be regarded as intervention in Russian affairs, as assistance to Kolchak or Denikin might be.

SIGNOR NITTI: Intervention in favour of the one or the other is for us impossible. I must conform to the vote of the Italian Chamber.

LORD CURZON: If my information is correct, there is, nevertheless, a precedent for Italian intervention. Some time ago Italy sent arms to the Daghestan, whose cause found warm support in the Italian mission; on the other hand, my information is that much is hoped from the Italian aid at Baku and in the Daghestan.

SIGNOR NITTI: I cannot do anything officially. There are some Italian interests in Georgia, and I believe that Italian volunteers have gone there. Probably I will be able to help this move; it will be impossible, however, to send regular troops, or even to send any *matériel* officially; if I did, I would have the Italian Government against me, even the Conservatives.

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MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It does not matter very much whether the arms are sent officially or unofficially, so long as they reach the Caucasian States.

SIGNOR NITTI: I may say very confidentially that I could supply arms and war *matériel* if Great Britain or France will take the responsibility of sending them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We agree.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We decide then to accept, in principle, the supply of war *matériel* and food to the republics of the Caucasus, and to refer to the military experts for their solution of the problem just put.

LORD CURZON: Whom do you mean by 'military experts'?

M. CLEMENCEAU: In practice that would be Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson, since officially we cannot include an Italian representative. If that is done, it ought to be possible to reach a conclusion within forty-eight hours.

It was decided:

1. That the Government of the Armenian State should be recognised as a *de facto* Government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudiced the question of the eventual frontiers of that State.
2. That the Allied Governments are not prepared to send to the Transcaucasian States the three divisions contemplated by the Inter-Allied Military Council.
3. To accept the principle of sending to the Transcaucasian States arms, munitions, and, if possible, food.
4. That Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson are requested to consider of what these supplies should consist, and the means for their despatch.

Mr. Wallace will refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions.

M. Matsui also reserves the acceptance of his Government with regard to paragraph 1.

APPENDIX TO No. 77

Document 1

ALLIED MILITARY COMMITTEE, BRITISH SECTION, PARIS, *January 12, 1920.*

The British delegation has prepared a memorandum on the situation created in the Caucasus by the defeat of General Denikin's armies, and of the measures to be taken to enable the Caucasian republics to offer a resistance to the junction of the Bolshevik and Mussulman forces across their territories.⁵

After a preliminary examination of the question the Allied Military Committee is of the following opinion:—

If it has not been possible to overcome Bolshevism on its own soil, it should be possible to arrest it on certain dangerous routes, such as that of the Caucasus.

⁵ See No. 54, minute 3, and document 2 below.

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With this end, the organisation of a military barrier on the line of the Caucasus could well be considered.

In view of the unstable condition of the local Governments and of the immature condition of their military forces, this barrier should first of all be organised by European troops, whose strength might be fixed at two divisions.

Eventually these European troops could be relieved by local forces, as soon as the latter shall have been reconstituted, organised and provided with the necessary armament.

Beyond financial and material provision, this organisation of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed).

It would be advisable, therefore, to undertake it without delay.

In the meantime the elements of General Denikin's armies of the East, which, in spite of their reverses, constitute the only force in these regions which has any military value, might advantageously continue the struggle with a view to denying to the Bolsheviks the approaches to the Caucasus and of allowing the necessary time for organising the defensive barrier.

Consequently, without being able to foresee the period during which their resistance would be effective—probably not a long one—it would certainly be advisable to continue to give them material assistance within the scope of possible action by them.

The military barrier of the Caucasus should be strengthened and completed by the grouping under Allied command of as large a number of ships in the Caspian Sea as possible; thus ensuring the command of this sea.

It is on these lines—according to the available information on the present situation—that the general conditions of defensive military action in the Caucasus should be drawn up.

If the Allied Governments consider it advisable to undertake such action, the question would remain of considering the possibilities of carrying it out and of examining the best means to that end.

F. FOCH. C. SACKVILLE-WEST. UGO CAVALLERO.

Document 2

Note prepared by British Delegation

Present situation caused by defeat of both Kolchak and Denikin.

Bolsheviks, having failed to upset Europe, have made agreement with Mussulmans to attack the East.

Owing to collapse of Denikin, Transcaucasus becomes bridge which must be defended by Allies to prevent union of these two hordes.

It, including the Caspian and especially Georgia, is the natural barrier separating these two forces.

At present, in consequence of impending advance of Red army towards the Caucasus, the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will be unable to resist attack from both north and south, and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies. If Allies will help, Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

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As a preliminary measure and before considering the larger aspect of preventing Bolshevik invasion of the East, certain steps can and should be taken:—

1. Recognition by Allies of Georgia and Azerbaijan (this has now been done).⁴
2. Diversion of all stores, &c., now *en route* to Denikin, to these republics and to Armenia.
3. Additional help by Allies to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia—
 - (1) Financial.
 - (2) Military stores, especially cartridges and boots.
 - (3) Provisions, especially bread.
4. Sufficient military assistance to secure Batoum and Baku.
5. Denying of the Caspian and the fleet to the Bolsheviks. Denikin's fleet must either be voluntarily sunk or secured for our own use.

PARIS, January 12, 1920.

AZƏRBAYCANIN MİLLƏTLƏR CƏMIYYƏTINƏ QƏBUL EDİLMƏSİ
24 NOYABR 1920

COMMUNICATED BY LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

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Société des Nations

Admission de
l'Azerbaïdjan dans la Société des Nations.

MÉ MORANDUM PRÉSENTÉ PAR LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL.

League of Nations.

Admission of
Azerbaijan to the League of Nations.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

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League of Nations.

MEMORANDUM ON THE APPLICATION
FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIDJAN
TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

By a letter dated 1st November 1920⁽¹⁾, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations was requested to submit to the Assembly of the League an application for the admission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the League of Nations. This letter issues from the Azerbaijan Delegation attending at the Peace Conference, which has been in office at Paris for more than a year. The Members of the Delegation now at Geneva state that their mandate is derived from the Government which was in power at Baku down to the month of April last.

It may be convenient to recall briefly the circumstances which preceded the establishment of this Government.

Establishment of the State of Azerbaijan.

The Transcaucasian territory in which the Republic of Azerbaijan has arisen appears to be the territory which formerly composed the Russian provinces of Baku and Elisabethopol. It is situated on the shore of the Caspian Sea, which forms its boundary towards the east. Its northern boundary is the frontier of the province of Daghestan; on the north-east it is coterminous with the area known as the Northern Caucasus, on the west with Georgia and Armenia and on the south with Persia. Its population according to the last Russian statistics, is estimated at 4,615,000 inhabitants, including 3,482,000 Musulman Tartars, 793,000 Armenians, 26,500 Georgians and scattered minorities of Russians, Germans and Jews.

It may be interesting to note that this territory, occupying a superficial area of 40,000 square miles, appears to have never formerly constituted a State, but has always been included in larger groups such as the Mongol or Persian and since 1813 the Russian Empire. The name Azerbaijan which has been chosen for the new Republic is also that of the neighbouring Persian province.

First Federal Period.

On the collapse of the Russian power in the Caucasus in the month of October 1917, the peoples of this region, Tartars of Azerbaijan, Georgians and Armenians, united to form a sort of Federal Republic under common government with a Federal Chamber of representatives.

In consequence of serious disagreements, this Transcaucasian Federation was dissolved on the 20th May 1918 at Tiflis, where its Parliament held its meetings.

⁽¹⁾ This document is circulated separately under the reference number 20/48/68.

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Second period: Independent Republic.

On the following day, May 28th, the Republic of Azerbaijan was proclaimed at Tiflis. Fətəli Xan Xoyski was named President of the Government, and it appears to have been agreed at that time that the Musulman members of the former Federal Chamber, together with the members of the Musulman Council, should constitute the provisional Parliament. The Government of the new Republic thus composed was transferred from Tiflis to its own territory, but was not able to take possession of its capital — Baku — until the 14th September, 1918, after this town had been evacuated by the Bolshevik forces retreating before the Germano-Turk invasion. Ultimately a Parliament of 120 members was elected by universal suffrage and the executive power was entrusted to a responsible Ministry composed of notabilities of the district of Baku.

On the 17th November, 1918, General Thomson, at the head of British troops, and representing the Allied and Associated Powers, entered Baku. He appears on his entry to have considered the Government in power in the town as only a local authority. He formally announced that he occupied the territory in perfect agreement with the new Russian Government and without prejudging the rights of Russia in the district. On the 28th December, 1918, however, General Thomson proclaimed that the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan would henceforth constitute the sole regular local government and that the Allies would guarantee their support to it. The constitution of the Republic appears none the less to have been somewhat obscure during and after the British occupation.

The Government of Azerbaijan was represented at Paris during the Peace Conference and obtained on the 12th January, 1920, at the same time as the Republics of Georgia and Armenia, *de facto* recognition from the Supreme Council. It should be noted, however, that the Government of the United States did not associate itself with this recognition.

Third period: Dispersal of the Government.

On the 25th April, 1920, Bolshevik disturbances occurred at Baku and compelled the authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan to take flight. Certain members of the Government, who fell into the hands of the revolutionary forces, were put to death. The army of the Republic was dispersed. According to information furnished by the delegation now in Geneva, the territory traversed by the railways still continues in the possession of the Bolsheviks, with the exception of the district between Elisabethopol and the Georgian frontier. A considerable portion of the territory not so occupied is, however, understood to be still under the administration of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, some departments of which are said to be at Elisabethopol, while others are said to have emigrated to Tiflis. The army is understood to be divided, certain units being in the Northern part and others in the Southern district of the country.

Communication with Georgia is maintained, but communication between the Republic and its Persian and Armenian neighbours is understood to be suspended in consequence of the occupation on the Caspian side and the recent invasion of the Kemalists.

The Republic of Azerbaijan is accordingly at the moment deprived of all the resources which it drew from the exploitation of petroleum, of the fisheries of the Caspian Sea and the transit trade. Its administration can only be carried on by precarious means, and its executive and control organs maintain connection with difficulty with the central Government, which is itself for the moment dispersed.

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Juristic observations.

The conditions governing the admission of new Members to the League of Nations are prescribed in Article I of the Covenant, which is in the following terms:

"The original Members of the League shall be those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other Members of the League.

"Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

"Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal."

The application made by the Azerbaijan Peace Delegation for the admission of Azerbaijan to the League of Nations appears to raise from the purely legal point of view two questions upon which it will be necessary for the Assembly to pronounce.

The territory of Azerbaijan having been originally part of the Empire of Russia, the question arises whether the declaration of the Republic in May 1918 and the recognition accorded by the Allied Powers in January 1920 suffice to constitute Azerbaijan *de jure* a "fully self-governing State" within the meaning of Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In this connection it should perhaps be noted that this recognition is only claimed by the Azerbaijan Delegation to have been given *de facto* and that it was given only by Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, but was refused by the United States of America.

Should the Assembly consider that the international status of Azerbaijan as a "fully self-governing State" is established, the further question will arise whether the Delegation by whom the present application is made is held to have the necessary authority to represent the legitimate government of the country for the purpose of making the application, and whether that Government is in a position to undertake the obligations and give the guarantees involved by membership of the League of Nations.

AZƏRBAYCAN SÜLH NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN MƏKTUBU
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Société des Nations.

Admission de la République Azerbaïdjan
dans la Société des Nations.

LETTRE DE LA DÉLÉGATION DE PAIX DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE AZERBAÏDJAN.

League of Nations.

Admission of the Azerbaijan Republic
to the League.

LETTER FROM THE AZERBAIDJAN PEACE DELEGATION.

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ADMISSION OF THE AZERBAIDJAN REPUBLIC TO THE LEAGUE.

The following letter received from the Azerbaijan Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris
is circulated for the consideration of the Members of the League.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIDJAN

1st November, 1920.

N° 669.

PEACE DELEGATION

87, RUE DECAMPS, 87
(Avenue Henri Martin)

TELEPHONE : PARRY 47-28

To His Excellency, Sir Eric DRUMMOND, K. C. M. G., C. B.
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,

Geneva

Sir,

I have the honour to submit to you the following declarations in behalf of
the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Peace Conference in Paris, of
which Delegation I am President.

The Azerbaijanian people, comprising more than 4 million souls, which
separated from the former Russian Empire and proclaimed its independence on the
28th May 1918 with Baku as its capital, has long been patiently awaiting its admission
to the League of Nations.

The Azerbaijanians regarded the League and still regard it as the salvation
which is above all necessary to those small peoples who are constantly threatened by
the violation or denial of their vital interests, both political and economic.

The Azerbaijanian Delegation, in fulfilment of the ardent desire of the
Azerbaijanian people to be received in the League of Nations, made the following
statement in its Memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference at Paris in
September 1919, which expressed the political claims of the Azerbaijanians.

"Appreciating to the full the part to be played by an international tribunal
such as the League of Nations, in the name of the Azerbaijanians, we offer our
sincere congratulations on its conception and organisation, convinced that we will
also have our place among the other peoples in order to collaborate in their work
of peace and in order to be able to contribute as far as in us lies towards the
realisation of the lofty and generous aim of the League of Nations for the benefit
of humanity. We have no doubt that we shall find guarantees for the defence of
the inviolability of the rights of our people in an international organisation of
morality and justice such as the League of Nations; our people, as already stated,
possesses all the material and human resources necessary for an independent political
existence and for development within the family of Nations called into being by the
great Wilsonian principles based on the rights of peoples to self-determination."

Having thus expressed its recognition of the lofty significance of the League of
Nations, the Azerbaijanian Delegation had the honour, in the same Memorandum,
to address the following claim to the Peace Conference

"The admission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Membership of the League of
Nations, the Republic of Azerbaijan wishing to place itself like the other nations
beneath the high protection of the League"

The Delegation, composed of the President and Members of the Azerbaijan
Parliament, for two years has continuously defended the interests of the Azerbaijan-

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janian people at the Peace Conference, and it has the unshaken conviction that, both in its attitude towards the League of Nations and in its present request for admission to Membership of the League, it expresses the real wishes of the Azerbaidjanian people."

The Delegation declares that the Azerbaidjanian people in its unshaken decision to separate from the former Russian Empire was led by an ardent aspiration for an independent life based on political, social and religious liberty, and by a wish to participate in the culture of the whole of humanity and to take part in the peaceful work of the peoples, and by the desire to become of use to its fellows and contribute its offering on the common altar.

The majority of our population is Mahomedan; and our people, in spite of the general opinion of the political decadence of the Mahomedan world, is anxious to become an example of a Mahomedan State of Republican form, democratic in character from both the political and religious point of view, with equal universal suffrage for all elements of the population.

The best guarantees for the achievement of this aim are to be found in the fundamental character of the Azerbaidjanians, in their past and in the economic and human resources with which Azerbaidjan has been so richly dowered by nature. In spite of all the oppressions and persecutions to which the Azerbaidjanians were exposed under the Russian regime¹, which attempted the Russification of Azerbaidjan at all costs, our people preserved their national qualities of honesty, bravery, love of work and tolerance of other peoples. In spite of all the acts of repression of the Russian regime which strangled any manifestation of national culture, the Azerbaidjanians were able to preserve their language, their literature and their poetry; and to-day there is a brilliant group of writers, poets and dramatists, who are studying both past and contemporary literature and are renewing the national traditions, and who at the same time are leading their compatriots towards a greater comprehension of the culture of the civilised peoples of Europe and America. As a result, Azerbaidjan can now boast of a large number of politicians, publicists, engineers, lawyers, doctors, as well as of great development in the Press and in the publication of books, and even in the theatre, which does not exist in other Mahomedan countries, and which serves as a means of disseminating knowledge and education among the people.

As regards the economic resources of the country, we may cite the oil wells Baku which are known throughout the world, the fisheries in the Koura and on the shores of the Caspian, which extend over 600 kilometres, the cotton plantations on the Steppes of Mougau and elsewhere, not to speak of the other natural riches which will be able to supply the intellectual and political needs of the young Azerbaidjanian Republic.

In conformity with the principles of universal suffrage referred to above of equality for all the elements of the population with guarantees for the rights of minorities, the Government of the Azerbaidjanian Republic began by organising its Parliament: the women of the country took part in the elections—the first time women have voted in a Mahomedan country. Among the Members elected there were representatives not only of the Azerbaidjians, but also of the minorities: Armenians, Russians, Georgians, Poles, Jews and Germans. The Cabinet also contains Armenian and Russian Ministers.

All these advantages, based on democratic principles, enabled the Republic to devote itself to the preliminary work required for organisation and the complete establishment of order and the introduction of the necessary reforms to consolidate and develop the Republican form of Government. But unfortunately, from the very beginning, all the resources of the Republic had to be employed in the struggle against the Russian Bolsheviks, who, in 1918, with the aid of detachments of Russian troops who had remained in the country after the rout of their Army, took possession of the town of Baku as well as of the neighbouring oil zones and certain districts of the Province of Baku. This bloody conflict lasted till September 1918, and it was only then that the Government was able to leave the town of Gandja, where it was temporarily established, and to return to Baku, the capital.

From this time onwards there has for the first time been a period of calm, permitting the construction of the State on a Republican basis: Parliament and the Government at the head applied themselves with the greatest vigour to the task of organisation. As a result of their labours, by the end of 1919 there was complete calm within the Republic and the most friendly political and economic relations were established with other countries with regard to transit, commerce, transport, etc., and a defensive alliance was signed with the neighbouring State of Georgia against the menace of General Denikin's volunteer army. At the same time Azerbaidjan had to organise a military force in the form of a small standing army. The Budget estimates of 1920 were voted, as well as a comprehensive scheme for exploiting the economic resources of the country; plans were also prepared for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly to vote the fundamental laws of the Republic.

These activities, demonstrating the strength and solid basis of our state

¹ Detailed in Chapter II of the Memorandum.

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organisation, induced the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at the Peace Conference, to recognise, *de facto*, on the 12th of January of the present year, the independence of the Republic of Azerbaidjan at the same time as it recognised the Georgian and Armenian Republics.

The news of this recognition was naturally received with satisfaction by all the Azerbaidjanians. The whole people responded with extraordinary enthusiasm and with a profound consciousness of its moral responsibility for the future of Azerbaidjan. All classes rejoiced and blessed this first step towards entry into the great family of States. To keep the now recognised flag of independent Azerbaidjan floating worthily on high, all elements in the country, with Parliament and the government at their head, realised that it was necessary to increase tenfold the country's resources, and all were ready to make the necessary sacrifice for the sacred cause of strengthening and developing the Republic of Azerbaidjan on a democratic basis.

Unfortunately, in the midst of these preparatory labours for the organisation of the State, a new disaster fell upon Azerbaidjan. On the 27th April of the present year, the Russian Bolsheviks, in their thirst for gain and their desire to reinforce their disastrous activity by the possession of millions of tons of naphtha in the reservoirs of Baku, once more invaded 30 to 40,000 men of the Red Army. The Azerbaidjians were again exposed to shooting, pillage, devastation and imprisonment. And at the present moment, the Azerbaidjanian people, abandoned to its fate, maintains a bitter struggle in spite of the Red terror and the merciless proceedings of its oppressors. In many places the Azerbaidjians have risen against the Bolsheviks who have now been driven from everywhere but in Baku and we have no doubt that, as in 1918, the people will have the strength to rid themselves finally of the Russian Bolsheviks.

It goes without saying that a fight, particularly a fight against the Bolshevik terror, means many victims, and ruins the country. It was not for these sacrifices in blood that the little Azerbaidjanian people longed so passionately for independence; it was against the holocausts, against war, against all kinds of militarism.

From the very foundation of the Republic, our people indulged the hope that the independence and the neutrality of the country will be recognised, in order that it might be free from military service, and not be compelled to maintain an army. To achieve this, we placed all our hopes on the League of Nations, the supreme organisation of morality and justice.

The Azerbaidjanian Delegation declares that the Azerbaidjanian people places its fate without fear in the hands of the League of Nations, in the hope that beneath theegis of the great principles of the League of Nations, and beneath its protection, the free Azerbaidjanian Republic will be able to develop its intellectual and economic resources for the benefit of its people, which loves the cause of liberty.

The admission of the Azerbaidjanian people to membership of the League of Nations will encourage it to continue its peaceful and laborious life for the benefit of humanity at large.

We send you herewith a series of printed documents setting out in detail the above-mentioned facts. The Azerbaidjanian Delegation has the honour to ask you, Sir, to be good enough to request the members of the General Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva to admit the Azerbaidjanian Republic to membership of the League of Nations. The Delegation regards it as its duty to accept all obligations imposed by the Covenant of the League of Nations on its members, as well as all obligations of an international character.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,
A. M. TOPTCHIBACHEFF,
President of the Peace Delegation of the
Republic of Azerbaidjan.

ANNEXES :

1. One copy: Claims of the Peace Delegation to the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaidjan, presented to the Peace Conference in Paris.
2. One copy: Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaidjan.
3. One copy: Claims of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian Azerbaidjan presented to the Peace Conference (in French).
4. One copy: Economic and Financial Situation of Caucasian Azerbaidjan (in French).
5. One copy: Anthropological and Ethnical Constitution of the population of Caucasian Azerbaidjan (in French).
6. One copy: The First Mahomedan Republic: Azerbaidjan by D. Z. T. (in French).
7. One copy: Review of the History, Literature and Politics of Azerbaidjan, by Adil Khan Ziatkhan (in French).
8. One copy: Republics of the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaidjan, by Edmond Hippéau (in French).
9. Numbers 1-12 of the Azerbaidjanian Bulletin (in French).

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RÉPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAIDJAN

LETTRE DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA DÉLÉGATION DE PAIX
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAIDJAN

League of Nations

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIDJAN

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEACE DELEGATION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIDJAN

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Letter from the President of the Peace Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Note by the Secretary-General :

The Secretary-General has the honour to forward herewith to the Members of the League of Nations the following letter dated the 7th December, which he has received from the President of the Azerbaijan Peace Delegation.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIDJAN
PEACE DELEGATION
Huseyn Yusuf-Bekov
GENEVA

December 7th, 1920.

To His Excellency M. PAUL HYMANS,
President of the Fifth Assembly of the
League of Nations, Geneva

SIR,

At its Fourth Meeting, on December 1st, the Fifth Committee elected by the Assembly of the League of Nations arrived at the conclusion that it was impossible to admit the Republic of Azerbaijan to the League of Nations.

This conclusion, as will be seen from the Report contained in No. 17 of the *Journal*, page 131, is based upon the facts:

- (1) That it is difficult to determine precisely the extent of the territory over which the Government of this State exercises its authority.
- (2) That, owing to the disputes with neighbouring States concerning its frontiers, it is not possible to determine precisely the present frontiers of Azerbaijan.

The Committee decided that the provisions of the Covenant do not allow of Azerbaijan being admitted to the League of Nations under the present circumstances. Will you allow me, on behalf of the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, of which Delegation I am the President, to present to the Assembly of the League of Nations, through your intermediary, the following observations relating to the two arguments brought forward by the Fifth Committee.

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The Committee, in the first place, refers to the difficulty of defining the frontiers of the territory over which the Government of Azerbaijan exercises its authority. The Delegation takes the liberty of pointing out to the Assembly of the League of Nations that the difficulty referred to by the Committee being only of a temporary and provisional nature, cannot and must not be considered to affect this question in any real or decisive sense. It is an undisputed fact that, until the invasion of the Russian Bolsheviks on April 28th, 1920, the legal Government of Azerbaijan exercised its authority over the entire territory of the Azerbaijan Republic, without exception, within the present boundaries as indicated in the map submitted to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. After this invasion, part of the territory was occupied by the Bolsheviks; and with their Government at their head, the Azerbaijanian people, concentrated in the town of Gandja, began a bloody struggle against the Bolsheviks, thanks to which, the latter gradually evacuated almost all the territory which they had occupied. At the present time, they hold only the town of Baku and surrounding districts, and occupy but a small part of the railway as far as the station of Adji-Kaboul. All the rest of Azerbaijan, including part of the districts of the provinces of Baku and Kouba, as well as all the districts of the former province of Elizabetpol, is in the hands of the Government of Azerbaijan, which has its headquarters in the town of Gandja, where there is also a section of the Parliament which was dispersed by the Bolsheviks, and part of the Army. This is equivalent to nine-tenths of the territory of Azerbaijan, within its present boundaries; and the Government of Gandja, which is the legal Government of Azerbaijan, is able to give sufficient guarantees that it will fulfil all its obligations of an international character, in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Delegation makes bold to assure the Assembly of the League of Nations that the struggle carried on by the people of Azerbaijan, headed by their Government, against the Russian Bolsheviks, will be continued with unflinching energy until Baku and the surrounding districts are delivered from the invaders.

Our people will never come to terms with the Bolsheviks, whom they look upon as usurpers who must be swept away.

We may say in passing, that so obvious a peril as Bolshevism threatens not only Azerbaijan, but the whole of the Caucasus. It has overrun the whole of the Northern Caucasus and Kouban, as well as the bordering States of Armenia, which has just been declared a Soviet Republic.

The second objection raised by the Committee relates to disputes outstanding between Azerbaijan and the neighbouring States of Georgia and Armenia. With regard to this point, the Delegation has the honour to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that it is almost impossible to name a new State whose frontiers are absolutely undisputed. On the contrary, we see that not only new States, but even States which have been in existence for centuries, have had, and still have, frontier disputes; but these disputes do not cause them to be deprived of their sovereign rights over their own territory. The Republic of Azerbaijan, in defending the integrity of her territory against all aggressions is obliged to come into conflict with Georgia over the districts of Zakatal, and with Armenia over Karabagh and ~~Zanghezur~~. These territories form part of Azerbaijan, and are administered by the Azerbaijanian Government; the provinces of Karabagh and Zanghezur were left under administration of Azerbaijan by the decision of a former Allied representative in the Caucasus. In any case, these disputes concern not only Azerbaijan but also the neighbouring States which, on their part, have caused these disputes. But the Republic of Azerbaijan has always taken the view that these frontier disputes with the neighbouring Republics of Georgia and Armenia were only questions of domestic interest for the Republics concerned, and that the interested Governments would find a way of settling these disputes by mutual concessions. It, however, this hope should not be realised, and if the disputes cannot be settled on the spot, the Delegation of Azerbaijan has no doubt but that the three Trans-Caucasian Republics will apply to the League of Nations, as can be seen in the text printed by the Delegation of Azerbaijan in its political

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memorandum (Republic of Azerbaijan, page 44) which was submitted to the Peace Conference in September, 1919, and also in the seventh point of the Notes which the Delegation presented, of November 25th, 1920 (No 607), to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations with reference to his memorandum No 108 upon the admission of the Azerbaijan Republic into the League of Nations. The Delegation firmly believes that, in spite of the aforesaid disputes which were thrust upon Azerbaijan, this country, so richly favoured by nature, will be able to guarantee the fulfillment of all the obligations of an international character which are imposed by the Covenant upon Members of the League of Nations.

The Delegation of Azerbaijan, on behalf of the vital interests of its country, which has twice suffered from the attacks of the Russian Bolsheviks, has the honour to declare to Members of the League of Nations that the admission of the Azerbaijan Republic to the League of Nations would furnish it with that moral support so urgently needed by our people in their struggle against the Bolsheviks — a people which alone, without any foreign aid, has been engaged, for more than six months, in a bloody struggle in order to save the independence of Azerbaijan.

In the hope that this appeal for moral support will attract the attention of the Honourable Representatives of the peoples taking part in the Assembly, I have the honour, on behalf of the Delegation of Azerbaijan, to beg you to be good enough to have the above statement read to the Assembly, at the time of the discussion of the above-mentioned conclusions of the Fifth Committee, with regard to the admission of the Azerbaijan Republic to the League of Nations.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) M ALLSOPTCASBACHEFF,

President of the Peace Delegation
of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

M. Allsoptcasbacheff

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LITICAL REPORT ON BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENT IN AZERBAIDJAN. 3

1. REQUISITIONING.

1. On the morning of the 28th. April the workmen Baku overthrew the existing Government and established a Bolshevik Workmen's Government. The change took place without turbance. Only one or two soldiers who resisted were killed, anyone else accepted the change pacifically. The Revolution-Committee (Revkom) at once assumed complete control over town. Numerous arrests were made - all the members of the Fish Intelligence Office, the English Vice Consul and some Alians, the Polish Mission, the French Consul and some civilian later some forty British Naval Officers and sailors under command of Commander Frazer. The boats plying between Baku and Enzeli had been stopped at once, but several steamers arrived the course of the next week from Enzeli, where it seems nothing was yet known of the events at Baku. In the meantime Bolshevik fleet of six vessels had moored in the harbour at Baku. Some Russian troops arrived who were quietly quartered in various parts of the town in private houses, schools and in public buildings.

2. The requisitioning of houses for administrative purposes, hospitals etc., began. The occupants of the houses were ruthlessly dispossessed, though at first an attempt was made to provide other quarters for them, that is a room or two for a family. But as the military demands became more urgent this could no longer be kept up and it was declared that the Bolsheviks required fifteen cubic feet of space while ten cubic feet sufficed for the non-Bolshevist. As the ceilings are often low and high and no consideration to floor space was given, the carrying....

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carrying out of this order produced a most unsatisfactory condition especially as little or no respect is paid to the separation of the sexes. I am personally acquainted with cases where eight or more people, married or single, of the better classes have been forced to occupy one medium sized room. The comfortless and almost miserable condition in which the people - almost without exception - have to live beggars description.

3. The requisitioning of the houses was accompanied by the requisitioning of the furniture, shiploads of which were sent to Russia. Since the beginning of July the requisitioning of a house or office includes also its entire contents. There is a new order that no one is allowed to have more than a change of wearing apparel and that no one is permitted to lay in a stock of food - for all of these a house to house search is going on. One can scarcely imagine to what extremities the unhappy population of Baku is being brought. Before I left, the beds were being requisitioned.

4. Since the 17th. July public and private sales are absolutely prohibited. All shops were to be closed (I left Baku on that day) and the necessities of life were to be obtained only at the Government co-operative shops. As the inhabitants are divided into various classes according to the work they do, it will be difficult if not impossible for some of them on account of the scarcity of food to obtain what they require. There are seventy thousand people to whom bread is refused because they do not belong to the manual labouring classes, being declared "Boorjoi", enemies of Bolshevism. When still at Baku the scarcity of bread had become so great that only the labourer of the first category received one funt of very bad bread for himself, but none for the members of his family.

5. The workmen.....

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5. The workmen, who themselves are mainly responsible for the change of Government, are far from satisfied and as hunger is a constant guest and actual famine stares the people in the face, their dissatisfaction is liable to assume a violent phase. There are already cases of starvation.

6. The requisitioning of all food and textile stuffs, stationery, machinery, etc., is rigorously carried out, even if the owner is a foreigner. The Persian merchants who are the largest food dealers in Baku have lost in consequence of requisitioning, millions worth of property. When the Persian Consul protested against this and pointed out to the Government that in their proclamation at Resht full protection of Persian property is guaranteed the Government tried to arrest him, but he succeeded in notifying some Persians of the danger threatening him and in a short time thousands of Persians surrounded his house. The officials sent thought it wiser not to carry out their order. As arrests are commonly made after dark the Consul changes his sleeping place each night.

ALL OF THE PROPERTY OF THE N.E.R. WAS CONFISCATED.

7. The first shiploads of food which were requisitioned were sent, I am told, according to the official newspaper reports to Moscow "as a present from the grateful inhabitants of Baku".

8. At present every article of commerce not yet requisitioned is declared to be already property of the Government and cannot be sold. During the last days carpets have been nationalized as well as objects of art, surgical instruments, musical instruments, and private libraries. Thus many are deprived of their only means of living.

9. All merchandise which was at the custom house has been requisitioned.

10. The Swiss.....

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10. The Swiss Consul had obtained from the Azerbaijan Government a mandate exempting the Swiss from requisitioning, this was however, disregarded by the requisitioning authorities. Mandates given to me were equally disregarded by Commissioners.

II. THE MORAL TENDENCY.

11. The coming of Bolshevism introduced in the population a new feature of gravest moral consequence.

12. The tacit purpose of Bolshevism is to destroy all close family ties, of making marriage a matter of convenience for a longer or shorter period, and divorce a question of will. I know from personal observation that young ladies of the better classes have had proposals made for such temporary marriages. As the Government desires to remove children from the influence of their parents it charges itself with their support and education, thus for example, a woman dentist was ordered to go to a certain station to practice dentistry. As she was married having one little girl of about seven years of age carefully brought up in a refined home, she asked what was to become of her child and husband, to which she received the answer that the husband would probably be sent to another station and the child to an orphanage. When I left Baku this unhappy fate was still hanging over this unfortunate family. A girl of eighteen years, brought up in a refined and wealthy home was ordered to the stage and later to accompany the troops into the field. There are many such cases. I have personal knowledge of these two. I cannot believe that the Bolshevik Government as such is the originator of such heartless cruelty but the lack of order, organization and most of all of central authority makes it possible for the officials to commit unpunished all sorts of excesses and to carry out their feeling of revenge against the hated "Boorjoi", without fear of punishment.

13. In the orphanages the children have their own committee of management with full authority which extends even to the sending away of employees. On one occasion brought to my notice, the.....

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the children's committee of the former Armenian Orphanage ordered that the special food served to the sick children was also to be served to their own table.

14. Another method the moral effects of which cannot be too strongly condemned is the organisation of children of tender age as spies, the accusations being accepted apparently without question. Many instances have been reported to me. The following is at first hand. A man whom I know well was reading his newspaper upon a bench in a public garden. Two men, strangers to him, were quietly discussing the public events upon the same seat while some young children played near by. Suddenly, two police appeared and arrested these two men. As they were taken off a little girl called to the police, "you wo'nt forget that I gave the information, number six".

15. There is also an organised band of young girls, elegantly dressed whose function it is to frequent restaurants and places of entertainment and to report upon conversations which they overhear or into which they draw men whom they succeed in attracting. A young lady of our acquaintance belonging to the better classes was invited to join this body of workers with promises of high payment, according to results. A case was quoted to her by the officials as an inducement, of a young girl whose activity had caused the death of twelve men.

16. A gross exaggeration of the principal of fraternity is the almost entirely ignoring of the difference of sexes upon the ground that "we are all brothers and sisters". In consequence of the enforced crowding it is common to find two or three married couples or several men and women not related, compelled to occupy one room, a condition which is looked upon as quite natural.

III. The HUMANÉ.....

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III. THE HUMANÉ MATERIAL.

17. A curious feature which may have an important bearing upon the persistence and present success of the Bolshevik movement is the extreme youth of the greater part of its active adherents, civil and military. These young people have grown up in the atmosphere of Bolshevism at a period of great national distress attributed to the old regime and therefore have no ideals other than those embodied in Bolshevism which they regard as ultimate truth.

18. A large proportion of the soldiery are mere boys who have taken up arms with youthful enthusiasm. Positions of influence are occupied by young girls, one of about eighteen years of age was even a member of the committee which decided over life and death. I recently saw a special Commission from Moscow and was especially struck by the extreme youthfulness of its members.

IV. THE DISSENTION AMONG BOLSHEVISTS.

19. In my personal dealings with the Bolshevik officials I was constantly brought face to face with opposing tendencies in the carrying out of what may have originally been the same principles. While some Bolshevik Authorities show no hesitation in applying the harshest and most violent measures against the Boorjoi population; others, mainly the older men, deprecate and condemn such actions as inhuman and unworthy of a great cause and fevor the conquest of the world by specific propangenda.

20. A well known Orientalist sent on a special mission from Moscow, who declored in the strongest terms the events occuring in Baku went so far as to invite me to make a statement in writing as to the treatment the Near East Relief had received in order that it might form part of the evidence which he would present to Mr. Lenine. For obvious reasons I did not comply but confined myself to a verbal message. I think it fair to add that I met with many persons who had been in various towns of.....

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of Russia and who reported the sufferings of the population as even worse than was the case in Baku. My experience leads me to believe that Mr Husseinoff, the Assistant Commissary of Foreign Affairs, was anxious that the Bolshevik movement should be carried out with justice and moderation. At our last interview he begged me not to judge Bolshevism by the chaos presented by the conditions in Baku. Naturally the passive resistance offered by the pacific Bolsheviks is for the present overwhelmed by the violent and aggressive. I know on the authority of a member of the Secret Council that on ~~the~~ one occasion Mr Husseinoff absolutely refused to sign the death warrant of seventeen persons presented to him by the "Extraordinary Committee" saying that there had been bloodshed enough. This was in the early days of the revolution. Nevertheless, as I know on the authority of an official of the Commissariat of Justice, 2.700 people were shot during the first two months, only about thirty five of these. Recently, it is said ninety five Armenians have been executed. Executions were announced in the official journal. The nightly executions continue as one hears from those who leave the prison.

21. Another rift in the unity of the Bolshevik movement in Azerbaijan is caused by the nature of the relation existing between the Tartars and Armenians. Their mutual enmity has been brought to a white heat by the recent event at Elizabepol, (Ganja) causing an undercurrent of separation which not even their common political Bolshevism will suffice to bridge over and is simply waiting for the occasion to manifest itself.

22. Another difference is caused by the barely concealed disregard of the recently arrived Russians from the Azerbaijan Government. I was informed that the acknowledgement of the independence of Azerbaijan by Russia was a concession without meaning on the part of Russia. "For us" said a Russian Officer, "an

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independent Azerbaijan has no existence". Orders issued by the Azerbaijan Government are often cast aside by the officials from Russia as I have several times personally experienced. As for example, in the requisitioning of my house, offices, workrooms, typewriting machines, etc. which had all been placed by mandates under the protection of the Azerbaijan Government. -100-
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V. COMPONENT PARTS OF THE BOLSHEVIK GOVERNING BODIES.

23. In addition to the Russian Army which has come from outside there is the Azerbaijan population which divides itself naturally into Moslems, Christians and Jews. The Jewish elements are used mainly in the minor offices of the commissariates where their racial characteristics are especially valued. The higher positions are occupied mainly by Tartars while the carrying out of orders is largely in the hands of the Armenians. There are two Armenians of predominant influence, neither of whom holds office.

24. The greatest power rests with the labor union which is the mainstay of the revolutionary committee known as the Reukom to which the decisions of all commissariates have to be referred for confirmation.

25. There is in addition to these the much dreaded "Extraordinary Committee" whose special function it is to deal with those accused of "Speculation", espionage and contre-revolution. The punishment of any of these is death. This word "speculation" has a special meaning in Bolshevik terminology and denotes neither more nor less than selling to the advantage of the owner, not necessary at an extreme price. Although the highest salary paid is 9.200 roubles both soldiers and especially sailors seem to be often in possession of very large sums of money. They have been buying one small bottle of perfume for 15.000 roubles, and small cakes of chocolate at 2.000 roubles each.

VI. THE ARMY.

26. The country of Azerbaijan is occupied by the 11th Army. The 9th Army is reported to be on the way. Heavy artillery has arrived from Petrovak and sixty guns from Buzeli. I have been informed by a high officer that the springs of the recoil action

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of most of the cannons on their arrival at Baku were completely
ruined, owing to the fact that there was no oil in Russia for
lubricating purposes, many of the cannons being in bad condition
while ammunition for them is scarce. The same was alleged of
about 90% of the small arms.

27. The army which arrived looking in every sense exhausted,
is now fully equipped in new and smart Italian uniforms and boots.
Of late Azerbaijan soldiery has been distributed among the Russian
troops.

28. There is a great scarcity of technical troops as well
as of trained officers. The adjutant of a division said to me
"our officers are all men of the highest training, such as artists,
actors, school masters.". The commanding General of one Army is a
hairdresser.

29. There is a massing of troops at Javla the point from
which the highroad leads into Armenia. From this point up to
Elizabethpol and even as far as Akstafa near the Georgian frontier
a fervent military activity is noticeable. It is common talk
among all parties, military and civil, that the intention of the
Bolsheviks will shortly be directed toward Georgia and Armenia.
As we were leaving for Tiflis some casual military acquaintances
assured me that they would soon follow.

VII. PROPAGANDA.

30. As I have pointed out already there are many who are
opposed to any violence in the treatment of the people and even
to military enterprise against countries which they wish to win
over to Bolshevism. This is especially marked in their attitude
toward Persia as I know from trustworthy sources. The military
party wishes to take Persia by force and for this reason made
their attack upon Enzeli. Against this a distinguished member of
a special mission from Moscow enunciated the following arguments,
"first", said he, to me, "we are in principle against all violence,
"secondly", "propaganda is a much more effective means to obtain
the desired end. Such propaganda ~~must~~ must be carried on by
instruction, by trying to gain the people over by suggestion and
promise, by abstaining from every kind of violence and injustice".

DAİRƏ HƏRBİ KOMANDANI H. SPOYERİN MƏLUMATI
29 İYUL 1920

10.

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The question is still under discussion as to whether or not to
follow up their military success or rely solely upon propaganda.

31. A special course of training is given to young men
and women to fit them to carry on propaganda work in Persia and
elsewhere. One of my own staff who speaks English fluently was
invited to be trained and go to Persia for this purpose.

32. Hindu is one of the languages taught at this school.

VIII. THE PRESS.

33. The press is solely in the hands of the Government.
Broad-sheets enlivened by clever caricatures on daily events are
affixed to the walls in various parts of the town and there is a
daily newspaper published in Russian, Armenian and Turkish.

(Sgd) H. H. SPOYER.

District Commander N.E.R.

Baku.

Batoum, July 29, 1920.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
7 YANVAR 1920

[169174/ME 58]

No. 12.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 7, 1920.

DURING last few days I have had long conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs (who is also Acting Prime Minister, and with War Minister and Minister of Interior.

Government is to be depended on to offer vigorous resistance to Bolsheviks if supported by us, but, if we refuse to assist, food situation will create anarchy shortly. I am informed no proposals have been made to Georgia by German or other enemies, and most solemn assurances have been given to me that no such overtures would be considered, even if made. Support of Allied cause is now admitted to be essential to Georgia's existence. Government beg me to show towards them same confidence they have in me, and tell me they will have no secrets from me and will follow my advice.

As to basis for an agreement with Denikin given in your Lordship's telegram No. 142, I have discussed matter with Mr. Mackinder and General Keyes, and feel sure I could secure Georgia's acceptance as soon as I am authorised to negotiate. I might even arrange some unofficial recruiting for Volunteer Army if it were thought absolutely necessary by His Majesty's Government, but I strongly recommend that all available troops be kept here and not sent to join a partially demoralised force.

As to Armenia, fact that Bolsheviks are allied with Turks and Germans is in our favour, but unless we act promptly and efficaciously in supplying moral and material aid there is grave danger that Dashnaks party might make terms with enemy.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 3 [group omitted].)

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI 1
8 YANVAR 1920

[169242/ME 58]

No. 13.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 8, 1920.

FOLLOWING from Colonel Stokes, No. 54 of 5th January:—

"I regard situation in Azerbaijan as serious, and think that it soon will become dangerous. Government is anti-Bolshevik, but collapse of Denikin—for his assumed failure is so regarded here—has thrown it into a state of alarm owing to danger of Bolsheviks. On the other hand, Government almost despair of any assistance from Great Britain. It has no hope whatever of assistance from Turks.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI 2
8 YANVAR 1920

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"If His Majesty's Government appear to secure friendship or even to control Azerbaijan and eliminate Turkish influence and avert Bolshevism, it is essential that some obvious sign of our support should be given immediately.

"Best sign would be return of breech-blocks of the two 6-inch guns and sale to Azerbaijan of uniforms, or material for them, and boots for 6,000 men. If this be done, ground will be prepared for removal of all Turks from service of Azerbaijan Government. Later it will be possible to get Azerbaijan to accept British instructors for its army, and gradually our influence could be built up in such a way as to obtain any concessions we wish, as evidently Government is anti-Bolshevik. I may mention that they anxiously desire the removal from their prisons in Baku of 100 to 200 Bolsheviks, and would welcome our taking charge of them. Danger of Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan can be, in my opinion, averted only by one of two methods: (a) friendly support of Azerbaijan immediately (b) despatch of British troops to Baku. If Bolshevism is to be kept out of Azerbaijan, immediate steps on one or other of these lines suggested is, in my opinion, imperative.

"Daghestan situation also demands immediate serious attention. Hostilities between Daghestan and Volunteer Army continue. Many Russian Bolsheviks and Nuri Pasha are assisting Denikin. Latter regard impending elimination of Volunteer Army as a factor of [group undecipherable] account, but have not any desire for Bolshevism in their country.

"In return for our support in shape of arms and ammunition and loan of 20,000L per month for five or six months, they are willing to get rid of all Bolsheviks and Turks to form Government to be nominated by us, and to give us large quantity of wool and any concessions we may desire.

"I have had no dealings with Denikin personally. Attitude of Denikin was communicated to me by Persian Commissioner, now in Baku, who states that Denikin did not make any special appeal for British support, but said that they would welcome such support in form of, and on terms given, above."

I recommend above to your Lordship's serious consideration.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 5; Constantinople, No. 7; and Mackinder, No. 5.)

[189209/ME 58]

No. 14.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 8, 1920.

FOLLOWING received from Colonel Stokes, dated 7th January:—

"In continuation of my despatch of 5th January, I beg to submit the following:—

"I to-day saw Minister for Foreign Affairs at his request. He expressed greatest anxiety at rapid decision by Allies as to fate of Azerbaijan. He gave me a copy of wireless message, dated Moscow, 2nd January, received at Baku, 6th January, from Norwcherin, addressed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, inviting them to attack Volunteer Army and then assist in giving it *coup de grâce*. He pointed out that successful advance of Bolsheviks on both sides Caspian Sea has brought Bolshevik danger to door of Transcaucasia, and Azerbaijan must decide very soon her policy towards Bolsheviks; indeed, in my opinion that decision may not improbably be taken out of hands of his Government by Bolshevik revolt in Baku itself. He stated that his Government is entirely anti-Bolshevik, but if Great Britain will not come to its assistance it may be compelled to make terms with Bolsheviks.

"It had been decided after mature consideration that it must look to Great Britain alone of all Powers for assistance to safeguard the interests and very existence of Azerbaijan. He did not pretend that this decision was due to any sentimental reasons. It was dictated by self-interest, but, in his opinion, in supporting Azerbaijan we would best serve our own interests in safeguarding our shortest route to Persia. He urged strongly that, owing to demoralised Volunteer Army, if Azerbaijan is to be saved from Bolshevism an immediate decision to support Azerbaijan is imperative.

"In my opinion Minister for Foreign Affairs did not overstate his case. Unless we are willing to see Bolsheviks rampant in Azerbaijan, a decision to support that country cannot be taken too soon. I have previously recommended provisional ultimatum, but in view of gravity of situation created by failure of Volunteer Army, I now recommend immediate grant of full independence and whole-hearted support to Azerbaijan, despatch

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
18 YANVAR 1920

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Note refers to previous collective note relating to Jemal's failure to comply with General Milne's instructions regarding Smyrna delimitation, and calls Porte's attention to further instances of improper conduct on the part of responsible heads of Ministry of War, as set out in enclosed schedule. It proceeds as follows:—

(D.) "Matter enumerated in this list involves definite breaches of article 5 and article 20 of convention of armistices between Allied Powers and Turkey, for which General Jemal Pasha and General Jevad Pasha are directly responsible.

"High Commissioners accordingly require Ottoman Government to remove the above-named two generals from their appointments within forty-seven hours of presentation of this joint note." (End of D.)

Offences enumerated in schedule are as follows:—

1. Despatch of specially selected officers from Constantinople for staff of National forces.
2. Despatch of men discharged, transferred from XIVth Army Corps to join National forces under orders from Ministry of War.
3. Secret despatch of arms to National forces proved by arrest of two officers caught red-handed.
4. Transfer of two battalions from Zumbuldak to Constantinople without permission of General Milne, and failure for over a month to obey orders for their return.
5. Transfer of 159th Regiment from Afun-Kara Hassar to Alashehr without permission. Jemal disclaimed knowledge of this, and eventually ordered return, but order was obeyed only by few details, and majority of regiment joined National forces.
6. Transfer of 174th Regiment from Brussa to Panderma without permission and failure even to notify movement until enquiry had been demanded.

We are now only waiting for military authorities to fix time for delivery of note which will fit in with their arrangements. This will probably be Monday morning, the 19th January.

Italian High Commissioner displayed almost insuperable reluctance to agree to note. He fought particularly hard against fixing of time limit but eventually accepted note as drafted. French High Commissioner is preparing French text for signature. Note will be delivered by French political officer. French High Commissioner and I were in favour of presentation by the three High Commissioners in person, but our Italian colleague opposed this also so strenuously that we waived it.

[171843/ME 58]

No. 36.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 31. Private and Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 18, 1920.

YOUR private and secret telegram unnumbered of 14th January.

Aggression of any kind on the part of Georgia and [? Azerbaijan] seems highly improbable. Both Governments have recently publicly declared their policy of absolute neutrality in Russian [? affairs]. All they desire is aid to preserve that attitude. They both realise that Bolshevism is now a cloak for Russian imperialism, but Daghestan is less conscious of danger from that quarter and some encouraging utterance by His Majesty's Government with regard to North Caucasus would be very valuable at this critical moment.

(Sent to Tehran, No. 17; Constantinople, No. 21; and Mr. Mackinder, No. 13.)

[172322/ME 58]

No. 37.

The Earl of Derby to Lord Hardings.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, January 20, 1920.

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon:—


"At meeting on Monday, 19th January, Supreme Council accepted principle of sending help to Transcaucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in shape of arms, munitions of war and, if possible, food. British and French General Staffs

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
23 FEVRAL 1920

No. 66.

Tiflis,

23 February 1920.



My Lord,

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Inclosed I have the honour to transmit copy of a Memorandum in the English language sent to me by Fath Ali Khan Khoiski, Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his Note No. 1110 of February 19.

I understand that a similar communication has been made to the local representatives of our Allies France and Italy and to America.

The supplementary lists are being translated and will follow by the next messenger.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

humble servant,

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

FƏTƏLİ XAN XOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

Inclosure in Mr Wardrop's despatch No. 66 of 23 Feb. 1920.

Copy.

MEMORANDUM.

The Government and the People of Azerbaijan Republic welcome with a deep moral satisfaction the fact of the acknowledgement by the Great European Powers of the independency of the Azerbaijan People and of the acceptance of them into the number of Members of the International Communion.

But, however great be the historical importance of the act of the 11th of the January 1920, which is quite estimated and recognised by us, - it could not give concrete and due results of respect of the amelioration and strengthening of the de facto situation in our country, if the Allied Powers would not give at the meantime to the Azerbaijan People a necessary moral and material assistance in order to enable them the performance of the high cultured mission which falls to them. The storming ocean of the great Russian riot overflowed with its waves nearly whole the territory of the former Empire of the Tzars.

Being in the ranks of the frontier-countries peoples strange to the Russian ideology, our Azerbaijan people defended in a tenacious struggle their independence against chaos till the present time, organised in a short time a standard order and a solid state policy, which are approved unanimously by all the representatives of the civilised states who visited Azerbaijan.

But all the pains and victims of the Azerbaijan people can be lost, if necessary measures will not be taken in order to secure their free and independent existence.

FƏTƏLİ XAN XOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

It is known that the civil war in Russia is at the present moment in its apogee and came with all its horrors close to the frontiers of the Azerbaijan Republic. However contradictory be the ideology of the opposed sides in Russia, both of them are equally malevolent to the selfdetermined peoples of Caucasus, and in a very short time the Azerbaijan People can face the severe danger, which is moving towards them from the North.

Trusting in the sympathies of the Allied Powers, Azerbaijan Government will attract their attention to the seriousness of the present political situation and takes the liberty and duty to point out the measures which are necessary and urgent in the present situation. Amongst those measures - the following are to be mentioned in the first rank :

I. MORAL - POLITICAL ASSISTANCE OF THE ALLIED POWERS.

About this the Azerbaijan Government never had any doubt - and, after the proclamation of the act of 11th of the January 1920, has more assurance.

II. MILITARY - STRATEGICAL ASSURANCE OF AZERBAIJAN.

From the strategical point of view, it is necessary to make safe the frontiers of the Azerbaijan Republic from the continent as well as from the side of the Caspian Sea. It is known that the present de facto frontiers in the North /from the side of the Dağhestan/ pass through the plain of Kuba which has no natural bars, and the most important strategical points of the Dağhestan and Terek-Provinces are occupied by the armed forces of the Volunteer Army, which are in a continual struggle with the mountaineers of those Provinces, who are defendin: the right for self determination

FƏTƏLİ XAN KOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

determination of their life with armed hands. 130

The presence in those countries of the foreign to the Mountaineers Volunteer forces and a grave throwing down of the rights of those peoples for a free life, caused in those provinces even the breaking out of Bolshevism, as a factor opposed to the forces of the Volunteer Army. 130

One can say with a full confidence that the mountaineers are quite foreign to the ideology of the Bolshevik tendencies and they will shortly and without complications free themselves from the influence of it, if the causes of Bolshevism will be immediately removed.

Therefore, the Azerbaijan Government is directly and vitally interested in the question of the clearing of the territory of Dahestan and ~~the~~ the southern part of the Terek-Province by the units of the Volunteer Army, not touching even the question of the determination of conditions of the life of the Mountaineers.

As regards the defence of Azerbaijan from the sea side, the first condition is to make innocuous the navy of the Volunteer Army in the Caspian Sea, while the presence of the navy in that Sea offers a big menace for Azerbaijan. Besides, the history of the Russian fleet gives important grounds to believe, that the fleet can quite easily pass over to the Bolsheviks and give them over all the Power on the Caspian Sea.

As an example can be pointed out the fact of a revolt on one of the boats of the Volunteer Army - "Eaglet" /"Orlionok"/.

Therefore it is necessary to hand over to the disposal of the Azerbaijan Government or at least

neutralisation

FƏTƏLİ XAN KOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

neutralisation of those boats by means of controlling them by one of the Allied Powers. For the same reasons it is very important the controlling of the Astrabad military and Sea-base of the Volunteer Army in the Isle of Ashur-Adé /Persia/ - by the Persian Government or of the Naval Command of Great Britain, while that base gives a very big support to the domination on the Caspian Sea. 131

As regards the military assistance for the Azerbaijan Republic, it must be mentioned, that the following are necessary in order to rise the military faculties of the Army, the arrangement of the Fleet and the Baku military port:

- a/ Supply of the Azerbaijan Army with all sorts of equipment in branches of Artillery, Engineering, Intendancy, Sanitary and Aviation.
- b/ Technical equipment of artillery manufactories: guns, shells, cartridges, powder, manufactories /with a branch for explosives.
- c/ Despatching of military aviators and specialists for the equipment and services for the artillery manufactories.
- d/ Assistance in repairing of the engines and other parts of the gun-boats "Kars", "Ardaghan", "Astrabad", "Cheok-Tepe" and "Krasnovodsk".
- e/ Returning of the gunlocks taken off by the British Command from the guns of the above boats.
- f/ ~~XX~~ Fulllest military-technical equipment of the Port of Baku with hydroplanes, aeroplanes, different kinds of destroyers, submarines, marine artillery, with necessary stock of shells, wireless, optical instruments, technical materials and so on.

The

FƏTƏLİ XAN KOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

The details about the necessary materials of ¹⁴⁰ equipment of the fleet and army are given in the attached lists.

III. THE FINANCIAL-ECONOMICAL QUESTION AND THE FOOD SUPPLY. 132

The general political and financial decay of the former Russian Empire disturbed the grounds of its economical life and led to the catastrophical fall of the value of Russian Roubles. The states newly formed upon the ruins of the former Russia unjustly bear the burden of the mistakes of the unreasonable financial management of the former Metropolis. The constant fall of our value and absence of the foreign value in our country, cause a grievous industrial and economic crisis, a stand in the international exchange, absence of import of necessary vital stuffs, and therefore - rise in price of the life and speculation, and excite the quite intelligible dissatisfaction of the great number of workmen and poor classes, and give an excellent weapon in the hands of the Bolshevik agitators and other people sowing the riots.

On account of the above, it is vitally necessary for our financial restitution as well as for support of our physical existence, an immediate financial and alimentary assistance from the side of the Great Powers.

We ask, for our financial reconstruction, and for the creation of a stable value of roubles and within the removal of the main obstacle for the international exchange and payment, - a loan on the European

FƏTƏLİ XAN KOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

European and American Market of a sum of 40 to 50 ¹⁴¹ million Roubles in gold.

The poor crop of the last year, the absence of foreign import, and a magnanimous concession by Azerbaijan of an important amount of grain to the neighbour Georgia, which suffered an acute lack of bread, - caused a heavy crisis in grain products in our country. The approximate quantity of food stuffs which are necessary to cover our current needs are presented in the following round figures :

- a/ grains - $1\frac{1}{2}$ - to 2 million poods
/ 24.500 to 32.260 tons /,
- b/ sugar - about 1 million poods
/ about 16.129 tons /,
- c/ implements of husbandry for an intensive rural economy,
- d/ manufactured and colonial goods,
- e/ a large amount of medical stuffs /the lack of those stuffs is very great/.

For military-strategical and economical purposes is necessary an immediate remount, renovation and strengthening of our railway buildings and completion of the rolling-stock with about 100 locomotives, 2.000 cisterns and 500 covered waggons, In exchange we can immediately export :

- 1/ Naptha: at present time are ready for export in Baku about 200.000.000 poods of same.
- 2/ Petroleum - about 20.000.000 poods, and other naptha stuffs.
- 3/ Different kind of raw materials, cotton, wool, silk, frison, leather, skins, goat-skins and so on - a big amount.

IV. THE QUESTION OF BATUM.

As

FƏTƏLİ XAN XOYSKİNİN MEMORANDUMU
23 FEVRAL 1920

IV. THE QUESTION OF BATOUM. 142

As regards the vital necessities of the Azerbaijan Republic, there is another most important question of our existence, which cannot be lost sight of. That is the question of the Town and Port of Batoum. Not touching even the question of the future political status of the Batoum-Province, we must point out the big economical and cultural importance of the town and port of Batoum for our State, as a unique port, which communicates us with the opened Sea and with European and non-European countries. 134

Batoum is a transit-way and a depot for nearly all our ~~gross~~ trade with the West, the terminus of the direct line Batoum-Baku and the final point of our pipeline Baku-Batoum. Therefore our most vital interests require, that our reasonable claims for a free communication with the external world, as well as for a free of costs using of all buildings and adaptations of the port, by the resolution of the question of Batoum, town and port, would be guaranteed by the international control, and would not be dependent from a political regime which can be set for the further time.

Presenting this MEMORANDUM, the Government and the people of Azerbaijan will trust, the Great Allied Powers, while the leading idea of their policy is the national selfdetermination of peoples, - will not be indifferent to the future of the Azerbaijan People, and will not refuse a necessary support and assistance in the present serious period of their independent existence.

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC.

(signed) F. KHOISKY.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
10 FEVRAL 1920

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FILES ONLY

Decypher. Admiral de Robeck. (Constantinople). Feb. 10th.

D. 11.0.p.m. February 10th, 1920.

R. 10.30.a.m. February 12th, 1920.

No. 121. Very Urgent.

Very Secret.

My telegram No. 76.

I have received from most secret source copy of what purports to be Military Convention concluded between Turkey and Azerbaijan on November 29th supplementary to Political Agreement of same date. Document is said to have been signed at Hotel here by Turkish Chief of the General Staff and Azerbaijan Military Representative named Kerimoff. Chief of the General Staff is same Jevad Pasha who has been so deeply implicated in national movement and who was recently dismissed at instance of Allied High Commissioners. I cannot identify Kerimoff. Convention amounts to a defensive alliance good for one (? year, omitted) Casus Foederis would arise if either party should be threatened by neighbouring State in its territorial integrity or by any State in its (? independence.) Parties bind themselves to secrecy until within six months expiration of Convention. Turkey undertakes to supply Azerbaijan with military instructors. Islamic bond between Turkey and Azerbaijan is emphasized in text of document. Document bears no obvious traces of being a forgery and cannot I think, be dismissed lightly though it seems inherently most improbable that formal agreement can have been concluded

It

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
10 FEVRAL 1920

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- 2 -

It is not impossible that it is only draft and that Jevad Pasha represented national forces rather than Government in which case official knowledge of it here might be confined to Ministry of War . Minister for Foreign Affairs categorically denied some days ago in conversation with Mr. Ryan that any agreement existed between Turkey and Azerbaijan. He scouted suggestion (made of course without mentioning document now in question) that Military authorities might have made Military Convention. He said he could not even believe national forces in interior had done so though he admitted physical possibility of this. On the other hand Reouf Bey is reported also from secret source to have stated to trustworthy informant (not Turkish) on January 14th at Angora that Nationalists had made offensive and defensive alliance with Azerbaijan.

Translation of alleged document follows by bag.

(9 .2. 3-4).

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
9 APREL 1920

No. 134.

Tiflis,

9 April 1920.

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E 4205 126A

MAY 5 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit copy of Despatch (No.49 of 5 April) from the Acting Political Officer at Baku in which Major Daly reports points discussed at an interview he had with Monsieur Ussubbekov, Minister President of Azerbaijan on 5 April.

Substance of this despatch has already been telegraphed to Your Lordship.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

humble servant,

For Chief British Commissioner

S. E. Hill
Secretary.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

MAYOR T. DEYLİNİN RAPORTU
5 APREL 1920

Inclosure: in Mr. Wardrop's despatch No. 134 of April 9th, 1920 ~~238~~

No. 49.

B a k u, 127
5th April 1920.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I interviewed the Minister President M.Us.ubekoff to-day. The following points were discussed:-

- (i) The Caspian flotilla.
- (ii) The Bolshevick danger in Azerbaidjan.
- (iii) The leading article by Dr. Karabekov in the Ittehad paper dated April 4th 1920.

(i) His Excellency stated that the Azerbaidjan Government were negotiating with Admiral Sergiev and General Dratsenko regarding the taking over of the Caspian flotilla and the purchase of munitions of war.

I informed His Excellency that as the British Government were closely interested in this matter, I hoped that he would keep me fully informed of the situation. His Excellency replied that it was the wish of his Government that they should work in the closest agreement, and that he would inform me the result of the negotiations and give me lists of munitions of war and material that had been taken over.

His Excellency appeared to be under the impression that negotiations were almost complete. This opinion I did not share as I was strongly under the impression after my interview with Admiral Sergiev that he (Sergiev) was having great difficulty to persuade his Officers to see eye to eye

MAYOR T. DEYLİNİN RAPORTU
5 APREL 1920

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to eye with him.

I asked His Excellency, if in the case of a Bolshevick attack, Azerbaidjan would be able to man the fleet for action. He replied that Azerbaidjan had sailors and gunners but urgently required Officers and wished me to transmit to you his request for British Officers and personnel.

His Excellency stated that he did not think that there was any fear of a Bolshevick attack as the Government hoped to be able now to open up trade communications with Astrakhan and establish friendly relations with Soviet Russia.

(ii) His Excellency informed me that the Government had discovered papers and documents which showed that the local Bolsheviks had determined to attempt to overthrow the Government.

A number of arrests had been made which included some local Mussulman Bolsheviks, to whose arrest members of the Ittehad party had protested.

A number of explosives, bombs and some arms had also been seized.

His Excellency stated that the Bolsheviks were not well organized, their leaders and arms had been seized and he was persuaded that they were not capable of a serious rising, and that there was ample force to keep order in the town.

(iii) In discussing the leading article by Dr. Karabekov in the "Ittehad", organ of the party of that name, His Excellency stated that they had considered closing down the publication of the paper, but that the article in question was written by Dr. Karabekov, who was an irresponsible man and who was quite capable of writing the very opposite the next day.

MAYOR T. DEYLİNİN RAPORTU
5 APREL 1920

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129

day. The Government were in possession of papers, which they intended to make use of, which, when known would discredit Dr. Karabekov.

His Excellency minimised the importance of the Ittehad Party, and added that ^{it} had no influence with serious minded persons in Azerbaïdjan.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient, humble
servant,

(and) MajBr T. Deylin Daly.

To, The Chief British Commissioner,
Tiflis.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
26 MART 1920

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FILES ONLY

Decypher from Batoum from Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) by Post.

D. 9.10.p.m. March 25th, 1920.

R. 9.0.a.m. April 4th, 1920.

No. 166. Clear the Line.

Following from Political Officer, Baku. Begins:

I have been informed by Sergiev that Dratsenko has issued orders absolving officers and men from further service. This implies abandonment of Petrovsk crews of (Europe ?) and Dmitri Donski have left their ships and further dissolution feared by Sergiev but he stated he can depend on loyalty of half of Volunteer Fleet. Sergiev must go to Baku or Enzeli and Ashurada after loss of base. Sergiev states that his last instructions even if he lost base to place fleet (? under the) protection of British at Enzeli retaining Russian flag and interior administration. Sergiev now willing to (? hand over) (? to) British at Enzeli or Baku but will not hand over to Persia or Azerbaijan. Willing to return unarmed ships to Russian companies who owned them after removing refugees from Petrovsk. Azerbaijan willing to supply oil for immediate needs of Fleet. Azerbaijan Government state they have reliable information that it is intention of Bolsheviks to attack Trans-Caucasian Republics and they ask for a categorical (? statement) from Allies that they can depend on material and diplomatic support as promised months ago. As Azerbaijan (? must) determine at once her attitude towards Bolsheviks she asks for immediate assurance of Allied support, if accorded, will encourage her to resist with all her force Bolshevik aggression. If this assurance is not given, Azerbaijan will not be in a position to resist attack and will no doubt attempt to come to terms with Bolsheviks.

(4.4. 8-4).

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
26 MART 1920

40
E 282621

1920

POLITICAL

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop. (Tiflis). March 26th, 1920.

D. 9.30.p.m. March 26th, 1920.

R. 10.0.a.m. April 7th, 1920.

No. 171.

Following dated March 26th received from Acting
Political Officer, Baku. Begins:-

Eliskaslanoff stated that Government is at wits end
how to maintain confidence of Parliament in Entente, he
said that different political parties were attacking Cabinet
saying that Allies only promised help but nothing ever
materialised even now when victorious red bands were rapidly
rolling down on Azerbaijan. He said that if Government could
only produce small present proof of future material aid much
would be done to quell growing Pan-Germanism.

If only a few rifles or uniforms could be paraded as
proof.

Daghestan already turning Bolshevick and Cabinet fears
infection spreading to Azerbaijan as mass of people con-
sider Azerbaijan cannot offer real resistance without effec-
tive Allied help. He said that opposition announced (gr.undec-)
Allies have sent Armenia considerable war supplies, thus ex-
plaining Ghusha troubles.

He begged, if possible, that Your Excellency should deny
this officially in order to quell anti-Allied agitation.
Cabinet does not forget British support in past but
people do not see this, only recognising present danger. Ends.
Sent to Foreign Office 179 (sic). Repeated to
Constantinople No. 109 and Teheran No. 58.

(7.4. 3-4).

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
7 MART 1920

E-1661

5 1920

FILES ONLY.

Decypher; Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) March 7th.

D. 9.50 p. m. March 7th. 1920.

R. 3.30 p. m. " 16th.

No. 136.

-----oOo-----

Secret.

Acting Political officer Baku reports con-
versation March 5th with Fuad Bey concerning whom
our Office have precise information (Major Depuys'
L1-1324 of February 18th.)

After studying situation in Azerbaijan and
Daghestan Fuad Bey reports:

Two influences are working in both countries;
Bolshevik and Turk and latter could be used in British
interests. He has consulted leading local Turks and
says he could form Committee, if accorded moral and
material aid, to use Turks against Bolsheviks and
assist Azerbaijan Government to preserve its authority.

In Daghestan it would be necessary to have a
completely controlled Committee of Management after
which civil and military administration would be
handed over to natives.

Volunteer army must evacuate towns occupied
by them.

Bolsheviks

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
7 MART 1920

2.

00

Bolsheviks have already offered Turks three million roubles so Fuad Bey could not guarantee success of his organization unless he received promise of support within ten days.

He proposes to issue newspaper in Baku and engage persons willing to risk their lives but it is question of £5,000 urgently necessary to begin with. He would work against Committee of Union and Progress. Turkish influence is strong in Azerbaijan but not Young Turk.

Sent to Foreign Office No.136, Teheran 44, Constantinople 83.

-----000-----

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASI
28 APREL 1920

364	EASTERN.	213
1920	CAUCASUS.	E 5326 202 MAY 27 1920
Registry Number } E5326/1/58. FROM Commander Jude, Tiflis. No. 147. Dated 26th April, 1920. Received 27th May, 1920. Eastern: Caucasus.	<u>Bolshevik invasion of Azerbaijan territory.</u> Transmits paraphrases of Tiflis telegrams No. 218 of 28th April (E3890) and No. 219 of 30th April (E4021) also copy of letter transmitted to Armenian Government on 27th April. Suggests that request of Azerbaijan Government for an Allied démarche to secure Georgian cooperation was a blind to conceal their intentions as regards the Bolsheviks. States Armenian Government consented to give guarantee asked for by Azerbaijan, subject to certain condition. No news of British personnel at Baku.	
Last Paper. 5325 (Print.) (How disposed of.)	(Minuted.) <i>Comd Jude confirms my original contention that the Bolshevik coup at Baku was a prearranged affair in which the Azerbaijan Govt. participated</i> R. Ke. Dmell 28.5.20 W. G. Osborne 28/5. Jan 28/5	
(Action completed.) 21/5	(Index.) A10	
Next Paper. 5327		

271127.—W. 28,226/4.—56M.—1/20.—W. & A. Ltd.—(C9).

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
28 APREL 1920

Confidential.

No.147.

Tiflis,
April 28th, 1920.

202
214
E-5326
MAY 27 1920

My Lord,

Inclosure 1.
Inclosure 2

I have the honour to inclose paraphrases of my telegrams Nos.218 and 219 addressed to Your Lordship on the 27th April and to-day respectively, which summarize the events of the last two days as regards the situation in Azerbaijan.

Inclosure 3

I also attach copy of the telegram referred to in inclosure 1, which was transmitted by Count de Martel, Colonel Gabba, and myself to the Armenian Government on the 27th April.

2. The fall of Baku on the morrow of the request by the Azerbaijan Government for an Allied démarche to secure Georgian co-operation and the Armenian guarantee naturally nullified the action taken in consequence; and it seems not unlikely, in so far as it is possible to judge from the scanty information hitherto available, that the Azerbaijan authorities had already decided on the 27th April upon their course of action as regards the Bolsheviks, and put forward this request as a blind to conceal their true intentions.

I should add that the Armenian delegation in Tiflis this afternoon communicated to me the reply of their Government, made before the fall of Baku was known to them.

The reply was to the effect that

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
28 APREL 1920

(2)

215

204

Armenia consented to give the guarantee asked for by Azerbaijan, subject to certain conditions.

In the changed circumstances, which now render the guarantee of no avail, I urged upon the Armenian delegation, as I had urged upon Monsieur Gegechkori this morning, the necessity for the closest co-operation between Georgia and Armenia, who are unhappily still distrustful of one another, in the face of their mutual danger.

3. I am at the time of writing still without news of the British personnel at Baku, but every effort is being made to get into touch with them.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

He Lull
Commander, R.N.V.R.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
18 YANVAR 1920

172

RUSSIA

POLITICAL
172088
JAN 21 1920

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop. (Tiflis),
January 18th. 1920.

D. 9.30.p.m. January 18th. 1920.

R. 7.0.p.m. January 20th. 1920.

No.34.

Your telegram No.141.

Colonel Stokes reports as follows:-

(?Persian) Commissioner in Baku says that question of Confederation of Persia and Azerbaijan was first raised by Azerbaijan envoy to Persia some months ago and Persian Government gave (?evasive) reply.

Mirza (?Co)za Khan Arfa Ud Dauleh (on his) way through (?Baku) to Persia (see my telegram No.195) put matter (?before) Azerbaijan Government who asked Persian Commissioner whether His Highness spoke in name of his Government. Reply was that Prince spoke for himself and (?had not been) authorised.

Azerbaijan Prime Minister suggested to Persian Commissioner idea of confederation. Reply was that Commissioner had no instructions but would listen. After hearing Prime Minister, Commissioner replied that question might appropriately be discussed after His Majesty's Government had recognised Azerbaijan (?and) added in case of confederation Azerbaijan must accept Persia's foreign policy without reserve.

Commissioner thinks that confederation would be
more

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
18 YANVAR 1920

173

(2).

more advantageous to Great Britain and Azerbaijan than to Persia and says that though all leading Azerbaijan politicians agree, (?that omitted) union with Persia is the best future (?for) Azerbaijan they do not all agree in considering friendship with Great Britain the same. He says that matter has been referred to Teheran (?but he) has not yet received reply.

Sent to Foreign Office No.34.

(?Teheran) No.19.

Constantinople No.24.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN TELEQRAMI
20 İYUN 1920

489 1920	EASTERN. 4942 CAUCASUS.	13 E 7224 JUN 25 1920
Registry Number } E7224/1/58 TELEGRAM FROM Commander Luke Tiflis, No 291 Dated 20th June, 1920. Received 25th June, 1920. E: Caucasia.	Murder of Khan Khoiski. States above, Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs, under late régime, was murdered in Tiflis on 19th June. Repeated Constantinople and Batoum.	
Last Paper. 415H (Print.) (How disposed of.)	(Minutes.) This is a good man & friend of the allies gone R. Du Donell 25-6-20 A telegram received at Carlton Hotel Doubtless by an Armenian for the Russians R. O. 800/25/6 Parisley 25-6 G	
(Action completed.) 5/9/20 Next Paper. 4257	(Index.) SEEN BY 20 JUN 1920 41 Next Paper.	

(*) (67267) Wt. 33320 4 Gp. 163 8.000 1-20 IV B & L

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN TELEQRAMI
20 İYUN 1920

2-1A E 7224 JUN 25 1920	CAUCASUS. POLITICAL.
Decypher. Commander Luke (Tiflis). 20th June 1920.	
D. 8.30.a.m. 25th June 1920.. R. 11.a.m. (26th) June 1920.	
No. 291. VERY URGENT.	
Khan Khoiski, Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs under late régime, murdered in Tiflis last night. Addressed to Foreign Office No. 291, Constantinople and Batoum.	

MESOPOTAMİYADAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
17 FEVRAL 1920

PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.

E. -597

23
1920

From: G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office.

Desp. 1000 17.2.20.
Recd. 1500 23.2.20.

...227 February 17th.

Following opinion by Norperforce may be of interest though you ? have received information more directly from Trans-Caucasia.

1. Mussavat party now in power in Caucasian Azerbaijan though originally pro-Turkey is endeavouring to throw off Ottoman influence by getting rid of Turkish officers in their volunteer force. They see that Turkish ? campaign is to dominate their government rather than to assist it to obtain complete independence. Influential ? Ittehad party which is allied with Bolshevik and Ottoman elements is opposed to Mussavat policy.
2. Should Turkey secure control of Caucasian Azerbaijan they would gain suitable base for spreading their pan-Islamic policy through Persia, Azorbaijan, Trans-Caspia and Afghanistan. Caucasian Azerbaijan once free from Turkish (7 groups omitted), as only other approach is through the Kurd provinces.
3. Caucasus Azorbaijan appears to be key to situation and policy (group undec.) of present government may enable them to nullify activities of (group undec.) of Turkey and their supporters.

C.2.Copies to: S.of S.
U.S.of S.
Sec.
A.G.
J.M.G.
M.G.O.
C.I.G.S. D.O.I.G.S.
M.O.1.2.2a.3.5.5a.

D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2.2b.R.Rb.6b.
D.S.D.
Paris.
Lord Curson.
Ad.(D.N.I.)
F.J.(Mr. Ehipps).
I.D.C.E.

Much mutilated.

ADMIRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASI (9 MART 1920)

British High Commission,
Constantinople,
9th March, 1920.

42

NO. 336 /M/2279.

E-2148

1920

SECRET

My Lord,

Enclosures 2.

I have the honour to forward for Your Lordship's information, a copy of two reports received from a secret source regarding,

- (i) Pan-Turanianism in Azerbaijan, and
- (ii) Bolshevik and Pan-Islamic Activity in Bokhara.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's Obedient Servant,

J. de Robek

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

The Right Honourable,
The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., P.C.,
etc., etc., etc.,

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
9 MART 1920

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PAN-TURANIANISM in AZERBAIJAN.

REPORT from A.S.

The following is an extract from a letter recently received from BAKU. The writer is a well educated man and is generally well informed. The date of the letter is about 1.2.1920:-

On the subject of Pan-Turanianism the writer reports that the number of Turks arriving in BAKU is constantly on the increase. These immigrants include a large number of teachers, officers, civil officials and mullahs. The majority of them travel to the Caucasus under Azerbaijan passports. These passports are sent from BAKU to the İTTİHAD party in Constantinople, and are distributed by the latter to such persons as may be selected by them. On a recent occasion a party of about forty Turkish teachers for elementary schools came to BAKU travelling under Azerbaijan passports.

The Mullahs in the mosques are paying much more attention to the inculcation of Pan-Islamic principles, and are directing their efforts to effecting a political and religious recognition of the supremacy of the Sultan as Khalifa.

Sympathies in official circles are again becoming pro-Turkish though anything in the way of open demonstration has been avoided pending the settlement of the Turkish question. NURI Pasha continues to enjoy considerable popularity both in AZERBAIJAN and DAGHESTAN, where he is at present organising and leading the insurgents against the Volunteer Army. RİFAAT Bey is also playing an active part in the operations in

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
9 MART 1920

2.

44

DAGHESTAN, and led the attack on DERBANT towards the end of January. Latest information from DERBENT shows NURI pasha to be staying at LEVASHI in DAGHESTAN. NURI Pasha's influence is undoubtedly on the increase in AZERBAIJAN, where he has come to be looked upon as a national hero, and as the "saviour of AZERBAIJAN from extermination by her enemies", the "founder of the republic" etc. etc. Photographs of the Sultan, NURI and ENVER Pashas are on sale in the streets of BAKU.

Constantinople. Copies to:- G.S.I., A.B.S.,
British High Commission
M.I.I.C.,
C.G.S., India.
G.S.I., Cairo.
G.S.I., Baghdad.
British Legation,
Teheran.
British High Commission
Tiflis.
Geneva.
Major J.A. Wallinger.
Political Officer,
C-in-C, Mediterranean

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMI
12 MART 1920

1920	EASTERN.	4934 E-2177 182 1920
CAUCASUS.		
<p>Eastern: Caucasus.</p> <p>Register Number } E2177/1/58</p> <p>Title Mr. Wardrop, Tiflis.</p> <p>No. 142 Cypher.</p> <p>Date 12th March, 1920.</p> <p>Received 26th March, 1920.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Situation in Azerbaijan.</u></p> <p>Transmits substance of remarks of Persian Commissioner at Baku to acting Political officer to effect that he views situation pessimistically unless force is immediately shown against Bolsheviks and Young Turks. Thinks Persian force should be mobilised and concentrated on Azerbaijan frontier and Caspian fleet be bought by Persia and manned by British. Is advising Persian Government to send Mission to Moscow to gain time. Mr. Wardrop requests Colonel Stokes be informed of above. Repeated Constantinople and Teheran.</p>	
<p>Last Paper.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2157</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Print.)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Box divided of)</p> <p>4(5) S.O. W.O. Ady. Mar 30.</p>	<p>(Window)</p> <p>See units within</p> <p>Copies { 20 ✓ 100 ✓ Ady ✓</p>	
<p>(Action completed)</p> <p>(Index)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2217</p>	<p>Next Paper.</p>	

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ 1
12 MART 1920

<p>Papers submitted between 26th</p>	<p>(1) Telegram No. 142 March 11 from Tiflis to F.O. (E2177/1/58).</p>
183	
<p><u>Contents.</u></p>	<p>The Persian Commissioner at Baku views the situation in Azerbaijan very pessimistically unless force is immediately shown against the Bolsheviks and Young Turks. He thought that a Persian force should be concentrated on the Azerbaijan frontier, and the Caspian fleet bought by Persia and manned by British. Persia could then guarantee the defence of Baku for Azerbaijan.</p>
<p><u>minutes</u></p>	<p>There is nothing new in this as far as the situation at Baku is concerned. It accords with the information contained in Tiflis tel. IV. 144.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">D. G. D. 26/3. J. G. D. 27.3 K.</p>

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ 2
12 MART 1920

RUSSIA.

E-2177 3
POLITICAL 1920
184

Decypher; Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) March 11th. 1920.

D. 4.00 p. m. March 12th. 1920.

R. 1.10 p. m. * 25th.

No. 142.

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Following is substance of remarks of Persian Commissioner at Baku in recent conversation with our acting Political Officer: Commissioner views situation in Azerbaijan very pessimistically unless force immediately shown against Bolsheviks and Young Turks, and thinks that arming of Azerbaijan (? not) dangerous, but that spirit of army is uncertain. He thought that Persian force should be mobilised and concentrated on Azerbaijan frontier and Caspian fleet bought by Persia and manned by British; if so Persia could guarantee defence of Baku for Azerbaijan. Commissioner is advising Persian Government to send carefully chosen Mission to Moscow merely to gain time. He has succeeded in securing free transit between Batoum and Persia and hopes to complete agreement in a few days. Please inform Colonel Stokes.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 142, Constantinople 85.
Teheran 46.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA TELEQRAMI
8 MART 1920

70

SECRET.

No.87.

Tiflis,

8 March 1920.

E 2730

1920


My Lord,

^{e/}
Herwith I have the honour
to transmit copy of Major Daly's
despatch No.2 of March 5th with a
secret document L/T 1324.

I have informed Major Daly *Re*
personally I do not like the document
and am inclined to mistrust the person
in question, though I have never met
him.

In addition, I am of opinion
that the Azerbaijan Government might
have reasonable grounds for disliking
action such as that proposed.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Your Lordship's most obedient,
humble servant,



His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
8 MART 1920

Incl; in Mr. Wardrop's desp. No 87
of March 8th., 1920

71

Copy
Confidential
No 2

Baku, March 5th., 1920

Sir,

I have the honour to report that to-day I had a conversation with Fuad Bey, whom I had sent down to Baku from Tiflis to give me a report on the situation ~~there~~.

After having studied the situation in Azerbaijan and Daghestan, Fuad Bey made the following declarations:-

(1) In both countries two influences are at work, the first, Bolshevik with whom it is impossible to work or to agree, the second, Turkish influence on the Mussulman world, which could be directed in a manner favourable to British interests and which would at the same time safeguard the independence of Azerbaijan and Daghestan.

(11) Fuad Bey has already consulted the most prominent Turks both civil and military, and is convinced that a committee could be formed under his leadership, if accorded moral and material support, with a programme which would be such as to utilise the Turks against the Bolshevik menace.

The programme of the committee would be to defend the independence of Azerbaijan by assisting the Government of Azerbaijan to preserve its authority. In Daghestan, it would be necessary to obtain temporarily complete ~~total~~ control in order to throw out the Bolsheviks..... later the civil and military administration would be handed over to the natives

of

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
8 MART 1920

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2.

of Daghestan.

(3) It would be necessary for the British Government to bring pressure to bear on the Volunteer Army to evacuate the towns occupied by them.

(4) In view of the fact that the Bolsheviks have made the offer of a sum of 300,000,000 roubles to the Turks, in order by this means to win them over to their cause, time is urgent and Fuad Bey fears that he could not guarantee the success of his organisation if more than ten days is allowed to lapse.

(5) It will be necessary to publish a daily paper in Baku, as the organ of this committee, to carry out anti-Bolshevick propaganda and to make popular their cause.

(6) In order to guarantee the success of the work and the safety of the members of the committee it would be necessary to engage a sufficient number of persons willing even to risk their lives.

(7) It is indispensable to have a preliminary sum of £5,000 at their disposal with further assistance in the future.

(8) After the committee has been officially constituted, the British to make representations to the Azerbaijan Government for facilities and protection.

(9) Fuad Bey agrees to take upon himself political and financial control on behalf of the British Government (who would be represented) in the most confidential manner.

(10) The committee would work against the programme of the Committee of "Union" and "Progress

I pointed out to Fuad Bey that, although I would forward his views as expressed in the

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
8 MART 1920

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3.

in the above statement to higher authorities, I could not give him any indication as to their reception.

Fuad Bey said although the Turks in Azerbaijan were few in numbers their influence on the people was very strong. A great many of them who were in Azerbaijan to-day were definitely against the Young Turks who had brought their country to ruin. It was the Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and not the activities of a few notorious Young Turks that was important. The Turkish influence could be directed to the advantage of Great Britain and Azerbaijan, and the Young Turk influence eliminated.

In using the word Turk, Fuad Bey said he implied all Mussulman in the Caucasus. The Azerbaijan Government were in a difficult position, as no party could afford to estrange Turkish feeling, which was at present represented unfortunately by such notorious Young Turks as Nuri, Khalil, Kuchuk Talaat, Baha-ad-din, Bedri Bey and Azmi Bey.

Fuad Bey insisted that the majority of Turks in Azerbaijan viewed with mistrust their leaders' intrigues with the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks had moreover expressed their disgust at Nuri Pasha's incapability and had stated that he was only 'playing with them' and must go.

Please see my Lt/1324 dated February 18th, a copy of which was forwarded to you.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN TELEQRAMINA ƏLAVƏ
8 MART 1920

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4.

I should like to receive your instructions as soon as possible, as to whether there is any likelihood of this assistance being accorded or not.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient, humble servant

(Sd) T. Denis Daly

Major

The Chief British Commissioner,
in Transcaucasia,
Tiflis

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN MƏRUZƏSİ
14 APREL 1920

SUPPLEMENTARY SITUATION IN SOUTH RUSSIA TO
14TH APRIL 1920.

(Crimea and North Caucasus).

1. Caspian Sea.

(a) The Volunteer Fleet is being disarmed at Enzeli by the British. On the 13th April 6 ships had already been disarmed and 9 were waiting. The crews were being landed and interned.

(b) The Bolsheviks report the capture of Fort Alexandrovsk, on the north east shore of the Caspian Sea, on the 5th April; they claim to have made about 1150 prisoners, the remnants of the Ural Cossack army.

(c) On the 6th April the Commander of the Volunteer Fleet reported that Astrakhan was free from ice, but that the Volga was still ice bound. (N.B. The ice on the Volga usually breaks up between the middle and end of April. The ice on the rivers near Petrograd is expected to break any day now, 15.4.20).

2. North Caucasus.

There has been little change on this front.

(a) The Minister President of Azerbaijan does not fear a Bolshevik attack, since he hopes to open trade relations with the Bolsheviks. In fact he considers the local Bolsheviks badly organised and states that there ~~were~~ sufficient Government forces to keep order there.

(b) On the Black Sea coast the Bolsheviks are reported to be 6 miles south east of Tuapse (they captured Tuapse on the 8th April) and well inland. The Admiralty have given instructions to C. in C. Mediterranean to take measures to stop the Bolsheviks advancing by the coast road, should they attempt to do so.

3. Crimea.

(a) The forces in the Crimea are being re-organised into 3 army corps, total strength 52,000 half of whom are without arms or equipment:-

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI 1
18 APREL 1920

17 47
148



RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Decypher: Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) (via Constantinople)
April 18th.

D. 2.15 p. m. April 24th.
R. 10 p. m. " " 1920.

No.207. Clear the Line.

-----000-----

Very Urgent.

Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me today and expressed grave fears of Bolshevik attack. He said some 10,000 troops were available for invasion from North and small force was already actually on Samur front threatening Yalama.


I told him I had no reason to believe Allies' policy had changed since February 24th when "Every possible support" was promised by Supreme Council, and understood action had been taken with regard to despatch of military material to Batoum (your telegram unnumbered April 18th most immediate) forwarded from Constantinople.

Trans-Caucasian Conference seems to be working satisfactorily and (? Mixed) Commission of Enquiry has already left for Karabach and other disturbed areas.

Sent to Foreign Office 207.
Constantinople 128.
Teheran 67.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI 2
18 APREL 1920

153 82



SECRET.

Decypher. Mr. Wurdrop, (Tiflis),
April 18th. 1920.

D. 2.15.p.m. April 24th. 1920.

R. 2.30.p.m. April 25th. 1920.

No. 208. Via Constantinople.

Following from Major Daly Political Officer
at Baku April 16th.

Mariman Bey Mariman Begoff is reported to be due
at Petrovsk April 17th from Moscow via Rostov and
Vladikavkas. From a secret source which is considered
reliable latest instructions from Moscow to Baku
Bolshevik Committee are to the effect that Moscow
has refused to send troops to the aid of local bolsheviks
in Azerbaijan. Moscow hopes that Azerbaijan will
become Bolshevik of her own accord. Haxafil Bey
from Moscow has been sent to increase local activity.
Mariman has instructions to negotiate with Azerbaijan
and to open negotiations with Persia before this can
be accomplished present cabinet in Teheran must be
overthrown.

If Bolsheviks attack Persia British have decided
not to defend Russo-Persia but to defend Persian

Indian Afghanistan Baluchistan frontiers. Information
from other sources twelve Bolsheviks ships arrived at
Petrovsk. Extraordinary activity reported on Orenburg
Tashkent line where double line is being laid.
Railway from Kuzik into Afghanistan to be put under
construction forthwith.
Kuropatkin army to be increased to 150,000.
(?Addressed to) Foreign Office No. 208. Sent to
Constantinople No. 127 Britforce No. 32.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA DEPEŞASI
16 YANVAR 1920

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No. 16.

Tiflis,

16 January 1920.

My Lord,

In view of the anxiety
expressed by Monsieur Khatissian
as to the effect on his countrymen of
the de facto recognition of Georgia
and Azerbaijan I thought it well to
write to His Excellency the personal
private letter of which I annex a
copy for Your Lordship's information.

It was understood that he
might show it to his colleagues and,
if necessary, to the members of the
Armenian Parliament.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

O. Wurdrop

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
16 YANVAR 1920

enclosure in Mr Wardrop's despatch No.16 of Jan.16, 1920.

Personal.

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Dear M. Khatissian,

I am much concerned at hearing from you that your countrymen are anxious and depressed by the de facto recognition only of Georgia and Azerbaijan at present.

In my opinion that news should have had a contrary effect.

The Armenian question is bound up with the Turkish question and will be settled by the Peace Treaty with Turkey and till then I am not authorized to make any official statement on the subject of the recognition of Armenia. The fact that Georgia and Azerbaijan are already officially recognised de facto seems to me convincing proof that the Armenian people have nothing to fear.

As you know, I have since my arrival treated Armenian affairs exactly as I have treated those of Georgia and Azerbaijan and I shall continue to do so.

The right to liberty of the Armenian people has so often been publicly recognised by Allied statesmen that de facto recognition of that right has only a slight importance and all that now remains is to find the formula in which that recognition will be stated. In my personal opinion there is no ground for uneasiness; the matter may be left in the hands of the Allies with full confidence that the Armenian people will be justly treated. Meanwhile nothing should be said that might give umbrage to anybody or seem to anticipate the decision about to be taken by the Allies.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) O.Wardrop.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASI
16 İYUN 1920

British High Commission,
Constantinople
16th June 1920

JUN 28 1920

SECRET

No. 855/L.2961.

My Lord,

Enclosures. 4. with reference to my telegram No.121 of the 10th February and other correspondence relative to relations between Turkey, or the Turkish Nationalists, and Azerbaijan, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a memorandum and enclosures, which have been received from a very secret source, relative to an alleged further agreement between Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, acting on behalf of the Council of the Nationalist Movement, and the Azerbaijan Government.

2. Photographs of the alleged letter to the Sultan's First Secretary and the attached copies of agreements have been examined at this High Commission. There is nothing in the appearance or style of these documents to suggest that they are fabrications, but the temptation is invent such documents at the present time is so great that this can only be regarded as negative evidence of their authenticity.

3. The question of the authenticity of the alleged agreements between Kiazim Karabekir and the Azerbaijan Government is one of minor interest, as, whether they are genuine or not, it may be regarded as certain that liaison

exists.....

The Right Honourable,

The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, M.C., P.C.,

etc., etc., etc.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASI
16 İYUN 1920

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exists between the Nationalist Military leaders and the Azerbaijan Tartars. It would be of greater interest to know whether direct communications passed as recently as April between the Sultan and the leaders of the National Movement.

4. While I am not in a position to express a definite opinion on this last point, it is worth noticing that the Sultan has maintained an even greater reserve than usual during the last three months, and it is possible that he may regard the National movement as a second string to his bow in case the Allies drive Turkey so hard as to prove Ferid Pasha's policy to have been a complete failure. It is also worth noting that in the enclosed papers a definite role is assigned to Ismail Hakki Bey, the Sultan's son-in-law. This officer is a member of the Sultan's military household; he is a son of Tewfik Pasha, and is now with his father in Paris. He and his wife, Princess Ulvie, have undoubtedly strong nationalist sympathies. Their house in Constantinople is much frequented by certain Allied and American personages whose attitude towards the National Movement is not untinged with sympathy.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient servant,

A. de Robeck
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 1
16 İYUN 1920

COPY.

SECRET.

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~~32~~

Alleged Fresh Convention between the Nationalists
and Azerbaijan.

Attached will be found a translation of a document purporting to be a copy of the convention signed at Erzerum on 15th. April, 1920, between the Nationalists and Azerbaijan.

The source from which it has been obtained gives the following account of the circumstances under which it reached Constantinople. The Sultan who was alarmed at the prospect of a Bolshevik army entering Turkish territory under the guise of an ally of the Nationalists, requested Damad Ismail Hakki Bey to obtain him reliable information as to the relations existing between the Nationalists on the one hand, and the Caucasian republics and the Soviet Government on the other. Damad Ismail Hakki thereupon sent a confidential messenger to Angora requesting that information on this subject should be supplied to him. The messenger returned with a letter addressed to the First Secretary of the Sultan which enclosed a copy of the convention referred to above and an annexe to it.

Two factors require to be considered in endeavouring to arrive at an estimate of the genuineness or otherwise of this document:

- (1) The reliability of the source from which it is obtained.
- (2) The contents of the document.

As regards (1), the information hitherto received from this source though small in quantity, has been good in quality, and has been proved by subsequent events to be correct.

As regards (2), it will be observed that article

1....

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 1
16 İYUN 1920

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1 of the present convention refers to the existence of a previous convention by Jevad Pasha and M. Kerimoff at Constantinople in November 1919. Details of this agreement were given in our report HA/463 of 30.1.20.

If the existence of the original agreement is not accepted, the present one must be considered a forgery.

As regards the latter, it seems doubtful whether the action against the Armenians referred to in article 16 would be mentioned in an official convention if it referred to a massacre of this people. The Turkish expression employed in the text is "tathir" - a cleansing - and may reasonably be held to mean an expulsion of Armenians from the territory in question.

The copy of the convention itself contains one obvious clerical error in article 8 in which Moslem nations are represented as groaning " under the yoke of Islam", and what is apparently an error also occurs in article 6 of the annexe in the reference to " the army of Turkestan", which it is suggested should read "the Turkish Army". A slight error is also observable in the covering letter addressed to the First Secretary of the Palace, where the emissary of Ismail Hakki Bey is referred to in the first instance as "Captain Abdulkader Effendi, son of Mehmet Furi", and in the second case as "Mehmet Furi Effendi".

It should also be noted that the document forwarded to the Palace by Hakki Behij, merely purports to be a copy of the convention, the original of which has, of course, not been seen in Constantinople.

Constantinople.
26. 5. 20.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
16 İYUN 1920

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ASSOCIATION FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE OTTOMAN RIGHTS OF
ANATOLIA AND RUMELIA.

Representative Committee.

1266 general.
2 private.

26th April. 1920.

To His Excellency the First Secretary of the Imperial Palace.
Excellency.

We have taken note of the Imperial wish confided to us by Captain ABDULKADER Effendi, son of MEHMET NURI of His Imperial Majesty's household, who has arrived here bearing a special letter of introduction from Your Excellency. We take this opportunity of repeating that the National Forces, from the highest to the lowest, will never fail in loyalty and fidelity to His Majesty the Sultan, and that at this tragic moment when an understanding has been reached for the partition of the powerful Ottoman Empire, they pursue no other aim than that of the safety of our great Sovereign and of our sacred country. They have sprung directly from the bosom of the nation. I am directed by the Representative Committee to beg Your Excellency to draw the special attention of His Majesty to this fact.

In reply to the Imperial Order which you have transmitted to me, I am directed by the Representative Committee to state as follows:- Neither the development of Bolshevism nor the Bolshevik forces which are a source of anxiety to His Majesty will be directed against the Ottoman territory in a hostile manner. The frontiers of the Eastern provinces are therefore safe.

In order to prove that the Representative Council of
the Society.....

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
16 İYUN 1920

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the Society for the Defence of the Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and Rumelia is taking all steps for the safety of the country, and with a view to dissipating the Imperial anxiety, we have handed to the aforesaid MEHMET NURI Effendi of His Majesty's household copy of the convention concluded between KIAZIM KARABEKIR Pasha, commanding 15th Army Corps, the delegate of the Representative Council on the one hand, and the Government of AZERBAIJAN on the other.

We beg Your Excellency to present it to His Majesty the Sultan and to acknowledge its receipt.

(SGD). H.BEHIJ.

Secretary General of the Representative Council for the Defence of Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
16 İYUN 1920

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(5)

Copy of the Military Convention concluded between ~~36~~ KIAZIM KARABEKIR Pasha, commanding XV Army Corps at ERZERUM, Major General, General Staff, and ALI AGHA SHEIKHLINSKI, Military Delegate of AZERBAIJAN.

The following military convention has been concluded and exchanged at ERZERUM at the headquarters of the XV Army Corps on the 15th April, 1336, between KIAZIM KARABEKIR Pasha, commanding the XV Army Corps at ERZERUM, and ALI AGHA SHEIKHLINSKI, under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of War, representing MIHMANDAROFF, minister of War of the republican Government of AZERBAIJAN, whose signatures are attached to this convention.

Article 1.

The six months designated as the period of execution of the military convention concluded at the capital of the Ottoman Empire between JEVAD, Chief of the General Staff at the Ministry of War of the Ottoman Government, and KERIMOFF, military delegate of the republican Government of AZERBAIJAN, which came into force in the month of November 1335, terminating in the month of May of the present year, the above convention will be revised as from that month.

Article 2.

The articles of the former convention dealing with the organisation and the formation of the army and its administration in the interior of AZERBAIJAN, and other articles dealing with this subject having been partially carried out and being already partially applied, will be executed without modification of any kind. Only those portions of this convention which deal with matters mentioned below will be considered as revised.

Article....

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
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Article 3. ~~37~~

Notwithstanding the signature of the present convention, the original convention will remain in force until the expiry of the period therein mentioned.

Article 4.

The following articles have been accepted by the representatives of both parties in virtue of the authority which they possess:

- (a) The reciprocal military assistance mentioned in the previous convention is defined in the following manner.
- (b) In the event of the republican Government of AZERBAIJAN being actually attacked by the neighbouring states, the Representative Council of the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA promises to render to the aforementioned Republic effective military assistance.
- (c) The republican Government undertakes to afford effective military assistance to the Ottoman forces in the case of urgent necessity, and further agrees that on being requested to do so, it will immediately permit unrestricted movements in and passage through AZERBAIJAN territory.

Article 5.

The republican Government undertakes to continue its endeavours for the purpose of establishing a military rapprochement between the Government of the Soviets and the Association for the Defence of Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA, and in case of necessity will become a party to the rapprochement.

Article 6.

The Association for the Defence of Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA will send a representative to the republican Government of AZERBAIJAN who will have full powers to discuss and decide on military, financial and other

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
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(7)

questions which may arise between the two parties. ~~38~~

Article 7.

In the event of ARMENIA attacking AZERBAIJAN or in the event of the eastern provinces being intentionally and unjustifiably annexed to ARMENIA, the two parties agree to defend each other with all their forces which will act as a single army.

Article 8.

In order to unite Islam for the defence of its existence against Christianity and to attract (and invite) to this union all other Moslem states and nations which groan under the yoke of Islam (sic), a committee will be formed at ERZERUM to be composed of delegates of the two parties which will deliberate on the measures to be adopted and on their execution. Representatives of all the neighbouring Islamic nations will be invited to join this committee.

Article 9.

The Representative Council undertakes to send to AZERBAIJAN a mission composed of Ulema for the purpose of organising the Muftis and the Islamic Association as well as to strengthen the close relations existing between the two countries.

Article 10.

The republican Government will send to the Representative Council a delegate possessing the same powers and entrusted with the same duties as the Turkish delegate mentioned in article 6.

Article 11.

In the event of the reciprocal military assistance mentioned in the preceding articles becoming necessary, as large a number as possible of officers and non-commissioned officers will be placed at the disposal of the AZERBAIJAN

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
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Ministry of War.

Article 12.

The republican Government agrees to take the necessary steps to enrol in the army of NURI Pasha officers and non-commissioned officers now prisoners in Russia who are returning or may return to their country.

Article 13.

The clauses of the former convention dealing with the payment of salaries and allowances to officers who are or may be placed at the disposal of the Azerbaijan Ministry of War will be modified as follows:-

- (a). The Azerbaijan Government agrees to receive these officers into its service in a rank superior to that which they held in the Ottoman army, and will pay them a salary equivalent to three times that which they are receiving in the Ottoman army.
- (b). The period for which these officers may serve in the Azerbaijan army will be doubled in reckoning their service for promotion in the Ottoman army.
- (c). The salary which they are at present receiving in the Ottoman army will be paid to their families.

Article 14.

The military delegates who have signed this convention in the names of the Turkish Government of Anatolia and of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan have decided that political and economic conventions...

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
16 İYUN 1920

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conventions which will form two annexes to the present military convention will be drawn up. Such annexes will settle the relations to exist between the Turkish government of Anatolia and the Republican Government of Azerbaijan. The bases and articles of these conventions will be prepared by another delegation.

Article 15.

The decision arrived at in article 4 (c) of the present convention concerning the permission for unrestricted movements and passage in the territory of Azerbaijan will at the request of the Turkish military delegate be set forth in detail in annexe A.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 3
16 İYUN 1920

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- (2). The conditions of the convention entered into between the two parties shall remain in force for a period of six months from the date of its conclusion. This convention having been concluded and signed by the plenipotentiary delegates of the two parties, it is not considered necessary to submit it for the ratification of their respective Governments.
- (3). In accordance with instructions which have been received by us, the delegates of the two parties have decided to extend for a further period of six months the political and economic convention annexed to the first convention, the period covered by which is about to expire. This extension will commence from the expiration of the period covered by the first convention, to which the following amendment may be made: The following phrase occurring in article 7 of the political convention:
- "Political relations which may be established between the two parties shall be based on their right of reciprocity"
- shall read as follows:-
- "Political relations which may be established between the two contracting parties shall be based on the privileges of the most favoured nation."

(4) In the..

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 3
16 İYUN 1920

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- (4). In the event of combined military operations becoming necessary, the command of the allied forces will be vested in a joint High Commission.
- (5). The fortress of ERZERUM being the headquarters of the XV Army Corps will be chosen as a base of all future military operations.
- (6). In the event of ARMENIA receiving reinforcements from anywhere or in the event of her joining GEORGIA in an attack on AZERBAIJAN territory, the under-signed XIAZİM KARABEKİR Pasha, delegate of the Representative Council for the Defence of Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA, by virtue of the authority vested in him, undertakes to despatch immediately to AZERBAIJAN the army of (?) TURKESSTAN.
- (7). In accordance with a special article of the convention concluded between the Soviet Government on the one hand and the Association for the Defence of Ottoman Rights in ANATOLIA and RUMELIA on the other, the under-signed ALI AGHA SHEKİKH LINSKI, delegate of the independent Republic of AZERBAIJAN, assist them in the transport of supplies and munitions, and afford them any help that may be necessary.
- (8). At the desire and request of the representative of the Republican Government, the delegation of the Representative Council, by virtue of the full powers with which it is invested, defines in the following clauses the essential functions of the "Special Organization" and the duties which are assigned to it.
- (a). The central committee of the "Special Organization" in ALEXANDRIA, to which are subordinate all other committees of the "Special Organization", functioning within the Ottoman Empire.....

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 3
16 İYUN 1920

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(13).

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(f). Either party will alone be responsible for the disagreeable consequences that may arise from any separate application before the stipulated period to the non-Moslem elements in its territory - even in a restricted locality - of the dispositions concerning the "Special Organization" contained in this convention.

(9). The dispositions of this convention may be modified with the consent of both parties in accordance with the necessities of the situation as affected by events and conditions which change from day to day, and if it is considered necessary, new clauses may be inserted and added.

(10). Should the Republican Government of AZERBAIJAN be faced with urgent and unavoidable necessity, the AZERBAIJAN High Command may, in the name of the Association for the Defence of the Ottoman Rights of ANATOLIA and RUMELIA, co-operate and, without asking permission, conclude an agreement, with the commander of the Turkestan army.

(11). Copies of this convention have been prepared and exchanged.

This copy is in conformity with the text.

(SGD) H.BEHIJ.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA DEPEŞASI
22 YANVAR 1920

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

No. 3 — ARCHIVES.

EASTERN.

[February 23.] 190

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[E. 414/L/58]

No. 1.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, Tiflis, January 22, 1920.
ENCLOSED I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch No. 9 of the 15th January, addressed to me by Colonel Stokes, with reference to the Azerbaijan reply to the Bolshevik proposal for an attack on the Volunteer Army.

I have, &c.
O. WARDROP.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 1
22 YANVAR 1920

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stokes to Mr. Wardrop.

Sir, Baku, January 15, 1920.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the originals and translations of two drafts of the reply sent by the Azerbaijan Government to the wireless message from the Bolsheviks asking them to attack the Volunteer Army.

Through the courtesy of the Georgian representative at Baku I was made acquainted with the first draft, and as, in my opinion, it was undesirable that the Azerbaijan Government should reply expressing its willingness to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Soviet Russian Republic, I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and urged him to have the last sentence of the draft deleted. Dr. Alshaban (the Georgian representative) supported my representations. Fath Ali Khan Khojinski (Minister for Foreign Affairs) undertook to put my views before the Cabinet, and meanwhile to delay the despatch of the telegram.

He also endeavoured to prevent the publication of the draft in the local press, but in this he was only partially successful. The Cabinet, having heard the Minister of Foreign Affairs, changed the words "the Government of Soviet Russian Republic" to "the Russian people," and the reply was sent as in draft (B).

It would, I think, have been preferable had the last sentence been entirely deleted, but I consider that the change made in the original draft, and the intentional vagueness of the language employed, render the message fairly innocuous.

I have, &c.
C. B. STOKES, British Political Officer, Baku.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
22 YANVAR 1920

Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

Draft (A).

(Radio-telegram.)

Moscow.

(Translation.)

To the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

IN accordance with your telegram dated the 2nd January, which was received by me on the 6th January, I am informing you of the following:—

The Azerbaijan people in great historical events, by means of great efforts and losses, at last received its freedom and independence.

Our Government is based upon the principles of establishing a democratic republic. The Azerbaijan Republic stands on the point of view that every nation has a definite right to arrange its own fate and life in accordance with its views, and that is why the Azerbaijan Government never allowed any interference in the inner affairs of its people, and, on its part, never interfered in the affairs of other people.

In accordance with these principles, the Azerbaijan Government considers it to be impossible to interfere in the affairs of the Russian people in their struggle in arranging their inner life. The Azerbaijan Republic always remained neutral, but it

[2266 z-1]

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
22 YANVAR 1920

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is always ready to defend its fate and independence from the forces outside. That is the reason why the Azerbaijan Government had a severe struggle with the Tsar's General (Denikin) who always threatened the independence of the Azerbaijan people, and in order that this struggle may be a successful one, we made a defensive alliance with the neighbouring Georgian Republic. The above policy of the Azerbaijan Government dictates the letter of establishing friendly terms with the neighbouring people, and that is the reason why the Azerbaijan Government is ready to converse with the Government of Soviet Russian Republic, in order to establish good friendly feelings in connection with the independency of both Powers.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Draft (B).

Answer of the Azerbaijan Republic.

(Translation.)

Moscow.

IN accordance with your telegram of the 2nd January received by me on the 6th January, I am informing you the following:—

The Azerbaijan people in great historical events, by means of great efforts and sufferings, received its freedom and independence. Our Government is based upon the principles of establishing a democratic republic. The Azerbaijan Republic stands on the point of view that every nation has a definite right to arrange its own fate and life in accordance with its principles, and that is why the Azerbaijan Government never allowed any interference in the inner affairs of its people, and on its part never interfered in the affairs of other people. In accordance with these principles, the Azerbaijan Government considered it to be impossible to interfere in the affairs of the Russian people in their struggle for arranging their inner life. The Azerbaijan Government always remained neutral, but it is always ready to defend its independence and freedom from any forces. That is the reason why the Azerbaijan Government had a severe struggle with the Tsar's General (Denikin), who always threatened the independence of the Azerbaijan people, and in order that the struggle may be a successful one, defensive alliance was made with the neighbouring Georgian Government.

The above policy of the Azerbaijan Government dictates the letter of establishing friendly terms with the other people, and that is the reason why the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic is ready to converse with the Russian people in order of establishing good friendly feelings in connection with the independence of both Powers.

KHOISKY,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic.

ADMİRAL DE ROBEKİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
28 İYUL 1920

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E 9123 63
JUL 30 1920

TURKEY.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Admiral de Robeck (Constantinople)
July 28th. 1920.

D. 8.0.p.m. July 28th. 1920.

R. 9.20.a.m. July 30th. 1920.

No. 862. (R).

Very Urgent.

By telegram No. 813 of July 14th.


(? Senior Naval Officer) Batoum reports that party of four Ex-(? Ministers) from Azerbaijan with one (? woman) and one child have sailed from Poti for Constantinople. I propose to deal with these people as refugees chargeable to His Majesty's Government.

I would point out that Doctor Agaeff, whose murder was reported in Luke's telegram No. 330 to Foreign Office July 20th, is the second Azerbaijan high official who has been murdered by Bolsheviks.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASI 1
29 APREL 1920

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~~RUSSIA.~~



Decypher: Mr. Luke [Tiflis] April 29th, 1920.
(via Basra.)

D. 1.00 p. m. April 29th. 1920.

R. 4.45 p. m. " 30th.

No. 223. Very Urgent.

-----000-----

Urgent, dated (? group omitted.)

News available from Baku tends to show that on receipt of Soviet ultimatum on evening of April 27th Azerbaijan Government immediately resigned.

The same night a meeting of leaders of all parties agreed that Executive authority should be placed in hands of Narimanov, a native of Baku and Soviet Commissar for Oriental Affairs, in meanwhile forming a Soviet (? administration) for conduct of current business.

It is reported that Russian Soviet Government has recognised Azerbaijan (? Soviet). Also reported that Russian Soviet preparing to send troops across Azerbaijan territory to effect junction with Turks post in (?) Zangezur region. Joint Turco-Bolshevik attack on Armenia seems probable unless Dashnaks able to secure terms from Bolsheviks which so far seems questionable.

Still

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASI 1
29 APREL 1920

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2.

Still no news of British in Baku. Georgian representative there imprisoned. Learn on reliable unofficial authority that Chicherin has asked Georgia to define her boundaries which he engages to respect provided Georgia disarms and interns Russian Volunteers (? in) Georgian territory. Georgian Government maintain intention of resisting aggression but internal position at Tiflis showing signs of uncertainty.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 223.

(Repeated to Constantinople No. 138, Teheran No. 72, Combat, Batoum (69).)

ADMIRAL WEBBİN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
1 MAY 1920

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E-4059

AY 3 1920

~~SECRET.~~

~~MILITARY~~

Decypher. Admiral Webb (Constantinople) May 1st 1920.

D. 10.25 p m. May 1st 1920.

R. 9.30 a.m. May 2nd 1920.

(No. 530)

VERY URGENT.

Following from Tiflis dated April 28th (Basins)

(? Urgent.)

April 28th (? sunrise).

Telephonic information received by Georgian Government Baku. Town was occupied by Bolsheviks punctually at 2 a.m. this morning following upon their capture of Balajari towards midnight and bombardment of Baku from the sea.

Azerbaijan Government understood to have handed over Administration to Soviet Commissar Narimanov, no resistance being offered. Georgian Government determined to take necessary measures for defence and in the first (group undecypherable) instance (group undecypherable) mobilizing two classes tomorrow. They again urge vital necessity for Allied aid and also their troops should be permitted to occupy villages of Batoum provinces in order to give their army liberty of action as far as possible to counter Bolshevik threats in the West.

Have urged Georgian Government to co-operate with Armenia for mutual defence. An warning political officer at Erivan to hold himself ready to leave if Armenian situation suggests that railway telegraphic and telephonic communication with Baku (? is) (likely to be omitted) interrupted (group undecypherable) requested Haskell to endeavour to obtain news of British personnel Baku by wireless from his representative there also to ascertain if naval party was able to reach Enzeli. (Lada.)

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA DEPEŞASI
19 YANVAR 1920

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No. 25.

Tiflis,
19 January 1920.

E 409

1920


My Lord,

Inclosed I have the honour to transmit for Your Lordship's information copy of a personal telegram of congratulation which I addressed to M. Ussubbekov on the occasion of the banquet given in Baku by Colonel Stokes to the Azerbaijan Cabinet to celebrate the de facto recognition of that Republic.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,



His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
19 YANVAR 1920

Conv.

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I sincerely congratulate Your Excellency and ~~the~~ people of Azerbaijan on de facto recognition and I am confident they will shew themselves worthy of the ^{trust} confidence placed in them by the Allies.

Your Excellency is already well aware of ~~the~~ respect and affection I feel for your countrymen and my belief in their ability to play great part in restoration of all that is best in Islamic culture. A land which has produced Nizami will not be content till it has added other great names to history of world's literature.

Your Excellency's declared democratic policy encourages me to hope that your people will be so contented that all efforts at dictature pretending to be in interests of masses but really based on selfishness and resulting in despotism will fail and that the Caucasus will in case of need remain a strong wall of defence for Asia against unscrupulous adventurers lusting to loot the Islamic lands and subjugate them. I earnestly hope that by wise teaching and just administration you will protect your ^{land} against false theories and those who propagate them and that brotherly affection among all the peoples of the Caucasus may from henceforth increase, enabling your rich and beautiful land to become the home of a prosperous cultured happy people living at peace.

May the recognition of Azerbaijan be always a subject for congratulation to her sons and to all their friends, of whom I am proud to be one.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASI 2
29 APREL 1920

EASTERN.

219

E-5327
248
MAY 27 1920

CAUCASUS.

Situation in Azerbaijan.

Transmits translations of two wireless messages addressed to Moscow by Baku Soviet Committee, announcing the composition of the Azerbaijan Provisional Military Revolutionary Committee, denouncing the old Mussevat Government and stating that relations with the Entente and other enemies of Soviet Russia are broken off.

Registry Number } 35327/1/58.

FROM
Commander Lukin, Tiflis

No. 148.

Dated 29th April, 1920.
Received 27th May, 1920.

Eastern: Caucasus.

Last Paper

5326

(Print.)

(How disposed of)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

5330

(Minutes.)

The substance of this has already appeared
in the Press

R. H. Small
27.5.20

D. G. O.
Jan
27.5

271127.—W.L. 324/1—55M—1/20.—W. & S. L. 100.—(20)

118/2

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 1
29 APREL 1920

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No.148.

Tiflis,

April 29th 1920
MAY 27 1920

249
E-5327

My Lord,

I have the honour to transmit for Your Lordship's information translations of two wireless messages addressed to Moscow by the local Soviet Committee now in power at Baku.

These messages were published in to-days Tiflis newspapers.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

A. C. D. K.
Commander SVR

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
29 APREL 1920

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Inclosure with Despatch No.148 dated April 29th,1920.

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The Military-Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan.

Baku, 29th April, To Lenin, Moscow. Supported by the wishes of the revolutionary proletariat of Baku and of the peasantry of the whole of Azerbaijan, the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communists' Party declares that the traitorous counter-revolutionary Government of the "Mussavat" Party is overthrown.

Henceforth the only power having full authority and expressing the will and the hopes of the labouring population of Azerbaijan is the Azerbaijan Provisional Military-Revolutionary Committee, composed of the following persons:- Nariman Narimanov, Mirza David Guseinov, Musabekov, Hamid Sultanov, Alimov and Ali Geidar-Karaev.

This committee will continue until the Peasants' Workmen's and Soldier's Councils meet. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communists' Party.

Baku, 29th April. To Lenin, Moscow. The Provisional Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan Soviet Independent Republic which has taken the reins of authority at the wish of the revolutionary proletariat of the City of Baku and of the working peasantry of Azerbaijan declares that the old Mussavat Government has betrayed the nation and is hostile to the independence of the country. The Provisional Revolutionary Committee breaks off all relations with the Entente and with other enemies of Soviet Russia. As it is impossible to restrain by our own might the onslaught of the united bands of internal and external counter-revolutionary bands, the Military-revolutionary committee of Azerbaijan recommends that the Government of the Soviet Republic should enter into fraternal alliance for the common struggle against

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ 2
29 APREL 1920

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universal Imperialism, and requests that effective assistance be rendered immediately by sending detachments of the Red Army.

The Military-Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic:-
Nariman Narimanov, Mirza David Gusseinov, Mussabekov,
Hamid Sultanov, Alimov and Ali Haidar Karaev.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASI
14 İYUN 1920

553		E	16 77
E 8125/1/58.		E 8125 JUL 12 1920	
Registry Number	FROM Commander Luke. Tiflis.	Bolshevik entry into Baku.	
No. 200.	Dated 14th June. 1920. Received 12th. July. 1920	Transmits copy of official account of above compiled by President of Delegation of former Azerbaijan Republic to the Transcaucasian Conference and transmitted at his request.	
E: Caucasus.	Last Paper.	(Minutes.)	
	8124	Soviet Russia will of course reply that they invaded Azerbaijan at the request of the Tatar Ittihad Party which professed to represent the Parliament of Baku.	
(Print.)		R. W. Smith 22.7.20	
(How disposed of)		Jan 27	
(Action completed.)	(Index.)		
Next Paper.			
	8127		

21914—W1. 1002.132—1031.—2.76.—W. & S. Ltd. —(190).

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

~~17~~

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Tiflis

June 14th 1920.

No:- 200/3.

E 8125

JUL 12 1920

My Lord,

I have the honour to enclose copy of
an official account of the entry of the Soviet
Troops into Baku, compiled by the President of the
Delegation of the former Azerbaijan Republic to the
Transcaucasian Conference, and transmitted at his
request to Your Lordship.

Enclosure.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble Servant,

Ag. L. Ag. Ag.
Commander RNVR

His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

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A SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR LE HAUT COMMISSAIRE
DU GOUVERNEMENT BRITANNIQUE AU CAUCASE.

Excellence,

En vous présentant ci-jointe une note au nom de
Monsieur le Ministre des affaires étrangères du Gou-
vernement par Vous représenté, concernant les évène-
ments qui ont eu lieu ce temps dernier en Azerbaïdjan,-
j'ai l'honneur de Vous prier de bien vouloir en porter
le contenu, le plus tôt possible, à la connaissance
du Votre Gouvernement.-

Le Président de la Délégation de
l'Azerbaïdjan à la Conférence
des Républiques Transcaucasiennes,
Ancien Remplaçant du Président
du Parlement de l'Azerbaïdjan,
Docteur

Agasieff

/ Gassan Bey Agasieff /.

Tiflis

8 Juin 1920.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

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A SA HAUTE EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR LE
MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
DU GOUVERNEMENT ROYAL BRITANNIQUE.

En qualité de Représentant plénipotentiaire de la République de l'Azerbaïdjan, occupée maintenant par les forces armées de la Russie des Soviets, je juge indispensable de protester aux yeux du monde entier au nom du peuple de l'Azerbaïdjan contre les événements ci-dessus exposés, qui ont eu lieu ces temps derniers dans l'Azerbaïdjan.-

Au mois d'Avril de l'année courante une concentration de l'armée rouge des russes fut remarquée à la frontière Nord de l'Azerbaïdjan.-

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Azerbaïdjan envoya alors, à ce sujet par le radio, une demande d'information au Commissaire du Peuple, chargé des affaires étrangères de la Russie des Soviets.-

Aucune réponse ne fut donnée à cette demande.-

Pendant la nuit du 27 Avril, sans aucune cause et sans aucun avertissement, l'armée rouge des russes, profitant de ce que presque toute l'armée de l'Azerbaïdjan se trouvait en ce moment au Sud, dans le Carabakh, menacé par les forces des arméniens, fit irruption du Dağəstan dans les limites de la République azérie de l'Azerbaïdjan.-

Les détachements de l'armée de l'Azerbaïdjan opposèrent à cette invasion une résistance armée qui fut suivie de pertes en tués et en blessés des deux côtés.-

Mais étant peu nombreux les détachements de l'Azerbaïdjan furent obligés de réculer; le lendemain soir le train-cuirassé

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

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le train-cuirassé qui suivait l'armée rouge se trouvait déjà à quinze verstes environ de Bəcou.-

Au moment où l'armée rouge des russes se mit à menacer directement la capitale et où toute résistance à cause du petit nombre des forces de l'Azerbaïdjan aurait seulement exposé les nombreux habitants paisibles de la ville aux horreurs sans but des massacres - un groupe des communistes de l'Azerbaïdjan, s'appuyant sur les forces armées extérieures qui venaient d'envahir le pays présenta au Parlement de l'Azerbaïdjan une sommation ultimative dans laquelle il réclamait la transmission du pouvoir entre ses mains.-

A onze heures du soir du même 27 Avril, le Parlement, dont le local était en ce moment entouré de communistes armés, fut obligé, à la majorité des voix, de se rendre à la sommation qui lui avait été présentée.-

En sorte que l'acte de la transmission forcée du pouvoir aux communistes de l'Azerbaïdjan par le Parlement avait été précédé par une invasion violente d'un grand nombre de forces armées de la Russie des Soviets au cœur même du Pays.-

Après l'abdication du Parlement - le pouvoir en Azerbaïdjan passa de facto aux mains des agents venus du dehors de la Russie des Soviets, par exemple, aux personnes suivantes: Ordjonikidzé, Kiroff, Lévandovsky, Pancratoff, Mikoyan et d'autres et à des personnes se trouvant en relation avec le Gouvernement Russe et sous sa dépendance.-

Dès le commencement l'Administration de l'Azerbaïdjan par ces personnes, étrangères aux intérêts du Pays, se signala par de nombreux actes de violence concernant autant la personne que la propriété des habitants paisibles des contrées par lesquelles passaient les armées rouges.-

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

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rouges.-

Plusieurs personnes parmi celles qui avaient été au service du Gouvernement de l'Azerbaïdjan furent o passées aux armes, d'autres furent arrêtées.- Plusieurs Missions Etrangères furent arrêtées, des officiers étrangers internés sur le territoire de l'Azerbaïdjan furent fusillés en masse, - ce qui est révoltant au point de vue de droit international.-

Les actes suivants du nouveau pouvoir, comme par exemple, l'ordre de dispersement de l'armée de l'Azerbaïdjan, le disarmement de la population musulmans, de la confiscation en masse et de l'exportation hors les limites de l'Azerbaïdjan de différentes marchandises et produits - témoignent d'une manière incontestable que l'unique but de ce pouvoir étranger établi par la violence - est l'asservissement politique du pays et la dilapidation de tous les fruits du travail de son peuple.-

Le peuple de l'Azerbaïdjan qui a fait de grands sacrifices au nom de son indépendance et qui a appris à apprécier et à défendre les bienfaits de la liberté n'a pas pu se soumettre au nouvel ordre des choses imposé de force.

Bientôt, partout dans le pays des soulèvements populaires survinrent soutenus par ceux des détachements de l'armée de l'Azerbaïdjan qui avait refusé de reconnaître le nouveau pouvoir

Le martyr terrifiant et horrible que souffre à cette heure le peuple de l'Azerbaïdjan dans sa lutte sanglante contre ses asservisseurs étrangers, lutte durant laquelle entre autres horreurs, toute la partie musulmane de la ville de Gandja, première ville après Baccou a été détruite

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

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a été détruite par le bombardement et où ont péri huit mille musulmans et où 1.500 femmes musulmanes ont été violées lors de l'occupation de la ville par les troupes rouges, - témoignent assez de sa volonté invincible d'organiser sa destinée lui-même.-

En ce moment une grande partie du territoire de l'Azerbaïdjan est soulevée par les insurrections populaires réprimées impitoyablement par l'armée rouge des russes, elle est arrosée du sang de tous les citoyens de l'Azerbaïdjan y compris les femmes et les enfants.-

Considérant que du côté de l'Azerbaïdjan Indépendant aucune démarche ennemie n'a jamais été entreprise contre la Russie des Soviets et qu'au contraire - l'Azerbaïdjan a plusieurs fois proposé d'établir par voie de traités des relations de bon voisinage entre les deux peuples, relations qui les auraient amenés à une collaboration économique basée sur la culture, et que ~~ainsi~~ d'un autre côté le pouvoir établi maintenant formellement dans l'Azerbaïdjan repose uniquement sur la force des baïonettes des armées de la Russie des Soviets, - je proteste fermement devant les peuples cultivés du monde entier et devant leurs Gouvernements au sujet de l'écrasement grossier des droits souverains du peuple de l'Azerbaïdjan à la vie indépendante, droits qui lui ont été reconnus, et je vous prie instamment de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour arrêter immédiatement le massacre qui a lieu dans l'Azerbaïdjan ainsi que d'en faire sortir les armées rouges des russes, afin de donner la possibilité au peuple de l'Azerbaïdjan de continuer sa vie paisible et indépendante qui correspond au désir

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
14 İYUN 1920

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désir qu'il a exprimé.-

Dans le cas où les armées rouges ne quitteraient pas l'Azerbaïdjan, toute la responsabilité pour les événements qui pourraient s'en suivre - reviendraient exclusivement à la Russie des Soviets.-

Le Président de la Délégation de l'Azerbaïdjan à la Conférence des Républiques Transcaucasiennes, ancien Remplaçant du Président du Parlement de l'Azerbaïdjan,
Docteur

Agasoff

/ Gassan Bey Agasoff /.

Tiflis

8 Juin 1920.

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
6 MAY 1920

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

AMENDED COPY.

CAUCASUS.

POLITICAL.

Decypher. Commander Luke (Tiflis) May 6th, 1920.

D. 4 a.m. May 6th, 1920.

R. 10 p.m. May 10th, 1920.

No. 232.

E 4550/1/58

Extremely Urgent.

.....

May 6th.

Reported that 100,000 Bolshevik troops including about 50% Moslems concentrating with Kyroff, Nugri and Khalil in command towards Azerbaïdjan of whom 40,000 already between Petrovsk and Derbent and 7,000 at Vladikavkaz. Enver reported arrived at Baku yesterday with mission to coordinate Turco-Tartar- Bolshevik cooperation. According to report, plan is first to attack Georgia from the East (? via) Poili, secondly to effect junction with Turkish Nationalists via Karabagh and Zangezur and (?Na)khichavan and Boyazid thirdly for Turkish troops to attack Batoum from Erzeroum and Olti.

Georgians have withdrawn behind Poili Railway bridge which ^{was} blown up and are preparing to evacuate Suchum.

It appears that (2 groups undecypherable)ll and all United States Military Staff suddenly left Tiflis for Batoum last night without giving any indication of their intentions to Allied Missions or local authorities. This hasty and unannounced exodus has provoked much comment locally. American lady workers in Georgia and practically entire staff working in Armenia have also been evacuated. Armenian Government resigned last night at the request of extraordinary session of Parliament, being replaced by Board of Control of Dasnak party namely Chanjanian Prime Minister

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
6 MAY 1920

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(2).

Minister and Foreign Affairs: Terminassian War and Interior:
Gulhandanian Finance and Justice: Jamllan Ways and
Communications: Varatzian Labour: Guzarian Education:
Araratian Religion. Four first named were members of
previous Cabinet. Armenian diplomatic representative at
Tiflis assures me that change of Government denotes more
drastic attitude against the Bolsheviks. Fact that per-
petrators of recent Bolshevik outrage on Tiflis were of
Armenian rabble has made Georgian public opinion question
sincerity of Armenian anti-Bolshevik feeling, and definite
Armenian-Georgian military accord not yet reached. No
further news of British or Allied officers and colonists
of Baku, but efforts to get into touch with them continue.
Disorders at Baku have been reported. In view of Turkish
threat to Batoum province, venture to suggest desirability
of British and Georgians working in cooperation in sense
that any parts of Baku that may be evacuated by us may be
transferred to Georgians for purposes of defence.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 232, repeated to High
Commissioner, Constantinople 148, Britforce Constantinople
38, Teheran 78, Military Governor Batoum 79.

(11.5 8/4).

SER P. KOKSUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
16 MAY 1920

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PERSIA.

Decypher. Sir F. Cox (Teheran) May 15th 1920.

D. Noon May 15th 1920.

R. 3.20 p.m. May 16th 1920.

No. 275.

.....
Intelligence Officer at Tabriz reports that intelligent
Russian who arrived at Tabriz May 13th reports that Khalil Bey
has proclaimed Bolshevik Government at Wakhshivan.

Sent to Foreign Office, No. 275, (? Constantinople) No. 13.
Tiflis 32.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
8 YANVAR 1920

169209/11588



Decypher; Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) January 8th, 1920.

D. 8 p. m. January 8th.

R. 7 p. m. " 9th. 1920.

(No. 11.

Very Urgent.

-----000-----

Col Stark

Following received from Stockholm dated January 7th. Begins:-

In continuation of my despatch of (January 5th) I beg to submit the following:

I today saw Minister for Foreign Affairs at his request. He expressed greatest anxiety at rapid decision by Allies as to fate of Azerbaijan. He gave me a copy of wireless message dated Moscow (January 2nd) received at Baku (January 6th) from Norwcherin, addressed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, inviting them for volunteer army and then, in giving it coup de grace. He pointed out that successful advance of Bolsheviks on both sides Caspian sea has brought Bolshevik danger to door of Trans-Caucasia and Azerbaijan must decide very soon her policy towards Bolsheviks. indeed in my opinion that decision may not improbably be taken out of hands of his Government by Bolshevik revolt in Baku itself. He stated that his Government is entirely anti-Bolshevik, but if Great Britain will not come to its assistance, it may be compelled to make terms with Bolsheviks.

It had been decided after mature consideration that it must look to Great Britain alone of all Powers for assistance to safeguard the interests and very existence of Azerbaijan

27-4370

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
8 YANVAR 1920

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Azerbaijan. He did not pretend that this decision was due to any sentimental reasons. It was dictated by self-interest, but in his opinion, in supporting Azerbaijan we would best serve our own interests in safeguarding our shortest route to Persia. He urged strongly that, owing to demoralized volunteer army if Azerbaijan is to be saved from Bolshevism, an immediate decision to support Azerbaijan is imperative.

In my opinion Minister for Foreign Affairs did not overstate his case. Unless we are willing to see Bolsheviks rampant in Azerbaijan a decision to support that country cannot be taken too soon. I have previously recommended provisional ultimatum but in view of gravity of situation (? created by) failure of Volunteer Army, I now recommend immediate grant of full independence and whole-hearted support to Azerbaijan, despatch of arms and equipment including uniforms for her army and of breach blocks and ammunition for two six-inch guns at Baku, and prompt payment of all (? sum)s due by us to Azerbaijan in connection with our military occupation. These measures would, I consider place the Government in a position to suppress Bolshevik organisations within its borders and enable it to prevent Bolsheviks obtaining control (? of) country.

I have already drawn attention to Bolshevik danger on Caspian Sea and in Trans-Caspia, and to situation in Daghestan which form part of same problem as safeguarding of Azerbaijan and I submit that the replacement of British Naval

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
8 YANVAR 1920

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3.

Naval personnel on armed ships in Caspian, and adoption of policy towards (A Turco)s and Daghestan similar to that advocated for Azerbaijan are equally urgently required. Admiralty would doubtless demand safe line of communication before undertaking control of Caspian. Recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan as independent States would, in my opinion, secure this.

In regard to question of recognition of independent Transcaucasian States, I wish to state my conviction that no promise of autonomy in any shape given by any existing Russian Government even if guaranteed by Allies, will carry any weight.

Policy advocated above may be regarded as drastic but in my opinion half measures would be of no avail and delay would mean disaster.

Ends.

I entirely concur.

Sent to Foreign Office, No. 11.

Repeated to Teheran No. 6, Constantinople No. 9,
Mackinder No. 6.

BRİTANIYA KOMMERSİYA MƏSLƏHƏTÇİSİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ
24 APREL 1920

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COMMERCIAL ADVISER TO BRITISH CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FOR TRANSCAUCASIA AND ARMENIA

T 5 April 24th, 1920.

Sir

BAKU OIL - AZERBAIDJAN REPUBLIC

After two visits to Baku and also to Batum during which I endeavoured to investigate the very intricate oil position, I have to report that in my opinion the very grave hindrances placed by the Azerbaijan Republic in the way of the oil industry generally and particularly of the despatch of oil from Baku by pipeline and on rail are not likely to be removed until certain outstanding liabilities contracted by the British Command are settled.

Although it must be emphasized that the Azerbaijan officials are exceedingly difficult to work with, at the same time it is but fair to state that the delay in settling the debts of the British Command has given rise to suspicion in the minds of the Azerbaijanis. I therefore heartily recommend that these affairs should be taken up with the Treasury, to whom, I am told by Mr. Heweloke, Vice-Consul at Baku and late British Manager, of the Baku Branch of the Russian State Bank, General Nowcombe reported after investigating the matter in Baku.

The only practical data I have been able to gather in Baku are contained in the enclosed copy of communication No 934 addressed by Brigadier-General E J F Vaughan to the President of the Azerbaijan Government, which is sufficiently clear as to need no amplification from one who has been unable to obtain any closer knowledge.

In addition to the liabilities above-mentioned, I am informed by Mr. Heweloke that there is a very considerable sum outstanding in respect of the transport of British Troops over the Azerbaijan railways.

Until these debts are repaid or some undertaking is given to the Azerbaijan Government that these matters have not been forgotten the existing mistrust will continue towards the British and militate against our chances in trade and industry.

/I

BRİTANIYA KOMMERSİYA MƏSLƏHƏTÇİSİNİN MƏRUZƏSİ
24 APREL 1920

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I therefore reiterate my suggestion that the matters alluded to herein should be investigated in London.

The obstructions of the Azerbaijan Government, added to the interests of the Georgians, through whose territory the railway and the pipeline pass from Baku to Batum, have made the work of the British Oil Controller operating under the High Command at Constantinople, exceedingly difficult. The inherent difficulties have become further complicated by the absence of a policy enabling the Oil Controller to make arrangements for even the immediate future, and these difficulties were still further enhanced by the expected withdrawal at different times during the past nine months of the British Garrison at Batum.

The Azerbaijanis are now endeavouring to dispose of their oil to the bolsheviks, and have already despatched 50,000 poods of kerosene to Krasnovodsk, while negotiations are going on for the shipment of further quantities up the Volga.

It is undeniable that the Azerbaijan Government have need of foreign currency and will still be glad to send oil through to Batum, but in order to render this possible and to pave the way for sound negotiations, the British officials on the spot must be put in a position to talk logically and to dispel all present motives of mistrust which the Azerbaijanis entertain unfortunately not without cause.

I have the honour to remain, Sir
Your most obedient, humble servant

Major

To Comptroller-General
Department of Overseas Trade

enclosure,

AZƏRBAYCAN NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİ ÜZVÜNÜN MƏKTUBU
20 FEVRAL 1920

COPY

REPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAIDJAN
DELEGATION DE LA PAIX.

20th February, 1920.

6

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

(British Department),

FOOD DEPARTMENT,

25, Rue de Bassano,

Paris.

Dear Mr. Goode,

In answer to your honoured letter I beg to inform you that after our conversation of January 21st, I have sent a communication to our Government asking them to answer the questions mentioned during our interview about the conditions and means of forwarding to us in Azerbaijan the objects of first necessity, the want of which is so greatly felt; at the same time I asked for information about the quantities of products that can be exported from our country and where they are to be found.

On account of the absence of regular means of communication we have not yet been able to receive any answer from the Government but the information that our delegation has received lately allows us to form a more closely approximate table of the most needed objects.

Thus the refugees from different parts of Transcaucasia into Azerbaijan number more than three hundred thousand (300,000); if we add to these number about 200,000 Azerbaijanis who have suffered from the Bolshevist Anarchy, the number of those who most need help amounts to half a million. It would require at least 50,000 tons of flour and other food products (sugar, tea, coffee, etc.) to feed them for six months.

All the population of Azerbaijan and especially the refugees have a great need of medical products, the want of which is the cause of the extension of various epidemics, (typhus,

AZƏRBAYCAN NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİ ÜZVÜNÜN MƏKTUBU
20 FEVRAL 1920

- 2 -

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malaria, influenza and diverse skin diseases) especially among the refugees, which is a great danger for the whole country.

There is also a great need of garments and shoes.

As to the products to be found in Azerbaijan and fit for export, I may say the following:-

According to the best information, at Bakou and the neighbourhood there are about three millions of tons of naptha and its by products (mazout, petroleum, benzine and various oils). About 20 thousand tons of cotton are to be round in different centres; 8 thousand tons of wool. Besides this, silk cocoons, carpets, etc. can be exported.

The Batum-Bakou railway line works quite regularly, but there is a great need of trucks, oil-tanks and engines.

There is an economic and transit treaty between Georgia and Azerbaijan, thus the transit of all merchandise through Georgia is unstamped by any special taxes.

The pipe line between Baku and Batum works also regularly, through which about 50 thousand tons of petroleum can be pumped.

While giving you this information, I hope you will do your best to relieve our population in the great hardships it is enduring by sending soon the products mentioned above.

Believe me to be most devotedly yours,

(Sd) M. MAGEROMOFF

De la Delegation Azerbaijan,
Hotel Claridge.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN LORD KERZONA DEPEŞASI
8 MART 1920

66

CONFIDENTIAL.

No.86.

Tiflis,

8 March 1920. 1920

248

E 2729

My Lord,


Herewith I have the honour to transmit for Your Lordship's information copy of a despatch, No.1 of 4 March, addressed to me by Major Daly reporting his conversation with the Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs on that date.

A summary of the conversation has already been reported to Your Lordship by telegraph.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

Your Lordship's most obedient
humble servant,



His Majesty's Principal Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPDUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
8 MART 1920

Inclosure to Mr. Wardrop's despatch No. 86 of March 8th 1920.

Baku,

No. 1.

4th March 1920.

67

247

Sir,

I have the honour to report that I presented my letter of credentials today to His Excellency Fath Ali Khan Khoiski. In accordance with your instructions I informed His Excellency of the decision of the Supreme Council to maintain a garrison of British, French and Italian troops at Batoum. This information was received with expression of satisfaction and relief.

His Excellency spoke at length of the recent failure of the Volunteer Army to hold the Bolshevik advance, and expressed his opinion that Petrovsk would very shortly fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and the Volunteer fleet would thus be deprived of its only base on the Caspian. His Excellency spoke of the possibility of the fleet seceding to the Bolsheviks, in the event of which Baku would be practically defenceless to resist any attack by sea. I pointed out that from information received there were no definite indications for believing that the Volunteer fleet would secede to the Bolsheviks. His Excellency agreed and stated that Baku and Enzeli were the only two harbours remaining in which the fleet could remain. As it was impossible for Azerbaijan to allow the fleet to use Baku as an open harbour, in view of Azerbaijan's strict attitude of neutrality in the Russian Civil War, he suggested as a temporary measure that the fleet should be interned in Baku harbour. There were some five weeks before the Volga would be ice-free, and by that time it could be hoped that the ultimate fate of the fleet would be determined. His Excellency pointed out that Azerbaijan as a former part of Russia had more right to the use of the fleet

CƏNAB O. VORDROPDUN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
8 MART 1920

fleet than Persia. In the event of some agreement being arrived at to enable Azerbaijan to take over the fleet, General Mehmandaroff, who was present during the conversation remarked that Azerbaijan could replace the doubtful elements amongst the crews by her own men, and retain the anti-Bolshevik Astrahan fishermen.

If such an agreement were possible, it is evident that British personnel would be required, quite apart from any political considerations. I was urged to ask for the return to Azerbaijan of the breech blocks (6-150 mm, 1-120 mm, 5-75 mm) of the gunboats 'Astarabad', 'Kars', 'Ardahan', which were believed to be in the hands of the Volunteer army at Petrovsk, or to have them replaced. In the event of these 3 gunboats being armed and commissioned, I am of the opinion that British personnel would be necessary, quite apart again from political considerations.

His Excellency begged me to place before you the critical situation of Azerbaijan created by the recent Bolshevik successes and asked for your advice as to the attitude that should be taken up by Azerbaijan in the event of a further Bolshevik advance. His Excellency stated that he did not believe in any direct aggression against the frontiers of Azerbaijan by the Bolshevik forces, the danger lay in the outbreak of disorder within her frontiers, disorders which the Government would be forced to suppress. The Bolsheviks would then have the opportunity to challenge Azerbaijan with suppressing the free will of the people by force and of maltreating the friends of Soviet Russia. His Excellency stated that the Bolsheviks were spending enormous sums on propaganda in Azerbaijan at the present time.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient, humble servant,

(signed) T. Denis Daly.

The Chief British Commissioner in Transcaucasia.

BÖYÜK BRİTANIYA NEFT DEPARTAMENTİNİN MƏKTUBU
14 MAY 1920

71

VICTORIA 9940,
Telephone: MAYFAIR 3007.

PETROLEUM DEPARTMENT.

2, QUEEN ANNE'S GATE BUILDINGS,

In reply, please quote S.332a

14th May,



Sir,

I am directed by Mr Kellaway to request you to inform Earl Curzon of Kedleston that he has been notified by the Army Council that, in view of changed and circumstances the possibility of a rapid withdrawal of British military personnel from Batoum, the Army is no longer in a position to exercise control or assume responsibility in connection with the oil industry of the Caucasus.

2. As Lord Curzon is aware, considerable importance is attached to the encouragement of export of oil products from Baku via Batoum, and Mr Kellaway hopes that, in spite of the occupation of Baku by the Bolsheviks, it will be possible to maintain and even increase the amount of trade which has been passing during

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
FOREIGN OFFICE.

BÖYÜK BRİTANIYA NEFT DEPARTAMENTİNİN MƏKTUBU
14 MAY 1920

72

is of opinion that the cost should eventually be borne either by a charge on the oil passing or by contributions from the companies benefiting by the appointment.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Ə. TOPÇUBAŞOVUN LORD KARDİNGƏ MƏKTUBU
31 MART 1920

60

REPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAIDJAN

DELEGATION DE PAIX

le 31st March 1920

London, 1920

N. 360

-240-

To His Excellency,
The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Lord Hardinge.

Your Lordship,

The events of the last few days and the rout of Denikin's Army give me the boldness to attract your Lordship's attention to the fate of the part of the Caspian fleet still in the hands of the above general at Petrowsk on the Caspian Sea.

As I had the honour of telling your Lordship at the time of our interview, the part of the fleet belonging to the Republic of Azerbaijan was handed over to General Denikin in August 1919, against which the Baku Government and the Azerbaijanian Delegation in Paris raised an energetic protest.

After the recognition de facto of the Azerbaijanian Republic, at a meeting in Paris under the Presidency of Field Marshal Wilson and in the presence of Admiral Beattie, during the discussion of the question of the defence of Azerbaijan on the Sea side, in consequence of my request the necessity of returning to the Azerbaijanian Government the part of the Caspian fleet then at the disposal of General Denikin was admitted. Now, after the defeat of the said General by Soviet Russia, the vessels which were in the hands of the Voluntary Army have been sent to the Persian port of Enzeli, at the disposal of the British Commandant.

Ə. TOPÇUBAŞOVUN LORD KARDİNGƏ MƏKTUBU
31 MART 1920

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(2)

In consequence of the above mentioned facts, and in the name of the Azerbaijanian Delegation, I beg ²⁴⁴ express the request that the ships now at the disposal of General Denikin should be restored to the Azerbaijanian Government, as those ships are indispensable for the defence of Azerbaijan from the Sea.

I profit by the opportunity to express the feeling of profound respect of the Delegation presided over by me to your Lordship.

Ali Topchibaşov



PRÉSIDENT DU PARLEMENT,
PRÉSIDENT DE LA DÉLÉGATION DE PAIX
DE LA
REPUBLIQUE AZERBAIDJANAISE

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DEPEŞASI
26 FEVRAL 1920

COPY.

In reply please quote
No. 5984 "I".

The Director of Military Intelligence,
War Office, LONDON.

118

With reference to your letter No. B.I./7341 (M.I.2) dated 3rd January, 1920, and in continuation of this office letter No. 5984 "I" dated 28th January, 1920, attached is a copy of a report from Major J.H. TORIN, M.C. forwarded from England, relative to the question raised by General Denikin's Foreign Office.

It would appear that a complete copy of the correspondence was sent to the Russian Authorities at the time of the agreement regarding the MUGHAN district and that all war material had been handed over to the Volunteer Army Representative on the spot. Further it would appear that the matter was settled to the entire satisfaction of General Denikin's Representative (Colonel ILLIASHALVITCHE). It is therefore difficult to understand why this matter has been brought up by the Russian Foreign Office at this late date.

It is pointed out that owing to the fact that a dangerous situation existed in MUGHAN at the time, it was most expedient that a settlement of the affair be arranged immediately so as to combat the strong Bolshevistic spirit that was rife among the inhabitants of the district in question.

A copy of Major TORIN's Report has been forwarded to the British Military Mission with the Volunteer Army under this office No. 5984 "I".

(Sd) D.C. CAMERON,
Major G.S.
for General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
Army of the Black Sea.

G.H.Q. "I",
Constantinople.
25th February, 1920.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
26 FEVRAL 1920

COPY.

28th Division.

Ref. your G1645 of 29-Dec.1919.

On 6th Aug.1919 I was ordered to proceed to Lenkoran and take over charge of the British Mission which had arrived there 3 days previously. A state of war then existed and the town of LENKORAN (held by the Russians) was being besieged by AZERBAIJAN troops assisted by local Moslem irregulars, whilst a strong force (about 2 Bdes, 3-4 B.Hqs, and some Cav.) was being organised, by the Azerbaijan Govt. on the frontier at SALYANI for the subjection of the MUGAN.

The General Officer Comdg in Trans-Caucasia decided that this local war, which could only lead to the complete subjection of the MUGAN and its Russian element, with the attendant heavy loss of life, must be stopped immediately and that the only solution was for the AZERBAIJAN Authorities to take over and administer the country. On this the AZERBAIJAN acceded to his request that their main force should not cross the frontier until the result of the Mission became known.

My instructions were to endeavour to stop the fighting that was then in progress and to obtain a peaceful solution at all costs. I was to inform the Russian Commander and population of this decision; that the British were supporting AZERBAIJAN in this, that Gen. Denikin would be informed; and that he could not, and would not be allowed to help them; and further that the Azerbaijan s were to be allowed to take over any war materiel in the country.

On my arrival I summoned both commanders to a conference and informed them of this; as a result a special meeting of the MUGAN parliament was held in the interior, and a commission elected and sent to LENKORAN to discuss these demands, and with full power to settle all questions with the AZERBAIJAN representatives.

Ref. the statement re PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE:-

On the arrival of this Commission 3 days later a conference was held and they asked me on what authority I made these demands. I stated that they were the orders of the British G. O. C. in T.C.; they then asked what authority he had to settle these questions; I replied that the representatives of the Power in military occupation of the country had full power to settle all local questions as it was for that very purpose (i.e. maintaining law and order) that they were in Military Occupation of the Country. They then asked if the PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE approved of these orders and I informed them that all orders for the Military Occupation of zones and areas originally emanated from the Allied Representatives in PARIS and as such these authorities acquiesced in and approved of the orders issued by their representative.

They were also informed that General DENIKIN would be told of this decision - this was done as when I visited TAGANROG early in Oct. I found that General DENIKIN was fully acquainted with the situation.

I was then cross-questioned as to the meaning of "the British were supporting AZERBAIJAN" and what would happen if they refused to accede to these demands. I replied that the AZERBAIJAN Army would be allowed to advance and occupy the country and if necessary we would support them, probably by the sending of the British ships in the CASPIAN to co-operate.

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN DEPEŞASINA ƏLAVƏ
25 FEVRAL 1920

- 2 -

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After the military terms between the two commanders had been settled the "front" abolished and all troops and guns withdrawn a Peace conference lasting 3 days was held. I acted as President and mediator and all conditions relating to the handing over of the country, its subsequent administration and the proportion of administrators to be supplied by both sides, were agreed upon and a document embodying them all in writing drawn up. This was signed by all the delegates on both sides.

The chief stumbling block was over the disposal of the Russian military equipment and stores; these they flatly refused to hand over to the AZERBAIJANS and eventually they agreed that it should all be handed over to the British Mission at the PERSIAN Consulate, pending the final decision of its fate which was to be decided by the British authorities on my return to BAKU.

As soon as the conference was concluded and all documents signed by both parties I returned to BAKU leaving Capt. CONNOR ROWAN in charge of the Mission. On arrival there I was informed that the British evacuation of BAKU had been expedited, that the Mission were to return at once and that nothing further could be done. On my pointing out the urgency of giving a decision re the military equipment it was decided that the Mission were to put back all that had been handed over to them, and instructions were sent, the same day, to that effect, to Capt. ROWAN.

He informed the Russians of this on the receipt of these orders and the Russian Commander with his own men embarked all the guns, M.G.s etc. that had been handed over and the Mission left the following day; these were all subsequently sent to PETROVSK and handed over to the Volunteers.

It was decided at the "PEACE CONFERENCE" that all questions not enumerated in the documents were to be settled by the AZERBAIJAN Govt when the administration had been installed. The question of the Fisheries was one of them and I was informed when at LENKORAN that they were all privately owned, mostly by Moslems, had all been confiscated by the Bolsheviks, and taken over by the Russians when they ousted the Moslem irregulars who had turned out the Bolsheviks, and that these therefore did not belong to the Russian Authorities but should be restored to their original owners.

As to how the AZERBAIJAN Govt settled these questions, I am unable to say but I would like to point out that about a month after I left LENKORAN the late Russian Commander (Col. ILLIASHAEVITCH) visited the British Military Liaison Officer at BAKU and informed him that all was quiet in LENKORAN and the MUGAN and that he considered that everything had been satisfactorily settled.

Copies of all documents were given to both the Russian and the Azerbaijan Representatives and the originals handed over to the Intelligence section of the Staff at BAKU.

(sgd) J. H. Torin, Major.
General Staff.

Jan. 18th. 1920.

AZƏRBAYCAN NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN LORD KERZONA MƏKTUBU
18 FEVRAL 1920

REPUBLIQUE D'AZERBAIDJAN

DELEGATION DE PAIX

N° 15.

le 18th February, 1920

E 326

1920

1920

1920

133

To His Lordship The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
LONDON.

S i r ,

We have the honour most respectfully to lay the following facts for your magnanimous consideration.

(1) In view of the advance of the Bolchevist forces towards Petrosk, the present naval base of General Denikin, the only possible inference that can be drawn is that either the battleships will go over to the bolchevist forces, or that they will become piratical. In the former case, they will strengthen the hands of those whom it is the determination of the Allies to weaken; in the latter case, they will become a danger to the whole region of the Caspian Sea and consequently endanger English interests in the South as well as our own. These battleships formerly belonged to Azerbaïdjan and, therefore, Azerbaïdjan has, in justice, the right to them. In the event of this consideration not meeting with approval at your Lordship's hands, we respectfully beg you to see that they are opportunely transferred into some hands, so that they may not prove dangerous to our country and to British interests as well.

(2) The North Caucasus declared its independence and established a government of its own, which after lasting for a year was destroyed, their homes burned, and inhabitants massacred by General Denikin. As a result of this, a struggle is going on between General Denikin and the

AZƏRBAYCAN NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN LORD KERZONA MƏKTUBU
18 FEVRAL 1920

- 2 -

inhabitants. And in view of the approach of the Reds to this territory, it is probable that the country will be overrun by the Reds. And if it falls into their hands, it will become a fertile soil of propaganda, which will affect Azerbaidjan and the neighbouring countries and which will thus endanger the independance of our country.

With the conquest of North Caucasus, the Reds will become very formidable and will menace the whole of the Southern East. But if the independance of North Caucasus is recognised and if it is assisted by the Allies with arms and ammunitions, the moral of the people will be inspired and they will consequently form a strong barrier and check the onrush of the oncoming forces and thereby avert the menace to Azerbaidjan and other Republics.

But, as it is, North Caucasus will not be able to stand against the powerful forces, which are already on its frontiers. This is a matter that ought to engage seriously the attention of the Allies. The logic of the circumstances, we are sure, will prompt the Allies to avert the danger by immediately helping them; first by recognising their independance secondly, by supplying them with requisite war material.

(3) The Republic of Azerbaidjan has no intention whatever of fighting against any nation and is anxious to live in peace and restore the prosperity of the country and its inhabitants. But owing to the disintegrating forces that are threatening the fabric of Society of the World the Republic feels obliged to take precautionary measures in order to preserve its Government and to secure the lives of its inhabitants. To do so under its present circumstances.

AZƏRBAYCAN NÜMAYƏNDƏLİYİNİN LORD KERZONA MƏKTUBU
18 FEVRAL 1920

- 3 -

is beyond her power without military support from the Allies. We therefore most respectfully but most urgently beg to Allies, in consideration of the impending danger, to supply the Republic with war materials in order to ensure the safety of the country.

In doing so, the Allies will not only protect the Republic from destruction but also safeguard allied interests, especially English interests and the Republic will be always grateful to the Allies for this help.

We have the honour to be,

S i r ,

Your most obedient Servants,

Mr. Taganb Mehtieff

Representative Member of the Peace
Delegation of the Republic of Caucasian
Azerbaidjan in London.

FORİN OFİSİN HİNDİSTAN DEPARTAMENTİNİN MƏKTUBU
17 MART 1920

It is requested that in any further communication on this subject the under-mentioned letter and number may be quoted, and the reply addressed to—

*The Under Secretary of State for India,
Political Department,
India Office,
London, S.W. 1.*

P. 1888.

E-1703
INDIA OFFICE, 1920
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

17th March 1920.

IMMEDIATE.

104

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to inform you that his attention has been called to the telegram No.135 of the 7th instant from the British representative at Tiflis reporting a suggestion made by the Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Caspian flotilla should be taken over and manned by the Azerbaijan Government, subject to the provision of British personnel.

I am to invite reference in this connection to my letter of the 7th January last, No.P.181, as indicating the importance attached by Mr.Secretary Montagu, from the point of view of the defence of India, to the maintenance of control over the Caspian. He would be glad to know whether, in the opinion of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the suggestion transmitted by Mr.Wardrop offers any prospect of a settlement of this question on satisfactory lines.

A copy of this letter is being communicated to the Admiralty and War Office.

I have the honour to be, Sir,


Your obedient Servant,

*The Under Secretary of State,
FOREIGN OFFICE.*

H. Shackleton

AZƏRBAYCAN VƏ GÜRCÜSTAN NÜMAYƏNDƏLİKLƏRİNİN MƏKTUBU
12 FEVRAL 1920

DÉLEGATION
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE GEORGIENNE
87, RUE LA PÉROUSE, 87
PARIS (16^e)



E 77
1920

89, New Oxford Street,

LONDON, W. C. 1.

12th. February, 1920.

My Lord,

Referring to the conversation which the Georgian and Azerbaijan Delegates had with Representatives of His Majesty's Government in Paris, the two Delegations are now in possession of all necessary information regarding the war materials required for the Georgian and Azerbaijan Armies.

A Representative of the Georgian War Office, Colonel Guedevanishvili, has just arrived in London with necessary instructions in the matter, and we would be much indebted to Your Lordship for the opportunity of discussing the question of military supplies for our armies with the Representatives of His Majesty's War Office.

We hardly need to point out to Your Lordship how much the Georgian and Azerbaijan Armies are in need of supplies, and how pressing this question is in face of the political and military situation on the Northern frontiers of Transcaucasia.

Awaiting the favour of your reply,

We are, My Lord,
Your most obedient servants,

C. Jvanyaladze
(Member of the Georgian Delegation
at the Peace Conference.)

The Right Hon. the
Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G.,
G.O.S.I., G.C.I.E.,
Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs,
FOREIGN OFFICE,
S. W. 1.

(Member of the Azerbaijan Delegation
at the Peace Conference.)

M. M. Mektieff

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
10 FEVRAL 1920

105

SECRET.

E 5
1920

Farəfərsə.

CLEAR THE LINE.

From:- G.H.Q. Constantinople.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 21.00 10.2.20.
Received:- 09.30 11.2.20.

-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-

1,8109 February 10th.

Reference cable 80^x dated January 20th from Derby Paris.
Following (?) general estimates by Intelligence Officer Baka
of equipment in possession of Azerbaijan. Sufficient for 20
battalions approximately 23,000 men 3 cavalry regiments 4 light
mountain artillery batteries 1 mountain gun battery 6 light
field batteries 1 field howitzer battery. 4 gun batteries.
Total approximately 4,500 men. Equipment required for
following 11 infantry battalions 2 Cavalry regiments 3 heavy
field batteries 2 field howitzer batteries 3 light field
batteries 5 light mountain artillery batteries 2 A.A. batteries
1 mountain gun battery 1 sapper battalion. Azerbaijan further
wish 18 aeroplanes and 12 small naval craft with Coast Defence
guns searchlights etc. and equipment for maintenance.
No report yet received from the Senior Officer detailed to
communicate with Government.

NOTE BY C.2.

Foreign Office have no trace of this telegram.

C.2. Copies to:-

S. of S.
U.S. of S.
Sec.
C. I. G. S. D. C. I. G. S.
A. G. G. H. G. M. G. C.
D. M. O. D. D. M. O.
M. O. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 5a.
D. M. I. D. D. M. I.
M. I. R. R. B. 2. 2B. 6B.
D. S. D. D. D. S. D.
S. D. 2.
D. C. M. G. D. E. O. S.
F. O. (Mr. Phipps).
I. D. C. E.
Paris.
Ad. (Capt. Goods).
Ad. (D. N. I.).
Lord Curzon.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
28 FEVRAL 1920

RUSSIA.

E 1097
156
1920

POLITICAL.

Decypher; Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) February 28th, 1920.

D. 6.55 p. m. February 29th.

R. 11.20 a. m. March 6th, 1920.

No. 123. (R.)

-----00-----

Following substance of telegram from Baku, February
28th. Begins:

Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs has telegraphed
Armenian Government as follows: Azerbaijan Minister for
Foreign Affairs continues acting in strict conformity with
agreement of November 23rd and has not (group undecypherable)
advance against Zangezur or elsewhere. But since November
23rd Armenian troops in that district have destroyed about
twenty Mussulman villages and from January 19th Armenian
troops with irregulars were marching to Shusha destroying
villages. Azerbaijan Government are sending small force to
prevent further destruction of life and property and restore
state of things existing before November 23rd. Ends.

I am using every endeavour to keep the peace.

Sent to Foreign Office 123, Constantinople 77,
Teheran 41.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
4 MART 1920

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should
be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

E 1029
134
1920

RUSSIA.

MILITARY.

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis) March 4th. 1920.

D. 8.20 p.m. March 4th, 1920.

R. 9.20 a.m. March 5th, 1920.

No. 128.

Clear the Line.

.....

Urgent.

Action of Armenian troops against civil Mussulman population at Kars district and elsewhere is rousing very strong feeling in Azerbaijan.

I consider presence of Allied officers in regions effected matter of urgency.

I believe Azerbaijan Government wish loyally to carry out agreement of November 23rd. They ask for immediate appointment of Allied Commission to enquire and act locally.

Colonel Haskell might be asked by Supreme Council for his opinion as he has better opportunities than myself for knowing state of things and I think collective Allied pressure on Armenia desirable.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 128, repeated to Constantinople No. 79.

(5.3 8/4).

FORİN OFİSİN HİNDİSTAN DEPARTAMENTİNİN MƏKTUBU
24 MART 1920

M. 61070.

24th March 20

Sir,

With reference to your communication of the 17th March, P.1888, forwarding a copy of letter of even date sent to the Foreign Office, on the subject of telegram 135 from the British Representative at Tiflis containing a suggestion that the Caspian Flotilla should be taken over and manned by the Azerbaijan Government, subject to the provision of British personnel, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that Their view is that events must be allowed to take their course, the Cabinet having decided that circumstances do not permit of our taking over ^{the} Caspian Command or holding the Batoum - Baku line of communication.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the Foreign Office.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
INDIA OFFICE.

(Sd.) ALEX FLINT
for Secretary

FORİN OFİSİN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
24 APREL 1920

This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should
be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.

44
145

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
Foreign Office, April 24th, 1920, 5 p.m.
No. 181.

-----oOo-----

Urgent.

War Office learn from Constantinople that Azerbaijan
Government has purchased from Volunteer Fleet on Caspian
war material consisting of guns, munitions and aeroplanes
for fifty million roubles. Please institute enquiries
and report by telegraph.

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
28 MART 1920

54

RUSSIA

POLITICAL

Decypher. Mr. Wardrop. (Tiflis). March 28th, 1920.
D. 2.30.p.m. March 28th, 1920.
R. 2.30.p.m. April 5th, 1920.

No. 169.

URGENT.

Hostilities on a large scale between Azerbaijan
and Armenians seem almost inevitable. French Com-
missioner who arrived to-day is taking collective
action with me to avert catastrophe which would
open Trans-Caucasus to Bolsheviks.

Sent to Foreign Office No. 169, Constantinople
No. 107, Teheran No. 57.

(5.4. 8-4).

KAPİTAN LYUKANIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
8 MAY 1920

82

CAUCASUS

E 4691

POLITICAL

Decypher. Mr. Luke. (Tiflis). May 8th, 1920. MAY 14 1920

D. 11.28. May 12th. 1920.

R. 1.50.p.m. May 13th, 1920.

No. 235.

Following is repetition of
y telegram No. 135 of March 30th.

Begins:

Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan both report
to me serious armed conflicts in Karabagh.

This outbreak for which both Governments have some
responsibility threatens to facilitate invasion of
Trans-Caucasia from both North and South. My French
Colleague and I are doing our best to prevent trouble.

Ends.

(13.5. 8-4).

CƏNAB O. VORDROPUN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
13 APREL 1920

76

24

E 3466

1920

RUSSIA.

POLITICAL.

Telegram (en clair) from Mr. Wardrop (Batoum)

D. April 13th.

R. " 19th. 1920.

No. 197.

-----oOo-----

Transcaucasian Conference 11th April. representatives
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia.

Resolved:

1st. Terminate immediately all armed conflicts
Kuzakh, Nakhitchevan, Ordubad, Karabakh;

2nd. Azerbaijan Armenian Governments will immediately
take strictest measures prevent possibility future conflicts
between Armenians and Mussulmans in this territory.

3rd. Urgently communicate above decision to two
Governments concerned for necessary action following
decisions.

April 12th Conference elects Commission of six members
to execute and control locally above decisions and renewal
of status quo and enquire cause first conflicts.

Sent to Foreign Office 197.

Repeated to Constantinople 123.

FORİN OFİSİN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
3 YANVAR 1920

185

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be returned to the Foreign Office if not required for official use.]

(166675/ME/58.)

FILES ONLY

Cypher telegram to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)
Foreign Office, January 3rd, 1920, 8 p.m.
No. 6.

-----oOo-----

Your telegram 199 (of December 15th).

Treasury have sanctioned payment of advance to Azerbaijan Government equal to 50% of bills due for military freight on railway, after allowing for credit in respect of sales of Army animals and stores, on the understanding that surplus roubles held by Command Paymaster Constantinople will be used for the purpose.

See also Foreign Office despatch No.55 now on the way to you.

BAŞ XƏZİNƏDARLIĞIN FORİN OFİSƏ MƏKTUBU
28 AVQUST 1920

134

Any reply to this letter should be addressed to—
THE SECRETARY,
TREASURY,
WHITEHALL, LONDON, S.W. 1,
and the following number quoted.

TREASURY CHAMBERS.

F. 1190

28th August 1920.

E 10599

AUG 30 1920

My Lord,

I have laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir J. Tilley's letter (L. 5061/212/58) of 21st instant relative to the disposal of sums of money due to the former Azerbaijan Government.

In reply I am to request you to inform Earl Curzon of Kedleston that, in view of his representations, they are prepared to agree that the sums in question should be credited to the account of that Government and held against any claims which His Majesty's Government may have against the present Azerbaijan Government, the disposal of any balance being left over for consideration, when the responsibility for the debts of the late Russian Government is discussed with the Government ^{or} of Governments which His Majesty's Government proposes to recognise as its successor.

I am, My Lord,
Your obedient servant,

The Under Secretary of State
Foreign Office.

FORİN OFİSİN ORDU ŞURASINA MƏKTUBU
24 YANVAR 1920

392 393

171857/L. 2/58.

Foreign Office,

S.W. 1.

January 24 1920.

Sir:-

In reply to War Office letter O162/391 undated regarding the provision by Messrs Vickers Limited of military equipment for the Azerbaijan Government, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to invite reference to the recent decision of the Supreme Council in Paris to send arms, ammunition etc to the Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments in order to enable them to resist Bolshevik aggression.

Lord Curzon therefore concurs with the opinion of the Army Council that there is no objection to Messrs Vickers complying with the request made to them by the Azerbaijan Government and that the transaction should be, if possible, on a cash basis.

I am,
Sir,
Your most obedient,
humble Servant.

Secretary

to the Army Council.

HƏRBİ DEPARTAMENTİN FORİN OFİSƏ MƏKTUBU
18 MART 1920

All further communications on this subject should be addressed to—
The Secretary,
War Office,
London, S.W. 1.
and the following number quoted.

0149/9087 (M.I.2)

WAR OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W. 1.

18^{1/2} March, 1920.

E 1851

1920

117

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No.0149/9087 (M.I.2) of the 11th instant, with reference to the alleged seizure of certain stores at Mughan by the Azerbaijan Army, I am directed by the Army Council to forward herewith a letter from the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, dated Constantinople 25th February, 1920, together with a full explanation of the facts by Major J.H. Torin.

I am to say that the Army Council consider the action taken by the General Officer Commanding and his representative at Mughan at the time to have been well-considered and satisfactory, and in view of the fact that the matter was settled with the concurrence of General Denikin's representative, can see no grounds for complaint by the Russian Foreign Office.

It will be noticed that a copy of Major Torin's report has been forwarded from Constantinople direct to the British Military Mission with the Volunteer Army.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

FORİN OFİSİN CƏNAB O. VORDROPA ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
21 YANVAR 1920

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502

POLITICAL.

Cypher telegram to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).

Foreign Office, January 21st 1920. 8.p.m.

No. 41.

.....

VERY URGENT.

Supreme Council at Paris has accepted principle of sending help to Trans-Caucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the shape of arms, munitions of war and, if possible food. British and French General Staffs were instructed to consult as to means, and have telegraphed to General Milne to send an officer from Batoum to visit threatened States and report without delay as to their needs.

You should lend every possible aid to these inquiries and instruct all officers under you in the Caucasus to do likewise.

Please repeat to Constantinople, Teheran and Dommiss.

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
9 MAY 1920

92
23

PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

FROM: G.H.Q. Constantinople.

TO: War Office.

E 4578

MAY 12 1920

Desp, 1745 2.5.20.
Recd, 2100 10.5.20.

I.2576 cipher May 9th.

Ultimatum has been delivered by the new Azerbaijan Government to Armenia demanding withdrawal from Karabakh and Zangezur within 3 days. Azerbaijan says Soviet Russia will support Azerbaijan in case of refusal.

C.2.Copies to: S.of S.
U.S.of S.
Sec.
A.G. Q.M.G. M.G.O.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
D.M.O. D.D.M.Q.
M.O.1,1b,1c,2,2a,2b,3,4.
D.M.I. D.D.M.I.
M.I.2,2b,R,2a,6.
D.S.D.

Ad.(D.N.I.).
F.O.(Mr.Gregory).
F.O.(Mr.Oliphant).
F.O.(Mr.Osborne).
I.D.C.E.
Paris:
Lord Curzon.
I.O.(Col.Pepys).
I.O.(Mr.Garbutt).

KONSTANTİNOPOLDAKI BAŞ QƏRARGAHIN ŞİFRLİ TELEQRAMI
1 FEVRAL 1920

S E C R E T.

611

PARAFHRASE.

Despatched 1500 1/2/20.
Received 2130 8/2/20.

From:- G.H.Q. Constantinople.

To: War Office.

I. 2056. February 1st.

Estimated strengths dated January 27th of armies

Transcaucasian Republics, Georgians 28,000, Armenians 19,000.

Azerbaijan 23,000.

C.2. Copies to:-S of S.

U.S. of S
Sec.
C.I.G.S. D.C.I.G.S.
A.G. C.A.G. M.G.O.
D.F.O. D.D.F.O.
L.O. 1.2 3.5 & A.
D.F.I. D.D.M.I.
F.I.R & A & B. 2 & B.
E.I.6B
D.S.D. D.Q.M.G.
Ad (D.N.I.)
Ad (Capt Coode)
E.O. (Mr Phipps)
F.O. (Mr Gregory)
Lord Curzon.
Paris.

AZƏRBAYCAN XALQ CƏMHIYYƏTİ
Böyük Britaniya arxivlərinin sənədləri

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN ƏLƏ KEÇİRDİYİ TELEQRAMLAR
21-24 YANVAR 1920

605

The references of Minister Kankhoiski to the former attitude towards Denikin intended to fight against this Tsarist General. On the other hand, the statement contained in the radiogram of Minister Khankhoiski with regard to the principle of non-intervention is the struggle now taking place in Russia may be understood as a refusal to fight against Denikin, unless his troops of their own accord attack Baku. Is it possible that Minister Khankhoiski has not realised that the struggle now in progress between the Soviet Government and Denikin has a great bearing on the fate of Azerbaijan. Is he in ignorance of the policy of Denikin and of all elements co-operating with him, which aims at the re-establishment of a Great United Russia within its former boundaries, and includes the complete abolition of the independence of Azerbaijan, depriving the people of self-determination and granting no freedom to the expression of the individuality of this region and its population? Is it as yet an undivulged secret for the Minister that the victory of the Volunteer Army would merely mean the re-establishment of the Tsarist regime, not only in Russia, but also in Azerbaijan? It is impossible that Minister Khankhoiski could not have heard of the recognition of the right of labouring masses of all nations to self-determination adopted by the Soviet Government. Undoubtedly he must know of numerous proofs of the practical application of this principle by the Soviet Authorities.

The Soviet Government in the first days of its existence recognised the independence of Finland and has repeatedly announced its recognition of Poland's independence. It was the first to propose peaceful negotiations with Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and has already concluded an agreement with the former on the understanding that it will grant Esthonia complete recognition of her independence. The Soviet Government has renounced all former treaties in which it was granted rights infringing on the complete independence of the peoples of Persia, China and Mongolia. It has recognised extensive autonomous rights of the Bashkir, Kirghiz and other peoples, which were formerly included in the Russian Empire.

Once more laying stress on the fact that it will adopt with regard to Azerbaijan these general principles on which it bases its attitude towards other nationalities, the Russian Government is at the present moment compelled to realise that the proposal made to the Azerbaijan Government with regard to joint action against the Tsarist General Denikin, who is bringing with him ruin for the independence of Azerbaijan, has not been responded to by the Government of Khankhoiski. It still, however, holds its offer open and hopes that this step will not prove a failure.

(Sd) TCHITCHERIN,
People's Commissary for Foreign
Affairs.

(NOTE:- The message of Jan.14 was not received here, but see out W.N. 366 (4).)

3. THE SITUATION IN AZERBAIJAN.

The Following is a translation of the message as intercepted:-
SAMARA, via MOSCOW, Jan 21.

According to statements of comrades arriving from the Caucasus, the fate of the Azerbaijan Government is in the balance. The Baku workmen are quite prepared for the establishment of
Soviet/

HƏRBİ KƏŞFİYYATIN ƏLƏ KEÇİRDİYİ TELEQRAMLAR
21-24 YANVAR 1920

606

Soviet Authority. The Bolsheviki are working energetically in Georgia. There is a revolutionary unrest through the Caucasus. The attention of all peoples is riveted to the successful advance of our Southern armies.

4. ENGLAND AND THE CAUCASUS.

The following is a translation of the message as intercepted:
MOSCOW. Jan. 24.

The following is dated Lyons, Jan 21.

The English are feverishly concluding the preparations for 10,000 soldiers to be sent to the Caucasus. The English and the Bolsheviki are having a race as to who will reach the railway Batum - Tiflis - Baku - first. Lloyd George forced the French to make concessions and insisted that the English troops in Germany should be replaced by French troops, so that the former could be sent to the Caucasus. Lloyd George gained this point by threatening that if the French refused he would make peace proposals to the Soviets. No one is so interested in preventing access to the Caucasus as the English. If the Bolsheviki break through and unite with Persia, the English Government fears that its rule in Persia will be at an end, as there is, even at the present time, a very hostile feeling towards the English in Persia, and Trans-Caucasus. If the Bolsheviki penetrate to Turkey, Mesopotamia would be gravely threatened and the railway Constant nople - Baghdad might be cut. In this matter Lloyd George and Churchill are of the same opinion. Ammunition, food supplies, clothing, rifles, harness, machine-guns, aeroplanes and tanks are hurriedly being sent to Baku, and the British troops stationed there are training the local Georgian troops to fight against the Bolsheviki. The prize for which the English are striving is the important oil centre, Baku.

ALYANS KONFRANSININ PROTOKOLUNDAN ÇIXARIŞ
10 APREL 1920

No. 79

I.C.P. 93.] *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the British Foreign Office, Whitehall, London, S.W. 1, on Saturday, April 10, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire:* Mr. Vansittart; SECRETARIES, Lieutenant-Colonel Storr, Captain Abraham.

France: M. Cambon (*in the chair*), M. Kammerer.

Italy: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali, Signor Galli, Don Ascanio Colonna.

Japan: Viscount Chinda.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

1. The conference had before them a letter from the Armenian delegation to the President of the Peace Conference, dated the 27th March, 1920 (A.J. 142) (see Appendix 1), on the subject of the restoration of Armenian property by the Turks.

Restoration of Armenian Property by the Turks
THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he thought that what was requested had already been provided for in the treaty.

M. KAMMERER said that this was the case. The same would apply to the Armenians as to the Greeks. He suggested that a letter should be sent in reply to this effect.

It was agreed—

That the secretary should acknowledge the letter of the Armenian delegation, and say that the question had been considered by the conference and that provision had already been made to meet the case.

2. The conference had under consideration a letter from the Azerbaijan delegation to the President of the Supreme Council, dated the 31st March, 1920 (A.J. 143),¹ on the subject of the claims of the Azerbaijan Republic to Batum and Kars.
- Claims of the Azerbaijan Republic to Batum and Kars*
Pending the decision of the League of Nations,² this question was adjourned.

¹ Not appended to filed copy.

² Cf. No. 72, minute 5-

AZƏRBAYCAN
XALQ CÜMHURİYYƏTİ

Böyük Britaniyanın arxiv sənədləri